Inder Kumar Kapoor vs Jaswant Rai Gulati
1996 Latest Caselaw 112 Del

JUDGMENT

C.M. Nayar, J.

(1) The present petition is directed against the judgment dated 7th August, 1991 of Shri D.R.Singh, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. The learned judge passed an order of eviction against the petitioner under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in respect of the tenancy premises as situated in property No. 5904, Block No.4, Dev Nagar, New Delhi. Respondent Jaswant Rai Gulati (since deceased) filed the petition for eviction against the petitioner on the averments that the premises were let out to the petitioner for the purposes of residence. He further alleged that he was owner/landlord of the premises in terms of the compromise decree passed by the court of Shri J.S.Kerey, Sub Judge 1st Class, Ferozpur, Punjab. Till 31st December, 1986 he was residing in House No.5908 Block No.4 Dev Nagar, New Delhi and in terms of compromise this property fell in the share of his brother. Therefore, the respondent had to vacate the said property so as to hand over possession before the court of Sub Judge,Ferozpur on 23rd January, 1987. Thereafter, he was left with no other alternative but to occupy the premises on rent from 1st January, 1987 and he became a tenant in respect of two rooms, one kitchen, one bath, one toilet and one covered place situated on the First floor of the property No. 5911 Block No.4, Dev Nagar, New Delhi. This property besides being rental was insufficient for the petitioner and his family which consisted of his wife, two unmarried daughters and two sons dependent upon him. Further it was pleaded that the petitioner nor any of the family members had any other residential house in Delhi and the other property bearing No. 7078 Beriwala Bagh which came to the hands of the petitioner by inheritance in terms of compromise dated 23rd January, 1987 was a non-residential property and not Fit for human habitation being factory premises. Therefore, in this background the petitioner applied for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement to settle in the demised property along with his family-

(2) The petition was contested by the petitioner herein. It was contended that the respondent had no locus standi to File the present suit for eviction as he was neither the landlord nor owner of the suit premises. Further-more it was pleaded that the premises had been let out to the respondent by late Brij Lal Gulati who died leaving behind his sons and daughters w io arc all necessary parties to the eviction petition and hence the petition was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. The petitioner further alleged that respondent could not File the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act within a period of Five years with effect from 1st January, 1987 when he allegedly became owner of the property by way of settlement between the legal heirs of late Brij Lal Gulati. Similarly, it was pleaded that the respondent was owner of another house in Beriwala Bagh, New Delhi and this property was a double storey house which could easily accommodate the petitioner and his family members. It was denied that the property at Beriwala Bagh was non residential and not Fit for human habitation.

(3) The matter was examined at length and the parties led their respective evidence. The learned Rent Controller reiterated the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act that the respondent-landlord, in order to succeed in his petition for eviction, was required to prove (a) that the respondent was owner/landlord of the suit premises; (b) that the suit premises were let out only for the purpose of residence; (c)that the petitioner required bonaFide the suit premises for his residence and for the residence of his family members dependent upon him (d) that the petitioner or any other family members dependent upon him did not have any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation in Delhi. The learned judge examined these questions and on appreciation of evidence found that the respondent/landlord was owner of the suit premises, which were let out only for the purpose of residence of the petitioner; they were required bonafide by the respondent for his residence as well as for the residence of his family members; the respondent or any family member did not have any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation in Delhi. The order of eviction, as a consequence, was passed and the petitioner was granted time for a period of six months to vacate the demised premises by order dated 7th August, 1991.

(4) The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the ingredients, as referred to above, have not been proved. The petitioner is not ihe owner-landlord of the demised premises and the petitioner and his family had an alternative residential premises at 7078 Beriwala Bagh, New Delhi and the present place of abode at flat No.84, Apna Ghar Housing Society, where the family of the petitioner is residing is in fact owned by them. Therefore, an alternative reasonably suitable accommodation is available to the respondent.

(5) The first point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner docs not hold any ground, as the learned Rent Controller has clearly held on appreciation of evidence that the respondent became owner of the property of his father late Brij Lal Gulati on his death by virtue of a decree Ex.AW1/1 and, accordingly, the petitioner became a tenant in respect of the premises, as shown in the site plan Ex.AW1/3. The petitioner has not been able to refer me to any evidence to show that the respondent did not become owner-landlord of the premises in the face of the compromise decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. This plea is, therefore, without any merit and rejected.

(6) The second submission that the respondent has an alternative reasonably suitable accommodation at 7078 Beriwala Bagh is equally without any basis. The learned Rent Controller examined the matter and clearly held on appreciation of evidence that the factory was being run in these premises which was not Fit for human habitation. The place, accordingly, was not suitable for the residence of late respondent and his family and the petitioner failed to discharge the burden that the premises at Beriwala Bagh was sufficient and suitable for the residence of the respondent and his family members. There is no scope for interference in appreciation of evidence on record in exercise of revisional powers of this Court as the findings are based on cogent grounds and there is no jurisdictional error in the judgment of the Rent Controller. It is also contended by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the above said premises have since been sold on 26th June, 1989. The Sale Deeds have been produced in Court. It is also reiterated that the premises have been sold for running commercial activities. In the circumstances, it was amply proved on record that neither the alternative premises were available to the respondent and the family members dependent upon him for their residence as they were being used for factory purposes nor they were suitable for the same. There is no infirmity in this finding which is, accordingly, affirmed.

(7) The learned counsel for the petitioner next contends that the family of the respondent is currently residing in flat No.84, Apna Ghar Housing Society at Pitampura which in fact is owned by them and it is not the tenanted premises. This plea was raised at the time of arguments and it has not been substantiated in any manner. The Rent Controller has held, on appreciation of evidence, that the petitioner was living in the tenanted premises along with his family which was not reasonably suitable and sufficient for them and a rent of Rs.l250.00 per month was admittedly being paid for use and occupation of the same. The Finding of the Controller is unassailable and is accordingly affirmed.

(8) The respondent-landlord has since expired on 26th November, 1994. The Rent Controller has allowed the eviction petition of the respondent, since deceased under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act as he succeeded on that basis. His death will also bring the present case within the purview of Section 14-D of the Act. The said provision reads as follows:

"RIGHT to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow

(1)Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.

(2)Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub- section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her."

THE Supreme Court in V.Rajaswari v. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd. 54(1994) Delhi Law Times 494 has clearly held that this option is open to the landlady. Paragraph 4 of the Judgment reads as follows: "4On a careful consideration of the above arguments, we are of the view that under Section 14D, the tenant has practically no defense whatever. All that has to be proved under the said Section which has been extracted above, are; (i)that the landlady is a widow, (ii) the premises are required by her for own residence. In this case, both these requirements are satisfied. As regards the first, we do not want to state the obvious. Regarding the second, the fact that she is living with her daughter or any other person, is no ground to say that the premises in question is not required for her residence. If this be so, we are unable to sec as to how her demand for increased rent would militate against her plea. Having regard to this established fact, we think that the trial of the application under Section 14D before the Rent Controller, will only be redundant. Therefore.we direct eviction of the respondent-tenant under Section 14D."

FOR the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in this petition. The petitioner is, however, given time to vacate the demised premises till 31st July, 1996 provided the petitioner files an affidavit of undertaking within four weeks agreeing to deliver vacant possession at the end of the period without requiring the respondents to file execution petition. With the above direction, this petition is dismissed. There will be no order to costs.