Machine Tools (I) Pvt. Ltd. vs Smt. Lata Mehta
1999 Latest Caselaw 1107 Del

ORDER

Vijender Jain, J.

1. Aggrieved by finding by the Additional Rent Controller in a petition filed by the respondent under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act that the premises were required by the respondent bonafidely, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. Premises were let out on Ist January, 1974. Premises are situated at D-262, defense Colony, New Delhi. The Additional Rent Controller held that the requirement of the respondent was bona fide. There was no dispute with regard to the ownership of the premises. However, Additional Rent Controller did not agree with the eviction petitioner qua the purposes of letting. The same was decided against the landlady who has filed Civil Revision No. 470/96 which is also pending in this Court. Therefore, I will not advert to that petition as I am deciding that petition separately.

3. Mr. Andley, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the requirement of the respondent was not bona fide. He has further contended that on the basis of material and evidence on record, the Additional Rent Controller could not have held the requirement to be bona fide. What learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in view of the testimony of AW-3 that he was not having any office in Delhi, that he was not maintaining any bank account in Delhi and he was only working as a Consultant, the Finding of the Rent Controller is not sustainable. Mr. Andley has further contended that there was no ration card which was brought on record which could show that the desire of the land lady to shift along with her husband was genuine or bona fide. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Chander Sain Berry Vs. Dr. Avinas 1997 DLR 340 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sarla Ahuja .

4. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. In a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction has to take into consideration that it was the Court of the Addl. Rent Controller which was seized with the evidence, material, and documents on the basis of which that has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding. The law is well settled that even if an Appellate Court, on the basis of same evidence, comes to a different finding than that of the Trial Court, the Appellate Court will not lightly interfere with the finding arrived at by the Trial Court. If that is so, then while exercising Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India how this Court can reverse finding until and unless this Court held that the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person could arrive at such a finding. As a matter of fact, the Additional Rent Controller in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment has dealt in detail and has held in last paragraph of the impugned judgment in the following terms :

"I find that the desire of the petitioner to settle in the City is not whimsical or fanciful. This desire seems to have been coming out of the inner core of their heart and has a most reasonable and logical and legal foundation. Accordingly, I conclude that the petitioner is in bona fide need to settle in this city."

5. In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta 1999 (6) Supreme 330 has held :-

"The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretenee or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the other landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.

6. The authority cited by learned counsel for the petitioner Chander Sain Berry Vs. Dr. Avinas (supra) is also of no help to his case. That case pertains to refusal for granting leave to defend. The other authority cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sarla Ahuja (supra) an appeal against the said decision the finding of the Trial Court was reversed by the Supreme Court. In Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. Traders & Agencies it was held that :-

In view of the rival submissions, what we have to consider is whether the appellate bench and the High Court applied the correct test while determining the question whether the appellant requires the suit premises bona fide and reasonably for her occupation. The fact that the appellant is the owner of the suit premises and that she does not own any other premises in the city of Bombay is not in dispute. She does not possess, even as a tenant, any premises in Bombay. No doubt, she would be entitled to stay in the premises of which her husband is a tenant but if for any reason her husband had parted with possession of such premises and the same were occupied by her husband's brother, it cannot be said that the said premises were available to her and by not referring to those facts she had come to the Court with unclean hands and that by itself was sufficient to disentitle her from getting a decree of eviction. If the appellant believed that the 'Olympus' flat of which her husband was a tenant was not available for occupation as the same was vacated by her husband many years back and was occupied by Sridhar and his family and that it was not possible or convenient for her and her family to go and stay there, it was not absolutely necessary for her to refer to those facts in her plaint. It would have been if she had referred to those facts but mere omission to state them in the plaint cannot be regarded as sufficient for disentitling her from claiming a decree for eviction. If otherwise she is able to prove that she requires reasonably the suit premises for her occupation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellate bench and the High Court clearly went wrong in holding that the said omission was sufficient to disentitle her from getting a decree of eviction and it also disclosed that her claim was mala fide and not bona fide as required by law.

7. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in this petition.

8. Dismissed.