Washeshar Nath Chadha vs The State
1992 Latest Caselaw 186 Del

ORDER

1. Washeshar Nath Chadha has filed this petition under S. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Art. 227 of the Constitution of India making the following prayers :-

(a) Call for the records of the case and being No. RC. No. 1(A)/90/ACU.IV/CBI/SPE/New Delhi entitled "Central Bureau of Investigation" and State v. Washeshar Nath Chadha pending in the court of Shri P. K. Jain, Special Judge, Delhi and to permit the petitioner to inspect the same;

(b) quash and set aside the warrants dated March, 14 and April 25, 1990 and the Orders on which they are purported to be made and Order dated June 5, and June 7, 1990 by Shri P. K. Jain, Special Judge, Delhi in Case No. RC No. 1(A)/90/ACU.IV/CBI/SPE/New Delhi; and

(c) stay the operation of impugned warrants dated 14th March 1990 and 25th April 1990 and the Orders on which they purport to be made pending the hearing and disposal of the petition; and

(d) pass such other order/orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case to give complete relief to the petitioner.

2. Briefly stated the facts pleaded by the petitioner in the petition are as under :-

The petitioner was issued an Indian Passport on the basis of which he went abroad on 27-10-1988, and since then had been residing outside the country. Presently, he is residing at Dubai.

3. On 22-1-1990, case R.C. No. 1(A)/90/ACU-IV was registered by C.B.I. against many persons including Shri Martin Ardbo, former President of M/s. A. B. Bofors, Sweden (P) Ltd., and Washeshar Nath Chadha alias Win Chadha, for the offences under S. 120, IPC read with Sections 161, 161, 163, 164 and 165A, IPC read with Sections 5, 5(1)(c), 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, read with Sections 409, 420, 468 and 471, IPC, and also for the substantive offences, and the investigation of the case was entrusted to D.S.P., Shri Umesh.

4. During the investigation of this case, a notice under S. 160, Cr.P.C. was issued by the Investigating Officer on 30-1-1990, directing the petitioner to appear before him on 31-1-1990 at 10-00 a.m. in the office of the S.P., C.B.I. ACU-IV, VIIIth floor, Lok Nayak Bhawan, Khan Market, New Delhi, in which the address of the petitioner was given of New Delhi. Another notice was issued on 31-01-1990 under S. 160, Cr.P.C. by the Investigating Officer, addressed to the petitioner at his Dubai address, with a direction that he should appear before the Investigating Officer at New Delhi on 5-2-1990. These notices had not been served on the petitioner.

5. A notice dated 18-3-1990 was received by the petitioner at his Dubai address from Consulate General of India, Dubai, to the effect that C.B.I. case was pending against him for trial in the court of Shri P. K. Jain, Special Judge, Delhi, in which non-bailable warrants of arrest had been issued against him on account of which the provisions of Sections 10(3)(e) and 10(3)(h) of the Passport Act, 1967 are attracted, and was asked to explain within a period of 15 days as to why his passport should not be revoked. An interim reply dated 18-3-1990 was sent by the petitioner, in which it was, inter alia, stated that no criminal trial was pending against him in the court of Special Judge, Delhi, nor did he receive any summons or warrants in such case. He asked for a copy of the First Information Report, and that Sections 10(3)(e) and 10(3)(h) of the Passport Act neither envisage the prevention of exit of a citizen who is already outside the country, and had been outside the country for a fairly long period. It was also pleaded that the revocation of passport of the petitioner would be contrary to the provisions of law, and that he was entitled to protect his status with regard to fair investigation. It was also reiterated by him that he was willing to co-operate in the course of investigation. Another letter dated 10-4-1990 was received by the petitioner from the Consulate General of India, Dubai, that it had been decided to impound his Passport, and he was directed to surrender the same within 7 days of the receipt of the order, and from this order, the petitioner came to know that non-bailable warrants were issued against him by the Special Judge, Delhi on 14-3-1990, about which he was kept in dark. A letter dated 12-4-1990 was written by the petitioner to the Consulate General of India, Dubai, for getting a copy of the statement of reasons on the basis of which order dated 10-4-1990 was issued. He preferred an appeal against the order of revocation on 26-4-1990 before the Chief Passport Officer, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, and the appeal is still pending.

6. It has further been pleaded by the petitioner that enquiries made by him, revealed that notice was issued for his appearance by the Investigating Officer at Delhi address, knowing it fully well that he was residing at Dubai, and without making any sincere efforts to get the same served, warrants of arrest were obtained on his Delhi address again giving by wrong information, since the petitioner was not residing at Delhi. It has further been pleaded that an application for inspection of the record was moved before the Special Judge by Shri R. P. Dave, and Shri Suhail Dutt. Advocates, on the basis of a vakalatnama, claimed to have been signed by the petitioner. The factum of vakalatnama being signed by the petitioner, was contested by CBI, and during the proceedings, another power of attorney duly signed by the petitioner was filed in court by his counsel Shri Ashok Grover, who had admitted before the Special Judge that the earlier Power of Attorney claimed by them to have been signed by the petitioner was, in fact, not signed by him, and rather it was signed by his son, and that inadvertently the same was filed. A prayer was made for inspection of the records, which was declined by the learned Special Judge on the plea that the power of attorney now filed has not been authenticated by a Notary, or the Consulate General of India, Dubai, in the absence of which the inspection of the record was declined vide order dated 5-6-1990, and an application for supply of certified copy by Shri Ashok Grover was also rejected on the same ground vide order dated 7-6-1990.

7. The claim of the petitioner had been that G. P. Hinduja, another person named as an accused in the FIR, was residing in London, who has been interrogated by the Investigating Officer at London on 22-1-1991, and that there were no reasons to single out the petitioner and to ask him to come back to India, so that he may be interrogated by the Investigating Officer. He has also claimed that the petitioner is always ready and willing to cooperate in the investigation of the case. It is in these circumstances that the present petition has been filed.

8. I have heard Shri D. C. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General. I have also gone through the record produced in Court.

9. The learned Additional Solicitor General has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of this petition. He has submitted that the Investigating Officer has power to investigate the case, which cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of the powers under section 482, Cr.P.C. He has also submitted that even if the Investigating Officer adopts illegal methods in the investigation of the case, High Court cannot take any action under the Criminal Procedure Code, and at best the relief could be claimed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying that the Investigating Officer may be restrained from misusing his legal power. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U.P., 1989 Cri LJ 1013. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no dispute with regard to the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment, but the petitioner does not want the quashing of the F.I.R. nor is he making any request to the Court to interfere in the investigation of the case. He has also submitted that all that has been prayed by the petitioner in this petition, is that the Investigating Officer cannot get the assistance of the Court in the investigation of the case by giving wrong facts or suppressing the facts, and it is only that part of the order which is being challenged by the petitioner in this petition. I have given my due consideration to this submission, and have also carefully gone through this judgment.

10. Case of Prashant Gaur v. State of U.P. (1988 All WC 828) was decided by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in which three questions were answered. The first question was : Whether under S. 482, Cr.P.C. the High Court has inherent powers to interfere with the investigation by the police ? which was answered as, "Investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government. It is only in the rarest of rare cases, and that too, when it is found by the Court that the F.I.R. and the investigation over a reasonable length of time, do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, or any offence of any kind, that the High Court may, under S. 482 of the Code interfere with the investigation." The second question : Whether the High Court has powers to stay arrest during investigation ? was answered that "Under S. 482 of the Code, the High Court, may not direct the stay of arrest during investigation except for a limited period in case of such exceptional nature as is referred in the preceding paragraphs". The third question : "Whether the decision reported in 1987 All WC 404 : (1987 All LJ 599) lays down a correct proposition of law ? was answered that "In view of our answer to questions Nos. 1 and 2 question No. 3 does not require to be answered and hence returned unanswered."

11. A single Judge referred following three questions :-

1. Are the answers to the questions Nos. 1 and 2 given by the Full Bench and the reasons for recording those answers, in accord with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Privy Council ?

2. If the answer to the above question is not in the affirmative, then what is the correct answer to the questions posed before the Full Bench ?

3. If no answer is thought necessary for any reason to the question No. 2, above, then correct legal position with reference to Puttan Singh's case may be laid down.

12. These questions were answered by the Full Bench as under (1989 Cri LJ 1013 at p. 1021) (All) :-

(i) For the reasons given above our answer to the first question referred to us is in the negative.

(ii) Our answer to the second question referred to us is that the High Court has no inherent power under S. 482, Cr.P.C. to interfere with the investigation by the police. The High Court has also no inherent power under S. 482, Cr.P.C. to stay the arrest of an accused during investigation. The decision by the Full Bench in the case of Prashant Gaur v. State of U.P., 1988 All WC 828 (supra) does not lay down correct law and is overruled.

(iii) Our answer to the third question referred to us is that the decision in the case of Puttan Singh v. State of U.P., 1987 All LJ 599 (supra) is correct.

13. It would be appropriate at this stage to quote paragraph 22 of the said judgment, which reads as under :-

In our opinion the High Court has no inherent power under S. 482, Cr.P.C. to interfere with the arrest of a person by a police officer even in violation of S. 41, Cr.P.C. either when no offence is disclosed in the first information report or when the investigation is mala fide as the inherent powers of the Court to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice come into play only after the charge sheet has been filed in Court and not during investigation which may even be illegal and unauthorised. If the High Court is convinced that the power of arrest by a police officer will be exercised wrongly or mala fide in violation of Section 41(1)(a), Cr.P.C. the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution restraining the police officer from misusing his legal power.

14. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph make it abundantly clear that High Court in exercise of the powers under section 482, Cr.P.C., has no power to, interfere with the investigation of a case even if the police officer is making efforts to arrest a person in violation of Section 41, Cr.P.C. It is, thus, clear that so long as the Investigating Officer is making investigation independently without the assistance of the Court, it is not within the power of the High Court in exercise of the powers under section 482, Cr.P.C. to interfere with the investigation, and the question as to whether the F.I.R. should be quashed, and whether any interference is required, could be gone into by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. It is the admitted case of the parties that the petitioner has already filed a writ petition for quashing of the F.I.R. which stands admitted in this Court.

15. The question, however, for consideration is as to whether it is open to a person to approach the High Court under section 482, Cr.P.C., expressing grievance against an order of the Court passed during investigation of the case, and my answer to this question is in the affirmative. The question as to whether there are grounds for the Court to issue non-bailable warrants can certainly be gone into by this Court in exercise of the powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Such a scrutiny of the order of a Magistrate can by no stretch of imagination be termed as interference in the investigation of a case by the Police. Court cannot interfere in exercise of the power under section 482, Cr.P.C. in the collection of evidence and arrest even by illegal methods. The decision with regard to the power of issuing warrants being available to the Magistrate in respect of a person living abroad and wanted only for interrogation would not amount to interference and would not stop the investigation of the case. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief in such proceedings, is entirely different.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the notice dated 30-01-1990, requiring the presence of the petitioner before the Investigating Officer on 31-01-1990, and notice dated 31-01-1990 requiring the petitioner to appear before the Investigating Officer on 05-02-1990 were issued under section 160, Cr.P.C., and that these provisions were not applicable to the present case. It would be appropriate at this stage to quote the said section which reads.

"160. Police officer's power to require attendance of witnesses. -

(1) Any police officer making an investigation under this Chapter may, by order in writing, require the attendance before himself of any person being within the limits of his own or any adjoining station who, from the information given or otherwise, appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case; and such person shall attend as so required :

Provided that no male person under the age of fifteen years or woman shall be required to attend at any place other than the place in which such male person or woman resides.

(2) The State Government may, by rules made in this behalf, provide for the payment by the police officer of the reasonable expenses of every person, attending under sub-section (1) at any place other than his residence."

17. A bare reading of the above section makes it abundantly clear that a Police Officer is empowered to direct any person to be present before him so as to be available for interrogation who appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case provided that the said person is available within the limits of his own or any adjoining station. The case of the petitioner has been that he was residing in Dubai since 27th October, 1988 and so it cannot be said that he was residing within the jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer. In these circumstances, it appears that the Investigating Officer could not avail of the benefit of this Section.

18. It may also be noted that learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that similar notices were issued to Sh. G. P. Hinduja, another person named as an accused in this very case for his appearance who raised an objection thereby challenging the powers of the Investigating Officer to avail of the said provision to which a reply dated 12th March, 1990 was sent conceding that legal position with regard to the Section 160, Cr.P.C. being not applicable was admitted to be correct. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent has not controverter this submission and in fact made statement at the bar that the petitioner is not required for appearance in terms of Section 160, Cr.P.C. and rather the Investigating Officer is placing reliance upon Section 73 of the Code.

19. Learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the Investigating Officer has found it difficult to get co-operation of the petitioner in the investigation of the case which has reached a dead lock on account of he being not available. He has also submitted that the petitioner, in fact, is absconding and concealing himself which can be carried out by a person even by staying at his own residence. He has also submitted that purpose of the Investigating Officer at this stage is to join the petitioner for collection of evidence and not for his arrest as an accused. He has also submitted that such a person can be arrested by Investigating Officer in exercise of the powers under section 41 of the Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, controverter these submissions and submitted that as regards the powers of the Investigating Officer available to him under section 41, Cr.P.C., they are not being challenged and can be exercised by the Investigating Officer without the aid and assistance of a Court. He has, however, submitted that the provision contained in Section 73, Cr.P.C. are not applicable and petitioner has always been ready and willing to join the investigation and to co-operate in the same. He has further submitted that the petitioner is being discriminated by the Investigating Agency in as much as G. P. Hinduja, another person named as an accused in the FIR was interrogated in this case at London, a place where he has been residing and that the petitioner is also ready and willing to join investigation at Dubai, a place where he has been residing much prior to the registration of his case.

20. A suggestion was put to the learned Additional Solicitor General about the reaction of the Investigating Agency to the offer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for being available for interrogation at Dubai. After getting instructions, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the petitioner could be interrogated at London like the interrogation of G. P. Hinduja but not at Dubai and this counter offer was not acceptable to the petitioner as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner.

21. The short question now thus for consideration is as to whether the Section 73, Cr.P.C. is available to the Investigating Officer to obtain warrants of arrest against the petitioner. Section 73, Cr.P.C. reads.

"Warrant may be directed to any person. -

(1) The Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may direct a warrant to any person within his local jurisdiction for the arrest of any escaped convict, the proclaimed offender or of any person who is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest.

(2) Such persons shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the warrant, and shall execute it if the person for whose arrest it was issued, is in, or enters on, any land or other property under his charge.

(3) When the person against whom such warrant is issued is arrested he shall be made over with the warrant to the nearest police officer, who shall cause him to be taken before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, unless security is taken under section 71."

22. A reading of the Section makes it abundantly clear that warrant can be issued by a Court against a person who is accused of non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest. The question for consideration is as to whether the petitioner is evading arrest as an accused and my answer is in the negative. It has specifically been submitted by learned Additional Solicitor General that at present the petitioner is required only for interrogation and not to be arrested as an accused. Can now it be said that the petitioner has absconded. Learned Additional Solicitor General has placed reliance upon a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of K.T.M.S. Abdul Cader v. Union of India, . It would be appropriate to give in brief the facts of the Full Bench case. Three petitioners K.T.M.S. Abdul Cader, A. M. Ahmed Yaseen and B.S.A. Rahman were alleged to have been smuggling and dealing with smuggled goods. This led the State Govt. to reasonable apprehension that unless they are detained forthwith, they will continue to indulge in similar activities which may prove a hazard to the safety and security of the country. Therefore, detention orders were passed under Section 3(1)(c) of the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Ordinance 1974. These petitioners left country even before the passing of the detention order and continued to live abroad and thus the warrant of arrest issued against them could not be executed. All the three petitioners had their families in India. A report was made by the State Govt. to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras on the basis of which proclamation under section 82(1), Cr.P.C. was issued. In the meanwhile the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter called the 'COFEPOSA ACT') came into force and fresh orders of detention under the said Act were passed against each of the petitioners aforesaid. These orders also could not be executed on account of the continued absence of the petitioner abroad and so the State Government moved Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to issue fresh proclamation under section 7 of the Act read with Section 82(1) of the Cr.P.C.

23. Under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA ACT the detention order could be passed even against a foreigner so as to prevent him from the activities of smuggling as mentioned in this Section itself. Section 6 of this Act provides that No detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason that the person to be detained there under is outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Government or the officer making the order of detention, or that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. Under Section 7 of the Act, Appropriate Government having reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing himself so that he order cannot be executed could make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class having the jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides and thereupon the provisions of Sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would apply in respect of the said person and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate. It was in exercise of this power that a proclamation had been issued by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. It was also observed that the petitioners should have been aware of the detention orders having been passed against them since their families continued to be residing in India. It was in this context that the following observations were made by the Full Bench (1977 Cri LJ 1708 at p. 1721) (Madras).

"The words 'absconding debtor' with reference to Bankruptcy Laws, according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of words and phrases, 3rd Edn., means one who departs for distant countries before the necessary proceedings can be taken to make him bankrupt or being outside the country continues to remain there with intent to defeat or delay his creditors. The primary meaning of the word 'abscond' is to hide and when a person is hiding from his place of residence, he is said to abscond. A person may hide even in his place of residence or away from it and in either case he would be absconding when he hides himself. In Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., 'abscond' has been taken to mean to fly the country in order to escape arrest for crime. Therefore, persons who get scent of the action to be taken by the detaining authorities and leave the country in order to escape the arm of the law can be said to abscond. Similarly persons who have already left the country without the knowledge of any action to be taken against them under the Act, but who continue to remain outside the country with a view to avoid any detention order that may be passed under S. 3 can also be taken to be absconding. It cannot be disputed that a person committing an offence in a particular country would ordinarily be liable to be tried according to the law of that country. If he leaves the country with a view to avoid or escape the arm of the law, he can be said to abscond so far as that country and its laws are concerned. In Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary, the word 'abscond' has been defined as to hide or to quit the country in order to escape a legal process. Therefore, if a person, before the legal process could be issued somehow or other comes to know of the issue of such a process or anticipates the issue of the process and quits the country he can be said to have absconded."

There is no doubt that a person could abscond even by hiding at the place of his residence or away from it and a person having left the country without the knowledge of any action to be taken against him and continue to remain out side the country with a view to avoid the said detention would be deemed to have absconded. However, can it be said that the facts of Full Bench case are similar to the facts of the instant case and the answer is certainly in the negative. In the instant case the petitioner is not required by the police for being arrested as an accused rather his presence is required only to join him in the interrogation of the case. There are no valid warrant of arrest against him nor could such warrant be issued by Special Judge to direct the petitioner to be arrested and produce in Court only to make him available to the Investigating Officer for examination as a person who could throw some light on the facts of the case under investigation. There can possibly be no dispute that Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere in the investigation of a case even if the Investigating Officer is collecting evidence by illegal means. However, the moment assistance of a Court is taken by the Investigating Officer during the investigation of the case, said order would be subject to the review by this Court. This Full Bench judgment thus is entirely on different facts and cannot be of any help to the respondent.

24. Similarly case of Kartarey v. State of U.P., relied upon by the Additional Solicitor General again may not be of any assistance to the respondent. All that has been held in the said judgment is that to be an absconder in the eye of law, it was not necessary that a person should have run away from his own house and it is only if he hides himself to evade the process of law and such a hidden place can be his own home. As already referred to, the petitioner has been residing at Dubai since 27-10-88 and has made an offer that he will be available for interrogation at Dubai, the place of his residence which offer in the case of co-accused G. P. Hinduja was accepted.

25. All my earlier discussion thus boils down to the following. Petitioner has been named as an accused along with others in the case under investigation with DSP Umesh of CBI. Petitioner has been residing at Dubai since 27-10-1988. Summons were issued to the petitioner first at his Delhi address and thereafter at his Dubai address under section 160, Cr.P.C. requiring him to appear before the Investigating Officer in the CBI office at New Delhi but the CBI has now conceded that resort could not be made to aforesaid provisions for enforcing the presence of the petitioner in the CBI office at New Delhi. The petitioner no doubt is named as an accused in the case, his presence is required by the Investigating Officer for interrogation and in these circumstances his co-operation is required but since he was not available warrants of arrest were obtained against him first on 14-3-90 returnable on 29-3-90 and on 25-4-90 returnable on 5-7-1990 and in both these warrants the address of the petitioner was of New Delhi and they were addressed to Dy. S.P. Umesh, Investigating Officer of this case.

26-27. These warrants could not be executed by the Investigating Officer.

28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Investigating Officer was fully aware of the fact that he was not in a position to execute these warrants of arrest against the petitioner addressed to him at the Delhi address of the petitioner who was in fact residing at Dubai and it was only with a collateral purpose to get the passport of the petitioner revoked. I am, afraid, it is not open to this Court to visualize the hidden purpose but the fact remains that these warrants could not be issued being not warranted by the fact of the case. It has, however, been rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that notice dated 18-3-1990 was issued to the petitioner by Consulate General of India. Dubai to the effect that they had been informed by the CBI that CBI case was pending against him for trial in the Court of Shri P. K. Jain, Special Judge, Delhi in which non-bailable warrants had been issued for his arrest and it was no this account that notice was given to him to explain why his passport be not revoked under section 10(3)(e) and 10(3)(h) of the Passport Act. He has submitted that it was factually wrong information since no such challan has yet been filed and so it cannot be said that any case was pending trial against him in the said Court. The said information could possibly be given to the Consulate General of India by the Investigation Agency and in any case not by the petitioner himself. It is not disputed from the side of the respondent CBI that the matter is still under investigation and no challan has been filed in the Court of Special Judge, Delhi. Thus it is clear that this fact is wrongly stated in the said notice. It is, however, not within the scope of this petition to decide as to whether there are grounds for the revocation of the passport of the petitioner or not and in fact an appeal against such an order has already been filed by the petitioner before Chief Passport Officer which is pending decision.

29. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Special Judge has erred in coming to a conclusion that in the absence of the power attorney of the Petitioner being attested by a Notary or Consulate General of India in Dubai, Advocates cannot be said to be duly appointed or constituted Advocates, since the there was no requirement of such a power of attorney to be attested by any one. A prayer has, thus, been made that the said order be set aside so as to enable the petitioner to claim the inspection of the file before the Special Judge. A perusal of the impugned order dated 5th June, 1990 shows that an application was filed by S/Shri R. P. Dave and Suhail Dutt, Advocates for the petitioner seeking permission to inspect the record and this application was accompanied by a vakalatnama purporting to have been signed by the petitioner. There was no date on the power of attorney and an objection was raised on behalf of the CBI, that power of attorney could not be signed by W. N. Chadha being not available in India. Referring to Chapter XV-C Punjab High Court Rules and Orders Volume 4, it was observed by the learned Special Judge that the inspection of record of pending cases in Courts subordinate to the High Court could be allowed to the parties to the case or their duly authorised pleader or agents and to none else and so the moot point for consideration was as to whether the aforesaid counsel had been appointed or constituted as Advocate by him. It was claimed by the learned counsel for W. N. Chadha that the said power of attorney was bearing the signatures of W. N. Chadha which fact was controverter by the CBI. The matter was reserved for orders and subsequently an application was moved by the CBI stating therein that the signatures on the power of attorney were different from the admitted signatures of W. N. Chadha on application for passport and on a letter addressed by him to the Ministry of External Affairs. Notice of this application was given to the counsel for W. N. Chandha and it is only thereafter that it was admitted by the counsel that the vakalatnama did not bear the signatures of W. N. Chadha and rather it was signed by his son. It was only thereafter that a fresh power of attorney was filed purporting to have been sent to the counsel by W. N. Chadha from Dubai and it was produced in Court by Ashok Grover, Advocate. It was in these peculiar circumstances that the learned Special Judge observed that vakalatnama may not be legally required to be attested by a Notary or Indian Consulate abroad but keeping in view all the circumstances, it was directed that such an attested power of attorney should be filed. I have gone through the order carefully and am of the view that there is nothing wrong with regard to the exercise of discretion by the learned Special Judge keeping in view of the circumstances in which the two different power of attorney were filed. This order does not call for any interference.

30. The question as to which record can be inspected by the petitioner will necessarily have to be decided by the Special Judge and I do not think it necessary to decide the question in these proceedings since there is no finding by the Special Judge as to whether the petitioner can inspect the application moved by the Investigating Officer on the basis of which non-bailable warrants were issued by the Special Judge. This point is left open to be decided by the Special Judge as and when agitated before him.

31. In view of my aforesaid discussions the petition is accepted in part. The issuance of the non-bailable warrants against the petitioner by the Special Judge on 14-3-90 and 25-4-90 for being produced before the Special Judge so that the investigating officer may join him in investigation is held to be without jurisdiction and thus could not be issued. Investigating officer is, however, free to take any steps permissible under law to proceed further with the investigation of the case. The prayer with regard to the setting aside of the orders dated 5-6-1990 and 7-6-1990 is however, declined.

32. Petition partly allowed.