M/S. Hans Raj Bhartiys And Co. And ... vs Union Of India And Another
1990 Latest Caselaw 156 Del

ORDER

P. N. Nag, J.

1. This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petitions Nos.2105, 2078 and 2662 of 1989 as in all these three petitions identical questions arise for consideration.

2. In these writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the Orders Nos. F.5(1)/89-P&S (P&C)/120066 dated July 17, 1989 (Annexure 'D' to the writ petition No. CW 2105/89) and F. 5(1)1 82-F & S (P & C dated May 22,1989, (Annexure 'G' to CW 2105/89) passed by the Commissioner, Food, Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner').

3. The petitioners hold license as dealers for free sale sugar and also for controlled sugar. The relevant portions of the impugned orders issued in pursuance of Condition 8 of the free sale sugar license granted in Form'E' appended to the Delhi Sugars Licensing Order, 1963 are extracted below:

Order dated July 12, 1989

"No wholesaler shall sell free sale sugar to another wholesaler.

Provided that the above restriction shall not apply to such sale by the following Government nominated agencies:

(a) The Co-operative Stores Ltd. (Super Bazar), New Delhi.

(b) The Delhi Consumer Co-op. Wholesale Stores Ltd., New Delhi.

(c) The Delhi State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., New Delhi.

(d) The National Consumer's Co-op. Federation Ltd., New Delhi.

This order shall -come - into force -with immediate effect."

Order dated May 22, 1989

"Every licensee shall dispose of the sugar obtained by him within seven days of the date of receipt thereof.

Explanation: The date of receipt of stock of sugar shall not be taken into account while computing the period of seven days."

4. Respondent No. 1 has filed counter affidavit, which was also adopted by respondent No. 2 during the course of hearing. In such affidavit the respondents have given brief history of various orders passed by the respondents as regulatory measure in public interest, which have ultimately led to the passing of impugned orders and which also show the policy of the Government under lying such orders. It has been stated that sugar being an essential commodity, its production, distribution and pricing is being regulated in

public interest and ensuring at the same time a reasonable return to both the manufacturer and the cane grower. For some time preceding May, 1984 the price of sugar in the open market showed rising trend. The Government had reports that the spurt in the price of sugar in the market was due to hoarding and speculative tendency of unscrupulous traders. Therefore, with a view to curb the hoarding and speculative tendencies of the traders, the Central Government issued Order No. G. S. R. 391 dated May 22, 1984 solely for the purpose of checking spurt in prices of non-levy sugar and khandsari sugar by reducing the maximum stock holding limits for recognized sugar and khandsari dealers. A copy of the order dated 22-5-1984 has been annexed as annexure B-I with the counter-affidavit. It is not that the stock holding limits were fixed by the Central Government for the licensed dealers for the first time. The Central Government has been fixing maximum stock holding limits in respect of recognised dealers for various cities and towns having regard to certain factors such as past experience, availability of other sweetening agents in the market, trend of prices and consumption requirement of the city or town etc. The Central Government has been reviewing the situation and fixing maximum stock holding limits since, 1971. In spite of the fact that the stock holding limits were reduced and the period of turning over of stocks was kept as 10 days there was no appreciable impact on the prices of open market. Therefore, with a view to curb the hoarding and speculative tendencies of the traders, the Central Government reduced the period of turning over of stock from 10 days to 7 days vide order No. G.S.R. 634 dated August 5, 1985 (Annexure B-11 to the counter-affidavit). The said reduction in the time limit for turning over of stocks by the recognised dealers from 10 days to 7 days was made effective from August 12, 1985. In these circumstances, respondent No. 2 issued instructions on August 12, 1985. It is not that the condition, of turning over of stocks within a specified period, was imposed for the first time on August 5, 1985. The stock holding limits in respect of vacuum pan sugar and khandsari sugar were imposed vide GSR No. 60 dated February 26, 1980 without the condition of disposing of the stocks within the specified period from the date of receipt of stocks. The said condition was imposed for the first time in respect of vacuum pan sugar by making amendment to G.S.R. No. 60 vide G.S.R. No. 267 dated May, 17, 1980. The stock holding limits were further reduced vide G.S.R. No. 410 dated July 14, 1980 and the condition of turning over of stocks within a period of 10 days was continued. Further, this condition was also made applicable to the khandsari sugar. However, while increasing the stock holding limits vide order No. G.S.R. 362 dated April 29, 1982 the restriction of turning over of stocks within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of stocks was removed. The restriction was again imposed on May 22, 1984 vide G.S.R. No. 391 when the stock holding limits were reduced. The time limit of 10 days was reduced to 7 days vide G.S.R. No. 964, dated August 5, 1985. Further to that in supersession of Order No. G.S.R. No. 391 dated May 22, 1984, the Central Government issued an order on December 21, 1988 vide G.S.R. No. 1193 wherein the stock holding limits in respect of sugar and khandsari were increased and the period of turning over of stocks was retained as 7 days However for making amendment to the said order dated December 21, 1988, the Central Government issued an order No. G.S.R. 27(E)/Ess.Com/ Sugar on January 13, 1989 wherein the period of turning over of stocks of 7 days was enhanced to 10 days. However, with the liberalisation of the sugar policy in the shape of enhanced stock holding limits and enhanced time of turning over of stocks, the price of levy sugar in the open market started showing rising trend. It is stated here that the wholesale price of sugar in Delhi January 6, 1989 for S. 30 grade was quoted at Rs. 650/- per quintal. However, as is apparent from the statement of wholesale prices (Annexure R-111 to counter) of sugar in principal market from January to July, 1989, the prices of free sale sugar in the market started rising thereafter. Therefore, the Central Government was forced to review the policy on sugar and as one of the regulatory measures and with a view to curb the hoarding and speculative tendencies of the traders, reduced stock holding limits vide order No.G.S.R. 513(E)/ Ess.Com/ Sugar dated May 9, 1989. However, the period of turning over of stocks was made as 10 days. In spite of this the rising tendency of prices could not be arrested. Therefore, the Central Government had to reduce the time of turning over of stocks from 10 days to 7 days vide order No. G.S.R. 555/(E)/ Ess.Com/ Sugar dated May 17,1989 by making amendment to order dated May 9, 1989. Copies of the orders dated 21-12-1988, 13-1-1989, 9-5-1989 and 17-5-1989 have been annexed as Annexures to R-IV to R-VII to the counter-affidavit. According to the respondents, the time limit of turning over of stocks has been changed from time to time. The condition of turning over of stocks within the specified time was discontinued as and when it was no longer required.

5. It has further been stated in the counter-affidavit that as one of the regulatory measures, the Central Government took a decision in recent times to issue telegraphic instructions to the State Government of Punjab, Haryana, U.P., Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Union Territory of Delhi on July 10. 1989 requesting strict enforcement of the decision of the Central Government to the effect that a wholesaler in the said States shall not be permitted to sell sugar to, another wholesaler located in the same city or urban area and it would be obligatory for every wholesaler to sell sugar to a retailer. However, the condition further stipulated that one sale transaction by a wholesaler with another wholesaler located in another city or urban area would continue to be permitted if accompanied by a physical delivery of stocks. The State Governments were advised to ensure strict compliance of the instructions by making suitable amendments in the licencing orders. It is in this context that the Commissioner issued the order dated July 17, 1989 prohibiting the sale of free sale sugar by one wholesaler to another wholesalers. This restriction has been imposed by the Central Government with a clear motive of arresting the spurt in sugar prices. The intention of prohibiting the sale of sugar by one wholesale to another is that the sugar should reach the consumer through the retailers and it should not change hands with the wholesalers only. The Central Government had reports to the effect that spurt in the prices of sugar in the recent months was due to speculative and hoarding tendencies of the traders. The sugar, instead of reaching retail outlets, was being detained at the level of the wholesalers. It became imperative to prohibit the sale of sugar by one wholesaler to another with a view to ensure smooth flow of sugar in the market. The impugned orders have been issued on the basis of instructions issued by the Central Government with a view to regulate the production, distribution and pricing of sugar in public interest.

6. Mr. A. K. Sangal, learned counsel for the petitioners, has challenged these impugned orders on various grounds. At the very outset, he very vehemently contended that Condition 8 of the free sale sugar license granted in Form 'E' appended to the Delhi Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963 which empowers the Administrator or the Commissioner in respect of the purchase, sale or storage for sale of sugar and stock under which the Commissioner has issued directions in the impugned order confers on the officers concerned arbitrary, uncanalised and uncontrolled powers without any guidelines. Neither any procedural safeguards are provided in Condition 8 nor is there any committee constituted to advise the officers concerned. There can be no representation to the higher authorities nor such an order can be challenged before any other higher authority. Therefore, Condition 8 of the License itself is bad and the impugned orders issued there under are ultra vires of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon B. B. Rajwanshi v. State of U.P., where the Supreme. Court struck down S. 6(4) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that it confers unguided and uncontrolled powers on the State Government, It is no doubt true that if unguided, uncontrolled and arbitrary power is conferred on an authority, the power has necessarily to be struck down being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In para 13 of the judgment it, however, has been observed by the Supreme Court that:

"It is no doubt true that in some decisions of this Court it has been held that even though a particular provision which confers discretion on the executive does not specifically state the circumstances in which such discretion can be exercised, the executive can seek the necessary guidance while exercising such discretion from the statute under which the discretion is conferred on it, This argument, however, is not of any assistance to the State Government in this case because even though the reason for remitting the award may be a reason connected with industry or labour it can still be used arbitrarily to favor one party or the other. The ground for remitting the award should be one corresponding to a ground mentioned in S. 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940; otherwise the power is capable of serious mischief."

It, therefore, follows that in case any guidance or control can be inferred or spelt out from the aims, objects, intention, scheme and policy of the Act, then in such a situation the provision has to be upheld. The facts of that case, however, were entirely different and it was found by the Supreme Court that the conferment of power on the State Government was unguided and uncontrolled.

7. In Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, the validity of Cl. (3) of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order (1948) being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution was challenged on the ground that the power to grant or refusal of permit has been given to the Textile Commissioner without any guiding principles and such a power is likely to be abused. Such challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court in para8 of the judgment which is reproduced below:

"In the present Control Order there is no such provision as existed in the U.P. Coal Control Order. Provisions of that Control Order bear no analogy to the provisions of the present Control Order. The policy underlying the Order is to regulate the transport of cotton textile in a manner that will ensure an even distribution of the commodity in the country and make it available at a fair price to all. The grant or refusal of a permit is thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the Textile Commissioner is to 'be exercised in such a way as to effectuate this policy. The conferment of such a discretion cannot be called invalid and if there is an abuse of the power there is ample power in the Courts to undo the mischief. Presumably as appears from the different forms published in the Manual, there are directions and rules laid down by the Central Government for the grant or refusal of permits."

8. It is settled principle of law that the legislature lays down the policy and indicates the rule or the line of action which should serve as a guidance to the authority. Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power, no question of violation of Art. 14 could arise, unless it be that the rules themselves or the policy indicated lay down different rules to be applied to persons or things similarly situated. Even where such is not the case, there might be a transgression by the authority of the limits laid down or an abuse of power, but the actual order would be set aside in appropriate proceedings not so much on the ground of violation of Art. 14 but as really being beyond its power.

9. In order, to determine whether this power vested in the Commissioner to issue directions under Condition of the License is arbitrary, uncontrolled, uncanalised and without any guiding principles, we will have necessarily to look into the aims, objects, intention, scheme and 'policy of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act) and the impugned orders issued by the Commissioner there under. The needs, object, intention, scheme and policy of the Act clearly lay down the guidelines for issue of such orders. The Act provides that, for maintaining or increasing supplies of essential commodities or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. In order to achieve these objectives,' Government has been vested with plenary powers under the Act to issue orders for regulating production, storage, transport and distribution of such essential commodities for controlling the price, etc. Guidelines and policy for the issue of such orders has also been clearly spelt out in the affidavit filed by the respondents. It has been clearly explained that the sugar is an essential commodity and these orders have been Issued with a view to control and regulate production, supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in the essential commodities in the interest of general public. Public interest is supreme. Regulatory measures adopted by the Central Government from time to time for regulating the production, supply and distribution etc. of sugar are in public interest with a view to ensure adequate availability of sugar to the consumer at a reasonable price. The Central Government has been taking certain measures from time to. time to restrict/prohibit the hoarding and speculative tendencies of the traders. The Central Government has been fixing the stock holding limits of sugar and khandsari from time to time having regard to certain relevant factors. When the position of stocks is easy, stock holding limits are increased. Likewise, the Central Government also prescribes the period of turning over of stocks of sugar from the date of receipt

of the stocks by the dealers with a view to ensure smooth flow of sugar in the market. When there is no need for the regulation, the Central Government relaxes or altogether removes the regulation. While imposing the regulatory measures, the primary objective before the Government is to protect the public interest. Keeping such guidelines, policy and object of the Act in view, it would be unreasonable (sic) the Commissioner is uncanalised, arbitrary and. unreasonable and without any guiding principles. Whenever the Commissioner has to exercise this power, he has necessarily to exercise such powers in accordance with the principles and policy underlying the provision of the Act, keeping in view the public interest. The mere fact that such a power is likely to be abused by the authority concerned will not make the provision ultra vires even in such a case there is a transgression of the authority of the limits laid down or an abuse of powers, but the actual order would be set aside in appropriate proceedings not so much on the ground of a violation of Art. 14 but as really being beyond its power. In view of this, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Condition 8 which confers on the Commissioner the power being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, must fail.

10. It was next canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the delegation of power to the Commissioner to issue directions suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and such power should be declared ultra vires of S. 3 of the Act. In this connection it may be relevant to refer here that the Central Government, by exercising the powers conferred on it by S. 5 of the Act, by order dated June 28, 1961 has delegated the powers conferred on it by sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in Cls. (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (ii) and 6) of sub-sec. (2) thereof, in relation to foodstuffs, to the State Government. In the Union Territory, there is no dispute that this power has been delegated to the Administrator. Vide Order dated February 19, 1963 the Delhi Administration, for regulating the sale of sugar through license, Cl. 4(b) of the license provides that every license in respect of free sale sugar issued or renewed shall be in Form 'E' subject to certain other conditions laid down therein. In Form V in which Condition 8 has been incorporated confers power on the Commissioner to issue any directions to regulate the production, sale or storage for sale of sugar etc. The argument of the learned counsel appears to be that there is already a delegation of power by the Central Government to the Administrator and further delegation of power by the Administrator to the Commissioner suffers from excessive delegation which is not permissible and, therefore, the impugned orders, which have been issued by the Commissioner are bad. This argument of the learned counsel is fallacious. No doubt under S. 3 of the Act it is the Central Government who has to issue orders to control production, supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities. Under S. 2(cc) "order" includes a direction issued there under. S. 4 of the Act provides that an order made under S. 3 may confer powers and impose duties upon the Central Government or the State Government or officers and authorities of the Central or State Government or to officers and authorities thereof as to the exercise of any such powers or the discharge of any such duties. S. 5 of the Act deals with "Delegation of power" which reads:

"5. Delegation of powers - The, Central Government may, by notified order, direct that the power to make orders or issue notifications under S. 3 shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by-

(a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or

(b) such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government,

as may be specified in the direction."

As already referred to, the Administrator has been empowered to issue an order for regulation of the production, distribution and pricing and such delegation has not been disputed by the learned counsel which, according to him, is a valid delegation by the Central Government. However, what has seriously been disputed by him is Condition 8 of Form 'E' which empowers the Commissioner to issue directions for regulating production, supply, distribution etc. According to him, this further delegation by the Administrator to the Commissioner should not be permitted as it suffers from vice of excessive delegation. We have carefully considered the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner but we are unable to accept the same. As already pointed out, it is not disputed that the Administrator is the competent authority to issue an order dated February 19, 1963. It cannot also be disputed that Form 'E' is, also a part of this order containing Condition8, which has been prepared under Cl. (4) of the Order. Condition 8 empowers the Commissioner to issue directions. This power has been conferred on the Commissioner obviously under S. 5 of the Act which provides for delegation to the State Government or the Administrator or such other officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or the State Government as may be specified, in the direction and order includes a direction as well. In other words, this power has been conferred on the Commissioner by an order itself validly issued in accordance with S. 5 of the Act. When re-delegation itself is, thus, permissible under the Act by the Parliament itself, it cannot be said that such a re-delegation is unreasonable. In Sudhanshu Bhusan Pal v. State of West Bengal, a similar question for consideration whether the formation of opinion by the Central Government under S. 3(l) of the Act for the issue of orders there under for maintaining or increasing supplies of essential commodities or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, can be delegated Government can further re-delegate the same to such other officer or authority subordinate to it. The Calcutta High Court clearly held that since the original delegation itself provides for re-delegation to the officers working under the State Government which is within the constitutional and legal competence of Parliament. Such a re-delegation is permissible. The Calcutta High Court held (at p. 64 of AIR):

"This re-delegation is also not unreasonable in the context. This further delegation under S. 5 of the Act is also controlled by a number of factors, namely,

(1) it has to be notified by an order of the Central Government;

(2) the matters and conditions under which such sub-delegation has to be exercised by the Authorities specified In S. 5 are to be observed by the sub-delegate. Parliament's competence to pass such a law is unquestioned. Parliament can select not only the Central Government as a instrument to make the order but also can authorise the Central Government that such instrument may be inter alia a State Government. Besides , this delegation by the Central Government is not abdication of the responsibility under S. 3(l) of the Act because of the word "also" in S. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act. In other words even where there is a delegation by the Central Government under S. 5 of the Act that delegation is concurrent with the responsibility which still remains with the Central Government under S. 3 of the Act. Therefore, if the sub-delegate in any way acts beyond or In conflict with the Central Government, the Central Government can certainly withdraw the delegation. That again is good enough control of the sub-delegate under S. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act."

11. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a person has a right to carry on any occupation, trade or business and that the impugned orders put unfettered restrictions to carry on his occupation, trade or business and as such is violative of Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. The background in which the impugned orders have been issued by the. Commissioner has been given by the respondents in counter-affidavit referred to above which need not be repeated here again. In the counter-affidavit of the respondents it has further been explained that in the normal course of business the wholesalers are supposed to sell sugar to the retailers and that channel of transaction is still open. There are a large number of retailers in Delhi. In view of the scarcity of sugar, the wholesalers can sell the sugar to the retailers without any difficulty. There is ready market for sugar. Furthermore, there are no such small scale wholesalers as alleged by the petitioners. In fact, the alleged small scale wholesalers are the retailers only. Being the retailers, so-called small scale wholesalers purchase sugar from the wholesalers and not direct from the sugar factories. The said restriction will not affect their trade in any way. The policy has not undergone any change so far as retail trade is concerned. The intention of imposition of restriction of transaction between one wholesaler and the another wholesalers is to keep the continued flow of sugar in the market and not to create artificial scarcity as alleged. The intention of the restriction, according to the respondents, is to keep continuous flow of sugar through retail outlets so that the consumers may not suffer. In view of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents it is clear that the impugned orders have been passed as a regulatory measure in the supreme public interest and with a view to put an embargo on the dealers in keeping sugar in excess of the quantity and the period specified and also with a view to prevent hoarding and black-marketing and to ensure equitable distribution and availability of sugar at fair prices in the open market. Furthermore, this has been done with a view that sugar must reach the consumer at the fair prices . More over, the affidavit discloses that it does not put unfettered restrictions in any form what so ever on the right of a person to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The wholesalers can still sell the sugar at a fair price. In this context it will be relevant to refer to a case of the Supreme Court reported as P.P.Enterprises v. Union of India, where a similar question arose for consideration. In that case the question for consideration was whether any recognised dealer shall keep in stock of vacuum pan sugar and khandsari at any time in excess of the quantity for a period exceeding ten days from the date of receipt by him of such stock of sugar or khandsari. The Supreme Court upheld Cl. (5) of the Sugar Control Order dated July 14, 1980 as this Order only seeks to regulate the limit of storage of sugar for a period exceeding ten days but it does not prohibit storage. Further it was passed with a view to prevent hoarding and black-marketing and to ensure equitable distribution and availability of sugar at fair prices in the open market. By following that judgment in P. P. Enterprises's case (supra), this Court has taken a similar view in identical. circumstances in Civil Writ Petition No. 1836/85 and other connected matters (M/s. Padam Chand Naresh Chand v. Union of India decided on September 12, 1985) upheld the impugned order vide which dealers cannot keep in the stock for a period exceeding 7 days, as in the present case. It goes without saying, as already referred to, the impugned orders have been passed with a view not only to regulate the limits of storage of sugar for a particular time but also with a view to regulate production, distribution and pricing of the sale of the sugar in public interest and in accordance with the policy of the Act. Therefore, the restrictions imposed by the impugned orders are reasonable and can always be imposed by the State. The impugned orders cannot be said to be violative of Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. In this connection reference may also be made to Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court has held (at p. 436 of AIR):

"It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word 'restriction' to be sufficiently wide to save laws inconsistent with Art. 19(l), or taking away the rights conferred by the Article provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt, therefore, that they intended the word 'restriction' to include cases of prohibition also. The contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved cannot, therefore, be accepted.

It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition, special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court."

Even if the restrictions are prohibitive, they can also be upheld if they conform to the test of reasonableness. In the present case they are only regulatory and not prohibitive and, therefore, it cannot be termed as violative of Art. 19(l)(g).

12. Lastly, the impugned order dated July 17 1989 was challenged on the ground of discrimination that the order although has been made applicable to the petitioners who are licensees of the free sale sugar but this order has not been applied to (a) the Cooperative Stores Ltd. (Super Bazar), New Delhi; (b) the Delhi Consumer Co-op. Wholesale Stores Ltd., New Delhi; (c) the Delhi State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., New Delhi; and (d) the National Consumers' Co-op. Federation Ltd., New Delhi who are similarly situated and holder of the licenses for the free sale sugar like the petitioners. In this context the respondents have explained in the counter-affidavit that the Super Bazar and other agencies exempted from the restrictions- imposed by respondent No 2 vide impugned order dated July 17, 1989, are not working for the sole motive of the profiteering whereas the petitioners are dealing with the sugar with the sole guiding principle of profit. Co-operative agencies are working on "no profit no loss basis". In these agencies, public participation is there and the service of the masses is their motive. These agencies work as retail agencies also whereas the petitioners are not working as retailers. The comparison of these co-operative agencies with the petitioners-dealers is baseless. Art. 14 no doubt prohibits classification but permits reasonable classification. As explained by the respondents, the agencies referred to by the petitioners are working on "no profit no loss" basis and in which there is public participation and service of masses is the motive and with this object this classification has been made. Therefore, there is reasonable classification made for treating these agencies differently from that of the petitioners and both cannot be treated alike and, therefore there is no question of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

13. A faint attempt has also been made that the impugned orders are discriminatory inasmuch as they have been made applicable only to Delhi and certain other places like Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat and Maharashtra on the basis of Telex issued on July 10, 1989 and not uniform to the whole country. In this connection the respondents in their counter-affidavit have clearly stated that as one of the regulatory measures, the Central Government took in the recent times was to issue telegraphic instructions to the State Government of Punjab, Haryana, U.P. etc. on July 10, 1989 requesting strict enforcement of the decision of the Central Government to the effect that a wholesaler in the said States shall not be permitted to sell sugar to another wholesaler located in the same city or urban area and it would be obligatory for every wholesaler to sell sugar to a retailer. However, the condition further stipulated that one sale transaction by a wholesaler with another wholesaler located in another city or urban area would continue to be permitted if --accompanied by a physical delivery of stocks. The State Governments were advised to ensures strict compliance of the instructions by making suitable amendments in the licencing orders. It is in this context that respondent No. 2 issued the order dated July 17, 1989 prohibiting the sale of free sale sugar by one wholesaler to another wholesaler. This restriction has been imposed by the Central Government with a clear motive of arresting the spurt in sugar prices. The intention of prohibiting the sale of sugar by one wholesaler to another wholesaler is that the sugar should reach the consumer through the retailers and it should not change hands with the wholesalers only. The Central Government had reports to the effect that spurt in the prices of sugar in the recent months was due to speculative and hoarding tendencies of the traders. The sugar, instead of reaching retail outlets, was being detained at the level of the wholesalers. It became imperative to prohibit the sale of sugar by one wholesaler to another wholesaler with a view to ensure smooth flow of sugar in the market. Again, the respondents further stated in the counter-affidavit that the bulk consumers are themselves licensed dealers like the petitioners-dealers. Therefore, there is no need for the petitioners to sell the sugar to the bulk consumers. The impugned order has not restricted the petitioners from recovering their alleged dues from the wholesalers. The restriction is not going to prohibit the trade in sugar as has been alleged by the petitioners. Since the impugned orders

have been passed as a regulatory measure and in accordance with the aims, objects, intention, scheme and policy of the Act, no objection could be taken to the validity of this order on this ground as well. In this connection it may be pertinent to point out that the condition imposed under the 'impugned orders is based on reasonable classification. The Government is the best Judge of the situation in a particular State and what quantity of sugar will met the exigency at a particular stage is purely a Governmental action which has the necessary data, machinery and expertise to form the opinion and decide and it is not for the interfere in such matters.

14. In view of the above, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed.

Petitions dismissed.