Murti Shri Radha Krishanji ... vs Jug Lal And Anr.
1986 Latest Caselaw 153 Del

JUDGMENT

B.N. Kirpal, J.

(1) In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution the challenge is to the decision of the Lt. Governor, Delhi, who held that proceedings initiated by the petitioner herein under the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act were barred by principles of res judicata.

(2) Briefly stated, the facts are that the petitioner filed a suit under section 77(3) (e) and (n) of the Punjab Tendency Act, 1887 for ejectment of Respondent No. I from Killa No. 2, Rectangle No. 43, measuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas situated in Village Daryapur Kalan and also for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 288.00 as arrears of rent for the years 1961-62 to 1963-64. In the said proceedings it was alleged that the land in question was exempted from the operation of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. The petitioner who had filed the proceedings contended that he was the Pujari and Manager of the temple Murti Shri Radha Krishan Ji Bhagwan, Mandir Shri Radha Krishan.

(3) The respondent, in his reply, raised a preliminary objection. The contention of the respondent was that the petitioner herein, had earlier filed a civil suit wherein similar prayers had been made. That suit had been dismissed and, therefore, principles of res judicata applied. In answer to this. the submission of the petitioner herein was that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to try that suit which had been instituted by the petitioner and, therefore, the decision of the civil court was a nullity and as such, the principles of res judicata were not attracted.

(4) The Revenue Assistant vide her order dated 16th June, 1970 upheld the preliminary objection and came to the conclusion that the suit filed under Section 44 of the Punjab Tenancy Act was barred on the principles of res judicata.

(5) The petitioner filed a first appeal. By order dated 3rd June, 1972, the Additional Collector, Delhi allowed the appeal and held that the civil courts could not entertain the suit in view of the provisions of Section 77(3) clauses (e) and (n) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, and as such, that decision was a nullity and, therefore, the principles of res judicata did not apply. The Additional Collector remanded the case to the Revenue Assistant for decision on merits.

(6) Being aggrieved, the Respondent No. I herein filed a second appeal to the Lt. Governor of Delhi. By order dated 9th November, 1972, it was held by the Lt. Governor that the petitioner herein was neither the Chela nor the Pujari of the temple and as such he had no locus standi to maintain the suit on behalf of the petitioner. It had further been held that there was no relationship between the parties of landlord and the tenant and as such, the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit. According to the Lt. Governor, the principles of res judicata barred the present proceedings and if the petitioner had any grievance he ought to have filed an appeal against the decision of the civil court.

(7) It is the aforesaid decision of the Lt. Governor which is challenged in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Section 77C3) (e) and (n) of the Punjab Tenancy Act reads as under :- "(3) The following suits shall be instituted in, and heard arid determined by, Revenue Courts, and no other Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which any such suit might be instituted : (e) Suits by a landlord to eject a tenant; (n) Suits by a landlord for arrears of rent or the money-equivalent of rent. or for sums recoverable under Section 14 (or suits for the recovery of such arrears of sums by any other person to whom a right to recover the same has been sold or otherwise transferred)."

(8) There can be no doubt that where proceedings can be taken under Section 77 the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred. Sub-clauses (e) and (n) specifically empower the landlord to initiate proceedings for ejectment of tenant and for recovery of rent. As such proceedings can be initiated by the landlord for ejectment and for recovery of rent not before the civil court but only under Section 77 of the Act. Where, however, proceedings are sought to be initiated by a person who is not a landlord, then obviously Section 77 can have no application.

(9) A landlord is a person who has a right to recover rent from the tenant. If there is no relationship between the parties of the landlord and the tenant, then a person cannot take recourse to the proceedings under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. In the present case, it is the petitioner herein who filed a suit against Respondent No. 1. -In that suit the Subordinate Judge gave a finding to the effect that the petitioner was not a landlord of the respondent. This finding could be riven by the civil court. There is no provision under Section 77 which ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question as to whether the petitioner was a landlord of the respondent or not. Having found that the petitioner is not a landlord, the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the suit.

(10) The Legislature was obviously conscious that situations may arise wherein a civil suit the court may form an opinion that some questions arise which can only be decided under the provisions of Section 77. It is precisely for this reason that in first proviso to Section 77(3) power is given to the court (hat. when any such question arises, it should refer that question to the Revenue Court. Therefore, if in the suit which had been filed by the petitioner, the Subordinate Judge had come to the conclusion that relationship of landlord and the tenant existed, then I am sure the Subordinate Judge would have taken recourse to the provisions of Section 77(3) proviso (1) and would then have referred the matter to the revenue court. As already mentioned, the conclusion which was arrived at by the Subordinate Judge was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. This being so, the provisions of Section 77(3)(c) and (n) did not apply and as such there would have been no occasion to refer the matter to the revenue court.

(11) From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that the civil court had the jurisdiction to decide the question as to the relationship between the parties and having come to the conclusion that petitioner was not a landlord, the civil court had the jurisdiction to decide whether it was entitled to the recovery of possession or of rent from the respondent. All these questions having been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, then applying the principles of res judicata, the Lt. Governor was right in coming to the conclusion that the present proceedings initiated under Section 77 by the petitioner herein were invalid.

(12) For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is dismissed with costs.