Nirmaljit Arora vs Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd.
1991 Latest Caselaw 60 Del

JUDGMENT

M.C. Jain, C.J.

(1) This civil revision raises an important question as to the interpretation of S. 3(c); as inserted by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, (for short, the Amendment Act). That question arose before Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.N.Goswami in the aforesaid revision He, by his order dated 9.1.1989, referred the question to be answered authoritatively by the Division Bench of this Court. The question that arose before him was to whether the Amendment Act applies to the pending proceedings and according to him as the question would arise in a number of pending cases before ibis Court as will as before the Rent Control and the Appellate authority, so for deciding the question authoritatively, reference was made by him for deciding the said question by the Division Bench.

(2) We may state a few relevant facts giving rise to the present reference.

(3) The petitioner in this petition, Mrs. Nirmaljeet Arora let out the premises in question to the respondent on 14.7.80 at a rental of Rs. 5,000.00 per month for a period of 3 years. On 18.2.1985, the petitioner filed a petition for eviction under S. 14(l) (e) read with S. 25B of the Delhi Rest Control Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) against the repondent. The said petition after trial was dismissed by the Rent Controller, Delhi, on 7.3.1987 It was found that the petitioner acquired a rented premises being M-137. Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi, and the need of the petitioner has extinguished Aggrieved from Ihe order of the Rent Controller, the petitioner find this revision petition under S. 25B(8) of the Rent Act, on 26.5.1987-The respondents filed an application C.M. 2892/88 on 2.12.88, raising a plea that a new Cl. (c) has been added to S. 3 of the Rent Act, by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 which lays cown that the Act shall not apply to any premises whether residential or not whose monthly lent exceeds Rs. 3,500.00 per month. In view of the above amendment, the premises in question were not covered by the provisions of Rent Act, 1958, as the agreed rent was more than Rs. 3,500.00 . The Amendment has come into effect from 1.12.88 and so the revision was not maintainable. A reply to the said application was filed on 5.12.88 in which the plea raised in the application was stated to be untenable and it was submitted that added provision S. 3(c) would not apply to the pending proceedings. It is under these circumstances that the question arose before the learned Judge who has referred the question to be answered by the Division Bench.

(4) We have heard Shri R.K. Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.N. Marwaha, learned counsel for the respondent. A notice was also sent to the Bar, calling upon the members of the Bar that the question aforesaid has arisen and if any lawyer is interested to assist the Court for answering the said question, he may appear before the Court and make his submissions. Mainly, the learned counsel for the parties made their submissions before us.

(5) By Section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, Cls. (c) and(d) have been added in S. 3 of the Act. S. 2 of the Amending Act reads as under :-

2.Amendment of S. 3 -In S. 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958(59 of 1958), (hereinafter referred to as principal Act)- (i) in Cl. (a) the word "or" shall be omitted; (ii) after the proviso, the following clauses shall be inserted, namely:- .

"(C)to any premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees; or

(d) to any premises constructed on or after the commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, for a period of ten years from the date of completion of such construction."

(6) Section 3 makes a provision that the Act shall not apply to premises which fall under Cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d).

(7) The expression "premises" has been defined under S. 2(i) which 15 as under: "(I)"premises" means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes,-- (i) the garden, grounds and out houses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord, for use in such building or part of the building; but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house."

(8) The provisions of the Rent Act would not be attracted in respect of the premises covered by Cls. (a) to (d) of S. 3. So far as Cls. (c)'and (d) are- concerned, they have come into effect on 1.12.88- The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is that actions that petitions, revisions, or other proceedings which are pending on 1.12.88, whether are to be governed by the Act or whether even to the pending actions and proceedings, Cl. (c) of S. 3 would, apply i.e. whether the provisions of the Act would net apply to the pending- actions and proceedings. The question, therefore, would be as to whether the amended provision of S 3(c) is prospective in operation or retrospective in operation If the provision is prospective, then the question of application of S. 3(c) to the pending proceedings does not arise. It is only when it is found that S. 3(c) is retrospective in operation, in that situtation, the Act will not apply even to the pending Proceedings-

(9) Before proceeding to consider the question, it would be appropriate to examine as to how like provisions are to be interpreted and construed. First we may refer to some of the authorities on interpretation of Statutes.

(10) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, at page 215, under the heading-Retrospective Operation of Statutes, writes.    "UPON the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. The. statement of the law contained in the preceding paragraph has been "so frequently quoted with approval that it now itself enjoys almost judicial authority."  

(11) He further referred to the observation of the judgment in Re: Athlumney by R.S. Wright, J. The passage reads asunder;- "Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this-that a retrospective operation is not to be given toa statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment 'is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective Only. The rule has, in fact, two aspects, for it "involves another and subordinate role, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary".   

(12) The Rule is further stated as under :    "IF,however, the language or the-dominant intention of the enactment so demands, the Act must be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, for "the rule against the retrospective effect of statutes is not a rigid or inflexible rule but is one to be applied always in the light of the language of the statute and the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing."  

(13) With regard to pending actions, on page 220, it is stated that in general when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows its clear intention to vary such rights. Reference was made by him to a decision of the House of Lords in Att. Gen. v Vernazza, (1960) Ac 966. Lord Denning said (at p. 978) that it was "clear that hi the ordinary way the Court of Appeal cannot take into account 'a statute which has been .passed in the interval since the case was decided at first instance, because the rights of the litigants are generally to be determined according to the law in force at the date of the earlier proceedings. But it is different when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to that effect or because it deals with matters of procedure only, for then Parliament has shown an intention that the Act should operate on pending proceedings, and the Court of Appeal are entitled to give effect to this retrospective intent as well as a Court of first instance."

(14) Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 387, deals with Retrospective Enactments It is stated that a statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, 'or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. The passager was extracted from the judgment in Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch 402, by Lindley, L.J. that it is a fundamental rule of English Law that no 'statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly to require such a construction. And the same rule involves another and subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than Us language renders necessary. At page 398, it is stated that it is well recognised rule that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights, but such a construction should never be adopted if the words are open to another construction. It is also stated that if a statute be ambiguous, the Court should lean to the interpretation which would support existing rights.

(15) Crawford on construction of statutes deals with Amendatory Act in paragraph 295 and he states that as with statutes generally, an amendment will have no retrospective operation, unless its terms clearly indicate a different inteat. There is also a presumption that amendments are effective prospectively. Consequently, rights acquired under a statute before its amendment are not affected, unless the amending statute, expressly or by necessary implication so provides. But if the legislative intent requires it, retrospective operation must be given to the amendment.

(16) Shri R.K. Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner cited quite a good deal of case law, but we would like to refer to some of the important decisions out of them.

(17) In United Provinces v. Atiga Begum , the question was with regard to the applicability of UP. Regularsation of Remissions Act to the pending proceedings. In that case, the suit was instituted on 5.12.1934, by two land-holders for their share of the arrears of rent for the period 1931- 1934 A.D. against the defendant who were thekadars fixing an annual rent off Rs. 948.00 and entitling the thekadars to make collection of rents from tenants. The defendants claimed a deduction on account of remissions of rent which had been ordered. The plaintiffs content on that remissions could not be set of was rejected by the Assistant Collector and deductions were made and the suit was decreed in part. The District Judge on appeal rejected the contention that the scale of remission of rent was excessive and the first court's decree was upheld. The appeal was prefered to the High Court. The High Court held that the remissions not being in accordance wish S. 73 Agra Tenancy Act, were ultra vires and illegal and S 74 of that Act was not a bar to that suit; but the suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs should have sued his tenants ignoring the remissions. It was during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court the U.P. Regularisation of Remissions Act came into force on 24th September, 1938. The U.P. Government entered as a party. Sulaiman, J. observed that the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language actually employed in the Act. For statutes which confer or take away legal rights, whether public or private, or alter the jurisdiction of Courts of Law, express and unambiguous words are necessary No loophole should be left for escape. It was observed that the order of remission dealt with by the U.P. Act is not necessarily within the four corners of S 73, nor is there any specific reference to that section. The language actually used can suggest that the section was intended to prevent the order of the Provincial Government, of any authority empowered by it in that behalf from being questioned. At page 39, colomn. I, the learned Judge observed as under : "As already mentioned, the landholder in the present case ignoring the order of remission had claimed the full amount of the arrears of rent from the very beginning. Even in the second appeal before the High Court, they bad challenged the order of remissions of rent in grounds Nos. 2, 3 and 6 of their memorandum of appeal, several years before the impugned Act came into force. They had already calld the previous order in question, and that plea was already before the High Court for consideration. The legislature was presumably aware of the previous decision in Klr (1938) All 114(?) and must also have been aware that numerous other sui's for arrears of rent must be pending. And yet no express words were put in the impugned Act to show that it should apply to all actions pending in appeal. Further, the provisions that no such order shall be called in question has a certain amount of ambiguity in it and leaves it doubtful whether only the parties are prevented from question the order or even the Court is debarred from ignoring it as having been issued by an unauthorised body, and enforcing ther law that has not been repealed or amended by the U.P. Act. Of course, no such bar would exist against the Federal Court but in declaring what decree should be passed by the High Court it cannot ignore such a bar if. it exists. In view of the trend of judicial decisions already referred to, I am of the opinion that the impugned Act was not applicable to the appeal pending before the High Court."

(18) In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, , the question that arose for consideration was as to whether Art. 13(1) of the Constitution of India has a retrospective operation. Art. 13(1) declared that all laws in force in the territory of India which are inconsistent with the provisions of the fundamental rights to be void to the extent of inconsistency. In para 7, it was stated that all that this clause declares is that all existing laws in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of Part Iii shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. It was observed that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implications made to have retrospective operation. It was observed that before the Constitution came into force, there was no such thing as fundamental rights. As the fundamental rights being operative only en and from the date of Constitution, the question of the inconsistency of the existing laws with these rights must necessarily arise on and from the date those rights came into being. It must follow, therefore, that Art 13(1) can have no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation.

(19) Another case cited by Shri Makhija is Moti Ram v Suraj Bhan, . In that case, S. 13(3) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 was amended. The application for ejectment was made on August 28, 1956 and the Act was amended by the amending Act 29 of 1956 on September 24, 1956. Ss. 13 and 15 were amended. S. 13 provided inter alia that a tenant in possession of a building shall not be evicted there from except in accordance with the provisions of that section, or in pursuance of an order made under S. 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 1947 as subsequently amended, Sub-see. (2) of S. 13 provided for an application to be made by a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant for a direction in that behalf. S, 13(3)(a)(iii) as it stood at the date of the application made by respondent No. 1 provided that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case of any building if he requires it for (he reconstruction of that building or for its replacement by another building or for the erection of other buildings. This provision was substantially modified by the amending Act. The question arose as to whether the amended provision applies to the present proceedings. The question was considered in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report. It was observed that if the amended provision applied to the present case, respondent No. I would not been titled to obtain an order of ejectment. It is plain that by the amendment Legislature has imposed rigorous limitations on a landlord a right to recover possession in the case of any building or rented land. The question was whether the amendment is retrospective in operation. It was observed (at page Sc 658; Air 1960) : "It is clear that the amendment made is not in relation to any procedure and cannot be characterised as procedural. It is in regard to a matter of substantive law since it affects the substantive rights of the landlord. It may be conceded that the Act is intended to provide relief to the tenants and in that sense is a beneficial measures and as such its provision should be liberally construed; but this principle would not be material or even relevant in deciding the question as to whether the new provision is retrospective or not. It is well-settled that where an amendment affects vested rights the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication. The amending Act obviously does not make the relevant provision retrospective in terms and we see no reason to accept the suggestion that the retrospective operation of the relevant provision can be spelt out as a matter of necessary implication."

(20) It was further considered as to what would be the consequences if the provision is held to be retrospective. It was observed that inevitably all pending actions in which landlords may have applied for possession of their buildings let out to the tenants under the provisions of S.13(3)(a)(iii) as it stood before the amendment, would automatically fail because they would not satisfy the tests imposed by the amended provision. If such a drastic consequence was really intended by the Legislature, it would certainly have made appropriate provisions in express terms in that behall. It was observed that when the Legislature intends to make substantive provisions of law retrospective in operation, it generally makes its intention clear by express provisions in that behalf. It was concluded that : "WEare, therefore, satisfied 'that Section 13(3)(a)(iii) as amended cannot apply to proceedings which were pending either before the Controller or before the appellate authority at the time when the amendment was made."

(21) In the present case; admittedly, the amendment Act came into force during the pendency of the revision petition.

(22) In Arjan Singh v. The State of Punjab, , the question that arose for consideration was as to whether the insertion of S.32 Kk in the Pepsu Act, 1955 would be taken to be from 30.10.1956 or will have a retrospective effect so as to be operative from the date of operation of the Principal Act No. 13 of 1955 i.e from 6.3.1955. After staling the rule of construction, in para 4, it was observed in para 5 that if the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge of the High Court is accepted, it would mean ignoring of sub-see. (2) of S.I of the 1962 Amendment Act. That section in specific terms says that S. 32 KK.hall be deemed to have come into force on the 30th day of October, 1956. It was observed that that provision clearly brings out. the, intention of the legislature. There is no ambiguity in it. It is nat possible to adopt any rule of construction which would necessitate the Court to ignore that provision and it is not possible to accept the conclusion of the High Court that S. 32 Kk must be deemed to have come into force on the date the principal Act came into force, namely, on March 6, 1955.

(23) Reference has also been made to Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills, New Contractors Co. Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, . In that case, the question was as to whether enhanced price of rice can be demanded under the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964. Cl. (2) of the Third Amendment Order, 1964 substituted the maximum price of the varieties of rice. A contention was advanced on behalf of the appellants that the claim of the appellants cannot be validly ignored as the word 'substituted' occurs in Cl. (2) of the Third Amendment Order. It was claimed by the appellants that they have to be paid at the controlled price as fixed vide the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964, regardless of ihe dates on which the supplies were made. This contention was not acceded to. It was observed that it is no doubt true that the literal meaning of the. word 'substitute' is 'to replace' but the question is from which date the substitution or replacement of the new schedule took effects It was observed that there is to deeming clause of some such provision in the Rice (Andhra Pradesh)Price Contorol(Third Amendment) Order, 1964 to indicate that it was intended to have a retrospective effect. It was further observed that : "IT is a well recognised rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospectivity may be inferred, a notification takes effect from the date it is issued and not from any prior date. The principle is also well settled that statutes should not be construed so as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the. Amending Act came into force. (See Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar (1962) 2 Scr 411 : Air 1979 Sc 1636) "

(24) In the prevent case, by S. 2 of the Amending Act, 1988 after the proviso, Cl. (c) was inserted, there is no deeming clause that it shall always be deemed to have been inserted.

(25) Reference has also been made to Govindas v. The Income-tax Officer, . The question that arose for consideration in that case was as to whether S. 171(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is retrospective in operation. In that case, the assessment of Huf for assessment years 195"-51 to 1956-57 was completed under S. 25A of the old Act. Tax was determined in reassessment proceedings. The question arose as to whether recovery can be effected under S. 171(6) of the 1961 Act. PN. Bhagwati, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed : "SUB-SECTION(6) of S. 171 applies only to a situation where the assessment of a Hindu undivided family is completed under S. 143 or S. 144 of the new Act. It can have no application where the assessment of Hindu undivided family is completed under the corresponding provisions of the old Act. Such a case would be governed by S 25A of the old Act which does not impose any personal liability on the members in case of partial partition and to construe sub-sec. (6) of S. 171 as applicable in such a case with consequential effect of casting on the 'members personal liability which did not exist under S. 25A, would be to give retrospective operation to sub-sec. (6) of S. 171 is not warranted either by the express language of that provision or by necessary implication. Thus, sub-see. (6) of S. 171 of the new Act cannot be given retrospective operation."

(26) In M/s. Punjab Iron Supply Co., Chandigarh v. Central Government, , the exemption was granted by the Home Department Notification dated 31.1.1973, as modified notifications dated 24.9.74 to those buildings which were given sewerage connection or electric connection or which are occupied, as the case may be, on or after January 31, 1973. It was held that the benefit of the notification cannot be extended to the buildings which were given the sewerage connection or electric connection or which were occupied, as the case may be, prior to January 31, 1973. Those buildings are governed by the provisions of the Act and any decrees passed in respect of them are governed by S. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applicable to Union Territory of Chandigarh, Their Lordships, with regard to the rule of interpretation regarding retrospectively observed (at pages Sc 93 and 94, Air 1948) .- "ALL laws which affect substantive rights general operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence, the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the .provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court has to decide whether in the. light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should be given to it or not."

(27) In Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v. Amireddi Sitharamamma, , the question was as to whether illegitimate son of a Sudra from Brahim concubine and the concubine are entitled to maintenance from the estate of the deceased and whether their rights were affected by Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The provisions of S. 4, S. 2 ard S. 22 came up for consideration. S. 4 provides that any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made .in this Act. S. 21 defines "dependents" and S. 22 created a liability that the heirs of a deceased Hindu are bound to maintain the dependants of the deceased .out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. It was observed-that before the Act came into force, rights of maintenance out of the'estate of a Hindu dying before the commencement of the Act were acquired and the corresponding liability to pay the maintenance was incurred under the Hindu Law in force at the time of death. The death in this case occurred in the year 1948 much before the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act came into force. It was observed that it was a well-recognised role that a statute should, be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect . vested rights, and such a construction should never be adopted if the words are open to another construction. The claimants under the new law were not entitled to maintenance but 'it was observed that Ss. 21 and 22 read with S. 4 do not destroy or affect the rights of the estate of a deceased Hindu vested on his death before,the commencement of the Act under the Hindu law in force at the time of his death.

(28) The case of State of.Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh Air 1955 Sc 84 : (1955 Cri Lj 254) cited by Shri Makhija, deals with the consequences of repeal of an enactment. It was observed (at page Sc 88; Air 1955): "WHENEVER there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look the provisions of the new Act bat only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destory them. The Court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that S. 6 of the General Clases Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. S- 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the sections. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of S 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment".

(29) The case S.S.Gadgil v. M/s. Lal Co., is a case under the Income-tax Act, The question in that case was as to whether under the Amending Act by S. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, the authority was conferred upon the Income-tax Officer to assess person as an agent of a foreign party under S. 43 within 2 years from the end of the year of assessment. The right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the assessed as an agent of a non resident party under the Income-tax Act before it was amended ended on 31.3.56. It was held that the authority of the Income-tax Officer under the Act before it was amended by the Finance Act, 1956 having already come to an end, the amending provision will not assist him to commence the proceeding even at the date when he issued the notice. It is within the period provided by the Amending Act. The provision of the Amending Act was interpreted in the manner that the power which had already come to an end prior to amendment, that power cannot be exercised under the Amending Act. It was observed that the provision must be read subject to rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is expressly mentioned, or to authorizes the Income-tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred. The legislature gave to S. 18 of the Evidence Act, 1956 only limited retrospective operation i.e. up to April, 1956.

(30) In Mohd. Idris v. Sat Narain, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force w.e.f. July 1,1952. The suit was filed en May 27, 1952 when the Abolition Act was not on the Statute book. When the Abolition Act was passed, it did not repeal the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act. Both the Acts continued on the Statute Book till July 12, 1953. On that date. Act 16 of 1953 i.e. U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Amendment Act was passed and by S. 67, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act was repealed. While repealing the Act, it was not stated whether the repeal was to operate retrospectively or not. But by S. 1(2), the Amending Act itself was deemed to have come into force from the first day of July, 1952 that is to say, simultaneously with the Abolition Act. Thus, it may be assumed that the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act was also repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952. The question was whether the right of the plaintiff to continue the suit under the old law was in any way impaired. The question was examined in the light of S. 6, U.F. General Clauses Act. The question was whether a different intention appears in either the Abolition Act or the Amending Act, 16. of 1953. For otherwise, the old proceedings could continue before the Munsiff. It was held that (at page Sc 1501; Air 1966): "There is nothing in the Abolition Act' which takes away the right of suit in respect of a pending action. If there be any doubt, it is removed when we consider that the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act was repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952 only and it is not, therefore, possible to give the repeal further retrospectivity so as to affect a suit pending from before that date. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector was itself created from July 1, 1952 and there is no provision in the Abolition Act that pending cases were to stand transferred to the Assistant Collector for disposal. Such provisions are commonly found in a statute which takes away the jurisdiction of one Court and confer it on another. From the two circumstances, it is to be inferred that if there is at all any expression of intention, it is to keep S. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable to pending litigation."

(31) In K. Eapen Chako v. The Provident Investment Company (P) Ltd, Air 1976 Sc 26,0, S. 125(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (1 of 1964) created a bar against Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with the questions required to be settled by the Land Board in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There was a clear provision in the provisio to S. 125(1) of the Act that the section shall not apply to proceedings pending in any Court at the commencement of the Act of 1969 on lst January, 1970. The effect of the proviso was to carve out by way of exception what would otherwise have fallen within the provision to which it is a proviso. It would follow that the pending proceedings were saved from the operation of S. 125 (1) of the Act, and are to be determined by the Civil Court. It was also observed that same is the position if viewed in the light of S. 125(3) of the Act and that provisions is also prospective. It is a case where there was change in procedure and it was held that if the Legislature forms a new procedure alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reason why they should not be. In other words, if a statute deals merely with the procedure in an action and does not affect the rights of the parties, it will be held to apply prima facie to all action?, pending as well.as future.

(32) It would appear from the case law considered above that the rule of construction or interpretation is veiy well settled and well established that laws generally are prospetive in character more particularly, laws affecting vested or substantive rights or laws creating new liabilities or imposing new disabilities, unless there are express words in the statute affecting the existing rights of unless there is clear manifestation of the intention of the Legislature on the basis of which it can be said that the law is retrospective in character, and even vested rights have been taken away or new liabilities have been created or new disabilities have been imposed. There are laws and laws' and cases and cases, the real question is the question of application of the cardinal rule of construction which is propounded and considered above. It is also well established that there is a presumption against retrospectivity and this presumption can only be rebutted by express words in the Statute or by necessary intendment of the statute. It is also well established that only to that extent, retrospectivity may be considered of the provisions in the statute which necessary arises from the express words or from necessary intendment. Beyond that extent, retrospectivity should cot be considered to have arisen.

(33) Mr. Makhija, therefore, has vehemently submitted in the light of the case law considered above that in the present S. 3(e), it cannot be found that it has retrospective operation. There is no deeming clause in S. 2 of the Amending Act, and besides that, the Legislature was well aware that under the Rent Act petitions and revision petitions and other proceedings are pending, if the Legislature had intended that the Rent Act should not apply to a situation as envisaged in S. 3(e), then the Legislature would have made its intention clear that even for the pending proceedings the Rent Act will not apply where the rental exceeds Rs 3,500.00 in respect of any premises. On account of insertion of Cl. (c), it Would appear that it will have operation from the date the Amending Act came into operation i.e. 1.12.1988. The intention of the Legislature, so far as insertion of Cl. (d) in S. 3 is concerned, is clear and manifest as the language of Cl (d) is to the effect that the Act shall not apply to any premises constructed on and after the commencement of the Amending Act for a period of 10 years. So, building or premises which are constructed on or after the amendment of the Act to such buildings or premises, S. 3 will not apply for a period of 10 years from the date of completion of such construction. Cl (d), therefore, has a prospective operation. The intention to that effect is expressed in the words of Cl. (d). So, it is urged that if the legislature bad intended to apply Cl. (c) to the pending proceedings as well, the Legislature would' have expressed so. In the situation, that is, in the situation when S 3(c) was to apply to pending cases and proceedings, then all pending cases and proccedings would fail, as the provisions of S. 3(c) would exclude the operation of the Rent Act to such premises whose monthly rent exceeds Rupees 3,500.00 .

(34) Shri Marwaha, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that S. 3 declares that the Act shall not apply to premises a described io Cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d). Cl. (c) clearly declares that the Act shall not apply to premises whether residential or not whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3,5001-. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, clear that the Act shall not apply to such premises. When the Act itself shall not apply to the premises, then the necessary result would be that no new proceedings can continue under the Act and the parties are left to have their remedy before the civil Court. It' is only a case of change of forum and as such clause 3(c) has a retrospective operation and no pending proceedings can continue under the Rent Act. Mr, Marwaha, referred to the Statement of Objects and 'Reasons of the Amending Act and emphasised that having regard to objects of the Amending Act, the intention of the Legislature is all the more manifest that Section 3(c) should have retrospective operation. The object of the Amending Act is: (a) to rationalise the present Rent Control law by bringing about a balance between the interest of landlords and tenants; (b) to give a boost to house building activity and maintain the existing housing- stock in a reasonable state of repairs." (c) to reduce litigation between landlords and tenants and to ensure expeditious disposal of disputes betweenthem.

(35) Mr. marwaha urged that the Amending Act classified the premises into two categories, those whose monthly rent exceeds Rs.3,500.00 and those" whose monthly rent is Rs. 3,500.00 or less than that. The Act will have no application to premises whose monthly rent excludes Rs. 3,500 .00 . So in respect of such premises, the ordinary remedy in law is only available and the protection afforded to tenants under the Rent Act in respeno PpreaBses fetching leaf more than Rs. 3,500.00 has been taken away. It would be easier for the landlords to avail the remedy against such tenants under the ordinary law and in this manner, the legislative object would be achieved. According to Mr. Marwaha, no one has a vested right relating to forum and by legislation, change of forum can be created and it is only a procedural law, so, it will have a retrospective operation' He also urged that there is no saving for pending cases and as such having regard to the language of the Act, the object of the Act, the nature and character of the Act and the provision according to Shri Marwaha, Section 3(c) will apply even to pending cases and proceedings and all such proceedings will terminate w.e.f. 1.12.1988. . In support of his contention, Mr. Marwaha placed reliance on a number of decisions.

(36) Reference was made by Shri Marwaha to a decision of the Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Marwaha v. Smt. Sumunderi Devi, In that case the question was as to whether the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 will be applicable to the proceedings in view of the fact that although the premises were let out in June, 1976, but as the assessment was made in October, 1, 1976, the provisions of the Act will not apply for 10 years from October - 1, 1976 and, therefore, the suit could be decreed as the protection available under the Act will not be available to the tenants In that case, the suit was dismissed by tUd trial Court but the High Cot set aside the conclusion of the trial Court. The suit was decreed by the High Court in view of the language of Section . 2(2) explanation 1, according to which, period of 10 years will commence from the date of first assessment i.e. October 1,1976. On behalf of the appllant, reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Om Parkash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, and Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, . the respondent relied on a decision in Firm Amar Nath Bashehar Dass v. Tek Chand, .

(37) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section 2 of the Act made a provision that nothing in the Act shall apply to a building during the period of 10 years from the dale on which its construction is completed except as provided in various provisions mentioned in sub-section (2) and sub-section further made provisions as to when construction would be considered to be completed. Section 39 of the Act provided for pending suits for eviction relating to buildings, brought under regulation for the first time. This Section applies to those suits which are pending on the date of commencement of the Act i.e. 15th day of July, 1972. the suit was not pending on the date on which the Act came into force. This view was taken in 0m Parkash Gupta's case that the suit must be pending on 15.7.72. Section 40 of the Act deals with pending appeals or revisions in suits for eviction relating to buildings, brought under regulation for the first time. The provision of Section 40), therefore, would apply only to the suits from which revision or appeal arose was pending on the date of commencement of the Act. Their Lordships observed that it is well settled that the right of the parties will bo determined on the basis of the tights available to them on the date of the suit but in Vineet Kumar's case, the Supreme Court took the view that if during the pendency of the proceedings 10 years have elapsed, then tenant is entitled to the protection under the Act. Their Lordships quoted para 17 of the Judgment in Vineet Kumar's case and expressed that unfortunately attention of the Court was not drawn to 0m Parkash Gupta's case which has specifically conside red the Act and the language of the Section and is a decision by a Bench of three Judges. Their Lordships then considered the provision of Section 20. It provided that save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of tenant from a building, not with standing the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on expiry of notice to it or in any other manner. It was observed that the language of Section 20 clearly indicates that the restriction put under Section 2U is to the institution of the suit itself and therefore, it is clear that if the provision of the Act applies, no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the ground specified in the sub-section (2) of Section 20. I was observed that keeping in view that language of Section 20 and in the light of the provis.icns of sub-section (2) of Section 20, it will be clear that for a newly constructed building the provision of the Act will not apply for 10 years and so, the restriction under Section 20 will not apply. So, if during the pendency of the litigation, even if 10 years expired, the restriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted within 10 years and fresh restriction as provided for in Section 20 cannot be attracted.

(38) This case does not in any way help the respondents. In this case, the decree for eviction passed by the High Court was maintained as the Suit was instituted within 10 years and the period of 10 years expired during the pendency of the litigation and the bar of Section 20 was held to be not attracted. It is not necessary to deal with the authorities considered in this decision.

(39) Reference was also made to decision in Ramjilal v. Ramkishan, . It was also a case where the Act was not applicable to the classes of premises mentioned in Section 2(2). The Act was made applicable to the town of Hindaun but because of Clause (e) of the proviso, the provisions of the Act did not apply to the shop of the plaintiff-landlord for a period of seven years from the date of its completion. After the expiry of seven years, the provisions of the Act came into force, and Section 13 came into play. Section 27 was enacted as an abundant caution to apply to pending matters. In that case, as the period had expired, so the tenant was protected and except under the circumstances enumerated in Section 13, he could not be dispossessed. The shop was constructed on 23.4.59. It was rented out on 14.9.62. The landlord needed the shop for personal use. He determined the tenancy and a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment was filed on 27-8-64. The trial Court dismissed the suit in view of the findings that the plaintiff failed to prove that the shop was newly constructed and completed on 23.4.59 and that the plaintiff requires the premises bona fide and reasonably. The appellate Court agreed with the trial Court with regard to the reasonable bona fide need but reversed the finding on the new construction of the shop. The learned Judge opined that the shop was completed on 23.4.59 but he concluded that 7 years had elapsed after the completion of the shop and as such the provisions of Section 13 would apply and exemption provided under clause (e) of the provisio to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act beyond a period of 7 years could not be availed on by the plaintiff. Decree of dismissal was upheld. In view of the fact that 7 years had expired. Section 13 was made applicable. Consequently, the plaintiffs second appeal was dismissed by the High Court. This is a case of expiry of the exemption period and on account of expiry the law was made applicable.

(40) In K.C. Mukerjee v. Mt. Ramratan Kuer , the occupancy holder had transferred his holding and a suit for ejectment was brought. During the pendency of the Suit, Bengal Tenancy Act was amended by Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934. The amended provisions provided for continuance of occupancy holding by the lessees. Their Lordships held that both Sections 26(N) and 26(0) contained deeming provisions and as such, they arc retrospective in nature. Under Section 26(N), landlord's consent will be deemed. Similarly, under Section 26(0) as well, if the transferee pays to the landlord transfer fee or deposits the landlord's transfer fee with the Collector, every person claiming an interest as a landlord shall be deemed to have given his consent to every transfer made before 11.1. 1923, The Act contained no saving clause modifying Sections 26(N) and 26(0). Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the question is not whether general language shall be taken only in a prospective sense. The object of this section can only be to quiet titles which are, more than ten years old, and to ensure that if during those ten years the transferee has not been ejected he shall have the right to remain on the land. Within this class the legislature has not thought it to discriminate against tenants whose right is under challenge in a suit,a course which it may well have regarded as invidious or unnecessary. As substantive rights of landlords and their accrued causes of action were to be abrogated, respect for pending suits over old transfers cannot be assumed Their Lordships also dealt within the provisions of Section 26(0), and observed that it is reasonably plain that no such saving can be implied under Section 26(0). It would

(41) Appear from this case that in view of the deeming provisions, it was held that the provisions were retrospective. 41 Reference has also been made to a decision in Mula,v.Godhu, . There was a pre-emption decree passed by the trial Court During the pendency of the appeal. Section 31 was amended by Act 10 of 1960. In respect of Section 31, as amended, it was plain and comprehensive enough to require an appellate Court to give effect to the substantive provisions of the Amending Act whether, the appeal before it is one against a decree granting preemption, or one, refusing that relief relying on an earlier decision in. the case of Ram Sarup v Munshi, , it was held, that it was riot open to-this Court to pass,a decree of pre-emption in favor of, the appellants Who were deprived in 1960 of their right to secure such a decree in the present suit. It Was also observed that it was not even open to the High Court to pass a decree of pre-emption, favor,of the appellants on January 6, 1967. The argument that the appellant had already secured a. decree in their favor by the Court which decree has become final and that they have. fully complied with its terms and further that in the, present appeal, they are merely seeking modification of the decree of the High Court without claming any right of preemption in their own favor is unsustainable. Section 31 prohibited the Courts from passing decrees inconsistent with the amended Act. lt is noteworthy that the Courts jurisdiction to pass a decree inconsistent with the amended Act was taken .a way.

(42) It is not necessary to deal with Ram Sarup's case (supra) considered in this decision.

(43) Mr. Marwaha then referred to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court relating to Rajasthan Moneylenders Act. Sec. 26-B of the Rajasthan Moneylenders Act. 1964, as amended in 1968. was applicable to pending cases also.This view was taken in Kanhiyalal v.Sri Lal, 1980 Raj Lw '30l, and by another Judgment, the same view was taken in Ranchordas v.Malookchand, 1980,WLN 580 : (AIR 1981 (NOC), 72). two sections, namely, 11 and 26 were amended by the amending Act whereas in Section 11, the legislature expressly provided an exception of its application to those cases pending but no such, exception was carved out in Section 26(b). It was .observed that when Legislature, acts a particular point of time in legislating two provisions in the same Act, and in one retrospective effect is a voided by making an exception and in the other drastic consequences are contemplated by not enacting such an explanation,or exception. It was observed that while interpreting the law, that Court had no option but to respect the. wishes of the legislature, though seemingly it may create headship to those moneylenders who have already filed their suit and were not aware, of the drastic consequences of noncompliance of the sections of Act. Such an intention of the legislature cannot be challenged unless it lacks any legislative authority or becomes expletive of any of the provisions of the Constitution, It was observed so in Ramchandra v. Prabhulal, , and to the same effect is yet another decision in M/s.Arora Finance Company,Tonk v Nazeer Ahmed, .

(44) Another decision cited by Shri Marwaha from Rajasthan is Kishan Lal v. Shyam Lal, . In that case, a decree for eviction was passed prior to extension of Sections 13 and 26 in the area where premises in question were situated. It Was held that the decree could be executed provided any of the grounds in Section 13 existed. The executing Court itself should satisfy about the existence of such grounds. Section 26 of the Act clearly provided that no decree for eviction of a tenant from any premises in an area to which this Act extends for the time being passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to eviction of such tenant, be executed against him except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. This case turned on the specified provision contained in Section 26 of the Act.

(45) Reference has also been made to Shah Bhojrai Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, . In that case, after termination of tenancy, suit for possession was filed by landlord. ' During the pendency of the suit, Part Ii of the Act was extended to that area contained in Section 12. The language of Section 12(1) was to the effect that a landlord is not entitled to possession if the tenant pays or shows his readiness and willingness to pay standard rent and to observe the other conditions of the tenancy. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 applies from the date of which Part Ii of the Act is extended to the particular area by a Notification issued under S. 6 Sub-section (1) disentitles the landlord to the recovery of possession of any premises. In other words, no decree can be passed granting possession to the landlord if the tenant fulfills the conditions mentioned therein. The point of time when the sub-section will operate is when the decree for recovery of possession will have to be passed. Thus,in the light of the language of the sub-section, the provision applies equally to suits pending and also to those filed subsequently. This contention was negatived that the operation of Section 12(1) is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force in a particular area.

(46) It would appear that the language of the Section was clear so ac to apply to pending suits.

(47) Mr. Marwaha also cited the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak, . This case is also similar to the cases cited above. In this case as well, there was extension of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act to the area after passing of eviction decree but during pendency of appeal, it was held that Section 13 can be invoked and the tenant is entitled to claim protection as appeal is in continuation of suit. Change in law pending appeal can be taken into account. Section 13(1) was to the effect that notwithstanding anything to the contrary, in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favor of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the grounds. Their Lordships referred to the earlier decision in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory case, (supra), Mst. Rafiguennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, , Ram Sarupv. Munshi, (supra) and Mula v. Godhu, (supra). The following passage was quoted from Dayawati v. Inderjit, . "If the new law speaks in language which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance". And reference, was also made to Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, , Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal (1902) 2nd 26 Mad 91(FB),and Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v.Keshwar Lal Chaudhury .

(48) The case of Mst. Rafiquennessa (supra) was a case under Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act. The scope of Section 5(l)(a) was considered. It was held in that case that Section 2 clearly indicates that the legislature wanted the beneficent provisions en?cted by it to take within their protection not only leases executed after the Act came into force, but also leases executed prior to the operation of the Act; and in that sense, the Act clearly affects vested rights of the landlords who bad let out their urban properties to the tenants-prior to the date ofthe Act. That is one important fact which is Material in determining the scope and effect of S. 5. It was also observed that Section 5 itself gives an unmistakable indication of the legislative intention to make its provisions retrospective. The plain object of Section 5 is to protect the tenants who have built a permanent structure either for business or for residence, provided it has been built within 5 years from the date of contract of fenancy. So such case would fall within Section 5(l) (a) even though the constructions had been made before the date of the Act. It would then appear that there was a clear indication of the legislative intention under the provision itself.

(49) Mr. Marwaha also referred to a decision in Memon Abdul Karim Haji Tayab, Central Cutlery Stores Veraval v. Deputy Custodian General, New Delhi, . In that case, the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was amended by Act 9 1 of 1956, which came into force on October 22, 1956. With regard to sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 48, it was observed that they are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance there with after October 22, 1956. even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act. It was a case of procedural law.Such law would operate retrospectively to all actions after they came into force.

(50) Mr. Marwaha further cited a ease on the Citizenship Act, 1955. The came is State of U.P. v. Shah Mohanimad, . la that case, the plaintiff had gone to Pakistan after 26th January, 1950 but before the comencement of the Act. returned to India on a visa issued by the Indian High Commission, Pakistan. He instituted a suit before the commencement of of the Act for a' declaration that his nationality. never changed and he continued to remain a citizen of India. The plaintiff succeeded but the appeal was preformed to the High Court and a contention was raised that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question arisen in the; suit in view of Section 9 Of the Citizenship Act which had been passed during the pendency of the proceedings read with Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956. The High Court framed the issue and remitted the case to lower appellate Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have called for a decision on that issue but should have ordered its determination of the question by the Central Governiaent. It was held that the questions falling within Section 9(2) have to be determined by the Central Government and not by the Courts. And it was also held that it is clear from the language of Section 9(1) that it cannot be given prospective operation only and that it would cover all cases where an Indian citizen has acquired foreign nationality between January 26, 1950 and its commencement or where he acquires such nationality after its commencement. The case turned on the language of Section 9(2) and Rule 30. Section 9(2) provided that if any question arises as to whether, when and how any person has acquired the citizenships of another country, it shall be determined by such authority ?'n such manner and having regard to such rules of evidence as may be prescribed in this behalf. And Rule 30 provided that if any question arises, the authority to determine such question shall, for the purpose of Section 9(2), be the Central Government. Thus, Section 9 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 applied to pending suits as well in the light of its language and the rules framed there under.

(51) MR.ARWAHA also referred (o the decision in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, , where the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act were held to be retroactive. Their Lordships considered the rule of interpretation in para 21 as under (at pages Sc 1253 & 1254: Air 1989) :-

"WE read in Maxwell that it is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly at the time of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given (o a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation; otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively would pre-judicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and; for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which bad to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. writes that the general rule of law that statutes are not operated retrospectively may be departed from (a) by express enactment and (b) by necessary implication from the language employed and the author goes on to say ;

"IF it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Court will give it such an operation. "Baron Parke" said Lord Hatherley in Pardo v. Bingham, ( (1869) Lr 4 Ch App 735) did not consider it an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be, construed, and said that the question in each case was whether the the legislature bad sufficiently expressed that intention. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, what it was that the legislature contemplated". But a statute is not to be read retrospectively except of necessity......In Main v. Stark (1890) 15 Ac 384) Lord Selborne said : "Their Lordships, of course, do not say that there might not be something in the context of an Act of Parliament, or to be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation, but they ought not to receive a larger operation unless you find some reason for giving it......In all cases it is desirable to ascertain the intention of the legislature"

He went on: "Words not requiring retrospective operation, so as to affect existing statute prejudicially, ought not to so construed", but in Reynolds v. Att. Gen. for Nova Scotia, (1896 Ac 240) it was he that this rule did not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal a privilege which (lid not amount to an accrued right." (pp. 392-393).

(52) 52, In that case, a suit was instituted in the Court of Civil Judge by the plaintiff-respondent Prem Behari, praying for the reliefs inter alia that be be declared to be the sole and real owner of the suit house and the defendant- appellant be restrained from transferring the same. The suit was decreed on 13-3-74. On first appeal, the Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant on 23-12-74 and the defendant's second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court on 27-3-1978. On behalf of the appellant, a contention was advanced that the Bennami Transaction Prohibition Act, 1988 has put a complete bar to the plaintiff's suit. 5.4oftheBcnamiAct prohibited the right to recover property held benami by providing that no suit. claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami that lie by or on behalf of person claiming to be the real owner of the property and S. 4 also provided that no defense based on any right in respect of any property held benami shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by and on behalf of person claiming to be the real owner of such property. The suit house was held benami by the respondent in the name of the appellant. The Act was not made retrospective by any specific provision. Their Lordships referred to the relevant report of the Law Commission and the facts and circumstances attending to the issuance of the Ordinance prior to the enactment of the statute. Their Lordships considered the question as to whether the suit is still pending in the Supreme Court on construction of S. 4 along with the report of thg Law Commission and examined the question that the suit is still pending before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships held that the consequence is that the plaintiff-respondent's suit or action cannot be decreed under the law and hence the decree passed by the lower Courts is annihilated and the suit dismissed the legislative intention was gathered from the languaged employed in S. 4 and. The report of the Law Commission.

(53) In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to discuss the decision of the Kerala High Court in , cited by Shri Marwaha.

(54) In the authorities cited by Shri Marwaha, it would be clear that either the provisions were very express giving them retrospectivity or retrospectivity has been found by necessary implication intendment. As already stated above there are no express words in S. 3(c) giving this provision retrospective effect. Cl.(f) has been added w.e.f. 1-12-1988. It will have operation from that date. It would be considered to be law on the statute book on 1-12-1988. As already stated, there is no deeming clause in the amending S. 2. The absence of the deeming clause also manifests the intention of the legislature that the Legislature did not want to give retrospective effect to the insertion of Cl. (c) in S. 3. It was easy for the legislature to have stated in S. 2 of the Amending Act that the clause shall always be deemed to have been inserted. Had there been such a language employed in S. 2. Section 3(c) would have been given retroactive operation. Besides the absence of deeming provision, even in the language of S. 3(c), there is nothing from which it can be said that S. 3(c) would apply from before 1-12-1988 i.e. even to pending cases. This knowledge can be attributed to the legislature that thousands and. thousands of matters are pending at various stages under the Rent Act. If the Legislature intended to have such a serious and grave consequence to follow, that all proceedings should terminate under the Rent Act, it would not have rest contented by simply making a provision of insertion after the proviso to CI. (b) of S: 3. It would have categorically provided that the provisions of Cl. 3(c) shall apply se all pending actions and proceeding From the objects of the amending Act as well, it cannot be found that such were the intentions of the Legislature so as to give retrospective effect to S. 3(c). Having regard to the rule of interpretation of statutes, and in the light of the provision contained in S. 3(c) and in tha light of the amending S. 2 of the amending Act, and having regard to the consequences which would follow, if S.?(c) is given retrospective effect, which could not have been intended by the Legislature, we are dearly and firmly of the opinion that S. 3(c) is only prospective in character and has no retrospective operation, and as such, it will not apply to the pending actions and proceedings The pending actions and proceedings shall continue to be governed by the Rent Act an if in respect of the pending matters. S. 4(c) is not on the statute book. When we express that S.3(c) has operation prospectively,w.e.f.l-12-88,it would mean that S. 3(c) would apply from 1-12-88 and in that event, if the rent of the premises exceeds Rs 3,500.00 p.m" the provisions of S.3(c) would apply and as Such the Rent Act would have no application to such premises. This is the necessary result of the prospective operation of S. 3(c). It cannot be said that if S.3(c) is applied from 1 -12-88, it will,still be retrospective as it would apply to existing tenancies of the premises fetching rent exceeding Rs.3,50e.00 . Mr. S.Ganesh, learned counsel for the petitioner in one of the potions submitted that the vested rights of the tenants under the existing tenancies arise under the Rent Act cannot be taken away. There is no express provision to that effect in S. 3(c) nor there is necessary intendment to that effect. Suffloc it to say, S. 3 is a prevision declaring non-application of the Act to certain premises and according to S. 3(c), the Rent Act will not apply to premises described in CI. (c). The expression to that effect is clear in specific words. There is a clear mandate of the Legislatore. Thus, from 1-12-1988, the Rent Act will not apply to such premises. We have already considered some case law cited by Shri S. Ganesh.

(55) Section 3(c) is not simply a provision of change of forum as contended by Shri Marwaha, learned counsel for the respondent. By non-application of the Rent Act to the premises described under S. 3(c), the tenants of such premises have been deprived of the benefits and protection conferred on them by the provisions of the Rent Act like fixation of standard rent and protection against eviction. Change of forum is also the consequence of the non-application of the Act. If the law would have been a law relating to change of forum only, the pending cases could be dealt with by the new form according to the Rent Act. But here the provision under S 3(c) is that the Rent Act shall have no application. So, it is not a law whereby simply change of forum is effected.

(56) Mr Marwaha also contended the revision is net a matter of right. It is only a discretion with the High Court and there is no vested right , the petitioner like that of appeal. So, no vested right of the petitioner is affcoted., Mr.Makhija, on the other hand, submitted that revision under S. 25-B(8) is a matter of right. It is to some extent invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court Cases have been cited at the bar in support of the respective contentions. However, it is net necessary for us to examine this question for the simple reason that we have held that's, 3(c) being prospective in nature has no effect on the pending actions and proceedings and the pending actions and proceedings shall conditioned to be governed by the Rent Act, as if S. 3(c) was not on the statute book.

(57) We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the manner that S. 3(c) has a prospective operation and this section will not apply to the pending proceedings, 'The case will now go back to the learned single Judge for decision of the revision petition in accordance with law.