Ram Chameli vs Smt.Sujan Kaur & Another
1999 Latest Caselaw 647 Del

ORDER

Vijender Jain, J.

1. Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order of the Addl. Rent Controller on three counts. At the outset he has submitted that the respondent no.1/landlady was not competent to maintain the eviction petition as the relinquishment deed by other sons and daughters of respondent No.1 was only given in the year 1995. This argument is far fetched and absolutely irrelevant. Respondent No.1 being the widow of Kishan Chand could maintain an eviction petition even if there was no relinquishment deed in her favour by her other sons and daughters. Respondent No.1 was the widow of Kishan Chand who had purchased the property in the year 1958-59.

2. Next contention of the counsel for the petitioner was that the property was let out for composite purpose and the finding of the Addl. Rent Controller that the property was let out for residential purpose was contrary to the record. Addl. Rent Controller has recorded in his finding that on the basis of rent receipt issued on which the purpose of letting was residence, no other purpose could be ascribed for letting.

3. I do not see any infirmity with the finding of the Addl. Rent Controller on the purpose of letting.

4. Now coming to the bona fide requirement of respondent no.1 Counsel for the petitioner has contended that it was not pleaded in the eviction petition that the premises were bona fidely required for the residence of respondent no.1. In the alternative he has also contended that accommodation available with respondent no.1 was sufficient and it was a case of creating paucity of accommodation for the purpose of filing a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.

5. Let me first deal with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to sufficient accommodation available with the respondent. In his support he has also cited the judgment delivered by Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S.M. Mehra Vs. G.D. Malik [SLP (C) No. 236/90]. In the absence of the facts pertaining to said petition, as far as the ratio of Dr. S.M. Mehra's case (supra) is concerned, there cannot be any dispute with the proposition of law. Let us examine the facts of this case. At page 35 A is the site plan of the property in question. There is one room the size of 15'4" X 8'3", another room 13'1/2" X 8'3" and the third room 11'3 X 8'3". There is one store measuring 9'. There is no accommodation on the second floor, although the stand of the petitioner (before me) is that before filing of the eviction petition there existed two rooms on the second floor but the fact that those rooms were not in existence even prior to filing of the petition, therefore, the respondent is left only with three rooms on the ground floor. Taking into consideration the size of the family of the respondents, which consists of respondent no.1, respondent no.2 and his wife, one room for each of the sons of respondent no.2 who are of marriageable age, drawing and dining rooms and a guest room. The requirement of the respondents comes to at least six rooms.

Therefore, the authority of Dr. S.M. Mehra's case (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. I hold that the requirement for additional accommodation of the respondents was rightly held by the Addl. Rent Controller.

6. Adverting to the last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word 'bona fide' has not been mentioned in the eviction petition, the eviction petition has to be read as a whole. If one word of English Language has not been incorporated in the eviction petition, that will not be such an error which would be so fatal as to non-suit the landlady. In this case in the eviction petition, it has been pleaded in paragraph 18(a) (iii) that the accommodation available is not suitable for the petitioners and their family members. Taking into consideration the eviction petition as a whole it cannot be said that the omission of word 'bona fide' is fatal for petition to be rejected under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

7. In Rana Drego Vs. Lal Chand Soni 1998 RLR 290, the Supreme Court held as follows :

"In the light of the above admitted factual position when the land-lady says that she needs more accommodation for her family members, there is no scope for doubting the reasonableness of the requirement."

8. Similar question arose in Parvesh Kanta Vs. Vijay Kumar CR No.990/98 decided on 27.7.1999, where word 'residential accommodation' was not mentioned in the eviction petition. It was held that mere non-mentioning of the word 'residential accommodation' in the eviction petition cannot be a ground for non-suiting the petitioner.

9. No ground to interfere.

10. Dismissed.