Kewal Krishan Wadhera vs Jai Gopal Kapoor
1999 Latest Caselaw 650 Del

JUDGMENT

Vijender Jain, J.

1. A petitioner under Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was filed by the respondent against the petitioner on account of non-payment of arrears of rent. However, an order was passed by the Addl. Rent Controller under Section 14(2) on 14.1.1988 giving benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act to the petitioner. It seems that thereafter the petitioner committed default in payment of rent w.e.f. 1.10.1988 till 31.12.1988. A notice of demand was sent by the respondent to the petitioner on 6.1.1989. In spite of notice of demand, the petitioner failed to pay the arrears of rent in terms of the demand notice. A decree of eviction under Section 14(1)(a) was passed by the Addl. Rent Controller on 1.2.1991.

2. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal who also upheld the decision of the Addl. Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner.

3. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal, the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner. Mr. Vikram Jaitley, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Shri J. Mahajan v. Smt. Lita Lila Kapoor 1979 (2) RCR 625 and Debi Ram v. Devi Chand and has contended that there was no default as two months' rent was sent by money order and third month's rent was not due. He has contended that in terms of Section 26(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act it was only on the 15th day the rent became payable and due.

4. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Had it been the case that there was no agreed tenancy month as to from which date the tenancy started then one has the aid of Section 26 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. But this is not the case here. In this case the notice of demand dated 6.1.1989 specifically mentioned that the petitioner was in arrears of rent w.e.f. 1.10.1988 till 31.12.1988. Even the order which was passed on 14.1.1988 by the Addl. Rent Controller giving benefit of Section 14(2) to the petitioner was on the basis of tenancy commencing from first day of each month. Therefore, there is no force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that statutory dictum of Section 26 will come into play. In view of the facts of this case where the tenancy month started from First day of each month, the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no help to the petitioner. The same are distinguishable on the facts of this case.

5. I do not find any infirmity with the order of the Addl. Rent Controller as well as Rent Control Tribunal.

6. No ground to interfere.

Dismissed.