Director, Central Bureu ... vs Ram Jethmalani
1988 Latest Caselaw 62 Del

JUDGMENT

S.S. Chadha, J.

(1) Shri Ram Jethmalani, the respondent in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) is the plaintiff in a libel action instituted by him in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice in England, being No. 1983-J No. 6467, against one Shri Swraj Paul of London. The cause of action is alleged to have arisen out of statements made by said Shri Swraj Paul in London to the correspondents of "The Hindustan Times" and "The Daily" which appeared in August 28,1983 issue of the former and September 1, 1983 issue of the latter. Shri Swraj Paul has made a counter-claim arising out of respondent's statement appearing in the August 30, 1983 issue of "Indian Express". During the course of the said litigation in England, the respondent was called upon to furnish particulars of certain allegations made by the respondent. According to the respondent, the detailed particulars are available in the statements and documents forming part of the record of an investigation conducted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment in Crime No. 8/77-CIA(1), the first information report in respect of which was registered on October 22, 1977 and being in possession of the appellant-herein. The respondent requested the appellant to allow inspection and/or give certified copies of the statements and documents in the letter dated March 3, 1986 in these words :-

"RAMJETHMALANI New Delhi Advocate, Supreme Court Dated 3-3-1986 To The Director C.B.I, Spe, CIA-1 New Delhi. Sir, Re : Crime No. RC. 8/77-CIU (1).

ATa later stage during the investigation of the above case at the instance of the Government of India the Cbi had asked my advice and for that purpose the files of the investigation were produced before me by the officers of the department. The investigation was, however, dropped sometime in 1981. But on the 27th of August, 1983 a vitriolic attack was made on my character and reputation by Mr. Swraj Paul and the libel statements appeared in the Indian Press. Based on my knowledge and what I had learnt in the course of my professional duties I defended myself and repudiated statements and counter-statements litigation is pending in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, being Action 1983-J-6467. While I remember the broad facts the court has ordered some details to be furnished which I can not state from memory. These can only be had from the statements and documents which are available in the files of that investigation.

For the purpose of defending my character and reputation I urgently require inspection and/or certified copies of the relevant papers and proceedings. In particular, I require :-

(1)Statement of one Mr. Js Gill dated 21st November 1977, and any further statements thereafter. (2) Statements of one Mr. Nissim Gaon of Noga, Switzerland. (3) Correspondence between the Stc i.e. the State Trading Corpn. of India and/or Mr. Nissim Gaon or his company called Compagnie Noga d' Importation etd' exportation SA. (4) Documents in the shape of draft settlements and telex messages procured during the course of the said investigation. I have a legitimate, substantial and urgent interest in securing these documents. These documents do not constitute official secrets nor do I seek any material covered by Section 123, 124 and 125 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am fighting a litigation against a foreign national in a foreign court and I conceive it to be your duty to render me all possible assistance. It is not out of place to mention that in democracy every citizen has a fundamental right to know subject to exceptions which have no application here. I am willing to pay all the costs and charges. Kindly treat this as urgent. Thanking you Yours faithfully, sd/- Ram Jethmalani Note: All communications may be addressed to me c/o India International Centre, 40 Max Muellar Marg, New Delhi-110003 Phone No. 619431

(2) The appellant declined to comply with the respondent's request by his letter dated April 10, 1986 reading as follows :- NO.2503/3/8/77-CIU (I) Central Bureau of Investigation Special Investigation Cell, Dated the, 10-4-1986. To Sri Ram Jethmalani, Advocate Supreme Court of India, New Delhi Sub :- Case No. RC. 8/77-CIU (I) Dear Sir, I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 3rd March, 1986 regarding supply of copies of statements of witnesses and documents in the said case and to state that documents mentioned in your esteemed letter arc not available with us in original. Besides, neither the said documents nor the statements of witnesses recorded by the Cbi in the said case under Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code . are public documents. There is no provision under the Criminal Procedure Code to allow inspection or to furnish copies of the same to any person when the case is not pending trial in any court in India. It is regretted that this office is unable to provide the help requested, for want of any legal provision or orders from a competent court. Yours faithfully, sd/- Illegible Superintendent Of Police Cbi Sic Siu, Iii, N. DELHI."

(3) The respondent then filed a petition in this Court under Article 226 read with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India claiming the relief for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other suitable writ, direction or order directing the appellant to allow to the respondent inspection of the statements and documents in the possession of the appellant relating to the investigation and the final report under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code . in respect of Crime No. RC. 8/77-CIU (1) and to grant the respondent copies or to make copies thereof in particular the following :- "(A)Statements of one Mr. J.S. Gill dated 21-11-1977 and any further statements thereafter. (b) Statements of one Mr. Nissam Gaon of Noga Switzerland. (c) Correspondence between the State Trading Corporation of India and the said Mr. Nissim Gaon and/or his Company called Compagnie Noga d' Importation at d' Exportation, S.A. (d) Documents in the shape of draft statements and telex messages procured during the course of the said investigation."

(4) The writ petition came up for hearing before Mahinder Narain, J., a learned Judge of this Court who allowed the petition and directed the appellant in the judgment dated November 25, 1986 under appeal to give inspection of the aforesaid four documents to the respondent and also to furnish the copies of those documents to the respondent, if required, on payment of actual cost for making such copies. Before the learned Single Judge, the contention of the respondent was that he has, by virtue of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a right to get information so that he can effectively defend his litigation in London. Another submission was that documents forming acts or records of acts of Police in exercising powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short called Code), are public documents of which certified copies could be given on demand and payment of legal fees. The main objections of the appellant before the learned Single Judge was that the documents and the statements of witnesses which had been recorded by the C.BI. in the case, were not public documents and there is no provision under the Code to allow inspection or furnish copies of such documents or statements to any person. Another facet of the same submission was that the respondent has no right to inspect and, therefore, even if the documents are public documents, no copy can be supplied. The other submission was that the documents and statements of which the respondent sought inspection/copies, came into being as a result of the investigation made under Section 161 of the Code and could not be used for any purpose save as provided in Section 162 of the Code. The learned Single Judge dealt with those contentions and analysed the case law cited at the Bar and came to the following conclusion :- "IN view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that the record of the witnesses and documents given by them in support of the statements to the police officer in support of their statements comprised of acts of public officer, or records of acts of public officer, and as such are public documents, and any person who has a right to inspect the same, especially when the person who seeks it is a person who has something more than a mere idle curiosity with regard thereto. I do not think that the petitioner in this case can be categorised as a person with mere idle curiosity in the acts of the public officer or record of acts of public officer. He is a person who is concerned in a litigation in which he is defending his reputation. He is a citizen of India. He alleges that he has been libeled by a foreign citizen. He is making a plea to public officers in this country, as public servants, as representative of the Union of India to aid him in prosecution of the case by letting him have the information which the law in a foreign country and courts of foreign country require him to give according to the procedure in that country. The Constitution of this country by its Article 39 directs the State to secure justice for its citizens. The State would be doing right to its citizen, the petitioner herein, to secure him justice by giving him .an access to the documents to which he seeks access or of which he seeks copies. The petitioner has given an affidavit, undertaking that he shall not use it against the State. The petitioner has a light to have the information which is available in these public documents by virtue of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in , and Air 1982 Supreme Court 189. The libel against the petitioner was published in India, as also in England. Every citizen is entitled to seek vindication of his reputation which is a part of life, with which Article 21 of the Constitution is concerned, and in the aforesaid circumstances, in my view, it is fit and proper that a mandamus is issued to the respondent to give inspection of the documents which are sought by the petitioner."

(5) Mr. Sat Pal, Central Government Counsel followed by Shri B. Dutta, Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellant, took us through the relevant provision of the Code of 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The submission is that the Code which enacts in the main the procedural or adjectival criminal law also provides for the duties of the police to be performed in investigating the offences and to the use of statements. Chapter Xii of the Code relates to the information to the Police and their powers to investigate. Under Section 161 power is conferred on the Police Officer who may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and may also reduce in writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination and if he does so, he has to make a separate and true record of the statement of each such person whose statement he records. An examination of the provisions of Section 162 shows, according io counsel, that it imposes a general bar against the use of the statements made before the police and the enacting clause in clear terms says that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose except for the limited purpose of contradictions of the prosecution witness. The enactment being a code, says the counsel, must be deemed to be exhaustive in regard to the points specifically dealt with therein and thus the statements could not be used for any collateral purpose. Reliance is placed on "Gurej Singh v. Jagrup Singh'", 1983 Crimes 730, wherein it was held that the statements under Section 161 recorded by the police can be put to a limited purpose as conceived for purposes under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Reference is next made to "Gurcharan Singh v. Stale", 1984 (II) Delhi 627 wherein it was held that the case diaries cannot be used as evidence in the case and the Court can use the same as an aid in the enquiry or trial.

(6) Another facet of the same submission is that an investigation into an offence has to be kept confidential and thus there is wisdom behind the policy enacted in Section 162 of the Code prohibiting the user of the statements for any other purpose save as specifically provided in the Code. Reference is made to the scope of statements enunciated in "Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration", in these words :- "NOR was the High Court competent to use the statements of these witnesses recorded by the police during investigation, for seeking assurance for the prosecution story. Such use of the police statements is not permissible. Under the proviso to Section 162, Cr. P.C. such statements can be used only for the purpose of contradicting a prosecution witness in the manner indicated in Section 145,Evidencs Act, and for no other purpose. They cannot be used for the purpose of seeking corroboration or assurance for the testimony of the witness in court." The statute confers a purpose of the recording of the statements and it can be used for that purpose alone and for no other purpose, concludes the counsel.

(7) The next submission of the counsel is that the statements recorded by the police officer under Section 161 of the Code are not public documents as the mere act of recording those statements by the police officer would not give them the character of public documents. A statement recorded by a police officer in the course of investigation does not come within the description of a record within the meaning of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Those statements and documents do not form part of any act or record of act of a public officer within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act. Reliance is placed on "Natabar Jana v. State for this submission. Reference is made to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in "State v. Gian Singh", 1981 G.L.J. 538 wherein it was held that an inquest report given by a police doctor is only an opinion of the expert and was not an act or record of act of a public officer to give character of a public document. Reference is next made to "Baij Nath Bhatnagar v. Mohamad Din", A.I.R. 1936 Lahore 359 wherein it was held that the record of statement cannot be termed as a deposition and it is not evidence and at best it is an unpublished official record relating to an affair of State evidence derived from which cannot be produced in a case to which the first proviso to Section 162 is not applicable.

(8) Assuming that the statements and documents are public documents, it is next contended that the respondent has no right to inspect them and hence not entitled to a certified copy thereof within the scope of Section 76 of the Evidence Act. There is no material on the record to come to the conclusion that the respondent has any direct on tangible interest in obtaining the certified copies or inspecting the documents asked. Section 76 of the Evidence Act entitles a person to inspect or obtain certified copies of public document only if he is a person interested and not otherwise. Reference is made to "Queen Empress v Arumagam", I.L.R. 20 Madras 189, "State of Madras v. G. Krishnan", , "Isab Mandal v. Queen Empress I.L.R. 28 Calcutta 345 and "Natab Jana v. State",

(9) Lastly it is submitted that the learned Single Judge has not dealt with the question as to how the duty is cast upon the appellant to give inspection or supply copies of documents to the respondent under which provisions of the Constitution of India. Neither the preamble nor Articles 14, 19, 21, 39 and 51-A impose any such constitutional obligation on the appellant to do so.

(10) Chapter Xii of the Code of 1973 contains provisions empowering the police officer to act on the information received and to investigate in the classes o!' cases (1) where information is received as to the commission of a cognizable offence (Section 154), (ii) where information is received as to the commission of a non-cognizable offence (Section 155) and (iii) where information is received that a person has committed suicide or has been killed by another or by an animal or machinery or by accident or has died under circumstances raising a suspicion that an offence has been committed. Procedure for investigation is laid down in Section 157. The police officer is empowered to require the attendance of the witnesses (Section 160). Section 161 empowers the police officer to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and he may reduce in writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this section. The use of that statement in evidence and to what extent is provided in Section 162. This provision has undergone many changes and it is apposite to go to history.

(11) We may notice the provisions contained in the earlier Codes of Criminal Procedure to appreciate their contents. Section 119 of the Code of 1872 read as under :-    ''NOstatement so reduced into writing shall be signed by the person making it, nor shall it be treated as part of the record or used as evidence." Section 162 of the Code of 1882 read as under :- "No statement, other than a dying declaration, made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this chapter shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it or be used as evidence against the accused. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872."  

 SECTION162 of the Code of 1898 read as under :- "162(1) No statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this chapter shall, if taken down in writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall such writing be used as evidence : Provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution whose statement has been taken down in writing as aforesaid, the Court shall, on the request of the accused, refer to such writing and may then, if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice, direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof ; and such statement may be used to impeach the credit of such witness in manner provided by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of Section 32, Clause (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872."  

(12) SUB-SECTION (1) was substituted for original Sub-section (1) by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 18 of 1923. Some words were added at the end of Sub-para (2) by the Criminal Procedure Code (Second Amendment) Act 15 of 1941.   

SECTION162 read thus :- "162(1) No statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it ; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police-diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement of record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made : Provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, the Court shall on the request of the accused, refer to such writing and direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof, in order that any part of such statement, if duly proved, may be used to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. When any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his crossexamination : Provided, further that, if the Court is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry or trial or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interests, it shall record such opinion (but not the reasons therefor) and shall exclude such part from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused). (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of Section 32, Clause (1), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, (or to affect the provisions of Section 27 of that Act)."

Anew section was substituted for the old one Section 162 by Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 26 of 1955 reading as follows : "162(1) No statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it ; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made : Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aloresaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of Section 32, Clause (1), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) or to affect the provisions of Section 27 of that Act."

(13) The earlier Code was repealed by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Section 162 of the Code of 1973 corresponds to Section 162 of the repealed Code except for the addition of the explanation after Sub-section (2) reading as follows: "EXPLANATION.-ANomission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in Sub-section (1) may amount to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the particular context shall be a question of fact."

(14) It is apparent that under the Code of 1872 or even earlier Code of 1861, any statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under the Chapter relating to the information to the police and their powers to investigate could not be treated as part of the record or used as evidence. The changes introduced in the Code of 1882 exempted the dying declaration from the purview of the section by the additions of the words "other than a dying declaration" a nd the prohibition of the use of the statements made to the police officer against an accused. The words "other than a dying declaration" were omitted in the original Section 162(1) of the Code of 1898 but Sub-section (2) was added. The words "or be used as evidence against the accused" were substituted by the words "nor shall such writing be used as evidence." The proviso to Section 162 introduced in 1898 lifted the complete bar to the use of the said statement in evidence and permitted its user to impeach the credit of a witness in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed therein. Before the amendment of the Code by Act 18 i923, there was a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether or not the statement made to the police officer in the course of the investigation by the police could be used in a subsequent enquiry or trial. The Legislature set the controversy at rest by providing that "nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part or such statement on record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made." Another difficulty which had been noticed in the judicial opinion was avoided. The earlier section enabled the accused to make use of the said statement to impeach the credit of a witness in the manner provided by Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the amended Section of 1923 enabled the accused to use it to contradict the witness in the manner prescribed by Section 145.

(15) Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 25 of 1955 substituted Section 162. Clause 21 of the Government Bill, as introduced in the Lok Sabha, proposed the entire deletion of Section 162. The Select Committee's report opined against the deletion of Section 162 in these words:- "THE Committee feel that the deletion of this section will do away with the protection enjoyed at present by the accused against the prejudicial use of untruthful statement of the witnesses recorded by over-jealous police officers. The effect of such an omission would be that the statements recorded by the police under Sub-section (3) of Section 161 may be used by the prosecution both for the purpose of corroboration as well as of contradiction. The Committee consider that the statements recorded by the police should not be used by the prosecution for the purpose of corroboration. They may be used for contradiction only and this right should be available both to the accused and the prosecution. As the prosecution is not entitled to cross-examine its own witnesses without the permission of the Court it has been specifically provided that the statements recorded by the police under Sub-section(3) of Section 161 can be used by the prosecution for the purpose of contradiction, with the permission of the Court. The second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 162 has been inserted in Section 173 with suitable modification. The Committee have, therefore, omitted it from Section 162. Normally, it is only the defense which is entitled to cross-examine. The prosecution can never cross-examine its witnesses without the permission of the Court and the permission is never given unless the witness is held to be hostile by the Court. Therefore, if the witness turns hostile, the Court may permit him to be confronted with the statements that be made before the Court."

(16) Under the Evidence Act, 1872, the previous statement of the witness can be used to contradict the witness, (Section 145), to impeach his credit (Section 155) and to corroborate his testimony (Section 157). Section 162, therefore, restricted and circumscribed that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter Xii shall be used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made except for the purposes provided in the Code. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 162 permits the user of the previous statement for the purpose of contradicting the witness as provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 510 of the Code makes provision with regard to proof of documents by production thereof. A report of the Chemical Examiner submitted to the Police Officer was held as not inadmissible in evidence by virtue of Section 162 as Section 162(1) is subject to the provision of the Code of 1898 including Section 510 (See "Ukha Kohle v. State of Maharashtra", A.I.R.1963 S.C. 1531).

(17) The underlying object of Section 162 and the corresponding provisions in the earlier Codes show that the Legislature was against the use of statements made by any person to a police officer in the course of any investigation under that Chapter in any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement wamade. At the same time the provision enables an accused to refer to the earlier record of the statement of witness and if he found any contradiction, then he can discredit the testimony of the witness making the statement at the trial. It was mainly with the object of protecting the interest of the accused. When it was proposed to delete Section 162, the Select Committee opined that the effect of the deletion would be that it would do away the protection enjoyed by the accused against the prejudicial use of untruthful statements of witnesses recorded by over jealous police officers. It may be that when the police officer in the course of his investigation records a statement of any person, he may be recording a summary of the statement which appears to him to be relevant or he may be recording the statement of a witness in a very perfunctory manner or he may be recording the statement at the site of the crime in the midst of a crowd being constantly interfered with and it may not be a truthful record of the statement of that person, The Legislature has clearly qualified the words 'for any purpose' and prohibited the user for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation at. the time when such statement was made. In other words, the statutory bar to the use of such statements is imposed at any enquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation when such statement was made. The Legislature did not say that such a statement could not be used for any purpose whatsoever.

(18) The statements made to a police officer during the course of investigation have been used in subsequent case which was not under investigation when the witness made that statement. In an assault case the question arose whether the complainant could be cross-examined by confronting him with his statement made to the police when they were investigating a theft case, a case different from the case of assault. In ''Subhaya-v. Peta Venapa", A. I. R. 1933 Madras 85, it was held that a statement to a police officer during investigation of offence different from one under trial can be used by the accused for cross-examination. In "Haji Mohd v. State", , a defamatory statement made by a person during investigation of a bribery charge against a Sub-Inspector, to the Deputy Superintendent was sought to be used as evidence against the maker in his prosecution for offence of defamation. It was held that it could not be used at an enquiry or trial in respect of the offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act under investigation ; its use in any other enquiry or trial in respect of any other offence is not barred. "Hitta Bansi v. Sheo Lal A.1.R. 1948 Nagpur 243 arose out of a conviction under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code and it was alleged against them that during the investigation of an offence relating to a fetus found in a field the accused made a statement imputing illegitimate pregnancy and miscarriage or abortion to the applicant's unmarried sister. It was ruled that answers to the questions under Section 161 were not absolutely privileged and could be used. In "Ravinder Shoma v. Nirmal Sharma", 1985 D.L.T. 490, it was held that the statement made by the husband before the police during investigation of the case registered on the report of the wife regarding the beating incident was not barred in the proceedings under Section 125 of the Code. His statement was admissible including the admission of the husband of his having given 2/3 slaps to his wife.

(19) In "Khatri v. State of Bihar", the question arose whether certain documents which came into existence during the course of and as a result of the investigations into cases, called by the Court are liable to be produced or its production is barred under the provisions of Section 162 of the Code. It was ruled :- "IT bars the use of any statement made before a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter Xii, whether recorded in a police diary or otherwise, but, by the express terms of the section, this bar is applicable only where such statement is sought to be used 'at an inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made'. If the statement made before a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter Xii is sought to be used in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial or even at an inquiry or trial but' in respect of an offence other than that which was under investigation at the time when such statement was made, the bar of Section 162 would not be attracted. This section has been enacted for the benefit of the accused, as pointed out by this Court in Tahsildar Singh v State of UP., , it is intended "to protect the accused against the user of statements of witnesses made before the police during investigation, at the trial presumably on the assumption that the said statements were not made under circumstances inspiring confidence..."

(20) Gurtej Singh's case (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the appellant was not dealing with the question whether the legislature in Section 162 of the Code say that such a statement could or could not be used for any collateral purpose. There is no discussion but only one line statement that the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code, recorded by the police, can be put to a limited use only as conceived of for purposes under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Obviously the learned Judge was considering it at the trial of that offence. The statutory bar to the use of such statements is imposed only at any inquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation when such statement was made and not, in our opinion, to its use for any purpose whatsoever.

(21) As to the maintenance and use of the case diaries, we may notice the provisions. Section 172 of the Code provides for the maintenance by the police officer of a diary of his proceedings. It states that every police officer making an investigation under this Chapter shall day by day enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary, setting forth the time at which the information reached him, the time at which be began and closed his investigation, the place or places visited by him, and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through his investigation. Sub-section (2) provides that any criminal Court may send for the police diaries of a case under inquiry or trial in such Court, and may use such diaries, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. The accused has been given liberty or right to call for such diary under Sub-section (3). The police diary, therefore, cannot be used either as a substantive or as corroborative evidence in the case nor can the Court look into them and take the facts and statements written therein as material which would help it to come to a finding on the evidence in the case. The Criminal Court holding an inquiry or trial of a case is only empowered by Sub-section (2) of Section 172 to send for the police diary of the case and the Criminal Court can use it, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. To that extent the view taken by this Court in Gurcharan Singh's case (supra) is reiterated. But that case was not dealing with the question of the use of case diaries for collateral purposes. The bar against production and use of case diary enacted in Section 172 is again intended to operate only in an inquiry or trial for that offence. Thus there is no bar, in our view, to the production, proof or use of the statements made before a Police Officer during investigation in different proceedings.

(22) Section 173 of the Code provides for an official report after completion of the investigation and showing the result of such investigation being forwarded to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. Where such report is in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies, the police officer has to forward to the Magistrate along with report :-

(A)all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate. during investigation;

(B)the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. A report under Section 173 of the Code had been submitted in R.C.A. No. 8/77 CIA-1 dated October 22, 1977 before the Court of Shri D.C. Aggarwal, Special Judge, Delhi for permission to close the case on the ground that the investigating agency had not been able to get hold of any evidence of pecuniary advantage having been obtained by the named officials. The case was closed without any evidence being recorded by the Special Judge. The documents collected during investigation were ordered to be returned.

(23) Section 190 provides That the Magistrate specified therein may take cognizance of an offence, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or upon a police report of such facts or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. At the trial the judicial record comes into existence. Chapter Xxvii provides for the judgment.

(24) Section 363 deals with the supply of copy of judgments to be given to the accused and other specified persons. Sub-section (5) provides that save as otherwise provided in Sub-section (2), any person affected by a judgment or order passed by a Criminal Court shall, on an application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges, be given a copy of such judgment or order or of any deposition or other part of the record ; provided that the Court may, if it thinks fit for some special reason, give it to him free of cost. Only a person affected by a judgment or order is entitled to be given copies. A person affected by the judgment may be a complainant who is affected by the disposal of his complaint, or an advocate against whom remarks impugning misconduct have been made in the judgment or a witness who feels he has been wrongly discredited. So far as persons other than affected are concerned, a provision is made in Sub-section (6) that the High Court may, by rules provide for the grant of copies of any judgment or order of a Criminal Court to any person who is not affected by a judgment or order, on payment, by such person, of such fees, and subject to such conditions as the High Court may, by such rules, provide. Rules have been made by the High Court under the powers conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution of India with the previous approval of the State Government, For regulating the preparation and supply of copies of records of civil and criminal Courts by the Copying Agencies under the control of the District & Session Judges and the Judge, Small Cause Court by the Punjab High Court, Chandigarh and they are applicable to the High Court of Delhi and are contained in Chapter Xvii Vol. Iv of the High Court Rules. They are called the Punjab Civil and Criminal Courts Preparation and Supply of Copies of Record Rules, 1965. Relevant rule is Rule 3 reading as follows :-

"3.A copy of a record shall be granted in the manner prescribed by these rules to any person who, under the law for the time being in force, or under these rules, is entitled to get it. In particular, copies may be granted as follows :-

(1)Any party to a civil or criminal case is entitled at any stage of the suit or complaint to obtain copies of the record of the case including documents exhibited and finally accepted by the Court as evidence :- Explanation.-(i) "Complaints" include challans. (ii) A party to a suit or complaint who has been ordered to file a written statement is not entitled to a copy of the written statement of his opponent until be has first filed his own.

(2)A stranger to a civil or criminal case may, after decree or judgment, obtain copies of the plaint or complaint, written statement, affidavits and petitions filed in the case, as also of the evidence recorded by the Court, and may, for sufficient reasons shown to the satisfaction of the Court, obtain copies of any documents before the final order is passed. He may also obtain copies of any judgment, decree or order, at any time after the same has been passed or made, but he shall not be granted copies of exhibits put in as evidence except with the consent of the person by whom they were produced or under the orders of the Court.

(3)Official letters shall be treated as privileged documents and copies thereof shall not be ordinarily granted. Should it be necessary to grant a copy of a letter, or of an extract of a letter, received by a subordinate from a superior officer reference shall, in every case, be made to the superior officer for permission to grant copy thereof."

(25) A member of the public who is not a party or affected person, has been given a right by these rules to obtain the copies of the plaint or complaint, written statement, affidavits, petitions as also the evidence recorded in the case. A right of access has been given to the general public to obtain copies of part of judicial record. The copies of documents exhibited can also be given but with the consent of the person by whom they were produced. A stranger to the case has also been given a right to obtain copies of the judgments or orders, it is with a view to enable the public at large to know the view of law taken by the Courts and for that reasons the judgments and orders are made easily accessible to the public. In "Lali prasad Zutslui. Emperor , it was held : "...Iwould hold that it is the essence of the administration of justice that judgments affecting the rights, and more particularly the liberties, of the people should be made as public as possible, in order that the public at large might at leisure consider those judgments, either in their own interests or in the interests in a criminal cause, of the condemned person ; for it is only by such publicity that the public can be satisfied that the law is being properly administered by those responsible for its administration, and that abuses in that administration, which might occur if the fullest publicity was not given to the proceedings in a Court, may be avoided."

(26) The trial of the case arising out of Crime No. RC/8/77-CIU(1) did not commence. No evidence was recorded by the Special Judge. The respondent has not asked for copies from the record of the Special Judge. The respondent has asked the Director, C.B.I, to give inspection and copies of the statements of two witnesses, namely, Mr. J.S. Gill and Mr. Ceuz recorded during the course of investigation, the correspondence between the S.T.C. and Mr. Niseim Gaon and/or his company and also documents in the shape of draft statements and Telex messages. In regard to these the affidavit on behalf of the appellant is "that as per orders passed on the final report dated 18-7-1981 in RC-8/77-CIU-1 dated 22-10-1977, the Court of Shri D.C. Aggarwal, Special Judge ordered that the documents, if any, collected during investigation shall be returned to the proper parties and the same has accordingly been done". The statement of the said two witnesses is not evidence recorded by the Special Judge and the other documents do not form part of the judicial record of that Court. The respondent as a member of the general public has been granted a limited right under Section 363 of the Code of 1973 read with said Rule 3 of Chapter 17 of the High Court Rules, Volume IV. He has not been given a right to obtain the certified copies of the statements recorded under Section 161 or other documents collected during the course of investigation by the police officer even if filed in the criminal Court along with the final report.

(27) Rules have also been framed by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, regulating the procedure in Courts in cases where any person is entitled to inspect a record of any such Court, and prescribing the fees payable by such persons for inspection and are contained in Chapter 16-C of Volume Iv of the High Court Rules and Orders. Rule 1 says that the record of decided cases shall be open to the inspection of the public, subject to the general control of the head of the office. This rule gives a discretion to the Judge, Metropolitan Magistrate, Subordinate Judge or the Officer-in-Charge record room to allow inspection of the records of the proceedings, evidence, documents and orders of his Court or in the record room, as the case may be. The right to inspect and the right to take certified copies has been expressly conferred by the said Rule but its extent is limited by the rules.

(28) The record of the statements of the witnesses examined by a police officer during the course of investigation and the documents and records procured during the course of such investigation, now in possession of the Director, C.B.I, are not, in our opinion, public documents or the result of acts of public functionaries undertaken during the course of performance of public duties within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act. Public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act form an exception to the hearsay rule and their admissibility rests on the ground that the facts contained therein are of public interest. Public documents consists of the acts of public functionaries or transactions which official persons are required to enter in books or registers. The kind of acts which Section 74 has in view does not include the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code. Section 161 of the Code empowers the police officer to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and he may reduce in writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this section. We have earlier expressed that it may be untruthful statements of witnesses recorded by overzealous police officers or a record of the statement in a very perfunctory manner. A police officer is also not bound under Sub-section (3) of Section 161 to record the statements of witnesses examined by him during the course of investigation. If the police officer does reduce into writing statement, then it can be said that he is doing so in his official capacity in discharge of a statutory duty under Section 161(3) of the Code. But this recording of the statement of a person is not the acts or records of the acts of the police officer. It is merely a record of the statement of such person whose statement the police officer records. Mr. Dutta is, thus, right that the mere act of recording those statements by the police officer would not give them the character of public documents. In Natabar Jana (supra), it was held : "THE argument turns on the proposition that the evidence of a witness recorded by a police officer in course of investigation is a public document within the meaning of Section 74, Evidence Act. There is, however, authority against this proposition. In- Isab Mandal v. Queen Empress', 28 Cal. 348 (A), it was held that a written statement recorded by a police officer in the course of investigation did not come within the description of a record within the meaning of Section 35, Evidence Act, it follows that it cannot be a public document within the meaning of Section 74. Further in- 'Govt. of Bengal v. Santiram Mandal , it was held that records of statements made not on oath in course of a departmental enquiry by a government officer were not public documents. This was not a case of recording of a statement by a police officer, but the recording of a statement by a police officer in the course of investigation would be analogous to the recording of a statement in the course of a departmental enquiry by a government officer." To the similar effect is the ratio of Baij Nath's case (supra) and Arumugam's case (supra).

(29) Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect shall give that person on demand a copy of it. In other words, the right to obtain certified copies thus depends on the right to inspect the public documents assuming that the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code by a police officer or the documents collected by him during his investigation are public documents. Section 76 does not authorise the issue of the certified copy of a document which a person has no right to inspect. The aforesaid rule regulates the right of inspection of the record of civil and criminal courts. There is no special enactment allowing inspection of the documents or records in the possession of C.B.I. No provision of law except the constitutional provisions which we will deal later, has been brought to our notice which confers a right or enables the respondent to inspect records with the Director, C.B.I.

(30) Reliance by Mr. Sibal on "Parashuram v.Cocke A.I.R.1942 Bombay 26 for a right to inspect and to take a copy of the aforesaid documents is misplaced. That case arose out of the refusal to inspect the record in certain criminal proceedings in that Court governed by the procedure laid down by the Code of 1898. Section 548 of 1898 Code provided that if any party affected by a judgment or order passed by a criminal Court desired to have a copy of the Judge's charge to the jury or of any order or deposition or other part of the record, he would, on applying for such copy, be furnished therewith. The application for inspection was made by a person who lodged a complaint against the auditors of the Central Bank, and after the matter had proceeded for a considerable time, the applicant was absent at one hearing and the accused was discharged. It was held that he is clearly entitled under Section 548 as a person affected by the order of the learned Magistrate discharging the accused to require certified copies of the orders, depositions and other part of the record and to achieve that he had a right to first inspect. The right to take copy was thus conferred by statute and that is the basis of the judgment to allow inspections before obtaining the certified copies.

(31) We are unable to pursuade ourselves to agree to another contention of Mr. Kapil Sibal, the learned counsel for the respondent that the right to receive a copy of the judicial order referred to in Section 363(5) includes within its ambit the right to receive copies of all documents and statements on which the judicial order is based on the theory of incorporation, The right has been conferred on a stranger to the criminal case or a member of the public to receive a copy of the complaint as also the evidence recorded by the Court and later the final order. He can also get copies of the exhibited documents put in evidence but only with the consent of the person by whom they are produced or under orders of the Court. The documents which have not been exhibited, do not form part of the record and are required to be returned to party filing. The theory of incorporation is specifically excluded as exhibited documents received in evidence must have been dealt with in the final order but its copies cannot be supplied to a member of the public. Reference made by the Special Judge in his order to the statement of Mr. J.S. Gill as saying that M/s. Nogas had made payments outside the contract etc , does not have the effect of incorporating the whole of the statement in that order. It bears repetition that the respondent is not asking for any copies of the judicial record of the Special Judge, but only making a request to Director, C.B.I., who is under no obligation under the Code of Criminal Procedure to furnish or give certified copies or allow inspection of the records in his possession.

(32) The decision in "State of Madras v. G. Krishan", relied upon by the counsel dealt with the case of a statement or confession recorded under Section 164 of the Code. Section 164 confers a power on Magistrates specified in Sub-section (1) thereto to record any statement or confession made to them in the course of investigation by the police officer before the commencement of the enquiry or trial. The statute imposes a duty on the Magistrate to record what is stated by the person making the statement. Such statements are public documents, being acts of a judicial officer done under the provisions of the Code and the record so maintained is a record of a Court. It was on these facts that it was held : "A Magistrate recording a statement or confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is performing a judicial act and the record would be a public document within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. To entitle the respondent to a certified copy of such a document, he should show that he is interested in the document." The case then dealt with the main question as to the right of the accused to obtain copies before the filing of the charge-sheet. Section 173(4) of the Code was construed as impliedly prohibiting the grant of copies earlier than the time prescribed by it even through Section 76 of the Evidence Act entitles a person interested in a public document to inspect or obtain a copy thereof. That case was not concerned with the question whether or not the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code by a police officer during the course of investigation was a public document.

(33) To sum up, the statutory bar to the use of statements made under Section 161 of the Code before a police officer is imposed at any enquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation. There is no bar to the production, proof or use of such statement in collateral proceedings or in other words, at an enquiry or trial in respect of an offence other than that which was under investigation at the time such statement was made. Such statements are not public documents or the result of the acts of public functionaries undertaken during the course of performance of public duties within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence A.ct. The Legislature in its wisdom has given varied rights to the parties, affected persons or strangers to the litigation to obtain copies or inspection of the records. The respondent has however, not been given a right under Section 363 of the Code read with Rule 3 of Chapter 17 and Rule I of Chapter 16-C of the High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. Iv either to obtain certified copies or to inspect the record of the statements recorded under Section 161 or other documents collected during the investigation by a police officer even if filed in criminal Court along with the final report. The right to inspect and the right to take certified copies has been expressly conferred but its extent is limited by the statutory provisions. The Courts are to administer the law. As there is no statutory duty of the Director, C.B.I, to allow inspection or to grant copies of the said statements or documents, no writ of mandamus can be issued. Director, C.B.I, is thus right in the snd taken in the impugned letter dated April 10, 1986 that neither the said documents nor the statements of witnesses recorded by the C.B.I, under Section 161 of the Code are public documents and there is no provision in the Code to allow inspection or to furnish copies of the same. We may not be understood as holding that the records of statements written or maintained by a police officer under Section 161 of the Code cannot be summoned, proved or used.

(34) Can it then be said that by virtue of Articles 19(1)(a), 21 or 39 of the Constitution of India, the respondent has a right to get those documents at this stage so that he can effectively defend his reputation in a pending litigation in London or that the respondent has a right to have the information available in those documents by virtue of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in "State of U.P. v. Raj Narain", and "S.P. Gupta v. Union of India" A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 189 (commonly known as Judges' case) ? Under Article 19(1)(g), there exists in the citizens the right of freedom of speech and expression and the right to know is implicit in this right. But is the learned Single Judge right in saying that the State is to aid the respondent in the prosecution of the case by letting him have the information and inspection of those documents ?

(35) Article 19(1)(a) provides that "all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression". In the draft Constitution, right to education was put in the chapter of Fundamental Rights but was later transferred in the chapter relating to the Directive Principles of State Policy in Article 41. Article 41 provides that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to education. The State has, therefore, set up various public institutions, institutes, schools, colleges, vocational training centres etc. to facilitate the acquisition of the knowledge. The State has also provided with the medias, books, literature, periodicals in the public libraries to provide education. The State has thus taken steps to implement the Directive Principles of the State Policy to provide education to the citizens and extend all reasonable facilities to achieve that end. "The right to know is implicit in this right (Article 19)" as pronounced in Judges' case is to be understood in this light. The right to acquire information, receive education and attain knowledge is a natural right.

(36) But can the respondent or other citizens similarly situated be given any authority to scrutinise, supervise and control the functioning of the investigative machinery or the police or to delve in the files, correspondence, noting portions to receive education, to acquire information and attain knowledge ? Such a liberty to a citizen is bound to jeopardise the entire concept of the freedom of the manner of investigation by the police, C.B.I, or other investigating agencies. The record of the statements written or maintained by a police officer under Section 161 of the Code or other documents collected by itself cannot be a deposition or legal evidence and it may prove nothing. It cannot be a proof of every fact or particulars contained therein without further proof. It does not contain any act of public functionaries which is entitled to be disclosed to a person who may be vitally affected or interested. The demand is for the recorded statements and other correspondence between the S.T.C. and Mr. Nissim Goan or his company or the settlements and telex massages exchanged. They do not relate to any matter of public acts or public transactions or any Governmental functions of public interest. It is for this reason that there is no legal or constitutional obligation of the State to allow a citizen to peruse the unpublished official record or to give him copies thereof. As and when the records are summoned by the respondent, it is only then that the question of claim of privilege which has been conferred by Section 123 of the Evidence Act on the head of the department, may arise. The head of the department had no occasion to consider whether or not to grant or refuse permission to give evidence derived from unpublished official record relating to any affairs of the State or is it the interest of only a private litigant to whom the documents may be of vital importance. We have not seen the documents and, therefore, cannot say whether the documents fall in a particular class entitled to the grant of immunity from disclosure. The law recognises that there may be a class of documents which in public interest should be immune from disclosure.

(37) It is true that in the Judges' case, the Supreme Court has construed the scope of Article 19(l)(a) and held that "the concept of an open Government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a)". The observations were made in the context of the construction of the provisions of Articles 74, 217 and 224 of the Constitution read with Sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act. The writ petitions had impugned the decision of the Central Government not to continue Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of this Court for a further term on the grounds, inter alia, firstly, that there has been no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the constitutional authorities required to be consulted under Article 217 and secondly, that the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds. The prayer was made for disclosure and summoning the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, Chief Justice of Delhi and Chief Justice of India in regard to the non-continuance of Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge. The claim was resisted on I he ground that they were privileged against disclosure for two reasons, firstly, that they form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and hence by reason of Article 74(2) the Court was precluded from ordering their disclosure. Secondly, they were protected against disclosure under Section 123 of the Evidence Act since their disclosure would injure public interest. The material on which the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers is based, cannot be said to be part of the advice and the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, Chief Justice of Delhi and Chief Justice of India constituting the material forming the basis of the decision of the Central Government, was held to be outside the exclusionary rules enacted in Clause 2 of Article 74.

(38) The resistance of the claim of privilege from disclosure of documents within the ambit and scope of Section 123 of the Evidence Act was rejected by the Supreme Court by a majority of Six against One. It is well- recognised that fair administration of justice is itself a matter of vital public importance. The law on public interest immunity was expounded. The injury which would be caused to the public interest in the administration of justice by the non-disclosure of the correspondence was held as far outweighing the injury which may, if at all, cause to the public interest by their disclosure. P.N Bhagwati, J. dealt with the important question in the area of public law in the context of the open society as part of the democratic structure. His Lordship observed that the citizens' right to know the facts, the true facts about the administration of the country is thus one of the pillars of the democratic State and that is why the demand for openness in the Government is increasingly growing in the different parts of the world. These observations of Mathew, J. in "State of U.P. v. Raj Narain" (supra) were quoted:- "IN a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything, that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public security. To cover with veil of secrecy the common routine business, is not in the interest of the public. Such secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desired for the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratic routine. The responsibility of officials to explain and to justify their acts is the chief safeguard against oppression and corruption."

IT was further held in Judges' case 'This is the new democratic culture of an open society towards which every liberal democracy is moving and our country should be no exception. The concept of an open government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Therefore, disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so demands. The approach of the Court must be to attenuate the area of secrecy as much as possible consistently with the requirement of public interest, bearing in mind all the time that disclosure also serves an important aspect of public interest. It is in the context of this background that we must proceed to interpret Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act."

(39) Those cases, therefore, dealt with the question of disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of the Government and the right of a citizen to know about it in a public interest litigation in a Court of law. The veil of secrecy in the functioning of the Government was lifted so that the general public could exercise sound judgment on the conduct of the Government and the merits of public policies. It was felt necessary to go into documents of which production was ordered to decide the validity of the impugned action in the cases pending before the Court. The need for an open Government where there is access to information in regard to functioning of Government had been emphasised particularly in those cases where the policies impinged on the rights and lives of the citizens. Those cases, however, did not lay down the law that all files of the Government, public corporations or public agencies or authorities are open to inspection by individual citizens irrespective of the fact whether they relate to the matters of major public importance or not. Neither the said documents are required or necessary for the decision of this writ petition nor it is so contended unlike Judges' case. Any dispute between the respondent and said Mr. Paul is not the subject matter of this writ petition, but the subject matter of libel action pending in Courts at London. There is no iota of public interest involved in allowing an individual access to the correspondence or statements, if any, with the Director, C.B.I. It is merely the interest of an individual citizen who may, if advised, seek their production in a Court of law. The Court will consider its relevance to the enquiry or proceeding before it and order its production on merits subject to the claim of privilege, if any.

(40) Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This article applies to the deprivation of life and liberty by the State and has no application to the non-supply of the copies of the statements or other correspondence unrelated to the deprivation of personal liberty. The respondent only alleges "a vitriolic attack made on his character and reputation and the libel statement" and seeks for its defense the aforesaid documents. He is not seeking any relief relating to his freedom from imprisonment or physical coercion or intrusion into his privacy or invasion of his personal right or anything of that character.

(41) The result of the above discussion is that the Letters Patent Appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment dated November 25, 1986 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.P. 1146/86 is set aside and the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.