S. Darshan Singh Kohli vs Kusum Anand
1997 Latest Caselaw 736 Del

JUDGMENT

C.M. Nayar, J.

(1) The present suit is filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession and mesne profits and for issuance of perpetual injunction. The following reliefs are prayed: (a) Possession of the suit premises be delivered to the plaintiffs; (b) Perpetual injunction be issued against the defendant not to use the premises for any purposes other than for residence of the defendant and/or for members of her family and not to run any school over there; (c) Mesne profit @ Rs. 3,000.00 per month w.e.f. January 1, 1978 be allowed until possession of the premises is restored back to the plaintiffs and interest @ 12% per annum be awarded thereon until recovery of the same.

(2) The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs are owners of the property bearing No. 1/5, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi. This is a double storey house which the plaintiffs purchased from M/s Jawahar Mal & Sons some time in the year 1961. The land on which the said house was constructed was given on lease by the President of India to M/s Jawahar Mal & Sons vide lease deed dated January 24, 1961, registered as document No. 100 in supplementary book No. Volume 43, on pages 21-23 on January 27, 1961 subject to convenants and conditions therein contained on the part of the lessees or their successors to be observed and performed. The salient terms of the lease-deed are referred to in sub paragraphs I and Ii of para 2 of the plaint and it will not be necessary to reproduce the same herein.

(3) The above said property was let out by the plaintiffs to National Cadet Corps (NCC) about 10 years prior to the filing of the present Suit and since the property could not be used for purposes other than residence, the Delhi Development Authority (for short DDA) objected to the non-residential user of the building. The D.D.A. the lodged complaint against the present plaintiffs under Section 29(2) read with Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 some time in 1974 and the plaintiffs were eventually convicted on April 21, 1976 and were ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000.00 each.

(4) In view of the aforesaid user of the premises the plaintiffs filed an application for eviction of their tenants the Union of India and others under Section 14(1)(a)(c)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and one of the grounds of eviction was as follows: "That the respondent/tenants are, notwithstanding previous notice, using the suit premises in a manner contrary to the conditions imposed on the petitioners/landlords by the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India, while giving them the lease of land on which the building containing suit premises is situated. The suit premises are also being used contrary to the purpose as laid down by the Master plan and the Zonal plan applicable to the area".

(5) It is further specified in the plaint that according to the Master plan/zonal plan, the building cannot be used for any purpose other than residence.

(6) The respondents in the above said eviction petition vacated the premises on August 31, 1977 realising that the property could not be put to a non-conforming use. The user of the building by the tenants was contrary to the terms of the lease on which the land underneath the building had been granted to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had appointed one D.K.Chadha as their attorney to conduct the aforesaid civil case of eviction against the Union of India and others. The defendant got in touch with D.K.Chadha and requested him to let the ground floor of the aforesaid building to her on a monthly rent of Rs. 3,000.00 for the purpose of residence. She addressed the letter to the plaintiffs on October 28, 1977 in which he stated, inter alia: "I am interested to take the said premises on rental basis for residential purposes. The monthly rent as indicated by Mr.Mahajan is Rs. 3,000.00 per month." The defendant also asked for confirmation through the plaintiffs' representative Shri D.K.Chadha. The plaintiffs, however, did not reply to the said letter. On November 16, 1977 the defendant paid a sum of Rs. 3,000.00 to D.K.Chadha as an attorney for the plaintiffs on account of one month's rent in advance in respect of the premises and obtained receipt of the same. It was stated in the receipt as follows: "Rent is effective from Ist of January, 1978. In case the possession is given earlier, the difference will be chargeable or adjustable from the date possession is given."

(7) This receipt was given by D.K.Chadha in the personal name of Mrs. K.Anand. It is further averred that the place of residence and business of the plaintiffs at the relevant time was is Calcutta. Their son Shri Sharanjeet Singh who originally resided at Calcutta was in Delhi since about November, 1977. Shri D.K.Chadha while accepting rent told the defendant that the acceptance of rent was subject to the consent of the plaintiffs themselves or S.Sharanjeet Singh, since he was not competent to let out the premises on his own. It was further stipulated that before the defendant would be in possession of the premises she would be required to execute a proper lease-deed containing all the usual terms of the lease, particularly, about the user of the premises for the residence of the defendant. The plaintiffs were particular about this condition since they had already suffered on account of misuser of the building as mentioned above. The building was vacant since August 31, 1977 when the Ncc vacated the same. As the defendant was allegedly to occupy the premises with effect from January 1, 1978 she requested D.K.Chadha a week or so before the date that she be allowed to have some furniture/fixtures prepared in the verandah of the building which exists outside the building to which D.K.Chadha agreed.

(8) On or about December 29, 1977 the plaintiffs' son and attorney S. Sharanjeet Singh Kohli happened to visit the said building and found that the defendant had entered the premises by getting keys of the outdoor from the chowkidar. S. Sharanjeet Singh thereupon closed the door and locked up all their doors and took away their keys. In the absence of the plaintiffs' representative D.K.Chadha and Sharanjeet Singh the defendant got a lock fixed up over the lock of the plaintiffs on the outer door. Thereupon Shri Sharanjeet Singh contacted the defendant and requested her to remove her belongings from the premises but she declined to do so. He, accordingly, sent a telegram on December 31, 1977 to the defendant in the following words: Under instruction from Darshan Singh Mohinder Kaur Kohli owners of house 1/5 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi please be advised that you are trespassers. Stop Your possession is illegal. Stop. Vacate immediately or reporting police stop please contact S.S.Kohli attorney at phone 520133 or 581727 or G.S.Vohra & Co., Advocates, phone 271206 or 42167 G.S.Vohra & Co. Advocates"

(9) The defendant, however, did not reply to the said telegram. The plaintiffs also lodged police report on the same day in the said connection.

(10) The plaintiffs thereafter came to know that the defendant had started a school for children in the ground floor of the building i.e., in the premises in dispute under the name of Anandale SCHOOL. On January 7, 1978 plaintiffs' attorney S.Sharanjeet Singh received summons from the Court of Shri Ajit Bharioke, Sub Judge, Delhi in which the following prayer was made: "It is prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to restrain the defendants, by means of perpetual injunction not to disturb the and interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs, except in due process of law, in respect of the whole of the ground floor of premises No. 1/5, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, as shown in the plan attached hereto, by themselves, or through their agents or servants, etc. In any manner whatsoever." The following were named as the defendants in the said suit: 1. M/s Darshan Singh Mohinder Kaur 2. Shri Darshan Singh 3. Smt. Mohinder Kaur w/o S.Darshan Singh 4. Shri Saranjeet Singh Kohli 5. Shri D.K.Chadha C/o Kohli Trading Co. Along with the amended plaint Shri Sharanjeet Singh received copy of the application under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code . filed by the plaintiff in which the following prayer had been made: "It is therefore prayed that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the defendants, their agents, employees and associates and servants, from disturbing, interfering the possession of the plaintiff in the ground floor of 1/5 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi till the decision of the suit, and the Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant any other and further relief which the Hon'ble Court deems fit under the circumstances of the case. The ad interim injunction be passed ex parte." The injunction order was issued in favour of the defendant and the plaintiffs were restrained from interfering with the possession of the defendant herein from ground floor of the property of which she was in possession. The following averments which are of relevance as made in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 are as under: "13. That the defendant has, by filing the aforesaid suit tried to forestall the plaintiffs. She was apprised of the fact by the plaintiff's attorney that the plaintiffs could never agree to user of the premises for running a school because it would mean dire consequences for them and they could not afford to repeat the performance. It was for this reason that the defendant had written in the letter dated October 28, 1977 addressed to the plaintiffs that she wanted the premises for "residential purposes". 14. That the plaintiffs representatives requested the defendant to have refund of the sum of Rs. 3,000.00 paid to Shri D.K.Chadha any time, but she has refused to do so insisting that she is a lawful tenant and that she wanted to run a school there. Shri Sharanjeet Singh went to the extent of condoning the trespass and wanted her to execute a proper lease deed in which it was clearly stipulated that she would use the premises only for residence but she has refused to do so. 15. That the plaintiffs deny that they ever gave possession of the premises to the defendant or that she lawfully came into possession of the said property or that she is their a lawful tenant. She is not entitled to run a school in the premises, as it would be a non-conforming user. It would also be against the terms of the lease deed as stated above. Moreover, it would expose the plaintiffs to criminal prosecution. The plaintiffs cannot legally agree to a user which is in violation of law. Moreover, the defendant would be liable to eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Assuming though not admitting that the premises were given for being used as a school or for purposes other than a residence, such a user, being forbidden by law, stipulation to that effect would be void and the lease would be unlawful. If the premises is used for a non-residential purpose, the President could forfeit the lease and re-enter upon the building and it would also result in other penal consequences. The plea of misuser as put forward by the plaintiffs is further detailed in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 which may be referred to as under: "16. That the case set up by the defendant in opposition to plaintiff's plea of misuser, etc. inter alia, is that there is absolutely no restriction to use the premises for a junior school and that since the defendant is using the premises for a junior school, which is neither prohibited by the alleged lease deed nor by the Master Plan, the plaintiffs submit that the position taken by the defendants as indicated above is incorrect. 17. The plaintiffs made enquiries from the Dda on the subject and wrote letters in the said behalf, but received no reply. The plaintiffs wrote letter dated May 11, 1979 in this connection but received no reply. Thereafter a reminder was sent, but again no reply was received. The plaintiffs representative visited the office a number of times and was verbally told that if the Government decided at any time to take action for violation of the terms of the lease it would do so, and it was not prepared to commit itself in writing as to whether the user of the premises as school was permissible or condonable. 18. That on February 21, 1978 the plaintiff No. 1 received letter from the L&DO that inspection of the premises in suit would be carried out on April 26, 1978 at 10 Am to 10.30 Am by their representative Shri K.K.Barkat in terms of the lease deed but inspection was not done. Thereafter, another letter dated May 30, 1980 was received on the same subject and the premises were accordingly inspected on June 3, 1980 by a representative of the L&DO. By letter No. L&DO/PS III/1/5/WPH/ 2464 dated November 25, 1980 the L&DO wrote as follows in reply to the plaintiffs letter dated July 15, 1980 in which the plaintiffs had enquired about the result of inspection: I am to refer to your letter dated 15th July, 1980 on the above subject and to confirm that on inspection of the above premises by the Technical staff of this office from time to time it has been observed that a school is being run at the ground floor. It is also understood that the said school is unrecognised one and therefore the use of the premises as an unrecognised school is objectionable and violative of the terms of the lease deed. You are therefore, required to remedy the breach of the terms of the lease deed by removal or and regularised on payment of misuse charges which will be communicated to you on receipt of your written request for the same. It may, however, be noted that the charges will have to be paid for the period of the existence of the misuse even if it is removed at a later date." It is, therefore, contended that running a school in any case is in violation of the terms of the lease which is binding on the plaintiffs. Moreover, the running of the school in purely residential area is a non-conforming user and the plaintiffs are running the risk of being prosecuted under the provisions of Section 29 of the Delhi Development Act. The plaintiffs in the above background have filed the suit for possession and sought possession of the premises for the reasons as indicated in the plaint as well as claimed mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 3,000.00 per month with effect from January 1, 1978. The defendant filed her written statement wherein the following pleas have been taken in the preliminary objections: (A) The present suit for possession against the defendant is not maintainable as this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the provisions of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The relationship between the parties is that of landlord and tenant and, as such, this suit is liable to be dismissed. According to Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, as amended, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in so far as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any premises to which this Act applies or the eviction of any tenant therefrom or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Controller under this Act shall be granted by any Civil Court or by any other authority. The facts as pleaded are that the defendant was serving as Head Mistress in Spring Dales School at 13, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi. In the month of October, 1977 she decided to start a Junior School upto IInd standard and with that view approached M/s Mahajan and Co. and other property brokers for taking on rent suitable premises for running the said junior school upto IInd standard. (B) Shri Ladi Mahajan of M/s Mahajan & Co. Property Brokers, Patel Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi who was entrusted with this job by the defendant showed to the defendant the ground floor of the building bearing No. 1/5 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi comprising of 10 rooms, including miani, store and 5 bath rooms, one kitchen, lobby and open courtyard front and back besides side passage for the purpose of running a school as aforesaid along with Shri D.K.Chadha General Attorney of the plaintiffs sometimes in the end of October, 1977. (C) Shri D.K. Chadha, Attorney of the plaintiffs, demanded Rs. 3,500.00 per month for the entire ground floor of premises bearing No. 1/5 West Patel Nagar New Delhi described as above while the defendant offered Rs. 3,000.00 per month for the said purpose. Previously the premises was in occupation of another tenant who was paying about Rs. 1,000.00 per month. At that time it was suggested by the broker to give the offer in writing so that the General Attorney of the plaintiffs may write to the plaintiffs. (D) Sometimes afterwards Shri S.S.Kohli son of the plaintiffs who is also the General Attorney of the plaintiffs also came from Calcutta and the matter was discussed with D.K.Chadha, Ladi Mahajan, S.S.Kohli and the defendant and it was agreed that the premises will be let out to the defendant at a rental of Rs. 3000.00 per month and the repairs were started by the plaintiffs' General Attorney immediately. It was also made clear to these gentlemen that the premises were required for starting Junior School and not for residence. In the letter which was addressed to the plaintiffs by the defendant, it was got mentioned that the property was required for residence but it was made clear that this was only written to avoid any objection by the Local Authorities. The General Attorney of the plaintiffs and Shri S.S.Kohli son of the plaintiffs agreed to let out the premises for running the Junior School. The rent was fixed at Rs. 3,000.00 per month and this amount was paid to the General Attorney by the defendant on 16th November, 1977 and a regular receipt was given in favour of the defendant. It was made clear in the said receipt that the rent will be effected from Ist January, 1978, but in case the defendant occupies the premises before that she will be liable to pay the rent for that period. Ultimately, the possession of the premises was handed over to the defendant by Shri D.K.Chadha on Ist December, 1977. The defendant got the prospectus printed and distributed. The defendant also got the hand bills printed to the effect that the session of the school will start from January 1, 1978 and the registration for the Nursery and Primary schools from 15th December, 1977 at 1/5, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi. The defendant also advertised the school through cinema slides on Rachna and Vivek Theatres with effect from 26th December, 1977 which had been duly displayed in the said theatres. The defendant also received applications from the Lady teachers at the premises in dispute and also the registration of the children at the premises and the arrangements for registration and admission etc. were made. The defendant decorated the premises for school purposes and in fact by the middle of December, 1977, the entire furniture and the desks were put in the premises. The banners were put up outside the premises on Ist December, 1977 and the boards were put up in the second week of December, 1977. The plaintiffs Shri D.K.Chadha and Shri S.S.Kohli were present almost daily till the middle of December, 1977 as the premises was being got repaired by the attorneys of the plaintiffs. In view of the above the plaintiffs are estopped by their conduct in saying that the defendant is a trespasser and the premises were not let out to the defendant. The possession of the premises was handed over to the defendant by the plaintiffs' attorney on Ist December, 1977. (E) Since the plaintiffs threatened the defendant with forcible eviction, the defendant filed a suit for injunction against the plaintiffs on January 2, 1978 and by order dated January 3, 1978 the plaintiffs were restrained from interfering with the possession of the defendant or dispossessing the defendant from the premises in dispute. (F) The value of the suit for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction is wrong. The plaintiffs have deliberately valued the property at ridiculously low figure and the plaintiffs may be ordered to pay the requisite Court-fee on the market value of the property in dispute. On merits, it is accepted that the plaintiffs are the landlords of the property in dispute. It is reiterated that there is no restriction in the alleged terms of the lease with the Government of India that the premises will not be used for a junior school. It is stated that even according to the master plan it is permissible to use the residential premises in a residential zone for hostel, boarding house with density limitation, nurseries, kindergarten and schools, clinics, social and cultural institutions. It is also denied that Shri D.K.Chadha the General Attorney of the plaintiffs was not entitled to enter into any arrangement with the defendant. The remaining contents of the plaint are denied and it is reiterated that the defendant never committed any trespass and the question of condoning the trespass did not arise. The question of executing any lease-deed did not arise as the contract was complete and there could not be any stipulation that the premises would be used only for residence. Similarly, it was denied that the defendant did not come into possession lawfully. The defendant, it is alleged, is a lawful tenant of the premises. Replication was filed by the plaintiffs wherein the contents of the plaint were reiterated. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 23rd November, 1978: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the property in dispute? Opp 2. Whether the defendant tress passed into the premises in dispute on or about 29.12.1977? OPP. 3. For what purpose the property in dispute was let out? O.P.Parties. 4. Even if it is found that the premises were let out for running a school whether the lease for the said purpose is void because of violating the terms of the master plan? OPP. 5. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? Opp The following additional issues were permitted to be framed by order dated September 25, 1980: 1. To what mesne profits are plaintiffs entitled for the past period as well as in future? 2. Are the plaintiffs also entitled to interest on the mesne profits? If so at what rate and for what period? Issue NO. 1 The defendant does not dispute that the plaintiffs are owners of the property in dispute. In the written statement, it is only stated that the relationship between the parties is that of landlord and tenant and, as such, the suit was liable to be dismissed. Therefore, the ownership of the plaintiffs is not denied. The plaintiffs purchased the property from M/s Jawahar Mal & Sons in the year 1961. The plaintiffs have brought on record copy of the lease-deed which Jawahar Mal and Sons entered into with the Government of India on January 24, 1961 in respect of this property which is a registered document and referred to in paragraph 2 of the plaint. The plaintiffs have also filed copy of the sale deed dated March 3, 1961 which confers the title of the property on them. There is an averment made by the defendant in paragraph 1 of the written statement which reads as follows: "1. Para No. 1 of the plaint is wrong and is denied. It is denied that the plaintiffs are the owners of the property bearing No. 1/5 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi. It is, however, admitted that the plaintiffs are the landlords of the property in suit. It is denied that the plaintiffs had purchased the premises in question from M/s Jawahar Mal and Sons. The plaintiffs are put to strict proof." In suit for injunction (Suit No. 28/78) the defendants clearly stated in paragraph 1 of the plaint as follows: "Defendants 1 to 3 (plaintiffs herein) are the owners-landlords of property bearing No. 1/5, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi 110008 and Shri D.K.Chadha is their attorney to look after the property and lets out the property on their behalf and is realising rent of the property on their behalf." The plaintiffs are, therefore, held to be the owners of the property in dispute. The contention of the defendant that they are owners-landlords is only raised to reiterate that in view of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, this suit is not maintainable. This plea will be discussed at later stage. Issue NO. 2 The facts are not in dispute. There is no written lease or rent agreement between the parties which will govern the respective rights inter se. The plaintiffs made categorical averments in the plaint that; (i) they had appointed one D.K.Chadha as their attorney to conduct civil case of eviction against the Union of India and others (National Cadet Corp) about 10 years ago as the property could not be used for purposes other than residence and the Delhi Development Authority had objected to the non-residential user of the premises. The premises, as a consequence, were got vacated; (ii) the defendant got in touch with D.K.Chadha and requested him to let out the ground floor of the aforesaid building on a monthly rent of Rs. 3,000.00 for the purpose of residence. She addressed a letter to the plaintiff on October 28, 1977 (Ex. P.4) in which she stated that she was interested to take the premises on rental basis for residential purpose. The above said D.K.Chadha, however, did not reply to this communication; (iii) on November 16, 1977 the defendant paid a sum of Rs. 3,000.00 to D.K.Chadha as attorney for the plaintiffs on account of one month's rent in advance and a receipt was issued in this regard by D.K.Chadha; (iv) the ordinary place of residence and business of the plaintiffs was in Calcutta. Their son Sharanjeet Singh who originally resided at Calcutta was in Delhi since about November, 1977. D.K.Chadha while accepting the amount of Rs. 3,000.00 told the defendant that it was subject to the consent of the plaintiffs themselves or Sharanjeet Singh since he was not competent to let out the premises on his own; (v) it was further stated that before the defendant would be put in possession of the premises she would be required to execute a proper lease deed containing all the usual terms of the lease, particularly about the user of the premises for the residence of the defendant; (vi) the suit property lay vacant since August 31, 1977 when the N.C.C. had vacated the same. The defendant was to occupy the premises with effect from January 1, 1978 and she requested D.K.Chadha a week or so before that date that she be allowed to have some furniture/fixtures prepared in the verandah of the building which exists outside the entrance to the building to which D.K.Chadha agreed. (vii) on or about December 29, 1977 the plaintiff's son and attorney Sharanjeet Singh happened to visit the said building and found that the defendant had entered the premises by getting keys of the outdoor from the chowkidar. Sharanjeet Singh thereupon closed the outer door and locked up all doors of the premises and took away their keys. In the absence of the plaintiffs' representative D.K.Chadha and Sharanjeet Singh the defendant got a lock fixed up over the lock of the plaintiffs on the outer door. Thereupon Sharanjeet Singh contacted the defendant and requested her to remove the belongings from the premises but she declined to do so. He accordingly sent a telegram on December 31, 1977 in the following words: "Under instruction from Darshan Singh Mohinder Kaur Kohli owners of House 1/5 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi please be advised that you are trespassers. Stop. Your possession is illegal. Stop. Vacate immediately or reporting police Stop please contact S.S.Kohli attorney at phone 520133 or 581727 or G.S.Vohra & Co., Advocates, Phone 271206 or 42167. G.S.Vohra & Co. Advocates" The plaintiffs also lodged police report on the same day in the said connection. (viii) the plaintiffs came to know that the defendant started a school for children on the ground floor of the building known as Anandale SCHOOL. (ix) On January 7, 1978 plaintiffs attorney Sharanjeet Singh received summons from the court of Shri Ajit Bharihok, Sub Judge, Delhi wherein the defendant had made a prayer for restraint order against the plaintiffs by means of perpetual injunction not to disturb and interfere in her possession except in due process of law. The defendant, it is alleged, by filing the aforesaid suit tried to forestall the plaintiffs. She was apprised of the fact by the plaintiffs' attorney that the plaintiffs could never agree to user of the premises for running a school because it would mean dire consequences for them and they could not afford to do so as it would violate the regulations as framed by the Delhi Development Authority. In this background the plaintiffs' representative requested the defendant to have refund the sum of Rs. 3,000.00 paid to D.K.Chadha but she refused to do so insisting that she was a lawful tenant and she wanted to run a school there. The main plea which is highlighted and reiterated by the defendant is that the relationship between the parties is that of landlord and tenant and as such, the present suit is not maintainable. Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1950 as amended, bars jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceedings of the present nature. The plaintiffs clearly accepted the defendant as tenant and their Attorney even issued rent receipt for the amount of Rs. 3,000.00 which was paid on November 16, 1977. It was however, not denied that the defendant did not enter into any written agreement for taking the premises on lease or rent. The only written communication on record is the receipt as mentioned aforesaid. It is also not in dispute that the defendant had clearly stated in her communication that the premises were to be used for `residential purpose'. The fact that the alleged negotiations took place between the plaintiffs and the defendant were at the instance of D.K.Chadha, the alleged Attorney of the plaintiffs and Mahajan & Co., the property brokers. The plaintiffs did not come in the picture at all. The plaintiffs have, therefore, correctly reiterated that D.K.Chadha had no authority in law to let out the premises in favour of the defendant or any other person. This was only to be done by Sharanjeet Singh Kohli. In this regard reference may be made to General Power of Attorney Ex. P.7 issued in favour of D.K.Chadha which is dated 2nd January, 1976. The same may be reproduced as under: General Power Of Attorney Know all men by these present that I, Darshan, Singh Kohli, partner of M/s Kohli Trading Company, P-43 Rabindra Sarani Calcutta 1 do hereby appoint and constitute Shri Devinder Kumar Chadha son of Shri Tara Chand Chadha as full General attorney of our firm under the name and style of M/s Kohli Trading Company P-43, Rabindra Sarani, Calcutta to do all or any of the under-mentioned acts on behalf of our above named firm. 1. The attorney is authorised to institute and defend actions of all types, Civil, Criminal, Revenue, Income Tax and Sales Tax in all the Courts, Tribunals, Custom House, etc., to sign and verify pleadings, to make applications, statements or affidavit to appear etc. to engage and discharge counsels, to deposit and withdraw money, to grant receipts thereof, to take out executions, to file review, revisions and appeals upto the highest Courts, Custom House, Tribunals and to take all necessary steps in these receipts. 2. To submit Returns, to appear and act before the Income Tax and Sales Tax authorities, the appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Commissioner of Income Tax and Sales Tax, Income Tax Tribunal, to take copies of any proceedings, to get adjournments, to file or withdraw any documents filed, to receive notices and refund vouchers, and generally to attend to all matters pertaining and incidental to above proceedings of Income Tax and Sales Tax. 3. To make applications, obtain Licences from Import and Export Offices, to transact all business with the Reserve Bank of India on behalf of our above named firm. 4. To settle and compound disputes, claims, to stand surety and to withdraw action in settlements, claims, etc. 5. To make Imports and Exports on the above said Firm's name from India to pay Custom Duties on such Imports and Exports in Custom House to receive goods from Customs and to sell all such goods, to buy goods from India for Exports. 6. All acts done by the aforesaid Attorney in pursuance to these present shall be deemed to have been done by us and shall stand ratified. In witness whereof I put my signature hereunder on this day the 2nd January, 1976 at Calcutta. Executants sd/- Darshan Singh Kohli, Partner" It is further established from record that Sharanjit Singh Kohli made it clear to the defendant that an appropriate lease agreement had to be entered between the parties and only then question of creation of tenancy will arise. In this background when the plaintiffs learnt that the defendant had entered the premises immediate steps were taken by them in the following manner: (A) A telegram was sent on December 31, 1977 by Advocate for the plaintiffs which has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment. (B) A police report was lodged on December 31, 1977 which is marked as Exhibit P.5. The evidence of PW1 Darshan Singh also reiterates that D.K.Chadha was the Manager of the business of the plaintiffs in Delhi and he used to prosecute case against N.C.C. which was the earlier tenant. The Power of Attorney in his favour did not cover the suit property and, therefore, D.K.Chadha had no authority to let out the same in favour of the defendant. It is also stated in his evidence that the defendant had clearly stated that the property was only required for residential purposes and the plaintiffs were not aware of her plan to use it for running a school. Similarly PW3 S.S.Kohli reiterated in his evidence that no authority was given to D.K.Chadha to deal with the premises though the said person had told the witness that the defendant had approached him for taking the premises in question for residential purposes. On or about December 29, 1977 while he was passing through in front of the premises he noticed a Board of Anandale School. He enquired from the chowkidar and he told that the defendant had taken the premises. On enquiry the witness was told that the defendant had been allowed to make furniture in the back side of the verandah. Therefore, new locks were placed over the locks of the defendant and thereafter the telegram was sent. Police report was also lodged as referred to above. The reading of the pleadings as well as of the evidence on record clearly establish that the defendant had trespassed in the premises without entering into an appropriate agreement for rental of the same. She could have waited for the plaintiffs to come forward for that purpose and on the contrary she hurriedly entered into the premises and started running a school without any written consent of the plaintiffs in this regard. The receipt issued in her favour merely states the payment of Rs. 3,000.00 as an advance against rent of the suit premises effective from January 1, 1978. It was further stipulated that in case possession was given earlier, the difference will be chargeable or adjustable from the date the possession was given. The defendant in order to perfect her legal entry into the premises instead of negotiating with the plaintiff chose to file a suit for injunction in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Delhi (Suit No. 28/78) on January 2, 1978 for not disturbing her possession. Therefore, it is clearly established from the facts and evidence as enumerated above that the defendant trespassed into the premises in dispute on or about December 29, 1977. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts in this background cannot be held to be barred in terms of the provisions of Section 50 of Delhi Rent Control Act. The defendant who has been in a hurry to move into the premises without execution of a proper lease agreement cannot at this belated stage derive the benefit of the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act as the law does not confer on her the status of a tenant under the rent legislation. The Full Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in Sm.Krishnamoni Dasi v. Baser Mondal and others as referred to by Jaspal Singh, J. in his illustrative work on Delhi Rent Control Act clearly lays down the tests or fundamental principles to determine the question of exclusive jurisdiction of a Tribunal. The relevant paragraph may be reproduced as follows: "(101) The following tests or fundamental principles should therefore be borne in mind in deciding cases, where the question of exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal is raised: (1) The general law of the country is not altered by special legislation made without particular reference to it, though a statute passed for a particular purpose must, so far as that purpose extends, override general enactments. (2) If there is a manifest absence of jurisdiction in the tribunal which makes a determination, the Civil Courts will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. (3) It is for the Courts of general civil jurisdiction to determine what is the scope of the authority given to a statutory tribunal and to investigate the question as to whether a special or subordinate tribunal has acted within the limits of its jurisdiction. (4) Even where jurisdiction is given to the statutory tribunal to determine certain facts so as to give itself jurisdiction, it will be for the Court of general jurisdiction to adjudicate as to what are the powers which the statute has given to such an authority or tribunal. (5) No tribunal of special jurisdiction can finally decide upon its own jurisdiction or give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a matter collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limits of its jurisdiction depend. (6) No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can establish its jurisdiction by proceeding on an assumed fact, which is not a fact. (7) A statutory tribunal must act within the scope of its powers given to it or limited by the statute. (8) If the tribunal acts within the scope of its powers and commits an error, the Civil Courts cannot correct it i.e. its orders, whether right or wrong - cannot be challenged, except in a manner and to the extent prescribed by the statute. (9) The special tribunal might be invested by the legislature with exclusive jurisdiction to determine within its own authority certain matters and where it is so invested, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be deemed to have been taken away to that extent. (10) A statute conferring jurisdiction under certain particular conditions, cannot be taken to confer jurisdiction also in cases which do not fall within the ambit of the conditions laid down, merely on the basis of analogy. (11) The confiscatory rights of a special tribunal whose adjudication was declared to be conclusive could not have immunity from the Civil Courts and at the same time disregard the provisions of the Act under which the tribunal was formed. In other words, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is statutory and the tribunal, however, admirable in its intention, is not entitled to go outside the provisions and in any effect to legislate for itself." In view of the settled position of law and taking into consideration facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of this Court is barred by the provisions of Section 50 of Delhi Rent Control Act. There is no significant repudiation of the averments made in the plaint. In the evidence of the defendant as DW8, she has merely stated that she had not forcibly occupied the premises in dispute and rather she was inducted as tenant by Mr.Chadha. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiffs or their authorised representative did not at any stage participate in the negotiations with the defendant or handed over the premises to her. Issue No. 2 is, accordingly, decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. Issues No. 3 & 4 The property in dispute was, admittedly, residential as on an earlier occasion the plaintiffs had to file a suit for eviction of National Cadet Corps, the Union of India undertaking on that ground. The defendant even acknowledged in her communication dated October 28, 1977 that she required the premises for residential purposes. This document dated October 28, 1977 is marked as Exhibit P. 4 and reads as under: "M/s Darshan Singh Mohinder Kaur C/o M/s Kohli Trading Co. 1403, Tilak Bazar, Delhi 110 006 Dear Sir, I have seen your premises 1/5 Ground floor, West Patel Nagar, lying vacant for residential purpose through Mr. Mahajan of M/s Mahajan & Co. property dealers. I am interested to take the said premises on rental basis for residential purpose. The monthly rent as indicated by Mr.Mahajan is Rs. 3,500.00 per month while we are Interested at Rs. 3,000.00 per month which according to us is very reasonable, looking to the rents prevailing in the same locality for the same like accommodation. A = I would request you to kindly consider my offer and rent out the said premises to me at your earliest convenience. Please let me have your confirmation immediately through your representative Mr.D.K.Chadha or Mr.Mahajan. You may even convey your decision on the telephone Nos. 584618, 588057, 527193. If any surety is required, the same can be provided. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, sd/- (Mrs. K.Anand)" Subsequently, the defendant changed her stand and stated that it was mentioned in the above said letter that the premises were required for residential purpose only to keep the local authorities quiet. However, the contents of the above communication are not denied. Reference may be made to the testimony of the defendant who appeared as DW8. In the examination-in-chief, the defendant stated as follows: "I was Head Mistress of Spring Dales School, West Patel Nagar in 1977. Looking at the need of the locality and number of children coming for admission in that school in October, 1977 I decided to start my own school. I contacted property dealers, D.W.7, Mahajan and Company for getting me a premises for this purpose." The contents of the above communication dated October 28, 1977, however, are not denied and in the cross-examination the defendant offers the following explanation: " Mr.Chadha told me that I must write in the letter that I require the premises for residential purposes because it was a formality though I could use the premises for running the school. I do not know the reason why Shri Chadha said that it was a formality. The witness volunteers and says that Shri Chadha knew that the accommodation was being rented for the school. Shri Chadha knew that I was Head Mistress of Springdales School, Patel Nagar branch. I do not know whether it was suggested by Shri Chadha that I should mention that the accommodation was taken for residential purpose because there would have been some objection from local authorities if the premises had been let out for any other purpose but they may be knowing. As far as I knew and understood nursery schools and kinder gardens were not objected to by the local authorities even in residential premises." In view of the above admitted facts it is established that the property, in any case, could not be let out for non-residential purposes and the defendant herself conceded that the same was to be used for residential purposes though plea was raised that this was done only to avoid objection from the local authorities. Issue No. 3 is accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff. In view of the findings on issue No. 3 it may not be necessary to deal with issue No. 4 in any further elaborate detail except to say that the plaintiffs had been issued notices for violating the terms of the Master Plan and First information Report was lodged regarding non-conforming use. The plaintiffs were also prosecuted by Delhi Development Authority and a judgment was delivered on April 21, 1976 and the operative part of the same reads as follows: " In view of the above, I hold that prosecution has proved beyond doubt the case against the accused persons in respect of the aforesaid offence. They are accordingly convicted. Since the accused persons have already started eviction proceedings against the tenants. In view of this, I hold that ends of justice will be met by imposing a fine of Rs. 1000.00 each. In default of payment of fine, they shall undergo S.I. for 15 days each." Additional Issues 1 & 2 The plaintiffs have prayed for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 3,000.00 per month with effect from January 1, 1978 until possession of the premises is restored back to them. This amount seems to be just, fair and equitable and no higher claim has been pressed at the time of hearing. Therefore, it is held that plaintiffs shall be entitled to the amount of Rs. 3,000.00 per month as mesne profits from January 1, 1978. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are granted decree of possession in respect of ground floor of the property bearing No. 1/5 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi with costs. The plaintiffs shall also be entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 3,000.00 per month from January 1, 1978 till the date the possession is handed over to them. The plaintiffs shall also make good the deficiency in Court-fees within two weeks from today and on payment of the requisite Court-fees the decree shall be drawn. It is a matter of regret that civil litigation even in this Court is delayed to such a great extent that this suit has taken nearly two decades for disposal. The appropriate steps have to be taken in the very near future to plan expeditious disposal of matters so that faith in the judicial system of the country is not eroded. The suit was argued at length by one Senior counsel and when it was concluded another application was moved for framing of the additional issue in an effort to reopen the proceedings as well as there was a change of counsel. Therefore, an attempt was made to prolong the matter further. The defendant has been in possession of the suit property for nearly two decades and it is argued by learned counsel for the plaintiffs that she has built her own premises in the vicinity. It is, however, not necessary for this Court to go into this question as this does not from subject matter of the present suit.