Harbh Uppal vs J.N. Uppal
1995 Latest Caselaw 647 Del

JUDGMENT

M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J.

(1) The appellant (defendant in the suit) appearing in person has preferred this appeal against order of the learned Single Judge in Ia 7126195 in Suit No. 528194. The learned Single Judge accepted the prayer of the appellant, in view of Provisions of Order 32-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and ordered that proceedings in the suit, as and when they are taken up, could be held in camera. However, the learned Single Judge dismissed the other prayer of the appellant seeking to restrain the publication of the order passed in another Ia 3625195 in open Court. He held that the orders in Ia 3625195 could be pronounced in open Court and be released to the registry. The appellant bos filed this appeal against latter part of the order in Ia 7126195 as stated above.

(2) The appellant is the 1st defendant in the suit filed by the 1st respondent for partition. The appellant filed his written statement. On the ground that there were scandalous and unbecoming allegations in the said written statement filed by the appellant. the plaintiff (respondent) filed application Ia 3625195 under Order 6 Rule 16 Civil Procedure Code for striking off those allegations. The appellant-defendant filed his reply in that Ia and arguments were heard and Judgment reserved.

(3) At that stage the present application Ia 7126195 was filed contending that the order in Ia 3625195 should not be pronounced open Court nor published in the registry because of Order 32-A, Rule 2.

(4) Of course, when this appeal was filed, we refused to consider he appeal for admission unless appellant withdrew certain unrolled for allegations in the appeal. This was done and fresh set of papers filed. In the meantime, judgment in Ia 3625195 was in fact pronounced. Appellant pressed for a decision in the appeal. At the stage of admission we are passing this order.

(5) Order 32A refers to suits relating to matters concerning 'family". Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 states that the order shall apply n particular to suits or proceedings concerning the "family'.. Thereafter sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 gives an illustrative list of suits or proceedings. Rule (2) of Order 32A provides that in certain .suits and proceedings, the proceedings may be held in camera f the Court so desires. Sub-rule (6) of the order refers to the word 'family' and gives a list of persons who shall be treated as constituting a family. The appellant contends that the learned Single Judge is. precluded from delivering judgment in Ta 3625 '95 n open Court in as much the delivery of judgment in the Ia amounts to "proceedings" falling' within Rule (2) oF Order 32A and should be delivered in camera According to him. even the order or judgment cannot be pronounced in Court nor can the same be made available in the registry' for perusal by any member of the public. Order 32A Rule 2 reads : "PROCEEDINGS to be held in camera: In every suit or proceedings to which this order applies, the proceedings may be held in camera if the Court so desires and shall be so held if either party so desires."

(6) In our view, the contention raised by the appellant cannot be accepted. Order 20 Rule ( 1 ) of the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins that the Court, after the case is heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or, as soon thereafter as may be practicable on some future day; and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. Sub-rule (3) of Rule I of Order 20 also states that the judgment may be pronounced in dictation in open Court to a shorthand-writer if the Judge is specially empowered by the High Court in this behalf. So far as the learned Single Judge sitting on the original side of this Court is concerned, these can be no doubt that he is bound to pronounce judgment in the open Court. This provision is not restricted by Order 32A Rule 2 in any manner.

(7) We do not find any reason as to why the judgment of a Civil Court dealing with family matters, be kept secret and be not pronounced in Court. If the legislature wanted that judgment or order under Order 32A ought not to be published, it would have made a provision like the one in Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That Section makes special provision in regard to judgments delivered under that Act. Section 22 reads as follows : "22.Proceedings to be in camera and may not be printed or published (1) Every proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in camera and it shall not be" lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any such proceeding except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court printed or published with the previous permission of the Court. (2) If any person prints or publishes any matter in contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (l), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees."

(8) The provision in Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955 not only makes it mandatory for the Court to conduct proceedings in camera but also requires that no person shall print or publish any matter with relation to such proceedings except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court; printed or published with permission of the Court. Nothing precluded the legislature from making a special provision in Rule 2 of Order 32A precluding pronouncement of a judgment or order or of its publication. In other words, for pronouncing or publishing judgments or orders falling under Order 32A the previous permission of the Court is not necessary. Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act was brought into the statute-book in 1976 by Section 15 of the Marriage Laws (Amendment Act) 1976. Order 32A was also enacted in 1976 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1976 (104 of 1976). Though both amendments came in 1970 the legislature did not think fit to make any special provision in Order 32A Rule 2 restraining pronouncement or publication of the judgments I orders passed under Order 32A.

(9) The Statement of Objects and Reasons for Order 32-A read as follows: "CLAUSE 83. It is felt that ordinary judicial procedure is not ideally suited to the sensitive area of personal relationships. Litigation concerning or involving affairs of the family, therefore, seems to require special approach in view of the serious emotional aspects involved. In the circumstances, the objective of the family counselling as a method of achieving the ultimate object of preservation of the family should be kept in the forefront. The new Order XXXIIA seeks to highlight the need for adopting a different approach where matters concerning the family are at issue, including the need for efforts to bring about an amicable settlement. S.O.R. (Gaz. of India, 8-4-74. Pt Ii, S. 2 Ext. p. 331). Clause 80 (Original Clause 83). (i) the Committee note that the Order XXXIIA makes provisions for the procedure for suits relating to matters concerning the family. But Clause (f) of sub-rule (2) of rule 1 enumerates a suit or proceeding relating to wills, intestacy and succession. The Committee feel that such suits or proceedings may or may not be instituted by a member of the family. The Committee are. therefore. of the opinion that the provisions of this clause should be restricted to a suit or proceedings instituted by a member of the family so that suits or proceedings filed by a third, party might be governed. by the ordinary procedure. Clause (f) of sub-rule (2) of Rule I of tile proposed new Order XXXIIA has been amended accordingly." (ii) The Committee are aware- that the connotation of "family", as seven in Rule 6, is for the purposes of Order XXXII-A, yet, the Committee feel that it should he clarified that the definition of 'family in rule 6 is without prejudice to connotation of that expression in any personal law or in any other law for the time being in force. An explanation to rule 6 of new Order XXXII-A has been inserted accordingly." J.C.R. (Gazette of India. 1-4-76, Pt. Ii, S. 2, Ext.. p. 804118.)"

(10) A reading of the above Statement of Objects and Reasons show that it was not intended that the judgment/order under Order 32A should not be pronounced in the open Court nor be printed published.

(11) The appellant placed reliance on Section 2(2.) and Section 2(14) but they have no relevance. The appellant also relied upon .Section 14 of the Delhi High Court Act. It reads as follows : "14.For the purposes of section 12 and 17(a) proceedings shall be deemed to be pending in a court until that court has disposed of all issues between the parties, including any issues with respect to the taxation of the costs of the proceedings and shall include appeals, applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, applications for review, petitions for revision and petition for writs : (b) references to a High Court shall be construed as including references to a Judge or Division Court thereof, and references to an order made by a court or a Judge shall be construed as including references to a sentence, judgment or decree passed or made by that Court or Judge."

It is to be noticed that the above said provisions in Section 14 are relevant only for the purposes of Section 12 and 17 of the Delhi High Court Act, as indicated in the opening part of the Section 14. Section 12 deals with transfer of proceedings from the High Court of Punjab to the High Court of Delhi while Section 17 deals with extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi to Himachal Pradesh. It is, therefore, clear that whatever Section 14 states is relevant only for the purpose of Section 12 and 17 and not for the purposes of interpretation of Order 20 Rule I nor for the interpretation of Rule 2 of Order 32A. For the aforesaid reasons, the contention of the appellant is rejected. Further the Ia 3.625195 filed by the respondent-plaintiff requires the striking-off of certain allegations in the written statement of the appellant-defendant under Order 6 Rule 16. For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed.