Kewal Singh Chadha And Ors. vs The Director (Panchayats) A.D.M. ...
1995 Latest Caselaw 767 Del

JUDGMENT

M.K. Sharma, J.

(1) Since the questions of law raised in these writ petitions are similar we propose to dispose of these three writ petitions by this common judgment. Civil Writ 4296/1993 : By this writ petition the petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned notice dated 6.6.1992 issued by the Director (Panchayats)/Additional District Magistrate, Delhi under Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, 1954 read with Rule 47(a) of The Delhi Land Reforms Rules and also for quashing of the order dated 12.1.1993 passed by the Director (Panchayat) in pursuance of the aforesaid notice. The case of the petitioners in short is that they were allotted the lands by the Gaon Sabha and became lesses under the Gaon Sabha/Gaon Panchayat. The rent in respect of the aforesaid land lease out in favor of the petitioner was being depositedbypetitioners.However,subsequentlythe Gaon Sabhal Gaon Panchayat refused to accept the rent from the petitioners. On 22.1.1990 the Gaon Sabha was superseded and thereafter on 6.6.1992 the impugned notice was issued by the Director (Panchayats), respondent No. 1 alleging the petitioners as encroachers of Gaon Sabha land, situated at Andheria Mod. The petitioners appeared before respondent No. 1 and filed their written statements. The respondent No. 1 passed an order dated 12.1.1993 declaring the petitioners as encroachers and in possession of the Gaon Sabha land without legal title or documents and further ordered that the proceedings under Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 be initiated against the petitioners for their ejectment from the Gaon Sabha lands. Accordingly, by this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality & validity of the aforesaid impugned notice dated 6.2.1992 & also the order passed in pursuance thereof on 12.1.1993. Civil Writ 5432/1992: The contention of the petitioner in this writ petition is that her husband was allotted some land by the Gaon Sabha on perpetual lease basis. It is stated that rent was accepted by the Gaon Sabha up to June, 1985 and thereafter no rent was accepted by the respondents from the petitioner. Instead a notice purported to be under Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act was issued against the petitioner on 10.6.1992 treating the petitioner as an encroacher upon the land of Gaon Sabha and thereafter the impugned order dated 12.1.1993 was passed against the petitioner. Civil Writ 4412/1993: In this writ petition the contention of the petitioners is that they were allotted some land by the Gaon Sabha and were the lessees in respect of the same land. Rent in respect of the said land was-being deposited by the petitioners till December, 1984 but thereafter the Gaon Sabha refused to accept the rent. Instead the respondent No. 1 issued the impugned notice and thereafter impugned order was passed treating the petitioners as encroachers on Gaon Sabha land and carrying on commercial activities on the said land in violation of the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act.

(2) Mr. R.K. Ananad, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners drew our attention to the provisions of Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act and submitted that since the petitioners claimed to be lessees under the Gaon Sabha and produced rent receipts in token of their valid possession of the said land the provisions of Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act have no application at all in the present case and accordingly the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioners is bad in law and therefore, liable to be quashed. The further submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners was that the Director (Panchayats) has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice as also to pass the impugned order inasmuch as it is the Deputy Commissioner who is authorised under the provisions of the Act to initiate and take action, if any, and not the Director (Panchayats) as has been done in the present proceedings. It was further contended that a notice under Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act could not have been issued and consequently an order under the said provisions could not have been passed by the respondent No. 1. It was also contended that the Appellate Authority under Section 95 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act itself having passed the orders at the first instance under Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, the petitioners were deprived of the right of invoking the appellate jurisdiction and therefore, there is a mis-carriage of justice. The Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition 5432/1993 and C.W. 4412/1993 adopted the arguments of Mr. Anand.

(3) Mr. Nigam, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents countered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the impugned action taken by the respondents in the instant case is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. He further submitted that the impugned order merely directed that actions in terms of Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act he initiated for eviction of the petitioners and others in accordance with law. He further submitted that in the light of the 2 notifications issued by the respondents namely the notification dated 25.1.1990 and notification dated 30.1.1990 the respondent No. I was fully empowered to initiate the proceedings and to take final action as has been done in the present case. It was further submitted that a door to door survey was carried out by the staff of the Block Development Officer, Mehrauli block which revealed that large number of persons were sitting on Gaon Sabha land without any legal title or documents and therefore in accordance with the provisions and in pursuance of powers under Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act read with Rule 47(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, notices were issued to the petitioners to show cause and the impugned order was also passed in accordance with the aforesaid provisions.

(4) In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Sections 36 and 95 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, 1954 and Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, which have a bearing on the facts and circumstances of the present case : Section 36. Disposal of Claims. (1) Where any dispute arises as regards the ownership of any property mentioned in Section 35 between a Gaon Sabha and any person, the Gaon Panchayat shall give such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and then decide whether to treat the said property as the property of the Gaon Sabha.

(2)Nothing in this section shall bar any person or the Gaon Sabha from establishing his or its right in any Civil or Revenue Court having jurisdiction.

Section 95. Appeals.-(1) Any person aggrieved by an order or direction made by a Gaon Panchayat or Circle Panchayat under the Act or under any rule or bye-law may, unless otherwise prescribed, within 30 days from the date of such direction or order, exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof, appeal to the prescribed authority which may vary, set aside or confirm the said order or direction and may also award costs to or against the person filing the appeal.

(2)The prescribed authority may, if it thinks fit, extend the period allowed by Sub-section (1) for appeal.

(3)The decision of the prescribed authority under Sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court of Law.

Section 86A. Ejectment by Revenue Assistant of Persons Occupying Land without Title.- Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 64, 85 and 86, the Revenue Assistant also may, on receiving information or on his own motion, eject any person who is liable to be ejected from any land on a suit of the Gaon Sabha under any of these sections, after following such procedure as may be prescribed.

(5) The petitioners have not produced any lease in their favor showing allotment of the land in question in their favor. The petitioners, however, have produced certain photocopies of the receipts showing payment of rent in respect of certain lands. On perusal of the said copies of the receipts we find that the said receipts were issued by the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha. In reply to our pointed query to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Counsel stated that no lease deed is available with petitioners and the respondents should be directed to produce the same. So far as the photo-copies of the receipts are concerned there is no evidence to show that the same were issued with the approval of the Competent Authority to grant lease under Rule 178 of Delhi Panchayat Raj Rules. The allegation brought against the petitioners by the respondents are that the petitioners had been carrying on commercial activities on the land of Gaon Sabha and, therefore, in the absence of any legal title proceedings under Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 would be initiated, which according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, is the purport of the order impugned herein in these petitions.

(6) A reading of the provisions of Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act would show that there is no bar for a person or the Gaon Sabha from establishing his or it? right in any Civil or Revenue Court having jurisdiction to try such matters inspite of the fact that a proceeding has been initiated and decided in accordance with the provisions of Section 36(1) of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act. At this stage we may also appropriately refer to the provisions of Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, which empowers the Revenue Assistant on receiving information or on his own motion to initiate a proceeding to eject any person who is liable to be ejected from any land on a suit of the Gaon Sabha after following such procedure as may be prescribed. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid two provisions of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act and the Delhi Land Reforms Act, it is apparent that whether or not a proceeding is initiated and concluded under the provisions of Section 36(1) of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, a Revenue Officer is empowered to initiate a proceeding for ejecting any person from Gaon Sabha land occupying such land without title, who is liable to be ejected from any land on a suit of the Gaon Sabha provided the procedure prescribed for the purpose is complied with. In our opinion, therefore, initiation of proceedings under Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act is not dependent on initiation, conclusion and passing of the order under Section 36 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act but could be so initiated if in the opinion of the Competent Revenue Officer a person is liable to be ejected from any land and thereafter could be so ejected after full compliance of the procedure prescribed.

(7) On a perusal of the impugned order we find that the Director (Panchayats) directed for initiation of such a proceeding under Section 86A of the Act. The petitioners were unable to satisfy us that they have been lessees in respect of the land in question since no such lease deed could be produced before us in support of their contention. The validity of the rent receipts in respect of which our attention has been drawn is also disputed by the respondents. The allegation against the petitioners being that they have been carrying on commercial activities in the land of the Gaon Sabhu in violation of the provisions of the Act could be one of the grounds for ejectment of a person under the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act provided such allegation is proved and established. Admittedly, there is no dispute with regard to the ownership of the land in question which vests with the Gaon Sabha as according to the petitioners themselves they are lessees in respect of the same land and allegedly paying rent to the respondents in token of their possession and in recognition of title of the right and title of the respondents over the land in dispute.

(8) Considering the aforesaid aspects we are of the firm opinion that there is no bar for the respondents to initiate a proceeding against the petitioners as provided for under Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms Act which appears to be the real intention and purport terms of the impugned order. Accordingly, we find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the aforesaid action of the respondents is bad in law.

(9) In the result, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions. Accordingly the writ petitions are dismissed, but without any costs.