Amar Nath And Anr. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
1994 Latest Caselaw 719 Del

JUDGMENT

Jaspal Singh, J.

1. Amongst many buildings of historical and archeological interest adorning the sky line of Delhi is one known as Qutab Minar. Succumbing only partially to the vagaries of time, it stands proudly in a once sleepy hamlet of Delhi called Mehrauli. It now overseas colossal developmental activity around it. A little ahead of the complex now developed as a tourist spot around this Minar but under its lengthening shadows lies a piece of land bearing Khasra Nos. 1905/1811/1492 (less then one biswa), 1906/1811/1493 (10-11) and 1909/1812/1497 (7-19) total measuring 18 bighas 10 biswas. This piece of land is at the centre-storm of this legal battle. The cause is provided by the proceedings to acquire it under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called the Act). Following is a brief resume of the facts.

2. Sometime in the year 1916 the father of the petitioners purchased the land in question and later constructed thereon a Dharamshala, a Piao, three residential buildings and two water tanks. Part of the land was developed into a garden. He died in the year 1942 consequent upon which the land was mutated in the name of the petitioner. On November 13, 1959 the said land was notified for acquisition for a public purpose namely Planned Development of Delhi through notification under section 4 of the Act. It was followed on December 7, 1966 by a notification issued under section 6. On March 25, 1983 was announced the Award. The present writ petition was filed in October 1982.

3. The challenge is on the following grounds:

(a) The notification under section 4 of the Act was not published in the locality rendering it void.

(b) The notification under section 6 of the Act did not specify and describe the land which was proposed to be acquired or the structures standing thereon and as such it suffered from vagueness.

(c) The notification under section 4 issued on November 13, 1959 having been followed by notification under Section 6 on December 7, 1966 and the Award on March 25, 1983, there was inordinate delay rendering the entire proceedings bad in law.

(d) The Land Acquisition Collector was bound under law to give only one Award with regard to the land in question. By awarding compensation with regard to land only and reserving right to give another award with regard to superstructures etc., the Land Acquisition Collector acted illegally.

4. It is time now to come into grip with the contentions raised and to examine them in required depth.

5. There is no dispute that the notification under section 4 of the Act was published in the official gazette. The objection, is that its substance was not published in the locality. The respondents, however, claim its publication in the locality and in support reliance is placed on the counter-affidavit claiming such publication. The problem, however, is that the matter does not rest here. I had called upon the respondents to produce official record showing publication in the locality and this saw the respondents asking for adjournment after adjournment to trace and produce the record. It proved to be an exasperating exercise in futility as ultimately the respondents came up with the plea that the original record was not traceable and that probably it was to be found in the Roznamchas which stood destroyed. As per the petitioner the respondents were merely skirting the issue and their so-called frantic search was a mere pretence to lend some respectability to their false plea of publication.

6. Was it really a blind man's search in a dark room for a black cat which was never there?

7. I will come back to it a little later. Let me first read section 4(1) of the Act. It says:

"4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.-

(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)."

Clearly, the section lays down two requirements, namely, (1) a notification to be published in the Official Gazette and (2) the Collector causing to give public notice of the substance of the said notification at convenient places in the concerned locality.

8. And, what does Section 5A(1) of the Act say? Let us have a look at it too. It says:

"5 A. Hearing of objections -

(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, Sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be"

Section 5A thus empowers the interested person to object to the acquisition of the land. However, such objection has to be filed within thirty days from the date of issue of the notification.

9. As would be borne out from above, as far as a notification under section 4 of the Act is concerned the law prescribes that in addition to its publication in the Official Gazette, the Collector must also give publicity of its substance in the concerned locality. The purpose behind it is that in its absence the person interested may not be able to file objection about the acquisition proceedings depriving him thereby of the valuable right of representation provided under section 5A of the Act. The Supreme Court thus tells us in Collector (Distt. Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram :

"A bare perusal of section 4(1) clearly shows that in order to comply with the statutory requirements therein set out, a notification stating therein 'the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose' has to be published in the official Gazette. The second part of the Sub-section provides that the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Both the conditions are held by a catena of decisions to be mandatory. Whether the second condition is mandatory or directory is no more res integra. In Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan, Subba Rao C.J. speaking for the Court observed that the statutory intention is, therefore, clear namely that the giving of public notice is mandatory. If so, the notification issued under Section 4 without complying with the said mandatory direction would be void and the land acquisition proceedings taken pursuant thereto would be equally void. .........

the Court also referred to Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, and quoted with approval the statement therein made that a valid notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to the making of a declaration under Sub-section (1) of Section 6. This view has been consistently followed and was approved in State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib, , wherein it was observed that in the case of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the law has prescribed that in addition to the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, the Collector must also give publicity of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to have been complied with. The publication of a notice in the locality is a mandatory requirement."

The position thus boils down to this. The publication of the notice in the locality as required by the second part of Section 4(1) is mandatory and unless that notice is given in accordance with the provisions contained therein, the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated.

10. The mandate of the law being as noticed above, the challenge assumes significance.

11. Have the respondents satisfied the legal requirement?

12. As noticed above, there is an affidavit of a senior official swearing on the basis of the official records that there was a publication of the substance of the notification in the locality. Why should he not be believed? Or, to put it differently, should the failure of the authorities to trace the original record on account of its having been misplaced or destroyed be taken to be damaging enough to wash away the effect of the affidavit?

13. Three things need to be noticed as far as the claim with regard to publication in the locality is concerned. First, we have an affidavit sworn on the basis of the official record that such publication was done. True, the original record is not forthcoming but then, to my mind, this cannot be taken to be sufficient in itself to make me discard that affidavit. Secondly, one of the co-owners of the land in question had admittedly filed objections under section 5A and that objection petition when read out in court showed that publication in the locality was not challenged. I feel that this does lend credibility to the stand taken in the affidavit referred to above. Thirdly, the file of the Acquisition proceedings which was made available to the court contained a summary of the land sought to be acquired and its particulars. That summary was duly authenticated by one J.S.Lamba Land Acquisition Collector (PD) and bears the following endorsement:

"Checked & found correct.

Sd/-       

J.S. Lamba

L.A.C. (PD)7.12.1982"

This summary was gone through during arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner also. I am laying emphasis on this summary which was in Urdu written in Persian script as it contained the following:

"Notification zer dafa 4 ho chuka hai jiski mushtri munadi hasab zabta karaija chuki hai"

When translated, it would mean that notification under Section 4 had been published as per law by beat of drum. As already noticed, this summary was "checked and found correct" as far back as on December 7, 1982 by the Land Acquisition Collector himself. The Award itself was made in March, 1983. Does it not further fortify the assertion of the respondents with regard to publication of the notice in terms of Section 4 of the Act?

14. This, however, is still not the end of the matter. A similar question arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Union Territory of Delhi v. Patiala Flour Mills Co. AIR 1981 Delhi 203. Significantly, the notification under challenge in the said case was the same which is the subject-matter of the petition before me. It so happened that the learned single Judge who heard and decided the matter in the first instance, held the notification under Section 4 to be bad on the ground that its publication in the locality was not proved. Briefly stated, the reasons given in support of that finding were as under: (i) Beyond a bare assertion in the counter affidavit that public notice of the substance of the notification was given, no particulars had been furnished of the convenient places at which and the manner in which the publication was done, and that (b) such a bare assertion could hardly be regarded as proof of compliance with the mandatory provision in Section 4 of the Act. As before me, it was contended in the said case also that even if the affidavit and the summary referred to above were accepted, publication would still be bad on account of lack of particulars with regard to the convenient places at which the publication was done. The Division Bench finding itself unable to accept the reasoning of the learned single Judge, observed:

"The objection to this conclusion is two- fold. Firstly, the very same notification has been upheld in numerous cases and in fact the area of 300 square miles covered by the same notification shows that it could not be physically possible to give a public notice at convenient places beyond a limited extent. If a small plot of land is acquired, no doubt a notice would be given on that very land or to the owners thereof. However, if a very large area of land is acquired, then the notice has necessarily to be given by a different type of publicity.

15. This very notification i.e., the one under Section 4 made on 13th November, 1959 was the subject-matter of several proceedings in which objections were filed under Section 5A. One of the points raised in those cases was that only one notification could be filed under Section 6 and thereafter the notification under Section 4(1) was exhausted. This led to the passing of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, which was challenged before the Supreme Court in Udai Rain v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1138. The Amending Act which was retroactive was held to be intra vires which meant that different reports under Section 5A could be covered by different notifications under Section 6 and the same were valid for the period mentioned in the Act. In another judgment of the Supreme Court, namely, Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, , the history of the self-same notification as given in the judgment is self- explanatory. It was observed as follows:

"As regards the second contention that there was inordinate delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, and that the appellants and writ petitioners were deprived of the appreciation in value of the land in which they were interested, it may be noted that about 6,000 objections were filed under Section 5A by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Government had necessarily to wait for the disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further in the matter."

Thus, it would clearly appear that at least 6,000 objections were filed under Section 5-A referring to the same notification under Section 4. In addition to this, learned counsel for the State has produced before us a very large number of objections filed under section 5A concerning land adjacent to the one involved in the present Writ petition, i.e. relating to the same area of village Bahapur. There is no doubt that the court can take judicial note of the fact that objections have been filed by others from the same area which would largely establish that a public notice was given because otherwise nobody could have filed objections. We. cannot, therefore, accept the conclusion of the learned single Judge that there is no proof of a public notice being given."

16. The Division Bench judgment is thus a complete answer to the objections raised by the petitioner with regard to publication of the substance of the notification in the locality in terms of Section 4(1) of the Act. Respectfully, I may add that in the case before me, the presence of the summary referred to above and of the objections filed under section 5A with regard to the land in question itself by none other but one of the co-owners without challenging the factum of publication in the locality besides of course the counter-affidavit put this case on a higher and safer pedestal. I need say no more.

17. Having covered the first objection, let me travel on to the next.

18. It was contended that as notification under Section 6 of the Act is repaired to determine the identity of the property in question, the notification issued in the present case on December 7, 1966 under the said provision failed to do so inasmuch as the land notified was of Khasra No. 1811 whereas the land in dispute is comprised in khasra Nos. 1905/1811/1492 and 1906/1811/1493. The submission was that the so-called defect had rendered the declaration "ultra vires of Section 6(2) of the Act".

19. Yet another objection to the declaration under Section 6 was that although the land in dispute had buildings constructed on it, there was no reference to them showing further that the land in dispute had not been properly specified.

20. Do these objections have any teeth? Before I venture to answer the question raised a brief analysis of the relevant provisions of the statute would be helpful.

21. A look at Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Act would reveal that what is of primary importance is that "land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed" for a public purpose and notification has to be made to that effect. Significantly, Section 6 of the Act does not borrow the same expression. While notification under Section 4 is in respect of "land in a particular locality", Section 6, on the other hand, contemplates "a particular land", that is, a specific piece of land and makes no mention of "locality" at all. Why this difference? The Supreme Court supplies the reason as follows in Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay .

"The purpose of the notification under Section 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under S.6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a Company."

22. Although the word "locality" does not find mention in Section 6, its absence should not be accepted as obviating the mention of the locality in a declaration. It is true that Sub-section (2) enjoins the declaration to state "the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate" but that does not mean that the declaration need not contain any other particulars to identify or pin-point the "particular land". In a place like Delhi merely stating "the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate" may not be taken to be sufficient. The declaration must specify or, give such particulars as would be necessary to fix the identity of the particular land. If such particulars are not given in the declaration then may suffer from vagueness.

23. Can it be said that the declaration in the present case fails to meet the legal requirements as noticed above? My answer is in the negative. The declaration mentions the locality and notifies the land of khasra No. 1811 for acquisition. The grievance of the petitioner is that khasra No. 1811 having been subdivided into parts, the declaration ought to have mentioned the "min numbers" also which, in the present case, happen to be 1905 and 1906. But then "min numbers" may be required to be given where only sub-divided part or parts are sought to be acquired. Where whole of the khasra number is sought to be acquired, where is the need to give particulars of its sub-divided parts also? In the present case whole of the land in khasra No. 1811 was sought to be acquired. Whole includes its parts as well. And as it is so, the declaration cannot be held to be vague merely on the ground that particulars of two of its sub-divisions were not mentioned separately as well.

24. There is yet another reason which prompts me to dismiss the objection. Admittedly there was a plan of the land and it could be inspected at the office of the Collector. It was not the case of the petitioners at the time of arguments that the plan attached to the declaration was vague or unhelpful in determining the exact land which was the subject matter of acquisition. It has to be then taken as accepted that the land was properly specified and identified on plan. Under the circumstances, the challenge to declaration under Section 6 must fail on this ground as well. [See: Mukhtyar begum v. Commissioner, Nagpur ; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab C.W. No.79 of 1964 dated 28.9.64 (Punjab) referred to and followed in Subedar Samandar Singh v. State, )

25. As would be recalled, the declaration under Section 6 has also been challenged on the ,ground that, it made no mention of the constructions existing on the land. I think answer to this objection is provided in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bai Malimabu v. State of Gujarat wherein it was held that since "land" as defined in section 3 of the Act includes the superstructure, if any, existing upon it, it is not the requirement of the law to mention the superstructure, if any, separately in the notification.

26. To be fair to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was also argued by him that the declaration under Section 6 was also bad as it did not give municipal numbers assigned by the Municipality to the land in question. I find myself unpersuaded. The land had been properly identified. Consequently, there was no need to give municipal numbers also.

27. This much on the second objection.

28. It was next submitted that the Collector has opted to give two separate Awards, one which has still not been announced - and in support my attention was drawn to the following appearing in it.

''In khasra No. 1906/1811; the well situated is of 7-1/2' dia meter. Along with it at site, there is a big tank of good quality, for storage of water and necessary fittings of pipe etc. are made for the supply of water to the occupants of Dharam-Shala to which the well and storage is attached. Its value will be awarded through a Supplementary Award. Assessment of which is being got done by the technical staff Along with the valuation of the building of Dharam-Shala.

And,

"In Khasra No. 2848/1813(1498), 1909/1812 (1497) and 1906/1811(1493) there are buildings existing much before the date of notification under Section 4. There value have to be got assessed by the technical staff and award for their compensation will be made through supplementary proceedings on receipt of the valuation report."

29. It was contended that as under the law there can be only one Award and as the Award in question envisages yet another Award, it renders itself bad in law on that account. In support my attention was drawn to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Kerala v. P.P. Hassan Koya AIR 1968 SC 1201 and to yet another judgment which comes from the Punjab & Haryana High Court, reported as Sharan Pal Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1991, P & H 99 which, in fact, seeks to rely upon the above-noted judgment from the Apex Court.

30. In P.P. Hassan Koya's case (supra), the most important thing to remember for our present purposes is that there was one Award. The Collector had not reserved his right to pass a supplementary Award as in the case before me. The dispute in that case centered round the method to be adopted in determining the value of the land with buildings. The Land Acquisition Officer had determined the compensation payable to the persons interested at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per acre for the land, and for the houses standing thereon "at their break-up value". In a reference under section 18 of the Act, the Subordinate Judge took the view that the method so adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determining compensation by valuing the lands and the break-up value of the houses was "manifestly unjust and improper", and proceeded to adopt the method of determining the market value by capitalizing the net rent received from the unit, and taking into consideration the return from gilt-edged securities at 3-1/2 per cent at the relevant date. By resorting to this method he awarded compensation for the unit in question at 35 times the net annual rent. Dissatisfied by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, the State of Kerala went in appeal. The Kerala High Court determined compensation by multiplying the net rent by 33-1/2 times, that being in its view the true multiple derived from the return based in the current return from the gilt-edged securities. The matter than went to the Supreme Court and the point raised before it was that the rate of capitalization was unduly high. The Supreme Court agreed with the Trial Court and the High Court that the method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determing compensation was unwarranted and proceeded to observe:

"In determining compensation payable in respect of land with buildings compensation cannot be determined by ascertaining the value of the lam, and the "break-up value" of the building separately. The land and the building constitute one unit, and the value of the entire unit must be determined with all its advantages and its potentialities. "

And that:

"It cannot be laid down as a general rule applicable to all situations and circumstances that a multiple approximately equal to the return from gilt-edged securities prevailing at the relevant time forms an adequate basis for finding out the market value of the land."

It would thus be clear that the case related to one award and not to a case where the Land Acquisition Collector reserves his right, as in the case before me, to announce a supplementary Award. Secondly, the case essentially related to the method to be adopted in awarding compensation.

Consequently, in my view it is no authority on the question involved before me, that is, the effect of reserving a right to pass a supplementary Award.

31. In Sharan Pal Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), after referring to the above-cited judgment of the Supreme Court, the learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that necessary consequence of the Supreme Court judgment is that "only one award has to be rendered for the unit".

32. However, the question is, when a supplementary Award is given will it not form part of the main Award? Is supplementary Award not a special part of an ordinary part? Or a part only of the main part? If so, and I feel it is so, no fault can be found as the Award already stands announced and the Supplementary Award would submerge itself into the main Award, it being only its part.

33. Let me look at it from another angle. But before 1 do it, let me refer to a judgment of the Privy Council in Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra AIR 1932, which, it appears, was missed somehow by the otherwise discerning eyes of the counsel appearing in this case. In the said case the officer had dealt with the land by two documents. Their Lordships held that as the land in question was dealt with in both the documents, both of them must be read together as constituting one Award. Does it not mean that although in respect of a parcel of land section 11 of the Act contemplates only one Award, that Award may be contained in more than one document? If this be the position, what objection can possibly be there to the approach of the Collector with regard to the giving of a supplementary Award?

34. Of course, since the Supplementary Award has still not been made, we do not know what method is going to be adopted in determining compensation. This being the position, it would be open to the petitioner, at appropriate stage, to object, if so advised, to the method which may ultimately be adopted and thereby to the Award. Obviously that stage has not yet come.

35. Yet one more objection remains to the Award. And let me deal with it too before proceeding further.

36. It was next contended that Section 11-A of the Act makes it mandatory for the Land Acquisition Collector to make an Award under Section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984, and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for acquisition of me land in question shall lapse. It was argued that the Supplementary Award having not been made so far, the consequences of section 11-A of the Act stood clearly invited.

37. Unfortunately for the petitioner, I find myself unable to make myself agree with this contention ton. The reasons are as follows.

38. It is true that as per Section 11-A of the Act if an Award is not made within a period of two years from the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984 the entire acquisition proceedings with regard to the land in question would lapse. It is also true that in the present case the Supplementary Award has still not been made. But then, as already pointed out above, it is not a case where "no award" has been made. In fact the Award already stands made. True, some ground still remains to be covered and for that a supplement is to follow, but that does not wash away the Award already made and it is its presence which makes Section 11-A inapplicable.

39. Let us examine the matter from another angle and for that it is the Explanation to Section 11-A which hold the key. Let me reproduce it. It says:

"11-A. Period within which an award shall be made :-

The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.

Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court snail be excluded."

40. I say that the Explanation reproduced above holds the key because in the writ petition the court had, as far back as on October 25, 1982, stayed dispossession of the petitioner.

41. It was contended that the order staying dispossession of the petitioner did not and could not come in the way of making a supplementary Award, and as the said order posed no hurdle, the Collector ought to have proceeded to make the supplementary Award. With respect, I do not think this displays a correct appreciation of what has been explained in the Explanation.

42. While construing the Explanation we can ill afford to ignore the words "any action or proceeding".

43. Johnson tells us that the word "every" means each one of all, and the same great lexicographer defines "any" to mean "every", and says it is in all its senses, applied indifferently to persons or things.

44. It needs to be noticed that "any" when used in the affirmative and negative sentences has different meanings. To exemplify, the corresponding opposite of "not any" is not "any", while, on the other hand, "any" as used in affirmative sentences, being indeterminate in application, in broad and distributive sense it has reference to "every", "each" or "each one of all".

45. In short thus, the adjective "any" is of comprehensive meaning and being often used in the sense of "all" or "every", it precludes limiting the application of the phrase to a particular kind of action. And, once this position is accepted, the stay of dispossession by the Court would attract the application of the Explanation.

46. I am conscious of the fact that like all other general words, the meaning of "any" may also be restrained and limited by the context of the subject- matter. I. am conscious of this also that when used in a statute, the word should be so construed as to make its meaning comport with general scheme of the statute. And, if we peruse the Explanation with a discerning eye, it would be clear that it does lay down a limitation in the sense that "any action or proceeding to be taken" has to be "in pursuance" of the declaration which was to be taken but stayed by an order of a court.

47. The phrase "in pursuance of is more restrictive than the phrase "by reason of" which is permissive, and imports a notion of obligation. "In pursuance of" may be taken to mean "under" or "by virtue" or "in execution" of a statute. Surely, any action not authorised by a statute cannot be "in pursuance" or "under" or "by virtue" of it.

48. Barring the limitation referred to above, I find no other limitation imposed upon the phrase "any act "on" and I see no reason why within the sphere of its activity so prescribed this phrase be not allowed its full play. After all, taking of action to get possession is also in pursuance of the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. The action contemplated by the Explanation is the action to be taken in future. Why limit the horizons of that future within some confines when the Exploration itself prescribes no such limit? Let us take the case in hand. When the order staying dispossession was passed, the stage of sections 7 to 10 was already over. Rather the Award or at least, the main part of it, already stood passed and thus nothing remained to be done as far as those sections of the Act are concerned. Can it be said that in such an eventuality the Explanation will have no role to play? I think by holding so we would be scuttling the otherwise vibrant provision of widest amplitude.

49. For what has been recorded above, I find no force in the third objection as well.

50. It was last contended that delay in acquisition was fatal. Is it so?

51. The notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on November 13, 1959. This was followed on December 7, 1966 by a declaration under Section 6. Notices under section 9 and 10 of the Act were of October 13, 1982. It was argued that this delay of 16 years was unreasonable and as such the proceeding deserved to be quashed. In support my attention was drawn to Hansraj H. fain v. State of Maharashtra . However, I find myself unable to subscribe to this view. The notification under Section 4 required very large areas requiring detailed planning for development. Moreover, the notification saw many a legal battles in the form of numerous writ petitions entailing delay. This being the position and as it is not shown that the action lacked bonafides and was made in colourable exercise of the power, there is no scope for striking it down. In any case, by not questioning the validity, of the acquisition proceedings for a long time since the declaration was made under Section 6, the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings has become inappropriate because plans for development have been drawn but could not be implemented on account of the stay of dispossession.

52. In Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. JT 1993 (5) SC 465 the Supreme Court awarded additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum, after expiry of two years from 23.8.1979, the date of its judgment in Aflatoon's case till the making of the award, by the Collector to be calculated with reference to the market value of the land in question, on the date of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4. I hold that the petitioner before me too shall be entitled to additional compensation at the rate and in the manner as laid down by the Supreme Court.

53. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs