National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Swaran Singh
1997 Latest Caselaw 644 Del

JUDGMENT

Mohd. Shamim, J.

(1) Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned order.

(2) Learned counsel for the appellant, Dr. Singhvi, Senior Advocate, has vehemently contended that the learned lower Court while passing the impugned order for interim compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act (`the Act' for short) did not take into consideration the defense of the appellant that the person who was driving the vehicle was not holding the driving licence and the vehicle was being driven without a licence. Learned counsel in this connection has led me through a letter dated March 23, 1994 written by Khatri & Associates to M/s National Insurance Co. Then there is another letter from Khatri & Associates dated January 29, 1994 addressed to the Licensing Authority, Alwar with a report of the Licensing Authority thereon. The other letter which I have been taken through is from Mahajan Associates to National Insurance Company, Pathankot dated March 2, 1995 with a report of the Transport Officer. Dr. Singhvi on the basis of the above has strenuously argued that there is a prima facie proof to the effect that the vehicle in question was being driven by the driver without a licence. According to him, had this preliminary enquiry been conducted in that eventuality the Court could not have granted interim compensation to the claimant. The learned counsel thus contends that before passing an order under Section 140 of the Act an enquiry is a must as held by a Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court as reported in Pradeep Rao & Ors. v. Manoj Kumar Aggarwal & Ors., 1 (1996) Acc 176. To the same effect are the observations of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court as reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gajanan & Ors., 1 (1997) Acc 361.

(3) Since we are concerned with the construction of Section 140 of the Act, the relevant provisions of the said Section can be adverted to with profit as the same would set at rest the present controversy. Section 140(3) is in the following words:- "140(3). In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

(4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement."

(5) A close scrutiny of the relevant provisions of law alluded to above would reveal that the heading of the Chapter containing the said provision is "LIABILITY Without Fault In Certain CASES". Thus the Court in the case of an accident at the initial stage is not required to go into the question of liability or otherwise of the person from whom the compensation is claimed. The claimant in such a case at the said stage is not required to plead and establish that the death or the disability was caused on account of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. Section 140(4) further provides that the claim is not to be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made.

(6) The defense as put forward by the learned counsel is that the impugned vehicle which met with the accident was being driven without a licence as has been shown by the appellant by placing certain documents on the file. Hence the insurance company i.e. the appellant herein were not liable to pay the compensation. I am sorry, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel.

(7) It is manifest from the relevant provisions of law alluded to above that the Court at this stage will not be required to hold an enquiry as to whether the insurance company was liable or not at this stage? The Court is simply under an obligation to make a summary enquiry, which was made by the impugned order by the learned lower Court. Admittedly this is not in dispute that the deceased met with an accident and he breathed his last on account of the said accident. This is also not in dispute that the impugned vehicle was involved in the said accident which is prima facie clear from the F.I.R. No. 40/93 recorded at Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi. This is also not being questioned that the said vehicle was insured and the respondents are the LRs of the deceased. Thus the learned lower Court conducted a summary enquiry. Hence I feel the learned lower Court was justified in passing the impugned order. The same view was taken by the two Single Judges of this court as reported in Ravi Kumar & Another v. Ram Parkash 1 (1989) Acc 133, and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. N.P. Tyagi, 1 (1989) Acc 241.

(8) There is another side of the picture. The need to incorporate Section 140 in the above said Act arose as it was widely felt that the legal representatives of the person who lost his precious life in the accident had been deprived of their bread-earner. Thus there was need to provide his legal heirs immediate relief, to wash out their tears to a certain extent, and to assuage their wounds, to grant them some sort of solace immediately. The above said Section is a piece of social legislation. Thus it is to be so construed as to advance the purpose behind its enactment and to curb the mischief. In case the contention of the learned counsel that it is mandatory to look into the defense put forward by the insurance company before passing the impugned order is accepted in that eventuality, I feel, the very purpose of the incorporation of the said Section in the said Act would be flung to the winds and would be rendered nugatory.

(9) In view of the above, I do not see any force in the present appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed in liming.