Narayan Singh And Ors. vs Union Of India And Ors.
1992 Latest Caselaw 257 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Wad, J.

(1) These writ petitions raise common question of law and are, therefore, disposed of by one judgment.

(2) The Delhi Administration issued a notification under Section 4(1)read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 13/02/1981proposing to acquire Land measuring Bighas 848 and Biswas 09 from Village Pooth Kalan for a public purpose of construction of a supplementary drain.After the notification under Section 9 of the Act, the possession of the land in question was taken over by Delhi Administration. This supplementary drain was to be constructed for the benefit of the resident of Rohini ResidentialScheme, the biggest residential scheme in Asia. The acquired land was handed over to Irrigation & Flood Control Department of Delhi Administration.

(3) According to the petitioner, the original purpose of construction of a supplementary drain was given up by Delhi Administration before the award was made and the land in question was handed over to the D.D.A. and the D.D.A. is developing the land for various purposes under planned development of Delhi.

(4) The respondents have denied that the public purpose was changed before the rendering of the award. It was asserted that after the technical re-examination of the supplementary drain site, the Administration was of the opinion that instead of constructing a supplementary drain separately, it should be re-aligned with the existing Nangloi drain. For the re-alignment of the drain with the existing Nangloi drain, the additional land was already available with the D.D.A. acquired earlier. Therefore, the necessary land was taken from the D.D.A. for the new re-alignment scheme and the petitioner's land was made over to the D.D.A. as the same was not required for the new project.The new project was cleared by the Technical Committee on the ground of practical feasibility, reduction of expenditure and better convenience for the Rohini Residential Scheme. The petitioners participated in the further proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector which culminated in the award made by the Collector on 22-9-1986. The petitioners accepted the compensation without any protest but also filed an application for a reference under Section 18 for enhanced compensation.

(5) According to the petitioners, it was for the first time in 1989 that they found that the D.D.A. was carrying out construction and development activity on the said land instead of construction of a supplementary drain. The petitioners have, therefore, filed a petition challenging the entire acquisition of land by the respondents.

(6) The Counsel for the petitioners submits that a land acquired for one public purpose cannot be utilised for another public purpose, particularly wherethe original notification under Section 4 is coupled with Section 17 for urgently taking the possession of the land. Where the second public purpose has nourgency, notification of Section 17 would be bad in law as it would deprive the petitioners of the valuable right under Section 2-A to life their objections against the acquisition. According to the Counsel, the land is now being handed over to the D.D.A. for planned development of Delhi and since it is an ongoing activity, there can be no urgency for its acquisition.

(7) The Counsel further submits that the original purpose of construction of a supplementary drain was given up in 1985 before the award was rendered.He has relied on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Nand Kishore, and the decision of Bombay High Court in industrial Development & Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State, .

(8) While opposing the petition, the Counsel for respondent submits that the lands in question were acquired in 1981 and the petitions are filed in1989. The petitioners, thus, suffer from latches. It is then submitted that the petitioners had acquiesed in the land acquisition by accepting the compensation without protest. The petitioners are, therefore, estopped from challenging the acquisition now. It is then submitted that if the land acquisition was valid atthe initial stage in 1981, when the decision was taken on urgent basis, such acquisition does not become bad or illegal by any subsequent development.Once the acquisition is made, the property vests in the government free of all encumbrances and the government is free to utilise the same for any purpose other than the purpose for which the land was originally acquired. The respondents have relied upon Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, and Mangal Oram v. State of Orissa, which follows the decision in . Counsel for respondent also submitted that the original scheme of the supplementary drain had to be given up and the new scheme had to be adopted on the advice of the Technical Committee.

(9) The respondents, by their additional counter affidavit, have furnished additional material and charts. These charts show the vast area including the land originally covered by the supplementary drain wherein construction activity is already on. The first chart shows the portions of the roads passing through the acquired land. The second plan shows the passing of the sewer lines and development of the trunk sewer on the lands in question. The third plan shows the water mains passing through the said lands. The fourth plan shows the development of parks, higher secondary school, primary school.shopping centre and local shopping centre which are to be built on the land around and including the acquired land. These developmental activities are on the areas connecting or nearing the Rohini Residential Scheme. Atpresent, the part of the development activity is stopped because of the stay of dispossession granted in the writ petitions. The submission of the Counsel is if the acquired lands are to be released from acquisition it would completely upset the total development plan of the area as the roads, sewer lines, drama and water lines are passing through the acquired land.

(10) In Gulam Mustafa (supra) the Supreme Court has held (page 449)that "there is no principle of law by which the valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than one stated in Section 2(3) declaration." That case related to the acquisition of land under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act. The rationale behind the said principle is that once the land vests in the government on lawful acquisition, the owners of the land cannot challenge the diversion of the purpose by the government and utilisation of the land for some otherpurpose.

(11) The crucial question is whether the diversion of a public purpose by giving up the original public purpose is done before the acquisition is complete or after the acquisition. The other question is whether the presence of Section 17 notification Along with Section 14 would make any difference in principle mentioned above.

(12) The Counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Nand Kishore (supra) and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Industrial Development & Investment Co. (supra).But on careful reading of the said decisions it is clear that they do not help the petitioners, nor lay down any separate principle of law. In Nand Kishore,this Court had held that "the Government has no right to change the public purpose in midstream. The government cannot change the original public purpose till the acquisition is complete ......... If they want to depart from the original purpose, the only course is to start fresh acquisition proceedings.After the land is vested in it, the government has a right to change the use to which it will put the land." The same principle is reiterated by Bombay HighCourt in the Industrial Development & Investment Co. case (supra). The Bombay High Court held that "the purpose must continue to subsist until the land proposed to be acquired vest in the state in terms' of Sections 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, as the case may be. If the public purpose specified in Section 6 notification is altered or ceases to exist, there would be no further jurisdiction to continue the proceedings for acquiring of such non-existantpurpose."

(13) Thus, it is clear that change of purpose before the acquisition is complete is impermissible but the purpose can be changed after the lands vest in the government either under Section 16 or 17 of the Land AcquisitionAct. Thus, presence of Section 17 notification does not make any difference in the basic position.

(14) On reading the said decision of the Supreme Court and the HighCourts, it is clear that since the original acquisition in the present case was for a lawful public purpose, and there existed the real urgency in taking possession of the land, the acquisition was proper and legal and subsequent events have not made it unlawful.

(15) The Counsel for the petitioner has tried to rely upon AnnexureR-4 dated 27-9-1985, which is a letter from the Irrigation & Flood Control Wing of Delhi Administration addressed to the Chief Engineer, Rohini Project.The letter refers to the proposed change in the supplementary drain scheme and exchange of land with D.D.A. but on careful reading of the said letter it is clear that this is not the letter whereby the decision was taken for finally giving up the supplementary drain scheme. In fact, the letter states that the meeting be called of the Chief Engineer Rohini, M.C.D. and the DelhiAdministration. Pursuant to the said letter, meetings were held from time totime. The decision in regard to giving up of the original plan for the supplementary drain and securing the land for the D.D.A. for the implementation of the new scheme was finally taken in 1988, as evidenced from AnnexureR-6. The idea of giving up the original scheme of supplementary drain and the new scheme of re-aligning the drain with the existing Nangloi scheme could not have been implemented unless the land for the new scheme was made available by the D.D.A.

(16) Thus, it is clear that the original scheme of supplementary drain was finally given up in 1988 and not in 1985, as contended by the petitioner.This is after the award made in the present case on 22/09/1986.The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner that the change of purpose has vitiated the original land acquisition is without any merit and is rejected.

(17) It is true that the petitioners had acquiesed in the acquisition of land at the initial stage by taking the compensation without protest. Their preferring a reference under Section 18 for enhancement of compensation does not change the position that the compensation was accepted by them withoutdemur. It is also true that the petitioners were challenging the acquisition after a lays of 8 years. It is well settled in law that where the petitioners acquiesed in the acquisition of land and tried to challenge the acquisition after inordinate delay, such challenge is not competent in the eye of law. The petitioners are stopped from rasing such pleas before any Court of law.

(18) In case of acquiescence or latches, the Courts do not assist the petitioner because of their consent and long silence, the reason being that an interest is created in the respondents or the third parties. In equity such interest created due to the latches on the part of the petitioners cannot beignored. This principle was recognised by Bombay High Court in Industrial Development & Investment Company case (supra).

(19) The lands were handed over to the D.D.A. in the present case,development plan for the entire vast area including the lands in question have been prepared and the action is started. There are roads passing through the said land, water and sewer connections are also passing below the acquiredland, some public amenities such as schools, parks and community centres are also covering the said land. We cannot ignore these developments which are meant for the entire population covering this vast land and also the residents of the Rohini Scheme.

(20) For the reasons started above, the writ petitions are dismissed. The rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.