Mohanvi Corporation (P.) Ltd. vs Life Insurance Corporation Of ...
1971 Latest Caselaw 225 Del

JUDGMENT

B.C. Misra, J.

1. This second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act has been filed by the tenant against the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 11th March, 1971, by which it dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the Additional Controller dated 25th September, 1970, passed under Section 15(1) of the Rent Control Act directing the tenant to deposit arrears of rent and future rent as mentioned in the impugned order.

2. The appellant before me is a tenant of the respondent on a rent of Rs. 2,145 per month excluding of water and electricity charges and they fell into arrears of rent for a number of years for which some suits had been instituted and decreed. The period for which the rent is said to be in arrears in this case commences on 1st February, 1968. The landlord served a notice on the respondent on 4th June, 1968, which was delivered to the tenant on 11th June, 1968, by which arrears of rent were demanded and the construction and validity of the said notice is in dispute before me. Not finding a response to the notice, the landlord-respondent instituted a petition for eviction on 15th May, 1970, on the ground of non-payment of rent mentioned in Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Rent Control Act. The tenant has resisted the said petition on various grounds including that no valid notice of demand and terminating the contractual tenancy has been served. The Additional Controller, on 23rd September, 1970, after hearing both the parties, passed an order directing the tenant to pay all arrears of rent due with effect from 1st February, 1968, at the rate of Rs. 2,145 per month within a period of one month from the date of the order and also pay future monthly rent in accordance with law.

3. Aggrieved by the said order, the tenant filed an appeal before the Tribunal which failed and the tenant has challenged the validity of the notice in appeal in this court.

4. The ground of attack against the notice is that it purports to be a notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act of 1956 for holding the company to be unable to pay its debts and thereafter instituting proceedings for its winding-up on the grounds mentioned in Clause (c) of Section 433 of the Companies Act and that there is no notice that, in default of payment in response to the notice, any proceedings for eviction of the tenant will be instituted before the Controller under the Rent Act.

5. I have perused the notice. It is addressed to the tenant and has been issued under the instructions of the respondents by his counsel and after reciting the brief facts relating to the previous arrears of rent and pendency of suits between the parties, the notice proceeds to state that the tenant had not paid the rent in spite of repeated demands and requests and their contractual tenancy stood terminated by the end of June, 1968, and the tenant was required to deliver peaceful possession of the premises by the said date. It is further stated in the notice that the counsel had been further instructed to give notice that without prejudice to the rights in the pending suits, if the aforesaid rent was not paid within three weeks of the receipt of notice, it would be deemed that the tenant was unable to pay the debts as contemplated under Section 433(c) of the Companies Act and the notice was requested to be treated as notice under Section 434 of the Act and it was finally intimated that on failure to pay the aforesaid amount within the stipulated period, the landlord would be constrained to move the court for winding up of the tenant-company under the Companies Act.

6. It is obvious that the notice does not clearly indicate that in default of payment, the landlord will institute proceedings for eviction before the Controller under the Rent Act, but there is no doubt that the landlord had terminated the contractual tenancy and had required the tenant to deliver up peaceful possession of the premises on the termination of the period of notice. There is again no doubt that the arrears of rent due had been clearly demanded from the tenant. The liability of the tenant has been fixed by Section 26 of the Rent Act which lays down that every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by the contract or, in the absence of such contract, by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. Section 27 further prescribes that if the landlord does not accept the tendered amount, it is the duty of the tenant to deposit the same before the Controller in accordance with the prescribed procedure and the landlord is enabled to recover the same without prejudice to his rights and contentions. Ordinarily, under the Transfer of Property Act, the landlord will be entitled to institute a suit for eviction of the tenant on his failure to pay the arrears of rent, but Section 14(1) of the Rent Act has created a bar against the eviction of the tenant notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract. A proviso has been, however, added that he would be able to obtain possession of the premises if the Controller comes to the conclusion with regard to the correctness of one or more of the grounds mentioned in the clauses in the proviso. Clause (a) of the said proviso provides for a situation where the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which notice of demand for arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The requirement of the clause is, therefore, only service of notice of demand and there is no provision that the notice must also indicate the consequence of the failure of the tenant to pay rent in response to the notice. Consequences are provided by the statute itself. Should the tenant not pay the rent legally due within two months of the date of service of the notice, he loses protection and becomes liable to eviction under Clause (a), subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. Section 15 of the Act makes a further provision to enable the tenant to pay the arrears of rent in accordance with the order of the Controller at his peril of the consequences provided in Sub-section (6) and Sub-section (7) of Section 15 as well as the consequences provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. As a result, it cannot be held that a notice of demand referred to in Clause (a) of the proviso must contain any indication of the steps the landlord would take in default of compliance with the notice. The duty of the tenant is clearly to continue to pay rent in accordance with Section 26 and notice of demand is served only as a reminder of the duty and if he fails to pay the rent in spite of service of such notice, he renders himself liable to eviction not on account of intention of notice, but on account of the provisions of law contained in the Rent Control Act. Again, it cannot be seriously contended that the landlord cannot serve a composite notice of demand along with a notice to quit or with a notice of non-payment of debt provided in Section 434 of the Companies Act and no infirmity can be found with the notice if it is a composite notice to express intention of the landlord to take steps to recover his dues by any one or more of the various legal proceedings open to the landlord to initiate. The impugned notice is, therefore, valid.

7. I may also observe that the question of validity of notice is not to be determined at the stage of passing of an order under Section 15(1) of the Rent Act which the Controller is really bound to pass under Sub-section (1) of Section 15 as soon as a petition for eviction has been filed on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The question of its validity really arises when after the said order, the court determines whether or not the tenant is liable to eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of the Rent Control Act. In any view of the matter, no infirmity can be found with the impugned order and the appeal is consequently dismissed. I, however, find that the time allowed by the Additional Controller by his order dated 23rd September, 1970, has already expired and, in the interests of justice, I allow time to the appellant till 12th September, 1971, to comply with the order of the Additional Controller passed under Section 15(1) of the Act. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.