Surjit Singh Kalra vs V.N. Channa
1991 Latest Caselaw 414 Del

JUDGMENT

S.N. Sapra, J.

(1) The present revision petition, filed under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter called the Act, is directed against the order of eviction dated March 2, 1989, passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.

(2) Briefly stated, the facts are as under : Premises No. W-2, Greater Kailash I, New Delhi, were let out to petitioner by respondent, on May 15, 1969, on the monthly rent of Rs. 77 V-, exclusive of water and electricity charges. The premises consists of three bed rooms with attached bath and latrine, store, kitchen, drawing and dining room, courtyard etc. By the Amending Act, 57 of 1988, some more classes of landlords were carved out, from the classes of general landlords. Section 14-B to Section 14-D are the provisions, which were added in the Act, so as to give to classified landlords, certain special rights, to recover immediate possession of the premises, let out by them, if they were required for their own residence. Respondent, who was holding a rank of Brigadier in the Indian Armed Forces, filed an application, for eviction of his tenant, petitioner herein, from the aforesaid premises, under sub-Section (2) of Section 14-B read with Section 25-B of the Act, as amended by the Amending Act of 1988, on the ground, that he was going to retire on June 30, 1989, and that the premises, which were let out by him, were required for his own residence, after his retirement and also for the residence of other members of his family. Petitioner filed an application, under Section 25-B(4)(5) of the Act, for leave to contest the eviction petition. Petitioner filed affidavits, in support of the application, thereby, seeking leave to defend the eviction, inter-alia, on the grounds that provisions of Section 14-B of the Act, were unconstitutional, ultra vires; the premises had been let out for commercial, as well as, residential purposes, respondent was not the owner of the property in dispute, respondent was not in the bonafide need of the premises in dispute, that respondent was not going to retire etc.

(3) All the. allegations, made in the application, were controverter by the respondent/landlord.

(4) By the impugned order, the learned Additional Rent Controller, held that the tenant failed to bring out any plea in his affidavit, which could disentitle the landlord from recovering the possession on any ground, whatsoever. It was further held that the landlord proved all the ingredients, as laid down in Section 14-B of the Act. Accordingly, leave to defend the eviction petition was declined and order of eviction, against the present petitioner was passed.

(5) It is necessary to point out that besides, filing the revision petition, against the impugned order, the present petitioner, also filed , writ petition, being Civil Writ No. 1381 of 1989, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thereby, challenging the validity of the provisions, as contained in Section 14-B of the Act. It appears that in the writ petition, petitioner took all the grounds, which have now been taken in the present revision petition. The writ petition was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court, by order dated May 10,1990.

(5) Against the judgment of the Division Bench, petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition, being No. 7364 of 1990. According to the affidavit, filed by respondent herein, in the Special Leave Petition, petitioner took all the grounds, which have been taken in the present revision petition. Special Leave Petition has been dismissed by the Supreme Court of India, vide order dated February 13,1991.

(7) Before dealing with the contentions, urged before me, by learned counsel for petitioner, it is necessary to refer to the common judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Surjit Singh Kaira v. Union of India & another with Mahendra Raj v. Union of India and Col. Ashoka Puri, 43(1991) Delhi Law Times 447.

(8) In S. Surjit Singh Kaira (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held:

"BY the Amending Act 57 of 1988 some more classes of landlords were carved out from the class of general landlords. Section 14-B to Section 14-D are the provisions. The released or retired persons from armed forces or the dependants of the member of armed forces who. had been killed in action are covered by Section 14-B. They could recover, immediate possession of the premises let out by them if they are required for their own residence. The retired employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section 14-C. They could recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if they are needed for their own residence. The landlords who are widows are covered by Section 14-D with similar right to recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them or by their husband. These classified landlords are also given the benefit of the summary trial under Chapter III-A, by introducing Sections 14-B or 14-D in sub- Section(l)of Section 25-B. The sub-Section (1) of Section 25-B as it stands provides that every application by a landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-D or under Section 14-B or under Section 14-C or under Section 14D shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. There are, however, no corresponding amendments to sub- Sections 2 to 5 of Section 25-B. Omission to make corresponding amendments particulaRIy, to sub-Sections 4 & 5 of Section 25-B has given rise to the arguments for the petitioners that the tenant's right to contest the application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be denied even as against the classified landlords falling under Sections 14-B or 14-D. It was also argued that the classified landlords may prove the facts stated in their respective provisions, but the tenant is entitled to contest the application by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order of eviction on the grounds specified under Section 14(1)(e). The acceptance of the submissions urged for petitioners would practically obliterate the purpose and object of classification of landlords under Sections 14-B or 14-D who are carved out from the general landlords. Indeed, it would render the whole exercise of creating special classes of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them nugatory. Before the introduction of Sections 14-B or 14-D Section 14(1)(e) was the only remedy available to all landlords except those covered under Section 14-A to recover possession of their premises. The Controller shall give the tenant leave to contest the applications, if the tenant in his affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified under Section 14(1)(e). It is but natural when the landlord brings an action for recovery of possession of the premises covered under Section 14(1)(e), the tenant has the legitimate right to show that the landlord does not qualify under or satisfy the requirements of Section 14(1)(e). But today the remedy under Section 14(1)(e) is available only to landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under Sections 14-B or 14-D. The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of the rights under Section set out Section 14(1)(e). The argument that the absence of amendments to sub-Sections 4 and 5 of Section 25-B preserves the tenant's right to contest the application of even a classified landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14(1)(e) would be basically faulty. If such argument is available in respect of sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B, it must be equally available to sub-Section (2) of Section 25-B..... ...... Under sub-Section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the landlord depending upon whether it is under Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C or 14-D cr under Section 14(1)(e). The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defense under Section 14(1)(e) as against an application under Section 14-B. There cannot be any defense unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended the result for which the counsel for the tenant contended. It will be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never found favor with the Courts which have always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes. Section 14-B and allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and sub-Section (5) of Section 25-B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of Section 14-B or 14-D. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in Section 14-B or 14-D. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of classified landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14-B or 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from-showing that it is not bonafide. In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of Section 25(B) which states "special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. ...... .Needless to state, therefore, if an application is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective Sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defense by relying upon Section 14(1)(e). We find nothing contrary to our view in Precision Steel & Engineering Works and am. v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, . Sub-Section (5) of Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 Cpc has no part to play there. We, therefore, reiterate the views expressed in Busching Schmitz Private Limited case."

(9) Many of the grounds of challenge, raised by petitioner in the revision petition, stand rejected by the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Surjit Singh Kalra (supra).

(10) Mr. Rajeev Sharma, appearing for petitioner, contended that the learned Additional Rent Controller, ought to have followed the principles of law, as laid down in Precision Steel & Engineering Works and another v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, . By ignoring these principles, the Additional Rent Controller has acted against the law, laid down by the Supreme Court.

(11) The other contention, urged before me, by Shri Rajeev Sharma, was that the Additional Rent Controller, has manifestly erred in holding that Section 25-B of the Act, was not applicable to the application for eviction, under Section 14-B of the Act.

(12) NO-DOUBT, the Additional Rent Controller has wrongly held that the provisions of Section 25-B of the Act, are not applicable to the application for eviction, filed under Section 14-B or 14-D of the Act. As laid down by their Lordships in S. Surjit Singh Kaira (supra), the tenant is to file an application, under Section 25-B(4) & (5) to contest his eviction, on the grounds, to be disclosed in the affidavit, that if the facts so disclosed, are proved, then the same will disentitle the landlord to recover the possession. This, however, does not help the petitioner, because, the affidavit, filed by petitioner docs not disclose any fact, that will disentitle the respondent/landlord from recovering the possession.

(13) Section 14-B of the Act reads as under:

"14-B. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to members of the armed forces etc.-(1) Where the landlord;- (a) is a released or retired person from any armed forces and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence; or (b) is a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action and the premises let out by such member are required for the residence of the family of such member, such person or, as the case may be, the dependant may within one year from the date of his release or retirement from such armed forces or, as the case may be, the date of death of such member, or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord is a member of any of the armed forces and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time, within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (3) Where the landlord referred to in sub-Section (1) or sub- Section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-Section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him. Explanation-For the purposes of this Section, "armed forces" means an armed force of the Union constituted under an Act of parliament and includes a member of the police force constituted under Section 3 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (34 of 1978)".

(14) Under sub-Section (2), a landlord, who is a member of any of the armed forces and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement, can file an application, within a period of one year, before the retirement, for recovering the immediate possession of the premises, let out by him and which arc required for his own residence, after the retirement. This is established that respondent was serving as Brigadier in the armed forces and when, he made an application for eviction of petitioner, he was having less than one year before his retirement. In fact. he retired on June 30. 1989. It is also established that respondent wanted to recover the possession for his own residence. In fact, all the ingredients of Sections 14-B(2) were satisfied and petitioner/tenant failed to disclose even a single ground, on which respondent was likely to fail.

(15) It was further argued on behalf of petitioner that the tenant was entitled to leave to defend the application for his eviction, by disclosing such facts, in his affidavit, which would disentitle respondent from obtaining the order of eviction, under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.

(16) This proposition of law stands concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Surjit Singh Kalra (supra).

(17) Under sub-Section (5) of Section 25-B of the Act, the tenant can contest the application, by obtaining the leave with reference to the particular claim in the application, for eviction filed by the landlord, depending upon, whether, the claim is under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C or 14-D or under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. A tenant cannot be allowed to take up a defense, under Section 14(1)(e), as against an application, under Section 14-B of the Act. The defense should always be connected with and related to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant. This is the cardinal principle of law. As, observed by their Lordships in S. Surjit Singh Kalra (supra), when an application, for eviction of the tenant is filed, under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D of the Act, then, tenant's right to contest the same is narrowed down and restricted to the parameters of the respective Sections. The tenant cannot widen the scope of his defense by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).

(18) The other contention, raised by counsel for petitioner, was that after retirement, respondent, joined one M/s Lohia Machines at Kanpur. An affidavit has been filed to the effect that for sometime, after retirement to support him, respondent did join but, in April, 1990, he resigned. It has also been established that respondent was living in a temporary allotted accommodation.

(19) I do not find any jurisdictional error in the impugned order. Revision Petition No. 134/91 is dismissed in liming. Stay granted on 20th February, 1991, stands vacated.