A.C. Manna And Anr. vs Toti Devi
1970 Latest Caselaw 190 Del

JUDGMENT

B.C. Misra, J.

(1) This second appeal under section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 ha. been filed by the tenants and is directed against the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunl dated 27th December, 1955 by which the Tribunal reversed the order of the Additional Controller dated 25th March, 1965 and finally ordered eviction of the tenants appellants before me on the ground that they had acquired vacant posossion of other residence and were liable to eviction under clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Rent Act.

(2) The brief facts of the case are that the property in dispute is situated in Nawab Ganj, Delhi which was allotted to Shri A.K.Manna predecessor-n-interest of the appellants before me by custodion of Evacuees property, on a rent of Rs.4 88 per month and they had been residing there since 1947. Later on the ownership of the said property was transferred to Smt.TotiDevi, respondent before me, in adjustment of her claims with effect from 1st of October, 1955, although the formal documents in this respept were drawn up sometime in 1962. A letter of attornment in favor of the respondent was issued by the Rehabilitation Authorities on 28th December, 1960 (Exhibit A 2) which has been proved on the record, but the receipt of which is denied by the appellants.

(3) It appears that Shri A K.Manna, predecessor-ini-nterest of the appellants, purchased some piece of land in Karkari village in Shahdara, Dehli in the year 1957 and he constructed a small tenament of two rooms which were let out to two tenants This fact is admitted as well as established on the record of the case. On 8th June, 1962 Shri A. K. Manna died and he was succeeded by his son and widow (appellants betore me) who by operation of law, became tenants of the respondent. Eventually, on 15th September, 1964 the respondent instituted a petition for eviction which has given rise to this appeal. The eviction was sought on the ground mentioned in clause h'of the relevant provisions.

(4) The defense taken up by the appellants was that it was A, K.Manna who waS the-previons tenant and who had built the premises in village Shahdara and that on his death a new tenancy commenced in favor of the appellants and the appellants had not built or acquired possession of any residence at allatter the commencement of their tenancy. It is significant to notice that no other defense by way of acquiescence or estoppel or the unsuitability of the other residential other premises had .been taken in the written statement of the appellants, nor has any such plea been raised or pressed before me.

(5) The Additional Controller accepted the contention of the appellants and had that on a construction of section 14(1) clause (h) of the Rent Act tennts who were sougth to be evicted, namely the apellant before me, hal not acquared vacant possession of any residence and were, therefore, not liable to eviction.

(6) On appeal, the Tribunal came to a countary conclusionand it held that the word ''tenant'' included the legal representatives of the that and the moment the predecissor of the appellant had come within the ambit of clause(i) of the Act,he was iable to eviction and this liability could not be avoided by the death of thr tenant and it continued to attach to the claim of the tenants for continuance in possession of the premises in dispute.

(7) , counsel for the appellants appearing before me has raised the following contentions viz. (1). On a construction of clause (h) of the provisp to sab-section ( 1) of section 10, the legal representatives of the deceased-tenant cannot be visited with the penalty of forfeitare incurred by the tenant during his lifetime. (2) The appellants. who were the tenants by operation of law and who were sought to be evicted were not the persons who had acquired vacant possession of or built other residence and they had not contravened clause (h) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 14 of the Rent Act and (3) the word "acquired" connotes transfer inter vivos and does not cover the case of inheritance of the property from the deceased.

(8) I am unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants. The word ' tenant" defined in clause (L) of section 2 of the Act means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is or but for a special contract would bepayable. This definition would naturally embrace within its fold the legal repesentatives of the deceased-tenant. Any other construction would lead to absurd results as death of the tenant, either during the pendency of the proceedings or prior to their institution, would bring about extinguishment of all his rights and obligations in the tenanted premises as well as result in termination of the proceedings to which the tenant was a party and would make the administration of justice impossible. The rights of the tenant are' rights pertaining to the property and, therefore, they would survive after his death and would normally be heritable. To support the proposition that the word "tenant" in the Rent Act includes tenants whose tenancy has expired as well as the legal representatives of those who have died, reference may be made to Sham Sunder v. Ram Dos. Brock and others v. Vollams and Nihal Chand v. Shiv Narain. Consequently, the rights and obligations of the tenant would devolve on bids legal heirs normally subject to the exceptions carved out in respect of statutory tenants, whose contractual tenancy had expired. I am, however, not expressing any opinion on the rights and obligations of the statutory tenants as on the facts of the case before me, it has been assumed that the contractual tenancy of A. K. Manna had not been terminated. Applying this definition to the word "tenant" in section 14 as well as the proviso, it would follow that the word "tenant" includes the legal representatives of the tenant and the one expression does not exclude the other. The submission of the learned counsel that the word "tenant" occurring in clause (h) means and refers to the tenant who is sought to be evicted and the default committed by his predecessor-in-interest from whom he has inherited the rights in the property, cannot be visited upon him, is devoid of any force. .In cafe the predecessor-in-interest had committed forfeiture of the tenancy and was, therefore, liable to eviction, the same would be visited on his legal representatives as well and it is no defense on their part to say that they are entitled to the protection of the Rent Act against eviction while it was their father who incurred the forfeiture; since the legal representatives in law represent the estate left by the deceased, they can, on succession, not acquire any higher rights than possessed by him.

(9) At one time there was a difference of opinion on the question as to whether forfeiture of the lease should be continuous till the date of the proceedings for eviction or if once, it had been incurred, it was finally enforceable against the tenant. In Gugan Mal v. Messrs Moti Lal Chand Mal it was held that if an alleged breach had occurred during the time of previous landlord the transferee landlord was not entitled to obtain eviction on the said ground but this judgment was expressly disapproved by a Division Bench of the game High Court in Pritam Singh v. Raja Ram. In another judgment reported as Navrang Lal v. Suresh Kumar it. was held that once a tenant had incurred forfeiture of his right to remain in possession of the property on account of his committing any of the acts mentionad in the proviso, for which he was liable to eviction, the claim for eviction could not be resisted by attoning for the wrong, and the wrong need not be subsisting on the date of action.

(10) In the case before me, it has not been pleaded or urged that the appellants who are the legal representatives of the decersed-tenent, obtained any fresh letting under any new contract of tenancy and it has been admitted that it was only by the death of A.K Manna that his wife and son became tenants by operation of law As such, no question of fresh contrast of tenancy arises and the case is governed by sections 108 and 109 of the Transfer of property Act It. therefore, follows that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is not tenable I am, however, of the view that the appellants who stepped into the shoes of the deceased are, under the circumstances of the case, subject to the same rights and habitities as the deceased was

(11) With regard to the second contention, I am of the view that it follows as a corollary from the first submission of the learned counsel and falls with it If it bs held that the appellants are fresh tenants and there Was a fresh contract of tenancy then it would bs reasonable to infer that it is not they who has acquired any residential premises. But if the appellants have inherited existing rights in the property, they must vicariously suffer the liabilities foisted on the deceased tenant. Lastly the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the word "acquired" does not apaly to the case of inheritance. In Shyam Sunder v Khan Chand the Court noticed a judgment of Jindra Lal J in Des Raj Goyal v. Satva Parkash Gupta S. A. 0. No, 21. 7-D. of 1964. decided on 26th October, 1964, wherein his Lordship defined the scope of the word "acquired" and held that it had the widest amplitude. Similarly in Jai Kunar v. Sardar Begum (S. A O N) 79-0 of 1966 decided on 12th December, 1967), 1968 Delhi High Court notes 7, the meaning of the word "acquired''has been explained. However, in my opinion, the said point does not arise for determination in this case, as the findings of the Court below are that the deceased tenants built the property and let it out to two tenants and after his death the appellants who inherited the property also themselves let out one portion which fell vacant after the appellants had become its owners. This would bring the case within the mischief of Clause 'h' of the proviso to sub-section 11 section 14 of the Act, considered from any point of view, there is no merit in the appeal as a result, I dismissed appeal. There will be no order as to costs. I, however, allow three months' time to the appellants to vacate the premises.