Ramlal vs Begum Zaman Ali Khan
1987 Latest Caselaw 531 Del

JUDGMENT

C.L. Chaudhary, J.

(1) The J.D. by letter dt. 13.9,1979 refuted the stand taken by the L.D.O. in the letter dt. 1.9.1979 and further alleged that the request for grant of permission to sell the property Was made in 1976 and thonerartment took more than 3 years to owner the terms which had been complied with by remitting the demand draft. The demand draft was again sent with a request to accept the amount and grant the permission. But she was informed by letter dt. 4.10.1979 by (he L.D.O. that the terms issued to her on 19.6.1979 had correctly been cancelled and she would be communicated the revised terms. By letter dt. 3.11.1979 she was given the revised terms. by which an amount of Rs. 3,74,782.00 was claimed for granting the permission for the transfer. Thereafter the J.D. made several representations to deptt. saying it had wrongly and illegally cancelled and withdrawn the terms offered by letter dt. 19.6.1979 as the payment was made in compliance with those terms, but those representations did not find favor with the Govt.

(2) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Counsel for the D.H. contended that the terms of letter dt. 19.6.1979 were wrongly withdrawn and the amount of Rs. 86,849.95 claimed by the department had been paid within the reasonable time and as such the department had no right to withdraw and cancel those terms and conditions. It has also contended that the amount was paid within 50 days from the issuance of the letter dt. 19.6.1979. It is further contended that the period of 30 days was not the essence of the offer as it was not warranted by the terms and conditions of the lease deed or was prescribed anywhere else. The department was not within its right to withdraw those terms after the expiry of 30 days. His further argument is that it was also provided in the letter dt. 19.6.l979 that if the amount was not paid within the period stipulated then the amount had to be paid with interest(c) 10% on the total dues from the date of issuance of the letter. The terms and conditions itself visualised that amount could be paid after the period of 30 days with interest @ 10%.

(3) On the other hand the contention of Mr. Watwani, appearing for the U.O.I. is that it was clearly stipulated in the letter dt. 19.6.1979 that in case the terms and conditions were not complied with, those would automatically stand withdrawn and cancelled and by letter dt. 2.8.1979 those terms were actually withdrawn and cancelled.

(4) I have considered the relevant contention of the parties. In my opinion the contention of the counsel for the D.H. should prevail. No doubt in the letter dt. 19.6.1979 it was mentioned that the acceptance of the terms and conditions was to,be communicated in writing with the necessary undertaking and the demand draft within 30 days from the date of receipt of the letter and in case of failure the terms and conditions were to stand automatically withdrawn and cancelled. The period of 30 days is not prescribed anywhere. It was fixed by the department on their own volition. I do not think that the period of 30 days was sacrosanct and inviolable; and no payment could be made after the expiry of 30 days. The next clause in the letter provided that in case the amount was not paid within the period stipulated then interest had to be paid @ 10% on the total dues from the date of issuance of the letter. This clause contemplates that the payment could be made after 30 days. Both the clauses had to be re-conciled. The only way to reconcile is to hold that the period of 30 days was not mandatory but was only directory and the payment could be made within a reasonable time. If the amount was to be paid within 30 days then no interest was chargeable. However after the period of 30 days interest was chargeable @ 10%. Even otherwise in such matters reasonable time had to be given to the party for making the payment. What is reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. That is why the clause regarding charging of interest had been incorporated. The amount in fact was paid' within. 50 days. In my opinion the amount, was paid within reasonable time. As such' the J.D. did comply with terms and conditions of the letter dt. 19.6.1979 ' by making payment of the amount called for. The stand of the department by refusing to accept the amount was not legal and proper.

(5) In the result I hold that the D.H, is entitled to get the permission to self the property from the L& D.O. oh the terms and conditions of the letter dt, 19.6.1979. The D.H, is directed to pay the amount claimed in this letter of the L & D.O. with interest, calculated @ 10% per annum from the date of issuance of this letter till payment, The D.H. is also required to furnish an , taking as required in this letter.

(6) I may make if clear that this order is without prejudice to the rights of the U.O.I, 'to take such action in law as they may deem fit for, the recovery of the alleged misuse charges of the property, if any, from the lessee.

(7) To bring out more forcefully how the governmental action is patently arbitrary and as to how he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment without there being any justifiable basis for it the petitioner brought to our notice the higher rates of pension the P&A Officer had fixed for some other Judges of the Delhi High Court even though their overall period of service and their tenure of office as a Judge of High Court was lesser than his. While the P&A Officer has fixed the pension of the petitioner at Rs. 26,000 per annum, the very same authority had fixed the pension of Shri J.D. Jain at Rs. 46,340 and that of Shri D.R. Khanna at Rs, 44,684 per annum who had also retired as Judges of the Delhi High Court. They had put lesser periods of total service as well as service as High Court Judges. Shri J.D. Jain had put in judicial service for a period of 35 years, 7 months and 19 days including 6 years 5 months and 2 days as a Judge of the Delhi High Court. Shri D.R. Khanna had a total period of judicial service of 34 years, 10 months and 25 days including 5 years, 11 months and 28 days as a Judge of that High Court. We must confess that it surpasses our comprehension as to on what rational basis the P&A Officer deemed it just and proper to accord differential treatment to the petitioner and fixing his pension at the low figure of Rs. 26,000 when other Judges of the same High Court who had put in lesser number of years of service were held entitled to pension at much higher rates.

(8) The State Govt. of U.P. by its notification No. 14/1/39/84 Cx (1) dt. 31.5.88 has brought about a change in clause (b) of Paragraph 2 of Part Iii of the First Schedule and revised the rates of pension w.e.f. 1.1.85 in terms of the aforesaid Memorandum. Accordingly, a Judge of the Allahabad High Court Shri J.P. Chaturvedi who retired on 7.2.81 had his pension fixed at Rs. 46,100 per annum. We are given to understand that he had put in much shorter period of service as compared to the petitioner. We commend the action of U.P. Govt. in issuing a notification as above said to clarify the position and to ensure the implementation of the change brought about in Clause (b) of Paragraph 2 of Part Iii of the First Schedule and would direct all the State Governments to issue orders in similar terms.

(9) The learned Attorney General with his usual fairness frankly conceded that there is patent disparity in the pension fixed for the petitioner at Rs. 25,000. Shri Kuldeep Singh, learned Additional Sol. Gen. appearing on behalf of the Union of India assured us that the disparity would be removed as expeditiously as possible and the authorities would endeavor to pay the difference to the petitioner without delay. The learned Attorney General was kind enough to say that he would advise the Govt. to bring about party between pension drawn by petitioner and the other Judges in India.