Shakuntala Rani (Smt.) vs Sh. Rajesh Bhatt (Deceased) ...
1999 Latest Caselaw 328 Del

ORDER

Devinder Gupta, ACJ

1. This appeal by the plaintiff/appellant is directed against the order dated 17th November, 1998 of a learned Single Judge by which the plaint was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before a Court of competent jurisdiction.

2. Suit was filed, inter-alia, alleging that shop No. IX/222, Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi was let out to Sikandar Lal Arora, husband of the plaintiff, by Rajesh Bhatt, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants sometime in 1958 on a monthly rental of Rs.25/-. On account of Sikandar Lal Arora having suffered a paralytic stroke and his consequent indisposition the tenancy of said shop was transferred in the name of the plaintiff w.e.f. 5th December, 1997 at a monthly rental of Rs.200/- by said Rajesh Bhatt. At the time of transfer of tenancy, plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.4,800/- to Rajesh Bhatt towards advance rent covering a period of two years from 5th December, 1997 to 4th November, 1999. After the death of Rajesh Bhatt, the plaintiff attorney to the defendants as his legal heirs. It is stated that the defendants are carrying illegal construction in the back portion of the tenanted shop and want to forcibly dispossess the plaintiff by demolishing the back wall of the shop. Decree of permanent injunction is sought restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and employees etc. from causing any damage to the tenanted shop and also from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff in any manner whatsoever.

3. Para of the plaint dealing with the valuation of the suit and payment of court fee read:-

"That the value of the suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction is Rs.5,05,000/- on which appropriate court fee in accordance with law has been paid."

4. In terms of the order under appeal, the plaint was ordered to be returned for being presented before a Court of competent jurisdiction by the Single Judge observing:-

"According to the plaintiff, the suit premises were let out to her at a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and so the plaintiff ought to have valued her claim at the amount of the annual rent of the suit premises. There is no rationale basis for valuation of the plaint at Rs.5,05,000/-. Thus, in my opinion, the valuation put up by the plaintiff is arbitrary and plaintiff is arbitrary and unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively over valued."

5. Relying on the decisions in S. Rm. Ar. S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S. Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, and Smt. Sheila Devi & Ors. Vs. Sh. Kishan Lal Kalra & Ors., 1974 (II) ILR (Delhi) 491 (FB), submission advanced by Sh. Ajit Dayal appearing for the appellant was that Section 7(iv)(d) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 gives a right to the plaintiff to place any valuation that he/she likes in a suit of this nature and the Court has no power to interfere with the plaintiff's valuation.

6. Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Sathappa Chettiar's case (supra) has dealt with the question of the plaintiff's exercise of option in valuing suit under clause (d) of Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act. In Para 15 of the report it was held:-

"What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading S. 7(iv) of the Act along with S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Courtfees Act, S. 7, paras. 5, 6, 9 and para 10, CL.(d), court fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits falling under S. 7, sub-s. (iv) of the Act are concerned, S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of S. 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court-fees and that is natural enough. The computation of court-fees in suits falling under S. 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa..."

7. Following the ratio in Sathappa Chettiar's case (supra), in Smt. Sheila Devi's case (supra) it was held by a Full Bench of this court that sub section (iv) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act gives a right to the plaintiff in any of the suits mentioned in various clauses of that sub section to place any valuation that he likes on the relief he seeks subject, however, to any rules made under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and the Court has no power to interfere with the plaintiff's valuation.

8. Applying the law laid down in both the decisions, it was not open for learned Single Judge to have formed his own opinion and substitute that for the plaintiff's option that the suit ought to have been valued for purposes of court fees at Rs. 2,400/- being the amount of the annual rent of the suit shop and that the valuation put up by the plaintiff in the aforesaid para 15 of the plaint at Rs.5,05,000/- is arbitrary and unreasonable. While determining the court fee payable the court has to look the plaint and the substance of the relief (See: Shamsher Singh Vs. Rajinder Prashad and others, ). The amount of rent of immoveable property payable for the year next before the date of presentation of the plaint is relevant only for the suits between landlord and tenant, which are referred to in various clauses of sub section (xi) of Section 7 of the Act. A suit for injunction between a tenant and landlord does not fall in any of the clauses of sub section (xi) of Section 7 of the Act. Such a suit undoubtedly would fall under clause (d) of sub section (iv) of Section 7.

9. Ratio of the decision of Supreme Court Smt. Tara Devi Vs. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, relied upon by learned Single Judge cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court was considering the aspect of under valuation of a suit for declaration with consequential reliefs falling under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and referring to the decisions in Sathappa Chettiar's case (supra) and A.K.A.CT. V.CT Meenakshi sundaram Chettiar Vs. A.K.A.CT.V.CT. Venkatachalam Chettiar, observed that the plaintiff has right to value the relief claimed according to his own estimation and such valuation has to be ordinarily accepted. It was held that the court has power to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff and to revise the same where the plaintiff manifestly and deliberately underestimates the relief and the same is found to be patently arbitrary or unreasonable. In para 4 of the report it was held:-

"The instant special leave petition has been filed against the said order. We have heard the learned counsel and in our considered opinion we do not find any merit in the arguments made on behalf of the petitioner. It is now well-settled by the decisions of this court in Sathappa Chettiar Vs. Ramanathan Chettiar (supra) and Meenakshi sundaram Chettiar Vs. Venkatachalam Chettiar (supra) that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the reliefs sought in the plaint and such valuation both for the purposes of courtfee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted. It is only in cases where it appears to the court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the court can examine the valuation and can revise the same. The plaintiff has valued the lease hold interest on the basis of the rent. Such a valuation, as has been rightly held by the courts below, is reasonable and the same is not demonstratively arbitrary nor there has been any deliberate underestimation of the reliefs. We, therefore, do (not ?) find any reason to grant special leave to appeal asked for in the petition as the order passed in the said Revision is unexceptional. The special leave petition is therefore dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs."

10. On the ratio of the decision in Tara Devi's case (supra) only when plaint is shown to have been demonstratively undervalued that the court iOBs entitled to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff. Only when such valuation is found to be arbitrary and unreasonable that the court can revise the same. Undoubtedly even in the opinion of learned single Judge the suit has not been undervalued. As such it was not open to the court to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff.

11. Matter in issue is squarely covered by the decision in Sathappa Chettiar's case (supra).

12. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Learned Single Judge will now entertain the suit and proceed to decide the same in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

13. Plaintiff to appear before learned single Judge on.