Ramesh Provision Store vs Union Of India And Ors.
1987 Latest Caselaw 51 Del

JUDGMENT

S.S. Chadha, J.

(1) The petitioner in this petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India challenge the notification dated August 5, 1985 issued by the Government of India in modification of the earlier notification dated May 22, 1984 whereby the stock limit of sugar was fixed to 250 quintals and 10 days limit was prescribed for the disposal of the fresh stock from the receipt of fresh arrival in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966. By the impugned notification dated August 5, 1985 the stock limit is the same but the time limit for disposal of the stock has been reduced to 7 days. The impugned notification is averred as arbitrary unreasonable, impracticable, impossible to implement and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The license of the petitioner was suspended by the second impugned order dated October 28, 1985 and the petitioners seek a writ of certiorari.

(2) The petitioners are commission agents, dealers and stockists of sugar and khandsari Holding licenses to deal in such commodities under the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966. The license of the petitioners was suspended by the impugned order dated October 28, 1985 on two irregularities mentioned in the order. The first is that it was detected that the licensee has not reflected the different grades of sugar to customers in each of the cash memos issued. The second is the disposal of the sugar on two occasions within the period of 8 days instead of 7 days as prescribed. The petitioners purchased 60 quintals of sugar on August 4, 1985 and disposed of this sugar up to August 31, 1985. The second purchase of 35 quintals of sugar was made on September 20, 1985 and disposed of up to September 27, 1985. On facts, the contention of the petitioners is that they did dispose of the stocks within 7 days on both occasions as the notification uses the word from the date of the receipt and the date of the receipt has to be excluded. The notification is argued as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on various grounds.

(3) In P. P. Enterprises etc. v. Union of India and others, , a challenge was made in similar terms to an almost identical order issued on July 14, 1980 as passed under Clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966. The fixation of limit for storing sugar in Calcutta and other places was held as not arbitrary but based on reasonable classification. In the public interest, it became essential to pass the impugned order to secure its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices and to that end it became necessary to prevent hoarding and black market. The order dated July 14, 1980 also included a similar proviso that no recognised dealer shall hold any stock of vacuum pan sugar or khandsari (open pan sugar) for a period exceeding ten days from the date of receipt by him of such stock of sugar or khandsari. The prescription of time during which the stocks had to be disposed of was not argued before the Supreme Court as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such a challenge was made before another Division Bench or this Court in a batch of writ petitions, being C.W.P. 1836/85 decided on September 12, 1985. The Division Bench took the view that the whole order, both on the point of limits of stock and the time limit for which the stocks could be held, were specifically challenged but the challenge failed and it is not now open for reconsideration by this Court. The requirement of not keeping any stock beyond 7 days of the receipt was held to keep the wheels of trade moving and thus keep the price of sugar at a reasonable level. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning and view taken by the Division Bench of this Court and negative the challenge to the impugned notification.

(4) The notification dated August 5, 1985 prescribed that no recognised dealer shall hold any stock of vacuum pan sugar or khandsari (open pan sugar) for a period of 7 days from the date of receipt by him of such stock of sugar or khandsari. The question is whether in calculating the period of 7 days, the date of the receipt of the stocks is to be included or excluded. A question arose before the Supreme Court in Ham Das Gupta v. The State of West Bengal, , under West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act. It was held that in computing the period of three months from the date of detention before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention had to be made the date of commencement of detention must be excluded. It was ruled that where a. particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. It was observed :- :"....... ...The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which the act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded (see Goldsmith" s Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company, (1904) 1 Kb 1). This rule was followed in Cartwright v. Mac Cormack, (1963) 1 All Er Ii at p. 13, where the expression "fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy" in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at mid-night of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 Qb 135, a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Champman, [1951]) 2 Kb 792 and In re North, Exparte Lasluck, (1895) 2 Qb 264). Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day........."

There is a catena of authorities on the construction of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act that the word "from" is used to exclude the stated date and this principle is regarded as well-established. The provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act may not be applicable for the interpretation of the impugned notification but they do afford valuable guidance as to the method to be adopted for the purpose of computation of the time even in notification issued under the Sugar (Control) Order. In Srinivasa Silk Mills, Seshadripuram and others v. State of Mysore and others, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 117, the question arose as to the interpretation of the phrase "from". It was opined that it is well-settled principle that the word "from" is akin to "after" and that the word "from" if used for the purpose of and in reference to the computation of time, as for example, from a stated date, that stated date is prima facie excluded from computation. In Ram Nandan Singh v. Ramadhar Singh and others, , the question arose under the Bihar Panchayat Rules, 1959. The Full Bench ruled that the words "within 30 days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election". In Rule 72(2) should be so construed as to exclude the date of declaration of the result while computing the period of 30 days. The use of the word "from" from the date of the declaration of the result of the election has to be interpreted as indicating the exclusion of the date of declaration of the result of election in counting the period of 30 days.

(5) In view of the use of the words "from" the date of the receipt of the stocks, the meaning is that the date of the receipt of the stock has to be . excluded. When such a short period of 7 days has been prescribed for the disposal of the stocks, then the construction which benefits the dealer, should be given. The dealers may receive the stock in the closing hours of his working day and they have no opportunity to dispose of those stocks. The date of the receipt of the stock was thus not intended to be included in the period of 7 days.

(6) Reliance by the counsel for the respondents on Boota Mal v. Union of India, is misplaced. That case dealt with Article 31 of Limitation Act, 1908 which prescribed a period of one year when the goods ought to be delivered. It is on that construction that the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily the words of a statute have to be given their strict grammatical meaning and equitable considerations are out of place, particularly in provisions of law limiting the period of limitation for filing suits or-legal proceedings. The Supreme Court was not concerned as to whether the date on which the goods ought to be delivered was to be included or excluded in counting the period of limitation. We are not enlarging the scope of the period of 7 days prescribed in the notification but are only construing whether the date of the receipt of the stock is to be included or excluded. The word "from", in our view, is used to exclude the stated date.

(7) That takes us to the suspension order dated October 28, 1985. So far as the second irregularity is concerned, that is based on erroneous interpretation of the calculation of the period of 7 days. In our view, the petitioners have disposed of the stocks within 7 days on both occasions from the date of the receipt of stocks. As regards the first ground, it is the case of the petitioners that they had mentioned the grade of sugar in the stock register and also on the stock board exhibited for the public outside the shop and since there was only one grade of sugar and that grade of sugar was exhibited on the stock board as well as in the stock register, the petitioners have not committed any irregularity. Apart from it, the Delhi Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963 Form 'B' requires the licensee to issue cash memos to the customers. The provision is :- "THE licensee shall issue to every customer a correct receipt or invoice as the case may be giving his name, address, his license number, the name, address, the license number (if any) of the customer, the date of transaction, the quantity sold, the price per quintal and the total amount charged and shall keep a duplicate of the same to be available for inspection on demand by the Commissioner or the authorised officer authorised by him in this behalf."

It has not been brought to our notice that there is any prescription that the licensee had to reflect the different grades of sugar to customers on the cash memos. Apart from it, it is minor irregularity and could not form the basis of ordering the suspension of the sugar license of the petitioners.

(8) A preliminary objection was taken that the petitioners have an alternative remedy and should have availed of the same. Since the question of vires of the two notifications dated May 22, 1984 and August 5, 1985 was raised we heard the writ petition on merits.

(9) Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned suspension order dated October 28, 1985 is hereby quashed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.