Weldon Sales Corporation vs Om Prakash And Anr.
1995 Latest Caselaw 770 Del

JUDGMENT

Anil Dev Singh, J.

(1) This is a Civil Misc.(Main) against the order of Financial Commissioner, Delhi dated November 12, 1984. By that order, learned Financial Commissioner granted permission to the first respondent for the execution of the decree of eviction passed by the Civil Court against the petitioner in respect of plot bearing No.7199, 7200 and 7201, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and set aside the order of the Competent Authority dated January 19,1984 whereby it had directed the first respondent to get the plan of the proposed building, which he intended to raise on the disputed land, approved by the civic body for the purpose of getting permission under Section 19 Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956. The facts giving rise to the petition are as under:-

(2) The Delhi Improvement Trust agreed to sell land measuring 5826 sq. ft. comprised in Municipal Nos.7199, 7200 and 7201 Sadar Bazar, Delhi to the first respondent and Mr.Prem Narain and the possession thereof was handed over to them. They were required to raise construction on the said plot within the specified period. It was only after the completion of the building that the formal sale deed was to be executed in their favor by the Delhi Improvement Trust. After the partition of the country the petitioner occupied the aforesaid open plot in 1947. Ultimately in the year 1951, the first respondent and Prem Narain accepted the petitioner as a tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 48.00. It is not disputed that the petitioner started a factory over the land by raising an unauthorised structure over it. Sometime in the year 1964 the first respondent and the other co-owner instituted a suit, being suit No.887/64 in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi for eviction of the petitioner from the plot in question and for recovery of arrears of rent. On January 31, 1967 the suit was decreed and the petitioner was granted two months' time to remove the unauthorised structure and to vacate the land. The decree passed against the petitioner acquired finality as both the first and the second appeals were dismissed. While the first appeal was dismissed on January 11,1968 by the Additional District Judge, the order dismissing the second appeal was passed by this Court in Rsa No. 102 of 1968 on May 06, 1974. Since the land is situate in an area which has been declared to be a slum area under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (for short the Act), the first respondent on January 18,1979 applied before the Competent Authority Slum Areas for permission to execute the decree for eviction. On January 19, 1984 the Competent Authority granted conditional permission to the first respondent. The Competent Authority also held that the area in question should be treated as open land as the appellant had raised unauthorised construction over it subsequent to its occupation by the appellant, that the land falls in slum clearance area, that the appellant had the financial capacity to arrange alternative accommodation though with some difficulty, that the eviction of the appellant will be in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum area as provided under Section 19(4)(b) of the affects and that the respondent had not placed any evidence on record to show that he proposes to construct the building complying with the municipal Bye-laws and the Zonal Plan of the Delhi Development Authority. The Competent Authority in view of the last finding required the first respondent to get the plan of the proposed building approved from the Delhi Development Authority as a condition precedent for obtaining permission and in case the authorities insisted upon the clearance of the unauthorised structure as a pre condition for approval of the plan, in that event the said order was to be deemed as permission for execution of the decree of the civil court obtained by the respondent against the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority, the first respondent filed an appeal before the Financial Commissioner. As already pointed out the Financial Commissioner accepted the appeal by its order dated November 12, 1984 and granted permission to the first respondent for executing the decree of eviction. The Financial Commissioner also observed that since a decree of ejectment passed against the petitioner and in favor of the first respondent was in respect of the open plot of land, it was not necessary for the latter to get the plan approved for construction of a building thereon before the grant of permission to evict the petitioner specially in view of the fact that the petitioner had raised unauthorised construction thereon. It was also held that even removal of unauthorised construction would amount to improvement and clearance of the slum area. It was the view of the learned Financial Commissioner that the open land would stand automatically cleared/improved once the unauthorised construction thereon is removed. Accordingly the order of the competent authority was set aside and the permission was granted to the respondent for execution of the decree of eviction. The petitioner not being satisfied with the order of the Financial Commissioner has filed the instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution questioning the same.

(3) MR.JAITLEY, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed the order of the Financial Commissioner mainly on the following grounds:- 1.The decree of eviction could not be enforced without the first respondent securing approval of the plan for raising the construction on the land in question. According to section 19(4) (a) & (b) of the Act, permission to institute a suit for eviction or to enforce a decree of eviction against a tenant in a slum area can be granted by the Competent Authority only when he has the means to acquire the alternative accommodation and the eviction is in the interest of a slum area. Both the conditions postulated in section 19(4) (a) & (b) have to read cumulatively and not disjunctively and need to be satisfied. This construction would be in keeping with the decision of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Parsad vs. Union Territory of Delhi, . The finding of the Competent Authority that the petitioner had the financial capacity to secure an alternative accommodation was not based on valid considerations. 3. The view of the competent authority that an alternative accommodation could be obtained by the appellant at the rate of 20 paise per sq. ft. and at this rate it will be required to spend Rs. 1,166.00 per month by way of rent for an alternative accommodation measuring 5826 sq. ft. in a non slum area was not based on ground realities of the situation as no accommodation could be secured at such low rates. The test that a tenant living in a slum area can get an alternative accommodation at that rate does not hold good and is constitutionally unsound. He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rattan Arya and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another and Motor General Traders and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others and submitted that an eviction or provision of law initially in conformity with fundamental rights may cease to be so by passage of time. The test that a tenant living in a slum area can secure an alternative accommodation at the rate of 20 paise per sq. ft. of the covered area is totally archaic. 4. A request was made by the petitioner before the Financial Commissioner for grant of an opportunity to it for placing on record documents to show that it was a victim of 1984 riots which brought about its financial ruination, but no such opportunity was afforded. 5. The petitioner is a pre Master Plan user of the premises which are being used as a factory for manufacture of ink. In case the petitioner is required to move out of the subject premises, it has to shift to a conforming area in accordance with the Master Plan but the petitioner does not have the means to secure another accommodation in such an area. 6. There has been a partition amongst members of the petitioner firm. While the premises in question have fallen to the share of Sarvshri Prithpal Singh Sahni,Gulbir Singh Sahni,Amar Deep Singh Sahni Industrial Plot No.92/6 Faridabad has fallen to the share of Harvir Singh Sahni as per deed of retirement dated March 31, 1993 (Annexure P-1 at Page 95 of the paper book) to the rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner affirmed on January 10,1995. Therefore the petitioner has no other property where he can shift. 7. Without getting the requisite sanction of the plan for erection of a building on the subject land, permission could not be granted to the first respondent to execute the decree of eviction.

(4) On the other hand, Mr.Ishwar Sahai, learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that no case has been made out by the petitioner for interference with the order of the learned single Judge. He contended that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is to be exercised by the Court sparingly and only in rare cases. According to him the order of the Financial Commissioner does not suffer from any infirmity which warrants an interference by this court. He pointed out that both the Financial Commissioner as also the Competent Authority were of the opinion that removal of the unauthorised construction would amount to improvement and clearance of the slum area. Learned counsel urged that this being a finding of fact, based on material on record, is final and does not call for any interference. He further submitted that the primary object of the Act is the clearance of slums and prevention of creation of slums and that being so if in a given case the demolition or re-erection or re-construction of a building is necessary in the interest of slum clearance the poverty of the tenant, even if established would not bar the Competent Authority from granting permission. In the instant case the demolition of the unauthorised construction having been held to be necessary in the interest of slum clearance, the means of the petitioner to get an alternative accommodation loses significance. In this regard, he heavily relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Pannu Ram and others vs. Chiranji Lal Gupta and others, . It was further urged that even if the financial status of the petitioner is required to be taken into consideration, the finding of the Competent Authority and the Tribunal that the petitioner had the means to acquire an alternative accommodation cannot be faulted. Besides, the test that the tenant occupying industrial premises in a slum area can acquire alternative accommodation at the rate of 20 paise as reasonable one, has to be judged in the context of the time when the matter was brought before the Competent Authority for its consideration. It was also pointed out from the order of the Competent Authority that the business of the petitioner was an expanding one. Learned counsel denied the allegation of the petitioner that a request was made on its behalf before the Financial Commissioner for affording it an opportunity to place on record documents to show that the petitioner was a victim of 1984 riots in which it suffered heavily. According to the learned counsel no such request was made. While meeting the other submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been a partition amongst the partners of the petitioner firm and the property at Faridabad no longer belongs to the present partners of the firm, the learned counsel submitted that the alleged partition is a sham transaction put-forth only for creating a ground for the purpose of this appeal. He submitted that the industrial plot was acquired by the petitioner on October 30, 1964 but no mention of the same was made by it in its pleadings before the Competent Authority. The factum of acquisition of the plot was kept concealed by the petitioner in order to create a ground that he does not have any alternative accommodation to shift to, urged the learned counsel. He also submitted that a copy of the deed of retirement filed by the petitioner by virtue of which the Faridabad plot has been given to Harvir Singh Sahni, the retiring partner of the petitioner firm, shows that the alleged arrangement came into effect on March 31, 1993. Learned counsel contended that assuming that the partition took place on March 31, 1993, it cannot make any difference to the financial status of the petitioner as its status is to be seen at the time of passing of the order by the Competent Authority. Besides he canvassed that even if a partnership firm which took the premises on rent is dissolved, the erstwhile partners still remain tenants and the financial capacity of all the partners has to be seen.

(5) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.

(6) One of the controversies between the parties relates to the construction of section 19(4) of the Act. This provision is as follows:- @SUBPARA = "19.(4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub-section (3) the competent authority shall take into account the following factors, namely:-    (A)whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas; (c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed."  

(7) While the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that clauses (a) and (b) of section 19(4) have to be read cumulatively, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that they are to be read disjunctively. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, no permission can be granted to the landlord to institute a proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for eviction from any building or land in a slum area or execute such a decree or order against a tenant, unless the Competent Authority is of the view that an alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent urged that even if one of the factors postulated by clauses (a) and (b) of section 19(4) is in existence permission to execute the decree of eviction against the tenant or to institute eviction proceedings against him can be granted. In other words, his contention was that since the Competent authority as well as the Appellate Authority, were of the view that the removal of the unauthorised construction raised by the petitioner would be in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas, it was not necessary to consider the question as to whether the petitioner had the means to acquire the alternative accommodation, though both the Authorities had also considered that question and had come to the conclusion that the petitioner had the financial capacity to acquire the alternative accommodation. The question raised before me is no longer res-integra and had been decided by the Full Bench of this court in Pannu Ram's case (supra). It may be noted that the Full Bench while construing the said provision by the light afforded by the earlier decisions of this court, the objectives of the Act and its scheme and having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Prasad's case ÿ(Supra) held that an individual or a group of individuals owning property in slum area can assist the State in attaining the objective of clearing and improving slums. It further held that section 19(4) cannot be read to mean that unless alternative accommodation is provided in every case as a pre condition, improvement and clearance in slum areas cannot be contemplated. In this regard it observed as follows:-    "IN our opinion, the law is well settled. Improvement and clearance of slum is the avowed object of the Act. Chapters Ii, Iii and Iv give power to the State or its Officers to attain the objective and in order to attain it (they) have been given the requisite power so that there is no hindrance or obstruction. Because of the existence of this objective constitutionality of S. 19 was upheld by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad's case  wherein it was said that the exercise of power under S. 19 has to be in accordance with the legislative guidelines contained in the Preamble and Chapters Ii, Iii and Iv of the Act. We cannot read the observations of the Supreme Court as laying down that the State and State alone is to act to attain the objective of this social legislation. An individual or a group of individuals owning property in slum areas can assist the State in attaining the objective of clearing and improving slums. Indeed, that is why the Parliament brought in the amendment to S. 19 and S. 19(4) was enacted. There is no conflict between the observations of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad's case and circumscribing the exercise of power by the Competent Authority within the limits postulated by Section 19(4). Clause (b) of S. 19(4) cannot be read to mean that unless alternative accommodation is provided in every case as a pre-condition, improvement and clearance of slum areas cannot be contemplated. It may be in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum areas to some time demolish buildings even if it means evicting the occupants with no alternative accommodation being provided to them."  

(8) It further held:    "As we have observed earlier, the Parliament was conscious of the conditions obtaining in the areas where the Act had been in force and the extent to which the objective had been achieved when it enacted S. 19(4). Therefore, Cls. (a) and (b) have to be read disjunctively and it would amount to looking at the matter from the point of view of the tenant when permission is granted if conditions contemplated by clause (b) of S. 19(4) exist. That incidentally the landlord is benefited is immaterial. Just as protection from eviction is a social concept so is prevention of people from living in hovels. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the law enunciated in Abrol's case and in Mahabir Pershad's case (LPA No.122 of 1969, D.00 18.9.1973) (Delhi) (supra) is the correct law. ÿWe do not accept the proposition that clauses (a) and (b) must be read cumulatively. We do not also accept that even if the conditions postulated by clause (b) exist, but the tenant is too poor to acquire alternative accommodation, he can in no circumstances be evicted. We further hold that if the competent authority on valid grounds comes to the conclusion in a given case that eviction of the tenant is in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum areas, looking at it from the tenant's point of view the competent authority need not further investigate the question of the means and status of the tenant."  

(9) While coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the Full Bench relied upon earlier decisions of this Court in Smt.Parvati Devi vs. Tibbia College 1966 (2) Dlt 256, C.R.ABROL Vs. Administrator Ilr 1970 (1) Delhi 768, Fatima and two others vs. Smt.M.K. Rai and another (C.W.1268/70 decided on 30-7-1971), M/s.Krishan Lal   

(10) Mahadev Parsad vs. I.K. Sharma  Mahabir Pershad vs. M/s. Mahalaxmi I. & P. Co., Lpa 122/69 decided on September 18, 1973. A look at these decisions would show how firmly is the aforesaid proposition of law settled by this court.   

(11) In Smt.Parvati Devi (supra) it was observed by the Division Bench that the question whether alternative accommodation would be within the means of the tenant if he were to be evicted from the premises under his tenancy in a slum area, is one of the matters which is to be taken into account by the Competent Authority. It was held that section 19(4) of the Act does not lay down that in all cases where alternative accommodation is not within the means of the tenant the Competent Authority must refuse permission to the landlord to execute the decree of eviction already passed against the former. The Division Bench in that case looking to the circumstances under which eviction had been ordered by the Rent Controller,held that if eviction had been ordered to enable a landlord to carry out any work at the instance of the Dda or Mcd in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme and such building work cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated, the property of the tenant cannot be allowed to block the improvement scheme or development scheme which the landlord is under an obligation to carry out.In C.R.Abrol vs.Administrator (supra), a Division Bench held that section 19(4) enunciates the factors which can be taken into consideration by the Competent Authority and if anyone of the factors is in existence the Competent Authority can grant permission to execute the decree of eviction or to institute eviction proceedings against a tenant in the slum area. In Fatima vs. M.K.Ray (supra), the learned single Judge held that section 19(4) of the Act was mandatory as well as exhaustive. He further observed that that the factors mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) in section 19(4) were in the alternative and were not to be read cumulatively. In M/s.Krishan Lal Mahadev Parsad''s case (supra) again a learned single Judge took the view that the factors postulated in section 19(4) which can be taken into consideration by the Competent Authority for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant permission to the landlord for instituting proceedings for eviction or for execution of the decree for eviction against the tenant were in the alternative and therefore, it was not necessary to consider the financial status of a tenant when it is found that the eviction of the tenant would be conducive to the improvement and clearance of the slum area. Again in the case of Mahabir Pershad (supra), a Division Bench while taking the same view as was taken in Abrol's case (Supra) observed that if the factor envisaged by section 19(4)(b) exists poverty of the tenant or his inability to get an alternative accommodation, cannot be pleaded by the tenant to persuade the Competent Authority in his discretion to refuse permission. It was held that clauses (a) and (b) of section 19(4) have to be read disjunctively as in the alternative, and not cumulatively. To do otherwise would not be in consonance with the object which the Act seeks to achieve. The Division Bench cited with approval the decision rendered in C.R. Abrol's case. The same view was taken in a subsequent decision in Sarup Chand and others Vs. U.O.I. & others .

(12) Having regard to the aforesaid decisions, I have no option but to hold that clauses (a) and (b) of section 19(4) of the Act have to be read disjunctively and not cumulatively. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent has to be upheld. I do not see how the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Prasad's case (Supra) is helpful to the petitioner. This judgment, as already seen, has been considered by the Full Bench in Pannu Ram's case (Supra) while interpreting Section 19(4) of the Act.

(13) Since the Competent Authority as well as the first appellate authority have concurrently held that the eviction of the petitioner and clearance of the unauthorised construction would be in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas, it would not be necessary then to consider the financial capacity or the means of the petitioner to acquire alternative accommodation. Even though it was not necessary for the authorities to go into that question, still they went into it and held that the petitioner could acquire an alternative accommodation within his means. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, submitted that the Competent Authority was of the view that the petitioner may be able to secure an alternative accommodation within his means but it would not be without difficulty. Learned counsel submitted that such a finding does not meet the requirement of section 19(4)(a). Besides, he urged that the approach of the Competent Authority that the accommodation in a non-slum area for commercial purposes can be had at the rate of 20 paise per sq. ft. was not realistic. He also submitted that the criteria applied for the purpose of computing the rate at which alternative premises can be had is archaic and is divorced from realities.

(14) I have considered the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner but it seems to me that these submissions would not arise as the condition envisaged by Section 19(4)(b) of the Act for grant of the permission to execute the decree for eviction earlier passed against the petitioner exists, as found by the competent authority. At this stage it will be convenient to extract the finding of the competent authority: "........THUSfrom the magnitude of business they run and the assets they acquire I can visualise that the respondent can arrange to find alternative accommodation with some difficulty. I do not make them the allowance for this difficulty because I also agree with the petitioner that permission for execution of the decree of eviction against them will be in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum areas as provided under Section 19(4)(b) and that such an improvement can also be affected at the instance of the landlord /Pvt.parties in terms of decision of their Lordship in 'Pannu Ram and others Vs. Chiranjit Lal & others, Lpa 190 of 1977 decided on 28.5.82".

(15) For yet another reason these submissions do not arise for consideration. It cannot be denied by the petitioner that it was allotted an industrial plot at Faridabad on October 30, 1964 (Date is culled out from Annexure P 2 at page 100 of the paper book). But this fact was not brought to the notice of the Competent Authority or the Appellate Authority by the petitioner. It was the duty of the petitioner to have disclosed the factum of acquisition of the plot before them. Non disclosure amounts to concealment of fact. In order to counter the adverse affect of the aforesaid fact, the petitioner has now come up with a plea that there has been a partition of the property between the members constituting the firm. It is urged that the Faridabad property has fallen to the share of SH.Harvir Singh. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to a copy of the deed of retirement dated March 31, 1993. From the copy of the deed, it is clear that it was executed long after the decisions were rendered by the Competent Authority and the Financial Commissioner. Assuming that the partition took place on March 31, 1993 and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner made over the plot to the retiring partner, the plea of partition will not come to rescue of the petitioner as the state of affairs existing at the time of consideration of the application of the landlord under Section 19 of the Act will have to be taken into consideration. Undoubtedly the industrial plot No.92 at Faridabad was the property of the petitioner firm when the application of the first respondent under Section 19 of the Act was filed before and considered by the Competent Authority and it remained the property of the petitioner even on the dates when the order of the Competent Authority and the Financial Commissioner was passed. No importance can be attached to the alleged partition of the property of the petitioner effected after the passing of the order of the competent authority under Section 19 of the Act. A resort to such pernicious method will render the orders passed by the Competent Authority or the Financial Commissioner as otiose and nugatory. In Madan Lal vs. Competent Authority and another,ILR 1972 (2) Delhi 857, the Division Bench of this Court held that the Competent Authority has to ascertain the state of affairs at the time of consideration of application under section 19 of the Act. This principal adumberated in the aforesaid decision is a sound and salutary principle of law as otherwise a party will keep on changing his position at various stages of litigation in order to overreach the decisions of the Competent Authority and the Financial Commissioner.

(16) It may also be noted that in the instant case the Conveyance Deed pursuant to the retirement deed has not yet been executed. This is evident from the copy of a letter of the partners of the petitioner addressed to the Estate Office, Huda, Faridabad which is Annexure P- 2 to the rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner filed on January 10, 1995 (page 100 of the petition). Even otherwise the original partners constituting the petitioner firm will remain tenants of the first respondent even after some of them may have retired as there is nothing to show that the first respondent accepted the arrangement arrived at between the partners. In Usha Bhasin vs. Competent Authority , it has been held by this Court that where a firm is a tenant, the partners will remain tenants on the dissolution of the firm.

(17) Since the petitioner already had alternative accommodation viz Industrial plot at Faridabad, the question whether an alternative accommodation within the means of the petitioner would be available to him in the event of his eviction does not arise.

(18) The petition is also liable to be thrown out on the ground that the petitioner concealed this fact that it was having an industrial plot No.92, at Faridabad.

(19) The Competent Authority had also found the business of the petitioner to be an expanding one and it could acquire a staff car, delivery van and land for Bombay factory. In coming to this conclusion the Competent Authority relied upon the incometax returns for the year 1978-79, 1979-80 and 80-81 which showed the annual income of Rs. 82,000.00, Rs. 74,000.00 and Rs. 83,000.00 respectively. It was also found that the petitioner transacted business over Rs. 10 lacs. This finding has been affirmed by the Financial Commissioner.

(20) Besides industrial plot at Faridabad and land at Bombay, the petitioner is possessed of another property, namely, 56-57, Narain Market, Sadar Bazar, Delhi. This is apparent from Annexure P-5 to the rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner (page 103 of the file).

(21) Having regard to the aforesaid properties which were acquired by the petitioner, the finding of the authorities below about the means of the petitioner cannot be interfered with. I may, however, add that Bombay property is not to be taken into reckoning as a possible alternative accommodation. The learned counsel for the petitioner is right in his submission that the petitioner cannot be expected to shift to a far away place like Bombay as a substitute for the instant plot. But surely Bombay property adds to the financial status of the petitioner. It may also be correct that Narain Market is also not suitable for running a factory. But that too indicates the means of the petitioner.Even if it be held that the petitioner was not possessed of the means to acquire the alternative accommodation, though there is enough material to show that the alternative plot at Faridabad was available to the petitioner and it had the required means as contemplated by Section 19(4)(a) of the Act,the permission to execute the decree of eviction can be justified on the ground of Section 19(4)(b) as clauses (a) and (b) have to be read disjunctively.

(22) There is also no warrant in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the permission to execute the decree of eviction should not have been granted by the Financial Commissioner without requiring the first respondent to secure from the civic body the requisite sanction of the building plans for raising construction on the subject land. There is no such requirement under any of the sub sections of Section 19 of the Act. Even under Section 19(4)(b) the only factor to be considered is whether the permission to institute legal proceedings for eviction of the tenant or to execute a decree already secured for such a purpose, would be for the improvement and clearance of the slum area. It is also not necessary that after an unauthorised building or structure is cleared from a slum area, the resultant open land must be built upon. Imposing additional conditions would tantamount to re- writing the statute. Removal of an unauthorised construction is by itself an act of clearance and improvement of a slum area and it is not necessary to replace it by another building.It has been noticed by the Financial Commissioner in the impugned order that the ejectment decree passed against the petitioner was not on the ground that the first respondent wanted to raise a building on the vacant land. Thus, the Financial Commissioner was right in holding that removal of the unauthorised construction would amount to improvement and clearance of the slum area.

(23) Lastly I will deal with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the alleged request made before the Financial Commissioner for adjournment of the matter for placing on record material to show that the petitioner was a victim of 1984 riots but no such opportunity was afforded to it. On perusal of the record I find that the petitioner did not move any application before the Financial Commissioner requesting for such an opportunity to be provided to it. An affidavit has been filed by Shri Kalka Prasad Aggarwal, counsel for the first respondent, dated December 18,1990, stating that the matter was argued before the Financial Commissioner on November 9,1984. It further avers that no request was made by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority seeking adjournment of the matter for placing on record material to show that the petitioner suffered loss during 1984 riots. A perusal of the order of the Financial Commissioner also does not show that any such request was made before it. It has not been explained as to what prevented the petitioner from filing an application before the Financial Commissioner on November 9,1984 giving details of the loss during the riots and seeking time to file material in support thereof. Besides, as already observed, it is not necessary to go into question of financial status of the petitioner.In these circumstances, therefore, I have no hesitation in rejecting the aforesaid plea of the petitioner.

(24) In view of the aforesaid discussion no interference is called for with the order of the Financial Commissioner dated November 12, 1984. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed but with no order as to costs.