Pramilla Puri And Ors. vs Rajinder Singh And Ors.
1994 Latest Caselaw 448 Del

JUDGMENT

R.C. Lahoti, J.

(1) This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 preferred by the claimants, arising out of the Award dated 12.7.1990passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, New Delhi.

(2) The claimants are the dependents of late Shri 0m Parkash Puri, who died having met with an unfortunate accident on 23.2.1984 at about 9 a.m. on account of rash and negligent driving of buses owned by D.T.C. and the respondent No. 1 and driven by the respective drivers who are also respondents. The buses were insured by the respondent No. 5. The deceased was 33" years of age at the time of hisdeath. He was serving as a postal assistant in the office of the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices at a monthly salary of Rs. 1100.00. The Tribunal has assessed the dependency of the appellants at Rs. 800.00 per month and adopted a multiplier arrive at a figure of compensation of Rs. 1,92,000.00, awarded to the appellants. The appellant No. 1, the widow of the deceased, was already in an employment. The amount of compensation has been ordered to carry interest calculated at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of the award till realisation.

(3) The sole and singular point arising for consideration in the appeal is the figure of compensation. According to the claimants- appellants the deceased would have served up to the age of 58 years and hence the Tribunal should have adopted a multiplier of 25 i.e. the period for which the deceased could have served and earned but for the death occasioned by the accident. Reliance has been placed on a Supreme Court decision in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, and a single Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana HighCourt in Swaran Kaur v. Saghar Singh, 1993 (2) Plr 297. It has also been submitted that the awarded compensation should have been directed to carry interest at the rate of 15% p.a. in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Rukmani Devi v. 0m Parkash, 1990 Acj 687 and a Single Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Mala Aggarwal v. Jagdish Kumar, 1992 Acj 123.

(4) In so far as the principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants concerned, it is not necessary to dwell on it in detail, as law stands settled fully and finally with the pronouncements of their Lordships in GeneralManager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 (1)M.P.Judicial Reporter 1. Repelling a similar contention, as has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants before this Court, their Lordships have held: "IT is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier-method is logically sound and legally well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings of for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage there from towards uncertainties of future life and award the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased, says 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years...virtually adopting a multiplier of 45.... and even if one third or one fourth is deducted there from towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34.This is wholly impermissible. We are aware that some decision of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some suchbasis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle.They are merely instances of particular awards in individual' cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier-method. Any departure,except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation."

And again, "SOME judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground that Section 110(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in so far as it envisages the compensation to be just the statutory determination of a just compensation would unshackle the exercise from any right formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a just compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts, which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that themultiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases."

(5) The following statement of law from Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 34para 98 has been quoted with approval by their Lordships :- "THE calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest, in practice about 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and inflation is disregarded. It is assumed that the return on fixed interest bearing securities in so much higher than 4 to 5 percent rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax prayer. The multiplicand is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure:However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependents can invest theirdamages, the lump sum award to reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being thatthe dependents will each year draw interest and some capital ( the interest element decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the package of fund will be exhausted at the age which the Court assesses to be the correct age having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such asillness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarial evidence is admissible but the Courts do not encourage such evidence."

(6) In Susamma Thomas's case ( supra) the deceased was 39 years of age. He was a salaried employee earning Rs. 1032.00 per month. Their Lordships deductedl/3rd of the gross income towards the personal expenses of the deceased and treated the balance amount as likely to be spent on the welfare of the family and thedependents. A multiplier of 12 was chosen by their Lordships as appropriate to the age of the deseased.

(7) The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants does not hold the ground in view of the law laid down by their Lordships in SusammaThomas's case ( supra). Having assessed the dependency of the appellants, the Tribunal has chosen to adopt a multiplier of 20 while the deceased was in histhirties. Thus, the Tribunal has already been liberal in choosing the multiplier. It cannot be so interfered with as to be scaled down in the absence of a cross appeal or cross objections having been preferred by any of the respondents. The figure of compensation arrived at by the Tribunal has to be maintained.

(8) In so far as the award of interest is concerned. Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for award of simple interest at such rate as the Court may deem fit and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as the Court may specify.

(9) Keeping in view the decision of their Lordships in Narcinva V. Kamat v.Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins, 1985 Acj 397 as also the fact that in SusammaThomas's case ( supra) their Lordship vide para 15 left undisturbed the rate of interest of 12% effective from the date of the petition till payment, in the opinion of this Court, the Tribunal ought to have awarded interest calculated @12% p.a. from the date of the claim petition till realisation.

(10) For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. Though the figure of compensation arrived at by the Tribunal is maintained, in so far as the award of interest is concerned, a direction for award of interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of preparing claim petition till realisation shall stand substituted in place of the direction made by the Tribunal. Rest of the award is maintained.The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.No order as to the costs of this appeal