A.P. Maheshwari vs Arya Vir Bakshi & Ors.
1999 Latest Caselaw 554 Del

ORDER

Cyriac Joseph, J.

1. The petitioner in this revision petition is the defendant in Suit No. 44 of 1998 pending in the Court of Shri Satnam Singh, Additional District Judge, Delhi. The respondents herein are the plaintiffs in the suit.

2. The plaintiffs were the landlords of property bearing Municipal No. C-2, Pamposh Enclave, New Delhi and the defendant was the tenant in respect of the said property. When the tenant refused to vacate the premises even after the expiry of the period of tenancy and also failed to pay the arrears of rent the plaintiffs filed the suit praying for a decree for possession of the suit property and also a decree for Rs.1 lakh with future interest at 18% per annum. The said sum of Rs.1 lakh was claimed towards arrears of rent for the period from 1.1.1989 till 31.10.1990. For the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction the suit was valued as hereunder:

(a) For possession, Rs. 60,000/- being the annual rent of the premises.

(b) For recovery of arrears of rent, Rs. 1 lakh.

A sum of Rs. 2,930/- was paid as Court fee for possession and a sum of Rs. 3,320/- was paid as Court Fee for recovery of the sum of Rs. 1 lakh.

3. By an interim order dated 19.10.94 the trial court directed the defendant to pay all arrears of rent within one month and to continue paying the rent month by month by 15th of each month. In compliance with the said order dated 19.10.1994 the defendant paid the arrears of rent and continued to pay the monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/-. On 2.4.1998 the defendant filed an application under Section 151 of CPC stating that on the basis of interim order dated 19.10.1994 the plaintiffs had already recovered more than Rs.

4,50,000/- without payment of the requisite Court fee. The defendant prayed that immediate remedial action be ordered by the trial court for the recovery of the balance Court fee. It was also prayed that further proceedings in the case be stayed till the balance court fee was recovered from the plaintiffs. On 17.4.1998 the defendant filed another application under Section 11, 17 and 10 of the Court fees Act read with Sections 9 and 151 CPC. In the said application the defendant stated that the compliance of the trial Court's order dated 19.10.1994 resulted in the recovery of an amount exceeding Rs. 6 lakhs, creating an anomalous situation in which the jurisdiction of the Court was ousted since the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court of the Additional District Judge was only upto Rs. 5 lakhs. It was also stated that as per section 11 of the Court fees Act, no decree could be drawn without the payment of the difference of the Court fee actually paid and the Court fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the amount to be decreed. The defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be directed to pay the balance Court fee. It was also prayed that after realisation of the Court fee the plaint should be returned to the plaintiffs for filing it in the proper Court since the Court of the ADJ would be left with no jurisdiction in the case. Both the application were contested by the plaintiffs by filing reply to each of the applications. The plaintiff disputed the contention that the trial court lost its jurissdiction as a result of the payments made by the defendant in compliance with the interim order dated 19.10.1994. Regarding payment of Court fee the plaintiffs stated that they were and had always been ready and willing to deposit such court fee which would become payable once a decree was passed. The plaintiffs also contended that the interim order dated 19.10.1994 was passed by the trial court keeping in view the settled law that no person (an ex-tenant or a trespasser) should be permitted to contest a case without paying at least the admitted amount during the pendency of litigation. According to the plaintiffs the amounts paid by the defendant in compliance with the order dated 19.10.1994 would ultimately be adjusted against the total mesne profits decreed by the Court. The above mentioned two applications were dismissed by the trial court through a common order dated 20.5.1998. The said order dated 20.5.1998 of the trial court is under challenge in this revision petition.

4. In the impugned order dated 20.5.1998 the learned Additional District Judge has rightly pointed out that the suit is for possession of the property and recovery of Rs.1 lakh as rent and that proper court fee has been filed by the plaintiffs on the basis of the reliefs claimed in the suit. The learned Additional District Judge has also referred to the stand of the plaintiffs that the amounts paid by the defendant in compliance with the order dated 19.10.1994 would be adjusted against mesne profits decreed by the Court. Relying on the judgment of the High Court reported in 1996 RLR 404, the learned Additional District Judge held that since the defendant was in occupation of the suit premises it was just, fair and equitable that during the pendency of the suit the defendant at least paid the amitted rent of Rs. 5,000/- to the plaintiffs. It was also held that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was to be seen from the value of the reliefs claimed in the suit at the time of filing of the plaint and that the payments made by the defendant pursuant to the interim order dated 19.10.1994 could not oust the jurisdiction of the Court.

5. Having considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the materials placed on record I do not find any ground to interferes with the impugned order in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. In the judgment in State Bank of Patiala Vs. Chander Mohan, reported in 1996 RLR 404, a Division Bench of this Court upheld the direction to deposit rent at the agreed rate and stated as follows:

"24. We are of the view that in a suit for possession, for pastrent/profits and future profits, it is open to the Court to pass an order for payment of such an amount, under inherent powers of this Court u/s 151 CPC, and to prevent abuse of process of Court. It has become quite common for tenants, whose tenancies have been terminated validly, to continue occupation as trespassers, drive the landlords to file suits for eviction and profits with a view to see how far the patience of the landlords may last or how far the landlords or their L.R.S. could fight the tenants particularly if the tenant had stopped payment of admitted rents. It is rather unfortunate that even public sector bodies like the appellant are taking such postures and driving landlords from pillar to post. That is why, it has become necessary for the Court to exercise its inherent powers u/s 151 to do justice and, pending suit or pending inquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 CPC, to pass interim orders rather than wait till disposal of suit for eviction or for completion of inquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 CPC. The Order passed in this case was the right order to be passed. After all, the direction was to deposit arrears of rent and also damages at the same rate as the rate of rent. Point 3 is held against the appellant."

In the light of the view expressed by the Division Bench in the above case the learned Additional District Judge was perfectly right and fully justified in passing the interim order dated 19.10.1994 directing the defendant to pay all arrears of rent and to continue to pay the monthly rent at the admitted rate. An order passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 of the C.P.C. with a view to do justice and to protect the landlord from the exploitation and harassment by the tenant cannot take away the pecuniary jurisdiction which the Court otherwise had. The contention raised by the petitioner in this revision petition is that the trial will lose its pecuniary jurisdiction on account of the recovery of the amounts paid by the defendants in compliance with the order dated 19.10.1994. There is no merit in this contention. In my view, even if the total amount recovered from defendant through the payments made by him in compliance with the order dated 19.10.1994 exceeded the maximum limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court, the trial court will not lose its jurisdiction. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court is dependent on the value of the reliefs claimed in the plaint. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted an anomalous situation will arise. After passing an interim order to do justice and after proceeding with the suit further, the court will cease to have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit when the total amount deposited by the defendant exceeds the maximum limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of that court. This is not in consonance with the law relating to jurisdiction. It is also against the spirit of the provision contained in Section 151 of the C.P.C.

6. As far as the payment of Court fee is concerned, the plaintiffs have already stated before the trial court that they are ready and willing to pay all court fees that may ultimately be found to be payable. The plaintiffs have also stated that the amounts paid by the defendant in compliance with the order dated 19.10.1994 will be adjustable against rent or the total mesne profits decreed by the Court. I do not find any justification for the demand of the defendant that the plaintiffs should now itself pay the entire court fee for the amount already recovered from the defendant pursuant to the interim order dated 19.10.1994. Such piece-meal payment of Court fees from time to time or at different stages is neither contemplated or necessary.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Madras High Court in (Bingi) Neelamma Vs. Agadi Mareppa, reported in AIR 1936 Madras 388. I have carefully considered the above judgment but I could not find anything in it to support for the petitoner's case.

8. Hence there is no merit in this revision petition and it is accordingly dismissed. All the applications also stand dismissed.