Trade Fair Authority Of India And ... vs Amarnath Bhatia And Anr.
1986 Latest Caselaw 238 Del

JUDGMENT

D.K. Kapur, C.J.

(1) This Lpa raises the same points that were raised in some other writ petitions decided by the Division Bench in SD. Sharma v. Trade Fair Authority 1985 Slr 670. The employees of the Trade Fair Authority bad filed writ petitions to challenge their removal from service in almost exactly the same circumstances as in the case of Amar Nath Bhatia the respondent in this case. There was a meeting or demonstration held on 3.2.81 by the employees of the Trade Fair Authority in which certain speeches were made. Shri S.D. Sharma was one of the speakers.

(2) There was a news item on 4.2.81 in the Patriot. There was an enquiry which led to the removal from service of Shri S.D. Sharma. An appeal to the Managing Director failed. Then a writ petition was filed. There were some other employees who similarly filed petitions. In the Division Bench judgment the conclusions were as follows :

(I)the charges had been proved against the petitioner ;

(II)the Trade Fair Authority was 'State' within the meaning of Articles 12 and amenable to the jurisdiction of the court.

(III)the employees of the Trade Fair Authority were in public employment and hence adverse action could not be taken against them without following the principles of natural justice and fair hearing had to be granted such as right to cross- examine etc.

(3) Any employee whose services had been illegally terminated was entitled to be reinstated. In the result the petitions were allowed.

(4) Learned counsel for the appellant states that the present case is distinguishable. However, it may at may at once be stated that in the present case the writ petition is based on the termination of the service of Mr. Bhatia for addressing a speech on 5-2-81. But it appears that the meeting was in fact the same, though the date seems to be different in the charge. The article of charge which appears as Annexure-K. to the writ petition filed by the respondent was to the effect that he also spoke at the meeting of the employees of the Trade Fair Authority although he was an officer of the Authority. The case of the respondent was that he was the Secretary of the Officers Association and he spoke in that capacity and did not say anything in support of the employees' demand.

(5) In any event, the writ petition of the respondent was decided by Wad, J. by the judgment under appeal of 29th July, 1982. It was earlier than the decision of the Division Bench in S.D. Sharma v. Trade Fair Authority, 1985(1) Slr 670. It was held in that judgment that the writ petition was maintainable because the Trade Fair Authority was amenable to writ jurisdiction being an authority in the nature of a 'State'. The Court observed that the authority was an instrumentality of the State or an authority within the meaning of Article 226 or Article 12 of the Constitution.

(6) On the merits, it was held that Rule 5(21) of the Conduct Rules was not infringed. The reason for this conclusion. Rule 5(21), which reads as follows.'

"HOLDINGmeeting, demonstration, slogan shouting, etc. within the premises of the Authority without the permission of the Chairman" did not apply to Mr. Bhatia. For one thing he did not hold the meeting. He merely happened to be present at the meeting organized by the Staff Association. He was the Secretary of the Officers Association. For some reason he spoke at the meeting but that was not the same thing as holding a meeting or holding a demonstration or shouting slogans. The learned single Judge observed:

"THE petitioner was President of the Staff Association when he was in Govt. service. After he joined the Trade Fair Authority of India he became the Secretary of the Officers' Association. Termination of the services of about 25 years (out of which 21 years service is the Govt. service) on a flimsy ground of an innocent appeal meeting of the Staff Association smacks of victimisation for the petitioner for being an office bearer of another Association. Termination of service was an extreme penalty totally unwarranted on the facts of the present case."

(7) Thus, conclusion of the learned single Judge was that Mr. Bhatia never held any meeting because he was not a member of the Association which was holding the meeting and there was a total absence of application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case by the disciplinary authority. The learned single Judge also held that the procedure to be followed in the matter of imposing major penalties had not been followed in the case. Concerning this, the learned single Judge observed that in fact the petitioner-respondent had pleaded guilty by confessing that he spoke at the meeting. But this is, in fact, not so. Mr. Bhatia never contested the fact that he addressed the meeting but not as a participant at the meeting but in a different capacity.

(8) All he stated was as follows : "THATofficers' Association has not taken any decision on your demand/stand and I also advised them to be peaceful and adopt cooperative attitude with the management."

(9) A mere admission of making a speech is not the same thing as admitting a mis-conduct. The conclusion as to why this statement amounts to misconduct which could lead to termination of the services of the employee is a question which has to be decided by the authority but was not decided. We are inclined to accept the conclusion of the learned single Judge that the making of statement of this type cannot be said to be a misconduct within the meaning of Rule 5(21). As observed in the other judgment i.e. the judgment of the Division Bench in S.D.Sharma's case those employees had held a meeting and the Bench had found that there was a misconduct but the Bench found that they had a fundamental right to hold the meeting. In the present case the Court has held that there was no misconduct.

(10) It will thus be seen that the preset case is more strong in favor of the respondent than was S.D.Sharma's case in favor of that petitioner. In that case i.e. the members of the staff association had held a meeting. In the present case the petitioner had addressed the meeting and the address was also most innocuous and rather more of explanation. We are, therefore, fully convinced that the judgment of the Division Bench in S.D. Sharma has to apply and therefore the judgment of the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition of the respondent-petitioner is fully justified and has to be upheld and accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs.