Murari Lal Chet Ram, Badlu And Anr. vs P.C. Sharma And Ors.
1988 Latest Caselaw 224 Del

JUDGMENT

D.P. Wadhwa, J.

(1) This batch of five petitions (C.M. (Main) Nos. 24, 25, 39, 267 and 268 of 1974) can be disposed of by one judgment as common questions of law and fact arise. These petitions under article 227 of the Constitution are by the tenants and their challenge is to an order of the Competent Authority constituted under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956 (for short 'the Act') granting permission under Section 19(l)(a) of the Act to the respondent-landlords to institute proceedings for eviction against the petitioners.

(2) The order in the case of petitions by Murari Lal (C.M. (M) 25/7-1) Chet Ram (CM.(M) 25/74) and Badlu(C,M. (M) 39/74) is of Mr. P.O. Sharma, Competent Authority, and is dated 22-10-1973. In the other two petitions of Pooran Chand (C.M. (M) 267/74) and Jayanti Pershad (C.M. (M) 268/74), the impugned order is dated 3-8-1974 and was passed by Mr. G.C. Jain, Competent Authority. The order in the first three petitions is common. The premises in question are a big house situated in the slum area to which the provisions of the Act apply and is occupied by various tenants. The tenanted premises mostly consisted of one room with common latrine and bath-room in the house. It is stated that the tenants are poor people working as hawkers and have been paying nominal rent being old tenants. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, claiming to be owner and landlords of the premises, filed various applications under Section 19(l)(a) of the Act. The applications were filed in the fm prescribed. In para 4 of the form, the applicant is to mention the grounds on which eviction of the tenant is sought. The respondents gave varying grounds for eviction of the tenants like nonpayment of rent subletting, causing damage to the tenanted premises, etc. One ground was however common and this was that the premises were in a dilapidated and dangerous condition and had become unsafe and unfit for human habitation and unless reconstruction was done, there was a danger of the same collapsing. It was stated that the landlords, therefore, required the premises bona fide for the purpose of building or rebuilding i,i terms of the sanctioned plan granted by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It was further stated that this building or rebuilding process was not possible and could not be carried out without the premises having been vacated by the tenant. Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Act prescribes the factors which are to be taken into account by the competent authority while granting or refusing to grant permission and these are:- (A)whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas; (c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed. Sub-clause (c) would not be applicable as it is a common ground that no other factors have been prescribed and the competent authority has to look to clauses (a) and (b) only.

(3) The competent authority did not decide the status of the petitioners whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenants would be available to them, if they were evicted. It held that it was not necessary so to decide as the case of the landlords fell under clause (b) of Sub-section (4) of Section 19 inasmuch as the landlords had got a valid sanctioned plan for reconstruction of the entire building from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It was observed that clauses (a) and (b) mentioned above were only alternative and not cumulative and, therefore, it was in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas that the tenants in occupation might bs evicted so that the property might be reconstructed and, therefore, in that case, it was observed, there was hardly any occasion to consider the means of the tenants. Reference was made to a Bench decision of this Court in C.R. Abrol v. Administrator under the Slum Areas and others (2nd (1970) I Delhi 768). The competent authority also referred to notices served on the respondent-landlords under Section 348 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act on the ground that the building in which the tenanted premises were situated was in a dangerous conditions. The respondent-landlords also brought on record certified copy of the sanctioned plan for reconstruction of the whole building.

(4) It was submitted by Mr. Iswar Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioners, that when these petitions were admitted, this court did not grant an absolute stay of the eviction proceedings filed by the respondent-landlords on the strength of the impugned order and that it was ordered that the petitioners would not be dispossessed during the pendency of these petitions. Mr. Ishwar Sahai said that petitions for eviction were filed against all the petitioners now before me and all these petitions had since been dismissed by the Rent Controller under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958. In a way, therefore, the question involved in these petitions would have become academic. It was, however, contended that in view of the judgment of this court in H.R. Aggarwal v. Raj Kumar (1978 (2) R.C.R. 680), impugned permission granted by the competent authority under Section 19 of the Act could again be used by the respondent-landlords to file yet another eviction proceeding against the petitioners on any ground under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, for short the Rent Act) and since the sword was always hanging on the head of the petitioners, the court should decide the points involved in the petitions. Though it is now almost 15 years since the passing of the impugned order, Mr. Ishwar Sahai submitted that there was no change in the status of the petitioners and they continued to be hawkers in old Delhi. Mr. Atul K-umar, who appeared for the respondent-landlords, submitted that the impugned order was valid and that it was not necessary for the competent authority to go into the status or the means of the tenants to acquire alternative accommodation, if evicted from the suit premises, when the whole of the building was to be reconstructed and, in the circumstances, therefore, it had to be held that the eviction of the tenants was in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas. In support of his submission, reference was made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Puma Ram and others v. Chiranji Lal Gupta and others . In this case the question that arose for consideration was if clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Act had to be read cumulatively and that permission to execute any order or decree for eviction against the tenant or to institute eviction proceedings against a tenant could only be granted if findings of the competent authority on both the clauses were that the tenant, if evicted, could within his means get alternative accommodation of the type which would not result in creating another slum and then determine whether the eviction would be in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas. This contention was rejected. The court held that the conditions mentioned in clause (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act were conditions in the alternative and did not have to be read cumulatively. It further held that the principal objective of the Act being clearance of slums and prevention of creation of slums, if in a given case the demolition or re-erection or reconstruction of a building or a set of buildings was necessary in the interest of slum clearance or improvement, the poverty of the tenant even if established would not debar the competent authority from granting permission. It was also observed in this judgment that the competent authority in considering the application for grant of permission moved by a landlord had to look at the matter from the point of view of the tenant and not from the point of view of the landlord, ever keeping in mind the objectives sought to be achieved by the Act. Thus, the court held that clauses (a) and (b) were to be considered in the alternative and neither got precedence and these had to be read disjunctively. If the competent authority comes to the conclusion in a given case that eviction of the tenant is in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum areas, looking at it from the tenant's point of view, the competent authority need not further investigate the question of the means and status of the tenant. In the case Mahabir Pershad v. M/s Mahalakshmi Investment and Property Co. Ltd. and Others (L.P.A. No. 122/69), decided on 18-9-1973), the ground of eviction of the appellant tenant was under Section 13(l)(g) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952, which gave a right to the landlord to sue for eviction if "the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding the premises or for the replacement of the premises by any building or for the erection of other buildings and that such building or rebuilding cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated". The court held that the competent authority had first to consider whether the eviction of the tenant was in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act. If the answer was in the affirmative then the eviction of the tenant became imperative and the Act was unable to protect him. It was only if the answer was in the negative that the competent authority would proceed to consider whether the tenant would get alternative accommodation within his means on eviction. In Parvati Devi v. Tibbia College Board and another (1966 D.L.T. 256), the court was concerned with the order of eviction under clause (1) of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Rent Act which entitled the landlord to claim eviction where the premises were required to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Department Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme and such building work could not be carried out without the premises being vacated. The court held that poverty of the tenant would not stand in the way of blocking the improvement scheme or development scheme made by the authorities and that it was not that unless all the requirements of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 19(4) of the Act were proved, that permission could not be granted.

(5) In view of these pronouncements of this court, it could not, therefore, be said that permission to institute eviction proceedings by the impugned orders was not rightly granted. But that is not the end of the matter. In Mahabir Pershad v. M/s. Mahalakshmi Investment and Property Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the court did not dismiss the appeal though on all the submissions it held against the appellant. This was on account of the fact that an application was filed by the appellant tenant that the premises had ceased to be unfit for human habitation as a result of subsequent events. It was pointed out that the competent authority issued a notice under Section 4(1) of the Act that the premises were fit for carrying out necessary repairs and that pursuant to that notice, repairs were carried out by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi which was administering Act, at a cost of about Rs. 5,000.00 . The appellant filed certain documents in support of his averments. The contention was that the competent authority had carried out the "work of improvement" whereby the premises were no longer unfit for human habitation and, therefore, the permission granted earlier by the competent authority to execute the decree on the ground that the building was unfit for human habitation and required immediate demolition and reconstruction had ceased to exist and that the whole matter should be re-examined. On these contentions, the court held that the matter did require re-examination by the competent authority who itself had carried out the work of improvement in the exercise of its authority under the Act. if that be so, the basis for the order which was impugned by the writ petition would disappear. The court also observed that the Rent Control Act and the Slum Act were, inter alia, for the protection of tenants from eviction aud that the justice of the case, therefore, required that the competent authority should re-examine the matter in the light of the allegations made and then come to a fresh and independent conclusion and determine the case under Section 19 of the Act. The case was, therefore, remanded to the competent authority.

(6) The Central Government framed Rules under the Act called the . These Rules provide for the forms in which various notices etc are to be issued. Rules 6 lays down what every plan for re-development of a slum area has to include. Rule 7 prescribes the requirements of Section 19 of the Act. It provides that where an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act relates to grant of permission to institute a suit or proceeding for the eviction of a tenant, it shall be made in form CC. As noted above, in para 4 of form Cc, the grounds on which eviction of the tenant is sought are to be mentioned. Staling of these grounds, in my view, is not an idle Formality particularly when considerations for granting permission under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act are different and though it will not be for the competent authority to adjudicate upon the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds of eviction. These grounds of a eviction have necessarily to correlate to the grounds of eviction mentioned in the Rent Act in respect of the premises to which the Rent Act applies, if, as in the present case, the landlord has been granted permission to institute proceedings for eviction against the tenant on the ground that the eviction of the tenant was in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas, the proceedings for eviction could be filed only under clauses (g) 335 and (1) and perhaps under clause (f) as well of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Rent Act. Clauses (f) applies where the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and are required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out the repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated. Under clause (g) the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated, and under clause (1) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme and which building work could not be carried out without the premises being vacated. Under clause (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act, the landlord cannot seek permission to institute proceedings for eviction on any other ground except the two and perhaps three grounds mentioned above. The landlord may join other grounds along with any of the two grounds under clauses (g) and (1), but if the landlord fails under clauses (g) and (1) the permission granted under clause (b) of Section 19(4) will not survive for the other grounds. This is so because then it could not be said that the eviction of the tenant was in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas on which basis permission was granted to the landlord. Reference at this stage may be made to Section 20A(1) of the Act which provides that where a tenant in occupation of any building in a slum area vacates any building or is evicted there from on the ground that it was required for the purpose of executing any work of improvement or for the purpose of re-erection of the building, the tenant may, within such time as may be prescribed, file a declaration with the competent authority that he desires to be replaced in occupation of the building, after the completion of the work of improvement or re-erection of the building, as the case may be. Then, other Sub-sections of this section provides how possession is to be restored to the tenant, and Section 20B provides how the rent is to be fixed in such a case.

(7) It is, therefore; apparent that by getting permission under Section 19(4) of the Act by taking his case as falling under clause (b) thereof, the landlord cannot give up the grounds of eviction under clauses (g) and (1) of the Rent Act, as above-mentioned, and file proceedings for eviction of the tenant on any other ground, thus depriving the tenant of his right granted to to him under Sections 20A and 20B of the Act. Once it is held that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act are disjunctive, the grounds of eviction under the Rent Act in respect of the premises falling there under have to be co-relatable to clause (a) or (b).

(8) On the strength of the sanctioned plan to rebuild, the landlords have got permission to institute eviction proceedings on the ground falling under clause (b) and without any reference to clause (a) of Sub-sections (4) of Section 19 of the Act. If the landlords fail on this ground before the Rent Controller, the permission under Section 19(4) would also perish. Mr. Iswar Sahai submitted that the sanctioned plan in the present case had long since expired and the landlords, therefore, must approach the competent authority again to get a fresh permission. This perhaps may not be correct particularly in view of the decision of this court in H. R. Aggarwal's case (supra). But, then this decision may, however, need a second look. Can a permission once given under Section 19(4) of the Act be used any time and for ever irrespective of the ground of eviction in each successive petition ? The following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in 336 New Delhi Municipal Committee v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India may be noted (para 9, page 2138) :- "In the first place, the Municipal Committee has the undoubted power under Section 67 to amend on assessment list "at any time". The width of this power may justifiably be curtailed by reading the expression "at any time" to mean "within a reasonable time" as was canvassed in Punjab National Bank v. New Delhi Municipal Committee but the question of reasonableness does not arise in this case and was not raised in the High Court."

(9) I, however, need not dilate further on this question, as presently it does not arise in the case now before me. I am only concerned with the validity of the impugned order which though otherwise is valid.

(10) With these observations, therefore, the present petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.