Sarla Luthra vs Gadore Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd.
1992 Latest Caselaw 552 Del

JUDGMENT

Santosh Duggal, J.

(1) The question falling for determination in this revision petition filed under section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short the Act. falls in a very narrow campass.

(2) The petitioner claiming to be the exclusive owner in respect to the ground floor premises of property bearing No. 151, Golf Links, New Delhi, under the tenancy of respondent No. 1, sought eviction of the tenant from the tenancy premises, by invoking the provisions of section 14D of the Act. The avrments, set out in the eviction petition, as culled from the impugned order, were that late Rai Bahadur Jai chand Luthra was the owner of this property, and landlord of respondent No. 1. in respect to the ground floor premises Along with one garage and two servant quarters, having let out the same to the said respondent.

(3) It was further pleaded that the said owner/landlord had bequeathed this, property to his three sons who became co-owners after his death. They were Lt. Col. Manmohan Singh Luthra, Maj. Gen. Surinder Mohan Luthra and Shri Joginder Nath Luthra. The petitioner further alleged that by virtue-of the bequest, the ground floor portion, which was under the tenancy of respondent No. I, fell exclusively to the share of Lt. Col. Manmohan Singh Luthra, husband of the present petitioner, and thus respondent No. I became a tenant under said Lt. Col. Manmohan Singh Lulhra. Lt. Col. Manmohan Singh Luthra having since died, the eviction petition was brought by her as being a widow, claiming to be landlady of the premises, on the plea that her late husband had bequeathed this property to her, and after his death,she has become exclusive owner. There was a specific plea that respondent No. 1 has been attorning to the petitioner after the death of her husband. She also pleaded that she had no other accommodation in her occupation in Delhi, and she required the tenancy premises for her residence as well as members of her family dependent upon her for residence.

(4) Respondents 2 and 3 in this petition, who were also imp leaded as such in the eviction petition, are two other brothers of the deceased husband of the petitioner. They have not contested the claim of the petitioner as to being the exclusive owner of the ground floor portion Along with garage and two servant quarters, which are under the tenancy of respondent No. 1 by virtue of the bequest in her favor by her late husband, who in turn had. inherited it from his father by virtue of a will.

(5) The tenant (respondent No. 1) sought leave to contest, after being served with the notice of the eviction petition. Certain preliminary objections wre raised to the effect that the respondent company had been declared to be a sick undertaking by order dated 30th August 1988, passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, (for short 'BIFR'), and as such the provisions of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 will operate as a bar to the present petition. It was also contended that the petition had been filed with the malafide object of seeking eviction on the contention that the petitioner was not living in Delhi but was living with her son at Indore, and that the motive of filing the eviction petition was not any genuine need for residence, but increasing the rent. Mr. P.C.Jhalani filed an affidavit in support of the application for leave to contest and the contention raised was that there was no such entity known as M/s. Gadore Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd., imp leaded as respondent No. 1 in the eviction petition, and that the correct name of the company was. Jhalani Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd.

(6) Another plea raised was that the provisions of section 14D of the Act cannot be available to the petitioner for the reason that the premises were let out to respondent No. 1 neither by her nor by her deceased husband, but by late Shri J.C.Luthra. It was also pleaded that on the death of Lt. Col. M.S. Luthra, husband of the petitioner, son and daughter of the deceased would also become legal heirs and the petitioner alone was not entitled to file the eviction petition.

(7) The petitioner controverter by affidavit all the allegations of malafide or that she did not have any need for residence in the tenancy premises, and reiterated all her pleas in the eviction petition about her requirement. She asserted that, in fact, respondent No. 1 had accepted her as the landlady, and has been paying her the rent, and that this fact of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant was not only admitted but was otherwise established in an earlier eviction petition filed by heron the grounds covered by clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act. She also pleaded that by virtue of the will left by her husband, she has become exclusive owner of the ground floor portion under the tenancy of respondent No. 1, and that her son or daughter did not have any interest in the said property, nor did they claim any.

(8) The Addl. Rent Controller disposed of the eviction petition on a very short ground, namely, that the provisions of Section 14D laid down very clearly that the premises in respect to which eviction is sought by a widow must have been either 'let out by her 'or 'by her husband'. He held that in the present petition, he was not concerned with the provisions of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, nor any other plea, because the maintainability of the eviction petition depended upon the fact that the premises must have been let out by the petitioner or by her late husband. In view of the fact that in this case the premises had been let out initially by the father-in-law of the petitioner the Controller expressed the view that the case did not fall within the scope and ambit of section 14D. as the wording let out by her or by her husband', in his opinion. could not be over-stretched, so as to include the predecessor-in-interest of the widow. He, therefore, held that the petition itself was a not maintainable, and it would be a futile exercise to further discuss the application for leave to contest on merits.

(9) The challenge in this petition is to the view held by the Addl. Rent Controller, throwing out the eviction petition at the threshold, holding the same to be not maintainable.

(10) Mr. Ishwar Sahai, arguing for the petitioner, contended that the intention of the legislature, while incorporating the provisions of sections 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D of the Act, was to create a new category of landlords, who it was felt should not be subjected to normal rigours of the Rent Control Law, and for all these classified landlords, a summary procedure was provided, and that section 14D covers one class of such landlords, namely, a widow. He assailed the view held by the Addl. Rent. Controller while dismissing the eviction petition as not maintainable, as being too narrow a construction which militates against the object of the legislature in introducing this provision, namely, to provide speedy remedy to a widow to get possession of the premises in possession of a tenant, if she required the same for her own residence, and that the provision was made to enable her to recover immediate possession of tenancy premises.

(11) The learned counsel further argued that, in any case, such a construction was not sustainable in the case of devolution of interest on the petitioner by inheritance or by bequest, and that in such an event, the person on whom the property devolves. in occupation of a tenant, inducted by her predeeessor-in-interest.

(12) Voluminous arguments have been addressed on this aspect of the matter, relating to the rules of statutory interpretation and numerous authorities cited by counsel for .both the contesting parties, but before I proceed to consider the same. I find that on facts alone, the case of the respondent/tenant was wholly unsustainable. I am even constrained to say that the Addl. Rent Controller certainly took a very superficial view of the whole matter, and did not advert even to the facts, as pleaded in the eviction petition, and set out in the application for leave' to contest, and the landlady's reply thereto.

(13) It is pertinent to note that the petitioner in the eviction petition had stated categorically in para 19 that: "THE respondent No. 1 are Attorning to her as their landlord and have also specifically admitted her to be so in their written statement filed in the eviction petition No. 1395/85 in the court of Shri Prem Kumar, A.R.C. Delhi."

(14) While filing application for leave to contest, although a number of preliminary objections as well as pleas on fact were raised, but there was no denial, at all, of this averment made in the eviction petition. On the other hand, while alleging that the petitioner was ordinarily residing in Indore, the tenant stated a fact which bears out the plea of the petitioner that respondent No. 1 attorney to her after death of her husband, because in paragraph 5 of the affidavit of Mr. P.C. Jhalani in support of the application for leave to contest, it is unequivocally stated that "the petitioner has been regularly receiving the rent from the respondent at the Indore address" of her son. This is a clear cut admission of the fact that respondent No.1 was paying rent to the petitioner alone.

(15) It is settled law that relationship of landlord and tenant comes into bang when on transfer of interest in the property, the person in occupation as a tenant, attorney to the successor-in-interest.

(16) This proposition has been laid down by the Supreme Court in & matter, involving interpretation of proviso to section 3(a) of the Act, in the case , Sangat Singh Vs. Ch. Perma Nand Bahl and others. In that case certain building, which was an evacuee property, was put to auction, and after the bid of the auction purchaser was accepted, provisional possession was given to him with direction to the tenant occupying the building to atom to him. The purchaser realised the rent accordingly. On a petition being filed, seeking ejectment of the tenant by the said purchaser, the plea taken was that the eviction petition was not maintainable by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the Act as the premises belonged to the Government. This plea was repelled, and it was held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had come into being by virtue of attornment by the tenant in favor of the purchaser, pursuant to directions of the Government, which was earlier receiving rent.

(17) The Court referred to an earlier case decided in Civil appeal No. 546 of 1966 Shiv Nath V. Shri Mela Ram, decided on 25.4.1969 (SC), and other connected appeals, quoting there from as under: "EVEN if it were assumed that the premises belonged to Government it would have to beheld in the circumstances of the case, that it was lawfully let by the respondent to the appellants inasmuch as the Managing Officer's giving "provisional possession of the property to the respondent" would really mean delivering symbolical possession of the property to him with the result that a direction to the appellants to pay rent to him would in effect amount to a direction to attorn to him. We are not impressed by the argument that "letting' without the meaning of the proviso can only apply to a voluntary act on the part of the landlord allowing the former tenant to continue in possession. Acting in pursuance of the direction of the managing officer after the property had been auctioned to the respondent would in law amount to a letting by the respondent to the persons who were tenants under the custodian before."

(18) In another case , Tej Bhan Madan V. 11 Additional District Judge and others, the Supreme Court even in the 'ease of transfer of interest by sale held that relationship of landlord and tenant would come into being between purchaser and the tenant of the vendor on the said tenant attorning to the purchaser on direction of the original landlord.

(19) I would, therefore, hold that in view of the uncontroverter fact that respondent No. 1 had attorney to the petitioner, after her husband's demise, and continued to do so, up to the time of filing of eviction petition, the plea of the tenant had to be rejected particularly when there was no denial of the averment in the eviction petition, that the tenant/respondent had specifically admitted her to be the landlord que the premises in their occupation in the written statement filed in the earlier eviction petition, particulars whereof were clearly given in para 19, already referred to.

(20) In this setting, when respondent No. 1 is shown to have admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the petitioner, and even of having been paying rent to her alone, then it will be the case where it can certainly be said on the strength of the proposition laid down in the above quoted two Supreme Court judgments that the petitioner is the landlady of the tenancy premises, and respondent No. 1 tenant under her, and this would be tantamount to letting of the premises by her to them within the contemplation of section 14D(1) of the Act.

(21) The contention convassed by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, appearing for respondent No. 1, that the words let out by her or by her husband' have to be given Strict literal meaning, so as to exclude any other situation, cannot be sustained for the reason that this question as to the meaning of words 'let out by her' or 'let out by him' is not a virgin territory, but has been subject matter of consideration in a number of cases.

(22) To begin with, the expression 'let out by him' as used in section 14A(1) of the Act, came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case Air 1977 S.C. 1959, Smt. Kanla Goel Vs. B.P. Pathal and others. That was also a case where the landlord who had let out the premises, to the tenant had died and his heirs had succeeded to the estate. One of the co-heirs, to whom the rent was being paid by the tenant, filed an eviction petition invoking the provisions of section 14A of the Act. The contention of the tenant that the petitioner did not satisfy the condition of having let out the premises within the meaning of expression let out by him' was repelled and it was held that section 14A(1) is available to a landlord if the premises are owned by him on inherittance, arid that the expression 'in his name' and 'let out by him, read in the spirit of the provisions, and without violence to the words of the section, clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly, and the lease must be under him directly,' which is the case where he as heir, steps into his father's shoes who owned the building in his own name and let it out himself. He represents the former owner and Lesser and squarely falls within section 14A.

(23) It was further held;    'THEaccent on 'name' is to pre-empt the common class of benami evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominalism. Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality of the ownership and land-lordism as the toughstone."  

(24) In this case, the Court also, enunciated the principle that the legislative project and purpose turn not on niceties of little hyperbolism bat on the actualities of rugged realism, and that "the construction of S. 14A (1) must be illurnined by the goal, though guided by the word.   

(25) Mr. Sahai rightly submitted that the same principle would govern the present case where also the petitioner has succeeded to the property by bequest, and is exclusively receiving rent. and there is no denial by the respondent of the fact that they had admitted her to be so in an earlier eviction petition and have been paying rent to her. It is rather their own assertion that she was receiving cent from them.   

(26) A Division Bench of this Court in the case   BM. Channa Vs. Union of India and others, has held:    "....WHILEinterpreting section 14A, the expression 'let out by him' has been understood to mean premises let out by the predecessor-in-interest of the landlord, we see no reason as to why a departure should be made while interpreting the same expression in Section 14C of the Act. The expression "premises let out by him' must mean premises of which he was the landlord on the date of retirement or at the time when application for eviction was filed, in case it is filed before his retirement."  

It was further held:    "......WHENa tenant) attorns to a new landlord it must be held that as from that date it is the landlord who has let out the premises. It our opinion it will be defeating the purpose and object of enacting Section 14C if a very restricted meaning was to be given to Section 14C."  

(27) In this case, the Division Bench went to the extent of saying that irrespective of the fart that premises were acquired by inherittance. or by purchase; in a petition filed under section 14C of the Act. it will have to be held that the premises were let out by the landlord qua the tenant in occupation thereof, on the date of retirement of the landlord or on the date of filing of the petition, and thus the landlord so situated will be entitled to maintain the petition under section 14C of the Act.

(28) On the same parity of reasoning, it can certainly be said that the expression let out by her', or 'by her .husband' as employed in section 14-D(1) of the Act, would take within its ambit the predecessor-in-interest of the husband, who had originally let out the premises to the tenant, continuing to be in occupation at the time the eviction petition is filed by the widow, particularly when the said tenant has attorney after the death of original landlord, firstly in favor of the husband of the widow and then to her.

(29) The arguments advanced by Mr. Rohatgi that the wording of section , is very specific, and restrictive and that the first rule for interpretation of the Statute is the plain meaning rule, and that the legislative intention has to be looked into only when the plain meaning of the word is not clear or words do not express themselves, cannot be sustained. A legislation like the one, whereby certain category of landlords was created, who were considered to be more in need of a short and accelerated procedure than the case of ordinary landlords governed by the provisions of section 14(1) of. the Act, has to be read' keeping in mind the legislative intent and the purpose behind induction of such summary provisions, and these are not to be defeated by placing too narrow or restricted an interpretation. Judicial authorities have gone to the extent that even words can be applied by the courts while interpreting beneficial legislation, with a view to achieve the object behind such a legislation.

(30) Mr. Sahai quoted from a very recent judgment of the Supreme , Kehar Singh and others v. The State (Delhi Admn.). I think it expedient to extract in extenso the proposition laid down in this judgment, having a bearing on the question of statutory interpretation because this, in effect, meets all the arguments advanced by Mr. Rohatgi:

"......INthe past, the Judges and lawyers spoke of a "golden rule ' by which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They took the grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of the consequences. Even if such a meaning gave rise to unjust results which legislature never intended, the grammatical meaning alone was kept to prevail. They said that it would be for the legislature to amend the Act and not for the Court to intervene by its innovation. 228. During the last several years, the 'golden role' has been given a go by. We now look for the 'intention' of the legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute, First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischief which the legislature intended to redress, we look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation, we will not consider any provision out of the frame work of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they own their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences."

(31) The Court also clarified that the enunciation of the principle by them implies a power of choice where differing constructions are possible and different meanings are available.

(32) In another case, . Atma Ram MittalVs. Ishwar Singh Punia, arising out of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, where buildings were given exemption from the provisions of the Act up to the period of ten years from completion of construction, it was held that the expiry of ten years during pendency of the suit would not entail loss of benefit of exemption. It was held that such interpretation, as sought by the tenant, would render ten years' holiday illusory and provide no incentive to the landlord to build new houses to solve problem of shortage of houses, and the purpose of the legislation would thus be defeated. The Court clearly laid down that: "....PURPOSIVEinterpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else."

(33) The court further held that even while finding out the plain meaning of the words, the context, the purpose of these have to be borne in mind, and that the word must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them.

(34) In face of this enunciation of law by the Supreme Court in judgments announced in the year 1988, reliance by Mr. Rohatgi on earlier judgments seems to be misplaced. Even in the case relied upon by him (1958 Scr 360), it was held that the operative provisions of welfare legislation should receive a beneficent construction from the Courts, laying down that:

"......THEwords used in a statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of adopting the construction which is more consistent with the policy of the Act arises."

(35) The question before me is not. even of an ambiguity, but whether such a restricted and narrow literal meaning is to be placed on the expression used in section 14D, so as to conclude that these provisions can be available to a widow only if the premises had been let out by her or by her husband. The interpretation, as canvassed on behalf of the tenant, would be nothing short of doing violence to the legislative intent, and rendering the provision illusory and nugatory. The object of adding these words, as highlighted in the case of Kanta Goel (supra), was to exclude the misuse or abuse of provisions of law, by resort to benami transactions, and not preclude successors-in-interest of the original landlord.

(36) The question of rule of literal interpretation also came up before the Supreme Court in another case , U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti. U.P. V. Braj Kishore and others, which provided for allotment of land to "landless persons". A contention was raised that any person who did not own land in the village including traders, or any person owning property in the cities, would come within the definition of "landless persons". The Court repelled this contention wholly, laying down that: "RULE of giving plain ordinary dictionary meaning has become obsolete."

This judgment quotes Lord Denning in "The discipline of Law" observing that: ".........AJudge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it. when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament?"

(37) The Court also held that it was now well settled that in order to interpret a law, one must understand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted, and taking note of the guiding motive behind 'Bhoodan' movement, it was held that the expression "landless" as used in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1975 would mean those landless labourers who are versed in agriculture, want to take to it, and have no other means of subsistence, and that all allotment under the Act hod to be in consonance with the said objective, laying down that the Court can enquire into the mischief which gave rise to the Statute, and to see what was the evil which was sought to be remedied, and that to interpret a law, one must understand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted.

(38) Even in an earlier case , Lt. Col. Pritpal Singh Bedi Vs. Union of India and others, the Supreme Court held that: ".....If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, 'the purpose for it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve....."

(39) It face of such clear enunciation of law in the aforesaid judgments, I do not think that any detailed discussion is required of the authorities. . relied upon by Mr. Rohatgi. while canvassing the contention that the Court should adhere to the rule of literal or grammatical interpretation. Even the authority recognises the principle that in case literal meaning gives rise to an anomaly or results in something which defeats the purpose of the Act, then the Court need not be constricted by such an interpretation.

(40) Mr. Rohatgi's reliance on Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 109, is also of no assistance because even there a situation has been envisaged. Where it would be permissible to add words by implication, in case it is necessary to give sense and meaning to an expression used, with reference to the context in which it is used.

(41) In view of the proposition propounded by various authorities noticed above, particularly judgments with reference to the interpretation of similar expressions in sections 14A and 14C of the Act in the case of kanta Goel (supra) by the Supreme Court and by a Division Bench of this Court in B.M. Chanana's case (supra), I do not think that any further discussion is called for, but reference to one case seems to be very essential because it dislodges completely the contentions raised by Mr. Rohatgi. In this case Jt 191 (1) S.C. 254, Anirudha Ramakrishna Karlekar Vs. Smt. Jankibai R. Bedekar, section 13(1)(c) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, was interpreted, which reads as under: "13.(1)...................................... (c) that the tenant or any person residing with the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes; or that the tenant has in respect of the premises been convicted of an offence of contravention of any provision of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 394 or of Section 394-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act."

(41) The Court held that simply because the provision spoke of persons, residing with the tenant, would not mean that it applied only to residential premises, and that keeping in view the legislative intent and the mischief which was sought to be prevented, this would also cover the business premises. There cannot be any better instance where in order to achieve legislative intent, widest possible meaning has been given to ah expression used.

(42) In another very recent judgment in the case " Surjit Singh kalraVs. Union of India and another, relating to the provisions of section 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D of the Act, the Court held very clearly that it is not permissible to read word in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words."

(43) It was further held quoting from another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case , Bameedia Hardware Stores Vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, that:

".......THEcourt while construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.

(44) In the above mentioned case question arose for the reason that while the 1988 amendment introduced provisions of section 14B, 14C and 14D in the Act, there was no corresponding amendment in sub-section (5) of section 25B which deals with Controller's powers to grant leave to the tenant to contest the application on disclosure of certain facts, made by affidavit. The statute only mentions clause (e) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 or section 14A, but the court taking note of the amendment in sub-section (1) to section 25B, held that in order to give sense to the scheme of section 25B, the missing words in sub-section (5), namely, reference to section 14B, 14C and 14D had to be supplied by the Court, and it had to be held that leave to contest could be applied for, and granted, on other conditions laid down in sub-section (5) of section 25-B of the Act being satisfied, even in the case of eviction petitions filed under sections 14B, 14C and 14D of the Act.

(45) The case , Emc Steel Limited. Calcutta Vs. Union of India and another, is another instance where the apex Court departed from the rule of literal interpretation, relating to case under section 14D of the Act, keeping in view the .legislative intent for providing benefit, as well as protection to a class known as 'widows', by holding that this benefit can be available to the landlady even in cases where the premises were let out by her after becoming a widow, and interpretation was further given, which strictly does not flow from the wording of the section, namely that this was once in a life time benefit.

(46) I am, therefore, of my clear view that the Addl. Rent Controller erred in placing too narrow and restricted interpretation on the expression used in section 14D, namely, "let out by her" or by "her husband", and that the dismissal of the eviction petition under section 14D of the Act, as being not maintainable on that account, cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. The revision petition has certainly to be allowed to this extent. Normally this would have entailed remand to the concerned court, for disposal of the tenant's application for leave to contest on merits, but the present is such a case where no remand is necessitated, because there is no other defense disclosed in the tenant's application for leave to contest, which if proved, would disentitle the landlady from seeking eviction by in voking section 14D of the Act.

(47) I have gone through the records of the case. In the eviction petition, it has been set out clearly that the petitioner was the landlady of the tenancy premises, and was receiving rent, which fact, as already noted, was uncontroverter. She further pleaded that she did not have any other residential accommodation in Delhi, and was putting up with her son, Dr. Mukul Luthra, who himself was in occupation of a small accommodation, consisting of one living room, one store and a kitchen, and she was compelled to share the living room with her son, daughter-in-law and grandson.

(48) There is no denial of this fact in the application for leave to contest, namely, petitioner's staying with her son, namely. Dr. Mukul Luthra. All that is alleged is that what she has stated was wrong and she, in fact, lived with her son in Indore, and that she has no intention, whatsoever, to shift to Delhi, and the petition has been filed only with an intention to harass the respondent No.1, and to seek enhancement in rent. it is not even alleged that rent was ever increased at any point of time, after the death of original landlord. The fact that the petitioner has another son in Indore with whom she might have been staying, does not amount to disclosure of such a fact which would disentitle her from getting relief of recovery of possession of the tenancy premises in Delhi because what is relevant is that she should have a residential accommodation in Delhi. The plea that she does not have any other residential accommodation in Delhi in her own right, and the one with her son was wholly insufficient and inadequate, is not controverter in the application for leave to contest. Even if such a denial had been there, that would have been of no consequence because in my view, denial of an averment is not the same as disclosure of a fact. Leave to contest can be granted only if clear, specific and definite facts are disclosed, and not on general denial of the pleadings.

(49) The scheme of the Act is such that ordinarily if the eviction petition sets out facts which meet the requirements of provisions contained in section 14D of the Act, then an eviction order in the absence of a contest can bepassed. Leave to contest is granted in terms of sub-section (5) of section 25B only if the tenant discroses any such fact which, if proved, would not entitle the landlord or landlady to relief of recovery of possession. The essentials to be stated in an eviction petition under section 14D are very limited, and all that a widow has to prove is that she is the landlady of the premises, which fact the petitioner has pleaded, and which fact has not been disputed. The application of the tenant for leave to contest does not disclose any such facts which can show that the tenancy premises are 'not required by the petitioner for her own residence. As my reading of section 14D goes, she did not have to prove any further facts to be entitled to the relief of immediate possession of the tenancy premises.

(50) The eviction petition was filed, as per records, on 6th December 1988. A period of four years has already expired, since after the moving of the petition. Respondents 2 and 3, who are co-owners of lease hold rights in the property, do not contest the right of the petitioner to get possession of the tenancy premises. Kanta Goel's case (supra), is also an authority for the view that even when there are other co-owners of the demised premises, even then a person who has been receiving rent, to the exclusion of others, can as a landlord maintain an eviction petition under section 14A. Same ratio shall apply to cases under section 14D. The plea. therefore, that the husband of the petitioner left other heirs, namely, sons or daughter is thus of no consequence. I, therefore, do not think that there is anything else require to be gone into for which remand would be necessary.

(51) The plea about section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 has not been pressed before me, and otherwise also, I dor not find it applicable-in the case of a petition filed for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, because the scope of operation of section 22 is entirely different, and the action which is sought to be suspended is only such as the winding up of the industrial company etc.

(52) As a result, this petition as also the eviction petition itself, deserve to be allowed, and the eviction order in respect to tenancy premises in No. 151, Golf Links, New Delhi, delineated as red in the plan annexed with the eviction petition, is passed in favor of the petitioner and against respondent No. 1 with costs. Counsel fee Rs.2000.00 ; Respondent No. 1 shall put the petitioner in vacant possession of tenancy premises by 30th of October, 1992.