Sher Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi)
1991 Latest Caselaw 415 Del

JUDGMENT

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. In pursuance to a notification dated November 13, 1959 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1984 (hereinafter called the Act) appellant's land in Village Nimri was acquired. An award No. 1274 dated June 20, 1962 pertains to compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter called the Collector). The Collector divided the land into two categories having nomenclature as Block A and Block B, and fixed the market value of the land in Block A and Block B as under :

Name of the Block

Land without garden

Land with garden

Block A

Rs. 2500

Rs. 3000

Block B

Rs. 2000

Rs. 2500

Apart from the above categories there was some land which was being used either as a Path or water channels. That land measured about 11 bighas and 3 biswas and the Collector allowed Rs. 500/- per bigha for that kind of the land. Appellant Sher Singh has half share in the aforesaid land. Shiv Prasad and Sher Singh filed separate applications before the Collector on the ground that the compensation awarded to them was on the lower side and they were entitled to the additional amount at the rate of Rs. 60/- per yard in addition to the amount payable in respect of the garden. The Collector, made reference on the basis of that application to the learned Additional District Judge. Shiv Prasad filed LA. No. 405/67 and the appellant Sher Singh L.A. 406/67 for enhancement of compensation. Both these references were consolidated by the learned Additional District Judge and were disposed of by a common judgment. The learned Additional District Judge vide his judgment dated February 3, 1968 dismissed both these claims of Shiv Prasad and the appellant Sher Singh after considering the relevant circumstances.

2. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, appellant Sher Singh filed the present appeal before this Court. The appellant placed reliance on two decisions of this Court : Chattar Singh v. Union of India (R.F.A. 92 of 1969) (1) decided on December 20, 1984 and Hukam Chand Jain v. Union of India, (2). According to the appellant these decisions squarely cover his case because land of the same Village Nimri was involved in these cases which was acquired in pursuance to the same notification dated November 13, 1959. The counsel appearing for the respondent Union of India has not disputed the factual position but challenged the correctness of this Court's directions in these cases pertaining to solarium, interest and additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent on the market value. It was further submitted that directions given by this Court in these cases are not in consonance with the provisions of law as interpreted by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh . This Court vide its judgment dated February 22, 1991 decided the case of Kazan Singh v. Union of India (R.F.A. 137/1980) (4). This was the leading judgment but by the same judgment a very large number of appeals were disposed of by this court following the principles laid down in Raghubir Singh's case. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to refer to a few relevant provisions of the Act prior to its amendment and the provisions as they stand after amendment :

"23(2). In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition".

Section 28 of the unamended Act provided for payment of interest on excess compensation in the following, terms :

"If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have, awarded as compensation is in excess to the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court."

The Act was amended by the Amending Act with effect from 24th September, 1984.

Section 15 Clause (b) of the Amending Act reads as follows:

15. In Section 23 of the Principal Act :--

(a).....

(b) in Sub-section (2), for the words "fifteen per centum" the words "thirty per centum" shall be substituted."

Section 18 Clause (a) of the Amending Act provides tint "in Section 28 of the Principal Act for the words 'six per centum' the word 'nine per centum' shall be substituted. "Section 30, Sub-section (2) is the material provision which falls to be construed and since the entire controversy between the parties turns upon the true interpretation of this provision, we may reproduce it completely. It runs as follows :

"30(2). The provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply and shall for deemed to have applied also, to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition) (Amendment Bill, 1982, in the House of People) and before She commencement of this Act."

We have been called upon to answer the correct legal position after the amendment and determine what is the just and fair compensation, solarium and interest to which the appellant is entitled to ?

(3) Immediately after the amendment in 1984 the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the amended provisions of the Act in the case of K. Kamalajammannivaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, . The Court observed in the said case that awards made by the Collector under Section 11 and by the Court on reference under Section 18 are only described as awards in the Land Acquisition Act, while further appeals are provided to the High Courts and Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the Court's observations are set out as under :---

"The new Section 23(2), of course, necessarily applies to awards made by the Collector or Court after the Commencement of the Act, that is, after September 24, 1984 which was the date on which the Act received the assent of the President. The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give effect to the amended Section 23(2) from the date of introduction of the Bill. So the amended provision was expressly made applicable by Section 30(2) to awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 also. A natural corollary was that the new provision should apply to orders made by the High Court or by the Supreme Court in appeals against such awards, that is, awards made between April 30, 1982 and September, 24, 1984. Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be, solarium would stand enhanced to 'thirty per centum' if an appeal happened by chance or accidently, to be pending on April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of Parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation even after several years, It was the intention of Parliament to make the amended Section 23(2) applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they be pending, the words "after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act" in Section 30(2) would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended Section 23(2) to have very limited retrospectively. It made the provision applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September, 24, 1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court arising from such awards".

In the same year a similar matter seeking interpretation, of the amended provisions again came up for adjudication before a bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, . The Court in the said judgment also considered the earlier judgment delivered by two Judges in Kamalajammannivaru's case (supra). The Court declared that decision in the case of Kamalajgmmannivaru cannot be regarded as laying down the correct law in regard to the interpretation of Section 30(2). The ratio of the said judgment is that the amended provisions of Section 23(2) and 28 are applicable to all the proceedings relating to compensation, pending on the date of commencement of Amending Act or filed subsequent to that date before the Collector or before the High Court or Supreme Court. The only requirement is that, order must have been passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against such award after April 30, 1982 but before the commencement of the Amending Act. In the said judgment Court observed that if it were the intention of the Parliament to have applicability of the amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 only to the award made by the Collector or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before commencement of the Amending Act and to an order, made by the High Court or Supreme Court only against such an award Parliament would have inserted adverbial phrase "after 30th day of April 1982 and before commencement of this Act, immediately after the words, "any award made by the Collector or Court" so as to indicate clearly and beyond doubt that the adverbial phrase was intended to cover only award made by the Collector or Court and in that event the words "such award" would have carried only one meaning, namely, award made by the Collector or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Act. The Court further observed ;--

"any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award", would then have had a limited meaning, namely, order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in an appeal preferred against an award made by the Collector or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Amending Act. These words would not in that event have comprehended passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April, 1982. But Parliament deliberately and advisedly introduced the adverbial phrase "after the 30th day of April, 1982 and before the commencement of this Act at the end of the sentence, so as to qualify both "any award made by the Collector or Court", as also "any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award". The words 'such award' in the context in which they occur, mean only the award made by the Collector or Court and do not import the time element which finds place only at the end of the sentence and not immediately following the words "any award made by the Collector or Court". It is therefore dear that under Section 30, Sub-section (2) the provisions of the amended Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April, 1982 or filed subsequent to that date whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. It would not be correct interpretation of Section 30, Sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of the amended Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed by the High Court of Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April, 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. Even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April, 1982 and in appeal against such award to pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April, 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of the amended Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable In relation to an order passed in such appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court. We accordingly affirm the view taken by the Bench of three Judges in Mohinder's case (supra) and express our respectful disagreement with the view taken by the Bench of two Judges in Kamalajammannivaru's case."

4. The statement of law as declared in Bhag Singh's case was followed in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court: State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, . Finally amending provisions of the Act came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh's case. The Constitution Bench examined earlier conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court after the amendment of Land Acquisition Act in the year 1984. Pathak, C. J. speaking for the Court in Raghubir Singh's case after analysing all the provisions and the relevant case laws approved the statement of law declared in Kamalajammannivaru and overruled the statement of law laid down in Mohinder Singh and in Bhag Singh (supra). The relevant portion of Union of India v. Raghubir Singh is set out as under :

Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (AIR 1982 SC 758) (supra), but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh (supra), but the judgment in Bhag Singh (supra) as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently We find ourselves at variance with it The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking' that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word 'or' has been used in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court, or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector of the Court made between the said two dates. The word 'or' is used with reference , to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court of the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.

In the result we overrule the statement of the law laid down in Mohinder Singh, (supra) and in Bhag Singh, (supra) and prefer instead the interpretation of S, 30(2) of the Amendment Act rendered in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (dead) by Lrs. (supra)".

In view of the Constitution Bench's judgment entire controversy stands resolved.

5. One facet of the amendment (23-1A) which perhaps did not fall for the consideration of the Constitution Bench was decided subsequently decided by the Supreme Court in Fillip Tiago De Gama . On careful analysis of these judgments we have arrived at the conclusion that all facets of 1984 amendment of the Land Acquisition Act have been interpreted by the Supreme Court. In this situation there is no scope of interpretation of these provisions by this Court. We have to apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court on the facts of the present case. We propose to briefly set out parameters which emerge from these judgments and thereafter apply these principles to the present case.

(a) The benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied in every case in which the award of the Collector or the Court has been made between 30th April, 1982 to the 24th September, 1984, or to an appellate order of High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out. of an award of the Collector or Court made between the said dates (Raghubir Singh case).

(b) Compensation cannot be awarded under Section 23(1-A) if the award of the Collector or Court did not fall in the inter-regnum period (between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984). (Fillip riago De Gama case).

6. On the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and after considering the relevant circumstances we fix market value of the acquired land at Rs. 1100/- per bigha. The appellant will be entitled to solarium at the rate of 15 per cent on the market value of the land and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date on which the Collector took possession of the land till the date of payment.

Whatever bas already been paid either the market value or interest will be deducted.

The appellant will be entitled to proportionate costs limited to court-fees only.

7. Before parting with the judgment we would like to mention that ordinarily we would have referred the matter to a larger bench while departing from the principles of solarium and interest as laid clown in Chattar Singh (decided before Raghubir Singh's case) and Hukam Chand Jain's case of his court but now when we are supported by a decision of a Constitution beach of the Supreme Court and later decisions of this Court in Kazan Singh and others, we considered it appropriate to decide this case in the light of the principles laid down in those cases.