Rukan Singh Tewatia vs Union Of India And Ors.
1991 Latest Caselaw 346 Del

JUDGMENT

M.C. Jain, J.

(1) Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner. By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to quash the decision of the Government dated 7/04/1991, cancelling the nomination of the petitioner as the Chairman of the Indian Sugarcane Development Council, and nominating the second respondent as Chairman of the said Council in his place. A further direction is sought that the respondent No. 1 be restrained from implementing the said order or from taking any steps for implementation thereof. By are solution dated 30th January, 1991, the Ind Indian Sugarscane Development Council was reconstituted. Earlier, it was constituted by the Resolution dated 7/01/1987. Clause 5 of that Resolution reads as under :- "5.The Council will continue to function until it is abolished by a resolution of the Government. The term of the Chairman and other non-official members of the Council would be three years from the date on which they are nominated on the Council unless this period is curtailed or extended by specific orders of the Government of India."

(2) The petitioner's case is that he was nominated as the Chairman of the aforesaid Council and thereafter by order dated 7/04/1991, bisnomination was cancelled and in his place, respondent No. 2 was nominated.According to the petitioner, that could not have been done till his term of 3years had expired. The petitioner's case further is that the aforesaid Council has been constituted under the Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982 and as such once the statutory power has been exercised by the Central Government constituting the Council, and nominating Chairman therein, the Government has no power or authority to cancel the same. First of all, we may consider,as to whether the Council has been constituted under the Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982. It may be stated that the order dated 30.1.1991 is in the form of a resolution of the Government of India, whereby the Council has beenreconstituted. It nowhere states that -the Council has been constituted in exercise of any statutory power or authority. A perusal of the provisions of Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982 would show that it envisages constitution of a committee. The word 'committee ' has been defined under Sec. 2(a) to mean, a committee constituted under Section 6. The-Sugar DevelopmentFund Act, 1982 was enacted with a view to provide financing activities for development of sugar industry and for matters connected therewith or incidentalthereto. Section 6 of the said Act provide that, for the purpose of securingspeedy consideration and disposal of applications received under Section 5 and for considering any problems arising in the course of the administration of this Act, the Central Government may constitute a committee of officers of that Government. The composition of the Committee and the procedure to be followed by the Committee in the discharge of its functions under the Act shall be such as may be prescribed. Section 6, therefore, envisages prescribing of the composition of the committee and the procedure to be followed by the committee in the discharge of its functions. Section 5 of the Act lays down that every application for loan or grant under Section 4 shall be made to theCommittee in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed. It would appear from the resolution dated 30.1.91 that no committee has been constituted. It contemplates constitution of Indian Sugarcane DevelopmentCouncil and not a committee. So, this resolution cannot be considered to have been issued in exercise of any power conferred by any provision of the Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982. To us, it appears that the said Council has been constituted not under any statute but in exercise of its executive power by the Government of India. The functions of the Council have been enumerated in clause 2 of the resolution. They do not conform with the functions of thecommittee under the Act. Thus, in our opinion, this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no merit that the said Council has been constituted under the Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982.

(3) When the Government of India has exercised its executive power in constituting the Council, then, in our opinion, it possesses the power to reconstitute the Council as and when it likes. The aforesaid clause 5 also provides that the period of 3 years can be curtailed or extended by the specific orders of the Government of India. The very fact that there can be reconstitution would mean that curtailment of the period of the existing Chairman or non-official members of the Council can also be done. Thus, the Government can reconstitute the Council and assuch, in our opinion, the petitioner'sgrievance has no validity in the eye of law and it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the cancellation of his nomination as Chairman of theCouncil.

(4) In the result, we find no force in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed in liming.