Raman Arora vs Nirmala Aggarwal
1998 Latest Caselaw 390 Del

JUDGMENT

M.S.A. Siddiqui, J.

1. The respondent as a landlord of the suit premises bearing Flat No. 34, Type A, Plot No. 69, Kamayani Kunj, I.P. Extention, Delhi, filed Civil Suit No. 621/96 for the appellant's eviction, who admittedly was his tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 3,300/-, on the ground that his tenancy was determined by a statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

2. The appellant resisted the suit for eviction denying termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. It was denied that the suit premises are exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was averred that the suit is barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

3. It is undisputed that on 8.3.1994, the respondent/landlord had let out the suit premises to the appellant/tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 3,300/- and the notice to quit dated 4.3.1995 was served upon the appellant. By that notice the appellant's tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 7.4.95. On the basis of these admissions, the learned Additional District Judge concluded that the appellant's tenancy was duly determined by the notice to quit dated 4.3.1995. As regards the question of jurisdiction raised by the appellant, the learned Additional District Judge held that the suit premises are exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act and as such the present suit is not barred under Section 50 of the said Act. Accordingly, the learned Additional District judge decreed the respondent's suit for eviction. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the appellant has come up in appeal before this Court.

4. The only contention raised before us in this appeal is that the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge on the question of jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit is erroneous as the respondent has failed to prove that the suit premises are exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The suit is founded on the allegation that the suit premises are exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act inasmuch as the suit premises were constructed after coming into force of the amended Section 3(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which inter alia provides that the Act would not apply to the premises constructed on or after the commencement of the amended Act, 1988 for a period of ten years from the date of completion of such construction. The question now is that whether there is any admission or not in the pleadings with regard to the exemption of the suit premises from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Learned Additional District Judge, relying on the certificate of possession dated 5.3.1993 issued by the Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and the lease deed agreement dated 5.3.1990 executed by the said society in favour of the respondent, came to the conclusion that when the tenancy in question was created, the suit premises were exempt under Section 3(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It is significant to note that the aforesaid documents have not been proved by the respondent. It cannot be disputed that these documents are not public documents and as such they are required to be proved in accordance with law. The learned Additional District Judge has committed a grave error in relying upon these documents for holding that construction of the suit premises was completed in 1993. However the learned Additional District Judge accidently arrived at a correct conclusion that the suit premises were exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act under Section 3(d) and as such the suit was not barred under Section 50 of the said Act. At this juncture learned Counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the application dated 21.1.1997 (at page 169 of the record of the lower Court) filed by the appellant under Section 151 before the Trial Court containing an implied admission of the appellant that the suit premises were constructed in the year 1993 and as such the same were exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Relevant paragraphs of the said application are as under:

     "6.  That the defendant filed a petition under Section 45 of  DRC      Act  before the Rent Controller but the plaintiff took an  objection that as the premises was constructed in the year 1993 so the      provisions  of DRC Act are not applicable in view of the  Section      3(D) of the DRC Act. 
 

     7. That the Court of Rent Controller in view of the  objections of      the  plaintiff  as provided under Section 3(D) of DRC  Act,  dismissed the petition. The defendant had to file a suit for  mandatory  injunction and permanent injunctions seeking directions  to      the plaintiff to issue no objection in favour of the defendant to      obtain electricity connection in his name at his own expense  and      also sought a direction to DESU to instal the electricity connection  in  the  name of the defendant. The said  suit  is  pending      before  Smt. Neena Bansal Krishna, Civil Judge, Delhi.  The  DESU      has  submitted  in said suit that the DESU is  ready  to  provide      independent electricity connection provided defendant fulfill  all      requirements of the DESU i.e. No Objection certificate issued  by      the plaintiff." 
 
 

5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has fairly conceded that the appellant had filed an application under Section 45 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller and the same was withdrawn on the ground that the suit premises were exempt under Section 3(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The admission of the learned Counsel for the appellant read alongwith the paragraphs of the appellant's application dated 21.1.1997 referred to hereinbefore dispenses with the necessity of further proof of the aforesaid facts. In Mahendra Vs. Sushila, , it was observed that Section 58 of the Evidence Act inter alia provides that no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleading". Thus admissions made in a suit have a special value in view of the provisions of Section 58 of the Evidence Act and an admission constitutes a substantive piece of evidence in the case; and, for that reason can be relied upon for proving the truth of the facts incorporated therein. The aforesaid admission of the appellant with regard to non-applicability of the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act is conclusive against him. The aforesaid admission of the appellant can be made the foundation for holding that the suit premises is exempt from the operation of the Delhi Rent Control Act by virtue of Section 3(d) of the said Act. In this connection, we may usefully excerpt the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Inccharam, as under:

"........Admissions, if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties on the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong."

6. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the respondent's suit was not barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. No other point was urged.

7. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the respondent.