Harbans Singh And Ors. vs Gurcharan Kaur And Sharan Kaur
1989 Latest Caselaw 525 Del

JUDGMENT

P.K. Bahri, J.

(1) This petition has been brought under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashment of the complaint pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'). It has been pleaded by the petitioners that the said offence punishable under Section 4 of the Act cannot be taken cognizance of as the same is barred by limitation.

(2) The facts of the case. in brief, are that Smt. Gurcharan Kaur respondent has filed a complaint against the present petitioners and two other persons, namely, Jang Bahadur Singh and Sukbjit Bahadur Singh, making allegations that her marriage was performed with Gursbaran Singh on July 12, 1981, at Delhi and at the time of the settlement of the marriage, the petitioners had demanded dowry items comprising of T.V., fridge and scooter or Rs. 20,000.00 in lieu thereof besides other items of dowry which are given at the time of marriage normally. It was mentioned that the complainant's father had expressed his inability to meet the demands regarding T.V., fridge and scooter or Rs. 20,000.00 in lieu of the same but he agreed to meet the said demands by and by after the marriage and the petitioners are stated to have agreed to the performance of marriage under such conditions with great reluctance. It was further alleged that after 3-4 months of the marriage, the petitioners again raised the demand for supply of the said dowry items or Rs. 20,000.00 in lieu thereof as consideration for the marriage and the complaint managed to obtain Rs. 1,000/ on the two occasions but the same did not satisfy the greed of the petitioners. It was alleged that the demand of said dowry items was again repeated from time to time and ultimately on July 2, 1983, the complainant was turned out from the matrimonial house on failure of her parents to meet the said demand of dowry. After obtaining necessary sanction from the authorities concerned, the complaint was filed.

(3) The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that any demand of dowry made after the performance of the marriage cannot be termed as offence under Section 4 of the Act as it stood before amendment of the Act. He has further argued that demand of dowry made before the marriage as consideration for the marriage constituted the offence which had become time barred by the time the complaint was filed.

(4) The learned counsel for the respondent has, on the other hand argued that they dowry items demanded by the petitioners were as consideration for performance of the marriage and those dowry items could not be given at the time of the marriage and were agreed to be given by and by but the repetition of the demand of the said items of dowry constituted an offence and the limitation would start running only from the date the last demand for the said items of dowry was made and calculating the limitation from that date, the complaint was filed well within time.

(5) Section 7 of the Act (before amendment) prohibits the court from taking cognisance of an offence except on a complaint made within one year form the date of the offence. So, the crucial question which arises for decision in the present case is as to what could be considered the date of the offence ? It is obvious that if the date of the offence in the present case is to be deemed to be the date when the first demand of dowry items was made, as consideration for performance of the marriage, before the marriage was performed then the complaint filed in 1983 was hopelessly barred by time. But if it is to be held that the date of offence is also when the demand for the said dowry items was repeated even after the performance of the marriage and till the complaint was turned out from the matrimonial house, then on the face of it. the complaint filed being well within one year from that date is not barred by limitation.

(6) Section 2 of the Unamended Act defined 'dowry' as any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly... ...... at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage. In the present case, the allegation made in the complaint and the statements made as preliminary evidence in support of the complaint clearly show that the items of dowry demanded at the time of settlement of the marriage were obviously as consideration for the marriage and come well within the definition of 'dowry' given in Section 2 of the Act. It is true that if dowry items are not demanded as consideration for the marriage they would not constitute 'dowry' as understood by Section 2 of the Act as it stood before amendment. So. any demand of any property or valuables after the performance of the marriage which demand had not been made at the time of settlement of the marriage as consideration for the marriage, the said demand of dowry items would not constitute 'dowry' as understood by Section 2 of the Act. In Madan Lal & others v. Amur Nath, 1984(2) Crimes 581, it has been laid down by a Single Judge of this Court that the property given must not merely be "connected" with the marriage but must be connected as a quid pro quo, as it were, in the sense that it is the property given cither to secure an agreement to marry or given at the time of marriage in exchange for or as the reasons for the marriage and it may also include property given subsequent to the marriage but expressly deferred as the reason for the marriage but would not include properly that may pass hands subsequent to the marriage, even months or years after it, merely to save the marriage from being broken or to otherwise keep the family of the in-laws of the wife better disposed towards her, or to smoothen the course of matrimonial life, or to save the wife from harassment, humilitation, or taunts, on the ground that she did not bring enough at the time of marriage. So, unless and until, there is a demand of dowry items made as consideration for the marriage, the said items could not be deemed to be 'dowry' as understood by Section 2 of the Act. Even if certain items of dowry which have been demanded as consideration for the marriage are not given at the time of the marriage, still those items of dowry would continue to be covered by the definition of 'dowry' given in Section 2 of the Act even though the said dowry items are given after the performance of the marriage but if no dowry items have been agreed or demanded as consideration for the marriage then even if some demand of dowry is made after the performance of the marriage, the latter would not come within the meaning of 'dowry' as given in Section 2 of the Act. Similar view was expressed by another Single Judge of this Court in Inder Sain v. The State, 20 (1981) Delhi Law Times 309, which judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of L V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar and others, .

(7) In the case of L.V. Jadhuv (supra), the highest court had widened the scope of the demand of dowry as given in Section 4 of the Act by laying down that it is not necessary that the demand of dowry should have been agreed to by the other party at the time of settlement of the marriage in order to constitute the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Mere demand of dowry items as consideration for the marriage at the time of settlement of the marriage was held to come within the mischief of Section 4 of the Act Single Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Nirdosh Kumar v. Smt Padma Ram & Meena, 1984 (2) Crimes 239, also laid down the same proposition of law as has been laid down by a Single Bench of this Court in two above cases.

(8) The question which has arisen for decision in this case before me has not been considered by any of the judgments cited at the Bar. In Lajpat Roi Sehgal & others v. State. a Single Judge examined the question whether the delay made in filing a complaint beyond the period of limitation prescribed could be condoned or not by taking resort to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the court came to lay down that a delay for sufficient reasons could be condoned by taking resort to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of Section 4(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, In the present case, this question has not arisen whether there exists any sufficient ground for condensation of delay. The question which has arisen for decision is as to what should be treated as a date of offence for calculating the period of limitation However, in the case of Lajpat Rai (supra) the facts were, to some extent similar that a demand of dowry items as consideration for the marriage was made prior to the marriage and the demand was repeated even after the marriage However, the complaint filed in that case was beyond limitation even from the date when the fresh demand of dowry was made. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows : "If any person, after the commencement of this, demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardian of a bridge or bridge-room, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both : Provided that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under this section except with the previous sanction of the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may, by genera! or special order, specify in this behalf."

(9) A persual of the aforesaid section shows that the demand of dowry itself is an offence Of course, the demand must be of dowry items as understood by Section 2 of the Act. In the present case, it is true that a demand was made regarding the dowry items as consideration for the marriage so the offence, of course, stood committed even before the marriage was performed However, when the demand was repeated again and again after the performance of the marriage in respect of the same very items of dowry which are covered by definition of 'dowry' given in Section 2 of the Act, the petitioners would be, in my view, deemed to have committed again an offence under Section 4 of the Act when the demand was repealed. I am not laying down that the offence contemplated under Section 4 of the Act is a continuing offence but what I am emphasizing is that every demand of dowry whenever repeated constitutes another offence and thus, the dates of commission of the offence under Section 4 would be when the demand was made initially and also when the said demand was repeated afresh. The wording of Section 4 of the Act docs not make the demand as an offence which has been made only prior to the marriage. It is evident that the dowry items demanded as consideration for the marriage, which come within the definition of 'dowry' in Section 2 of the Act, if are given prior to the marriage or at the time of the marriage, the person taking such dowry items would be guilty of offence punishable under Section 3 of the Act which reads as follows : "IF any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both."

(10) It is also very clear that if some dowry items which were demanded as consideration for the marriage are not given at the time of the marriage but are given after the performance of the marriage even then such person taking such dowry would be deemed to have committed offence punishable under Section 3 of the Act. Similarly, even though the dowry items demanded prior to the marriage as consideration for the marriage are not given at all, even then the offence stands committed, when the demand was made, would come within the fore corners of Section 4 of the Act and similarly, if a demand is repeated after the marriage the person repeating such a demand would be deemed to have committed an offence again under Section 4 of the Act and the date of offence would be also when the demand is repeated in respect of the dowry items demanded at the time of the marriage as consideration for the marriage.

(11) In view of the above discussion, I conclude that the complaint 'filed by the respondent was not barred by limitation. This view is being expressed by me on the basil of the allegations made in the complaint and the preliminary evidence led in support of the complaint. Nothing would debar the trial Court to give any finding on merits if on merits the trial court comes to the conclusion that no demand of dowry was made after the performance of the marriage. The trial court could then return the finding that the complaint is barred by time as the demand made at the time of settlement of the marriage was beyond the period of one year proceeding the filing of the complaint. I, hence, dismiss this petition.