S. Sharma vs M.L. Sawhney And Ors.
1980 Latest Caselaw 237 Del

JUDGMENT

M.L. Jain, J.

(1) The facts of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution are that the petitioner took the house in dispute on rent of Rs. 1100.00 p. m. for a period of 2 years on January 25, 1975, after the permission from the Rent Controller for a limited tenancy was obtained. This limited tenancy was extended by another two years on the basis of a similar permission. At the end of the second term, the landlord-respondent moved an application on May 10, 1979 before the Controller under Order 21 Rule 11 for recovery of possession. Several objections were raised by the tenant against eviction. The main stand now taken by him is that the limited tenancy was fradulent and obtained by misrepresentation and that the petitioner was not a limited tenant but a tenant who cannot be evicted otherwise than on the grounds stated in the proviso to Sub-section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (herein the Act).

(2) During the recovery proceedings the landlord made an application on July 24, 1979 that the petitioner had not paid rent since December 10, 1978 and that he be directed to deposit the entire arrears of rent/damages tending the disposal of his objections. The Rent Controller was of the view that such an application was not maintainable under Sub-section (1) or Subsection (2) of Section 15 of the Act but can be considered as an application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. He, therefore, by his order of February 2, 1979 directed the petitioner to pay or deposit arrears of rent from December 10, 1978, to the last date of month of tenancy at the rate of Rs. 1100.00 p. m. within one month and to continue to pay future rent at the said rate from month to month by 15th of succeeding month. In case the order is not complied with, the objections filed by the respondent shall be deemed to have been dismissed. Hence the present petition.

(3) It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 151 cannot be invoked because the respondent can recover his rent through the alternative remedy of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent. Nor has the respondent been able to show that any manifest injustice has occurred so as to invite application of Section 151 G. P. G. The Act cannot be circumvented by resort to Section 151 G.P.C. The order was therefore, without jurisdiction and this court is entitled to intervene under its supervisory jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution.

(4) After consideration, it appears to me that the order can be covered by Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act because the recovery of possession is on the basis of a ground other than the one mentioned in Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. It cannot be said that the said Sub-section (2) is confined only to the grounds given in Section 14 of the Act. There is also no difficulty in holding that upon failure of the payment, defense against eviction u/s 21 of the Act, can be struck out under Section 15(7). If one is not prepared to extend the construction of the said Sub-section (2) to cover the recovery of possession in virtue of Section 21of the Act, then the Controller could make the impugned order in the exercise of his inherent jurisdiction, recognised at least in some respects in Gurditta Mal v. Prabhat Kumar, 1980 R. L. R. 136, Moreover, under Section 42 of the Act, the Controller, is a Civil Court for the purposes of execution and can legitimately resort to Section 151 C. P. C. whenever he finds that ends of justice do so require. The petitioner is not only challenging the limited tenency which he could obtain only because it was a limited one but has also refused to pay the rents which he is bound to pay and instead, wants the landlord to file a suit for recovery thereof. This is manifestly unjust and the jurisdiction under Section 151 too has been correctly exercised by the Controller. Even otherwise. It is an attitude which cannot be supported in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The order in so far as it directs payment or deposit of arrears of rent is innocuous. It hurts only in that part which provides for the consequences in the event of its non-compliance. I think the Controller was perfectly justified in order to ensure that his order is complied with, to refuse to hear the petitioner if he failed to make the payment.

(5) I, therefore see no force in this petition. It is hereby dismissed. No costs.