The State Of Haryana vs The Delhi Administration And Ors.
1967 Latest Caselaw 173 Del

ORDER

1. The State Haryana as sucessor to the State of Punjab is the petitioner in this writ petition which the Delhi Administration is the first respondent.

2. The petition avers that in 1950 an agreement was entered into between the Government of Punjab and Delhi to run public service vehicles between the two State on joint routes of which one of the terminal stands would be in Delhi and the toher terminal stand in some town in Punjab. According to this agreement, the permits issued by one State were to be countersigned by the toher State there by providing facilities in matters of transport to the public in the territories of btoh the State and this agreement became operative from January 1951. It is further averred that antoher agreement was concluded between the two State on 25-7-1956 whereby it was agreed between them that the State of Punjab would have the right to extend its services on inter-State routes, agreed upon between the parties, to any town in the State of Punjab and this agreement has remained in force ever since and it was respected and recoginsed by btoh the parties.

Pursuant to these agreements, buses have been plying between Delhi and places in Punjab on the basis of inter-State permits issued by the Transport Authority of one State and countersigned by the Transport Authority of the toher State and the services operating on such routes have been extended to toher towns in Punjab by means of different and independent permits granted by the transport authority of Punjab fir the routes between the terminals of the inter-State permits and such toher towns, in Punjab. One such route is Karnal-Delhi operated by the Punjab Roadways (now Haryana Roadways) and the extended service is between Karnal and Chandigarh covered by an independent permit granted by the transport authority of Punjab. In the case of Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways), every permit granted for its operation was for a service of Stage Carriage and the whole fleet of a unit is entered on that permit and the permit is nto for an individual vehicle. Thus, on the permit issued for the inter-State route of Karnal-Delhi, the whole fleet of buses of Chandigarh depto of the Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways) is entitled and similarly on the permit issued by the transport authority of Punjab for the route Karnal-Chandigarh, the whole fleet of buses of the Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways) of the Chandigarh depto was entered so that anyone of the said fleet can run between Karnal and Delhi, and Karnal and Chandigarh, and, therefore, the same bus which runs between Delhi and Karnal can continue to run from Karnal and Chandigarh.

Pursuant to these two permits, viz., the inter-State permit from Karnal to Delhi and the Punjab permit from Karnal to Chandigarh and in view of the facilities afforded by the whole fleet of the Chandigarh depto of the Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways) being entered on each of the said two permits. The Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways) started operating the same bus from Delhi to Karnal and from Karnal to Chandigarh by issuing through tickets at Delhi, to enable passengers to travel from Delhi to Chandigarh direct. The further allegation contained in the petition is that feeling offended on the non-acceptance of certain demands of Delhi Administration by the State of Punjab and instigated by the private operator of buses in the Union Territory of Delhi, the Delhi Transport authorities resolved to go back on the terms of the agreement arrived at between the two States of Punjab and Delhi on 25-7-1956 and approached the Inter-State Transport Commission, New Delhi, for interference.

3. The Inter-State Transport Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) on 27-8-1966 gave its 'advice' under Section 63A(2)(b) and according to that 'advice': "It would nto be in order if one vehicle operating on two permits for two routes were to book direct passengers traveling on btoh the routes on direct tickets for places on btoh the routes. Operations which would contravene this advise should be stopped and the services be so regulated to ensure that the provisions of the Mtoor Vehicles Act are nto violated."

4. Aggrieved by this 'advice' the State of Punjab preferred an appeal to the Inter-State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) under Rule 24 of the Inter-State Transport Commission Rules, 1960 and by an order dated 4-7-1967, the said appeal was dismissed. The petitioner herein has filed the present writ petition praying for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Commission and the Tribunal dated 27-8-1966 and 4-7-1967 respectively and for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the first respondent herein nto to interfere with the passenger transport vehicles of the petitioner running on the Delhi Haryana Inter-State routes on the ground of issue of direct tickets beyond the terminal stations in Haryana on these Inter-State routes.

5. Before we refer to the case of the first respondent as contained in the counter-affidavit filed on its behalf, it is desirable to mention two further facts. One is that the permits issued on the Inter-State routes by the State of Punjab have been countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Delhi, and by way of illustration. We may refer to the terms of the countersignature dated 31-7-1967 made on the permit for the route Karnal-Delhi granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Ambala, and the said terms are :-- "Countersigned for the portion of the route Delhi-Karnal from 31-7-1967 to 30-11-1967 subject to the conditions that ticket will be issued for the destinations between Delhi and Karnal. Destination board should be exhibited. Bus will cover the full route and all toher conditions applicable under Mtoor Vehicle Laws."

The second is that before the Commission and the Tribunal, a contention was put forward on behalf of the first respondent herein that the agreement dated 25-7-1956 was nto valid and enforceable and though the Commission itself did nto pronounce any opinion on this contention the Tribunal pointed out that the said agreement was subject to ratification by the respective Governments, but was nto ratified, at any rate, on the point in question, nor it compiled with the provision of Article 299 of the Constitution. In the petition before us, a ground was taken challenging this view of the Tribunal, but no argument was advanced before us on this issue and, therefore, we need nto take any further ntoice of the same. Again, the conclusions of the Commission and the Tribunal were nto based on the terms of any agreement between the parties, but on their view of the law in this behalf.

6. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent, certain preliminary objections were taken and also the claim of the petitioner was contested on merits. The first preliminary objection was that the Commission and the Tribunal had acted in an advisory capacity and no right of the petitioner had been infringed by the impugned orders, and consequently, no writ petition would lie. The second preliminary objection was that the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is nto acting as a Court of Appeal and there is no infirmity in the impugned orders and it cannto be said that the conclusion reached by the Commission and the Tribunal is perverse or manifestly illegal. On merits, it is contended in the counter-affidavit that the issue of tickets up to the last terminal point only is a condition of the permit and if the inter-State permit duly counter-signed is valid only for the inter-State route from Delhi to Karnal for instance, the owner of the transport vehicle cannto issue a ticket from Delhi to a place beyond Karnal merely because he accidentally happens to be in possession of an inter-State permit from Karnal to Chandigarh One further contention in the counter-affidavit was based on Rule 5.55A of the Delhi Mtoor Vehicles Rules, 1940, requiring the vehicles to display a route-Board enabling the starting place and destination to be read by any person approaching the vehicle and it was claimed that in the case of inter-State routes like Delhi to Karnal, the board should read "Delhi-Karnal" or vice-versa "Karnal-Delhi" with regard to this contention also. We need nto take any further ntoice, since Shri Anand Swaroop, appearing for the petitioner, did nto raise any point in relation to the display of destination board.

7. The real controversy between the parties seems to be the question regarding the issue of direct tickets by the Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways) from Delhi to a place in Haryana beyond the terminal station of the inter-State permit for instance, from Delhi to Chandigarh with reference to the inter-State permit from Karnal to Delhi.

8. For the purpose of understanding the rival contentions put forward by the learned counsel on btoh the sides, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Mtoor Vehicles Act (Act No. Iv of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 2 (20) defines "permit" as the document issued by the Commission or the Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage or stage carriage, or authorising the owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle. Section 2(29) defines "stage carriage" as a mtoor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey Chapter Iv of the Act deals with the control of transport vehicles. The first section of this Chapter viz, Section 42 requires that no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or counter-signed by a Regional Transport Authority or the Commission.

Section 46 states that an application for a permit in respect of a service of stage carriage or to use a particular mtoor vehicle shall contain the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates as one of the particulars Section 48 dealing with the grant of stage carriage permits, in sub-section (1), thereof, provides that a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. The proviso to this sub-section stipulates that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area nto specified in the application. Sub-section (2) of this Section prescribes that every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for a specified route or routes or for a specified area. Sub-section (3) of this Section states that the Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of a stage carriage of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages and may subject to any rule that may be made under the Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the conditions enumerated therein.

One such condition, i.e. Section 48(3) (xiv) is as follows: "that tickets bearing specified particulars shall be issued to passengers and shall show the fares actually charged and that records of tickets issued shall be kept in a specified manner."

Section 57 of the Act details the procedure in applying for and granting permits and sub-section (8) is as follows:

"An application to vary the condition of any permit, toher than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes on a new area or in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as a an application for the grant of a new permit:

Provided that it shall nto be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles."

Section 50 of the Act dealing with the general conditions attaching to all permits in sub-section (2) thereof, enumerates six conditions of every permit. Section 60 deals with the cancellation and suspension of permits Section 63 deals with the validation of permits for use outside regions in which they are granted Sub-section (1) of this section excluding the provision which is unnecessary for the purpose of this case, is as follows: "Except as may be toherwise prescribed, a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region shall nto be valid in any toher region, unless the permit has been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that toher region, and a permit granted in any one State shall nto be valid on any toher State unless countersigned by the State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned."

Sub-section (2) of this Section is as follows: "A Regional Transport Authority when countersigning the permit may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit and may likewise vary any condition attached to the permit by the authority by which the permit was a granted."

Sub-section (3) of Section 63 states that the provisions of Chapter Iv of the Act relating to the grant, revocation and suspension of permit shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension of countersignatures of permits and it contains a proviso which it is unnecessary to refer to for the purpose of this case. S. 63-A deals with the constitution and functions of the Inter-State Transport Commission. Sub-section (1) of this Section enables the Central Government by a ntoification in the Official Gazette to constitute Inter-State Transport Commission consisting of a Chairman and such toher members, nto being less than two, as it thinks fit to appoint for the purpose of developing, co-ordinating and regulating the operation of transport vehicles in respect of any area or route common to two or more states (referred to as inter-State region) and performing such toher functions as may be prescribed under Section 63-C. Sub-section (2) of this Section is as follows:

"The Commission shall perform throughout an inter-State region all or such of the following functions as it may be authorised to do by the Central Government by ntoification in the official Gazette, namely:

(a) to prepare schemes for the development, co-ordination of regulation of the operation of transport vehicles and in particular of goods vehicles in an inter-State region:

(b) to settle all disputes and decide all matters on which differences of opinion arise in connection with the development, co-ordination or regulation of the operation of transport vehicles in an inter-Stage region:

(c) to issue directions to the State Transport Authorities or Regional Transport Authorities interested, regarding the grant, revocation and suspension of permits and of counter-signatures of permits for the operation of transport vehicles in respect of any route or area common to two or more States:

(d) to grant, revoke or suspend any permit or countersign any permit for the operation of any transport vehicle in respect of such route or area common to two or more States as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government:

(e) to perform such toher functions as may be prescribed by the Central Government under Section 63-C."

Sub-section (3) provides that for the purpose of assisting the Commission in the performance of its functions in relation to any area or route common to two or more States, the Commission shall associate with itself for such purposes as may be determined by the rules made under Section 63-C, a representative of the each of the Governments interested, who shall be chosen by the Government concerned and a person so associated shall have the right to take part in the discussions relevant to that purpose, but shall nto have a right to vtoe at a meeting of the Commission and shall nto be a member of the Commission for any toher purpose. Sub-section (4) of this section makes provision for giving effect to the directions issued by the Commissioner under Section 63-A (2) (c) and sub-section (5) makes provision for effectuating the power conferred on the Commission under section 63A (2) (d).

Section 63-C enables the Central Government to make rules to provide for all or any of the matters enumerated therein and one such matter is "the authority to which the time within which and the manner in which, an appeal against the decision of the Commission may be preferred." Pursuant to this rule-making power, the Central Government has made "The Inter-State Transport Commission Rules. 1960" (hereinafter referred to as the Rules.) Rule 24 (1) of the Rules is as follows: "Any person or authority (including Government) aggrieved by a decision, direction or order of the Commission, under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 63-A may, within thirty days from the date on which the decision,, direction or orders is communicated to such person or authority, prefer an appeal to the Inter-State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under Rule 25."

(It is unnecessary to refer to the proviso to this sub-rule for the purpose of this case). Sub-rule (3) is: "The Tribunal shall call for the records of the case and after giving the parties or their authorised representatives a reasonable opportunity to make representations either orally or in writing as the Tribunal may think fit, may confirm, vary or set aside the decision, direction or order appealed against."

One further provision of the Act that has to be ntoiced is section 44. That Section refers to the transport authorities contemplated under the Act and provides for their constitution, Sub-section (1) states that the State Government shall by ntoification in the Official Gazette, constitute for the State a State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3) and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such areas under their jurisdiction as may be specified in the ntoification, the powers and functions conferred by or under the Chapter on such authorities. There is a proviso to this sub-section according to which, in Union Territories, the State Government may abstain from constituting any Regional Transport Authority. Sub-section (3) of this section enumerates the functions of the State Transport Authority and one such function is: "to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority and if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions." Section 44 (3) (b).

9. It is against the background of these statutory provisions that we have to consider the arguments advanced before us. We shall first dispose of the preliminary objections raised in the counter-affidavit and repeated before us by Shri D. D. Chawla, appearing for the first respondent. Referring to the first preliminary point, we may at once mention that the orders of the Commission and the Tribunal specifically State that what the Commission and the Tribunal were doing was to give advice. However, the statutory provisions of S. 63A qutoed by us already, do nto lend support to this connection of the Commission and the Tribunal acting only in advisory capacity, and of what they do in relation to dispute between two Governments being only the giving of an advice.

Section 63A (2) (b) expressly uses the expression "to settle all disputes and decide all matters" and Rule 24 btoh in Sub-Rules (1) and (3) clearly indicates that the appeal is against the decision or direction of the Commission. We are unable to accept the argument of Shri Chawla that the elaborate provisions that have been made in the Act and in the Rules for the purpose of constituting the Commission and the Tribunal and authorising them to settle and decide disputes and differences, are merely for the purpose of giving advice to the Government who are parties to the dispute with no binding effect on them, who can accept or ignore the same. At any rate, these statutory provisions clearly indicate that the orders of the Commission and the Tribunal under section 63 A (2) (b) are in the nature of judicial or quasi-judicial determination of the disputes between the parties and, therefore, subject to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Courts at the instance of one of the parties to the said dispute or by a person affected by it. In the result, we have no hesitation in overruling the first preliminary objection of Shri Chawla.

As far as the second preliminary objection is concerned, there can be no dispute whether about the proposition that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is nto functioning as a Court of Appeal. But in a case where the High Court is called upon to interfere and does interfere with the order of a subordinate Tribunal, whether it interferes as a Court of Appeal or in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution will depend upon the nature of the infirmities vitiating the impugned order. Naturally, this question cam be answered only on an examination of the nature of the orders complained of and the infirmities they are said to suffer from. Therefore, this is nto really in the nature of preliminary objection and it is more in the nature of determining the extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with reference to the particular impugned order. Consequently, we shall deal with this contention of Shri Chawla after examining whether the impugned orders suffer from any infirmity or defect at all and if so what is the nature and character of such infirmity or defect.

9-A. As far as the Commission is concerned, the basis of its conclusion can be gathered from the following paragraph appearing in its Order dated 27-8-1966: "Section 48 (2) of the Mtoor Vehicle Act, 1939, prescribed that every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for a specified route or routes or for a specified area. It appears, therefore, that if a permit is expressed to be valid only for the one specified inter-State route, the same transport vehicle covered by the same inter-State permit cannto be allowed to proceed further to antoher route with liberty to pick up passengers en route on second route, which is an Inter-State route, as this would be in violation of the provisions of the Act. There is no objection to the same vehicle running on antoher route under a different permit, but would be objectionable if passengers who embark on the route covered (by) the inter-State permit are given direct tickets to any town on the second route for which the vehicle holds an inter-State permit. The issue of such a direct ticket would amount to extending the span of the inter-State route, which is nto permissible under the Mtoor Vehicles Act. In toher words, there can be no objection to the linking of the two routes but this linking should nto involve boarding of direct passengers, i.e. those holding on ticket for travel over btoh the routes on either of the two routes."

We may mentioned a few features with reference to the paragraph extracted above. In the first place, it does nto refer to any condition incorporated in the permit either by the issuing authority or by the counter- singing authority as a basis for its conclusion. Secondly, it proceeds on the basis of the existence of two routes covered by two valid permits, but the two routes linked. Thirdly it assumes that it is objectionable to give direct tickets to passengers to travel over btoh the routes. Fourthly, it states that the issue of such direct tickets would amount to extending the span of the inter-State route which is nto permissible under the Act, but does nto refer to any specific provision of the Act for this purpose, unless it be that the reference to S. 48(2) in the opening sentence of the paragraph can be taken to be the relevant provision in the opinion of the Commission.

10. As far as the Tribunal is concerned, in Paragraph 3 of its order, it refers to the argument advanced on behalf of the first respondent herein that the issue of tickets was condition of the permit under section 48 (3) (xiv) of the Act and the inter-State permit from Delhi to Karnal was therefore subject to the condition that tickets bearing specified particulars shall be issued to passengers and shall show the fares actually charged and this must be construed to mean that a ticket which is issued as a condition attaching to a single permit would be restricted to the route or routes covered by that permit as the State route alone is covered by the permit which is counter-signed by the Delhi Administration, the said permit would require the issue of a ticket only on the Delhi-Karnal route but nto beyond that. Then in paragraph r of its order, the Tribunal observed as follows:

"We think that the contention of the Delhi Administration is further supported by Section 42(1) of the Mtoor Vehicles Act under which no owner of a 'transport vehicle' (which includes a stage carriage) shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or a State Transport Authority authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used. The vehicle starting from Delhi on the Delhi-Karnal route would be governed by the conditions of the inter-State permit countersigned by the Delhi Administration. The use of the vehicle at Delhi or, for the matter of that at any place on the inter-State route, must be governed by the conditions of the inter-State permit alone. We have already construed Section 48(3) (xiv) to mean that the tickets which must be issued as a condition of the permit must relate to the route or routes or area covered by that permit. It would follow, therefore, that tickets to be issued from Delhi could nto be for any place which was beyond Karnal and, therefore, nto covered by the inter-State permit.

In paragraph 1 itself, the Tribunal recorded that it was admitted on btoh the sides that one vehicle can hold two such permits, and therefore, the same vehicle which runs from Delhi to Karnal can also run on the further route say, from Karnal to Amritsar. The Tribunal observed that though from the point of view of public convenience, it would have liked the vehicle starting from Delhi to issue a long distance ticket to a place even beyond Karnal so that the passengers starting from Delhi could be assured of reaching their destination beyond Karnal, still the attainment of that objective has been fettered by the existing provisions of the Mtoor Vehicles Act, referred to by the Tribunal. Here again, we would like to refer to certain features underlying the conclusion of the Tribunal. In the first place, as before the Commission, the validity of the grant of two permits for the same bus, one covering the route Delhi to Karnal and the toher from Karnal to Chandigarh to enable the said bus to ply form Delhi to Chandigarh via Karnal was admitted and accepted. Secondly, in the opinion of the Tribunal, section 48 (3) (xiv) by its own force, prohibited the issuing of a direct ticket covering btoh the routes. Thirdly, the Tribunal did nto rely for its conclusion on any specific condition imposed by the State Transport Authority Delhi, while countersigning the permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority of the toher State, but only relied on the existence of the statutory provision itself, viz. section 48 (3) (xiv). Fourthly, in the opinion of the Tribunal, certain provisions of the Mtoor Vehicles Act the provisions referred to by them are sections 42(1) and 48(3) (xiv) directly and section 48(2) indirectly in so far as it approved the opinion of the Commission.

11. In our opinion, the conclusion and the reasoning of the Commission and the Tribunal are nto warranted by the statutory provisions referred to by them or by any toher provision. Sections 42(1) and 48(2) refer to the vehicle being used in a public place only under and in accordance with the terms of a permit and the requirement as to a stage carriage permit being expressed to be valid only for a specified area. Neither of these Sections has anything to do with the issue of a direct ticket from Delhi to Chandigarh either directly or indirectly. We have already pointed out that the validity of the issue of two permits in respect of the same bus for the two routes from Delhi to Karnal and Karnal to Chandigarh to enable the bus to ply from Delhi to Karnal and to continue its journey thereafter to Chandigarh was conceded before the Commission and the Tribunal and even before us and if we may say so, rightly. That being the case, the orders of the Commission cannto be sustained so far as the same sought to rest its conclusion on section 48 (2) and equally the order of the Tribunal also cannto be sustained so far as it sought to rest its conclusion on these two sections. The further point to be ntoiced is that the Tribunal sought support for its conclusion, in our view principally from Section 48 (3) (xiv). In our judgment this section does nto support the conclusion of the Tribunal.

As we pointed out already section 48 (3) enables the Regional Transport Authority while granting a stage carriage permit, to attach any one or more of the conditions mentioned in that sub-section. The first thing that has to be ntoiced is that the Regional Transport Authority may or may nto attach any of the conditions enumerated therein. In this respect, section 48 (3) is in complete contrast with section 59(3) which enumerates six matters which shall be the conditions of every permit. Therefore, the mere existence of section 48 (3) (xiv) will nto cannto lead to the conclusion which the Tribunal has arrived at. This will be sufficient to hold that the orders of the Tribunal cannto be sustained even with reference to section 48 (3) (xiv) and the error of law committed by the Tribunal in this behalf can be said to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record since the conclusion of the Tribunal in this behalf constitutes a patent misconstruction of the statutory provisions.

12. Since the petitioner has also prayed for the issue of a writ of Mandamus to restrain the first respondent from interfering with the passenger transport vehicles of the petitioner running of the Delhi-Haryana inter-State routes on the ground of issue of direct tickets beyond the terminal stations in Haryana on these inter-State routes, it becomes necessary for us to decide whether section 48 (3) (xiv) authorises the State Transport Authority, Delhi, to impose a condition in the nature of preventing a permit-holder from issuing a direct ticket from Delhi to Chandigarh via Karnal and whether as a matter of fact that State Transport Authority, Delhi, has imposed such a condition. This question as stated above, fails in two parts. As far as that part which relates to the State Transport Authority, Delhi, actually imposing any such condition is concerned, we can straightway mention that no such condition has been imposed. We have already qutoed the terms in which the counter-signature was effected by the State Transport Authority, Delhi. It merely stated that "tickets will be issued for the destination between Delhi and Karnal." According to the leaned counsel for the petitioner, this condition requires that the Punjab Roadways (now Harayana Roadways) compiled with this condition, but this condition neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits the petitioner from issuing tickets for a destination beyond Karnal to be reached by the same by virtue of the second permit which it has for plying beyond Karnal up to Chandigarh.

On the toher hand, Shri Chawla, appearing for the first respondent, contends that though the condition extracted already, does nto in express terms prohibit the issue of tickets for destination beyond Karnal, still such a prohibition should be implied because this was a condition pertaining to the permit for the route Delhi-Karnal and therefore, it must be deemed to authorise the issue of tickets only for destination beyond the terminal point covered by the inter-State permit, with which alone the State Transport Authority, Delhi, was concerned. We are unable to imply any such prohibition in the condition extracted already. No doubt an authority issuing a permit or countersigning a permit is concerned with only the route to which the permit relates and nto beyond it and consequently every condition attached to the permit either by the issuing authority or by the countersigning authority may be said to relate only to the route or the area covered by the permit. But, so long as it is possible in law to grant a permit to enable the same vehicle to travel over antoher route in continuation of the route covered by the first permit, it cannto be contented that any condition, positive in form, contained in the first permit impliedly prohibits the doing of anything which is nto illegal.

Shri Chawla could nto bring to our attention any provision in the Mtoor Vehicles Act or the Rules made there under which renders the issue of such a direct ticket illegal. The whole of the contention of Shri Chawla is that by the issue of such a direct ticket, the identity of the route covered by the inter-State permit will be blurred, if nto destroyed, and therefore, in order to maintain and preserve the identity of the inter-State permit, it must be held that direct tickets should nto be issued. We are of the view that the issue of such a direct ticket does nto in any way affect the identity of the route. The route or the area to be covered by the plying of a vehicle remains intact and in our opinion, the issue of such a ticket does nto blur or destroy it.

13. The next argument of Shri Chawla was that the issue such a direct ticket amounts to extension of the route Delhi to Karnal as Delhi to Chandigarh via Karnal and such an extension cannto be affected without the route from Delhi to Charindigarh being treated as an independent route and a single and separate permit being issued therefore. For this purpose, Shri Chawala relied upon S. 57 (8) of the Act which has already been extracted and certain decision in relation to the extension of routes covered by a permit in our view, the very concession and conclusion that in law there can be two permits in respect of the same bus, one from Delhi to Karnal and the toher from Karnal to Charindigarh and there is on bar to link up the said routes, negatives the present contention. As far as section 57 (8) is concerned. The very ;language of that sub- section applied only to a case where the holder of a permit applies for the variation of the condition of his permit by conclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or by increasing the specified maximum and the said Section can have no application to a case where by means of independent permit validly granted in respect of the same bus, the routes are linked.

14. The decision of the Madras High Court in S. R. Kuppuswami Chettriar v. M. Ramachandarn, relied on by Shri Chawla, dealt with an application of a permit - holder for the variation of condition of his permit to enable him to discard the original destination and to take up an altered route and reach a new destination With reference to such an application, the madras High Court pointed out that the route is nto a condition of the permit under the relevant provision of the mtoor vehicle Act and an application of the nature made by the permit -holder refereed to above. Was nto an application for the grant of a new permit. In that case, the Madars High Court observed as follow: "A route in its ordinary sense means a way taken from the starting point to its destination. When, therefore, a permit fixes the two termini on a particular route, the cutting up of the route, abandonment of the one of the termini will undoubtedly affect integrity of the route for which the permit is granted. Variation no doubt, is a term of wide amplitude and includes every ntoification or alteration, But its meaning under the Mtoor Vehicles Act should be limited in the light of the statutory provisions. It is plain from sections 48 and 48A, (a section which is introduced by an amending Act of madras Legislature) that the integrity of the subject of variation either under section 48(3) (xxi) or under section 48-A for the simple reason that it is nto a mere condition to be attached to the permit but a statutory provision." Consequently, this decision is of no assistance to the contention of Shri Chawla. It may also be mentioned that in the same decision, the Madras High Court sought to make a distinction between the variation of a route where the original destination is discarded and the vehicle is to cover a new path reaching a new destination, and the variation of a route where to the existing route an extension is sought to be made beyond either of the tow termini. The next decision relied on by Shri Chawla is United Transport Company, Mangalore v. Regional Transport company, Mangalore v. Regional Transport Authority reported in Air 1964 My 26. That case related to the grant of inter-state permits between Mangalore and Bombay based on an agreement entered into between the Governments of Mysore and Maharashtra and the procedure followed by the Mysore transport authorities for recommending to the Maharashtra transport authorities for countersignature. For selecting the operators whose permits were to be recommended for countersignature, who were plying exclusively within the Mysore State, the procedure prescribed under section 57(3) of the Act was nto followed and the Mysore High Court pointed out that such a procedure, which was mandatory should have been followed We are of the opinion that this decision also has no relevancy to the point to be considered by us

15. The next decision relied on by Shri Chawla is Sudhir Kumar Sadhu v. Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan, . That case related to the extension of the existing route covered by a stage carriage permit by the inclusion of a new area and the High Court pointed out that Section 57(8) applied to the case and accordingly the application has to be dealt with as if it were an application for the grant of a new permit. The next decision relied on by shri Chawla is s. M Shinde v. S. B. Bagli reported in Air 1963 Mys 261, In that case, the Regional Transport Authority, Bijapur, called for applications for the purpose of selecting persons who should be authorised to extend their operations from the State border to the city of Bombay Persons holding permits valid from Bijapur to the State border applied for the same. The question that came up before the Court was whether those applications should be dealt with as if they

were applications for the grant of new permits. The Mysore High Court held that those applications in effect were one for variation of a condition of the existing permit so as to extend a route from the border of the Mysore State to the City of Bombay and, therefore came within the scope of s. 57 (8) of the Act On the face of it, this decision also has no bearing on the point to be considered by us

The last decision relied on by shri Chawla is Kannayya Naidu v. The Regional Transport Authority that decision held that the question of variation of a route in respect of which a stage carriage permit has been granted is within the jurisdiction of the Regional transport Authority acting under the provisions of section 57 of the Act and, therefore, that decision has no bearing on the case before

16. As pointed out by us already the question before us is a very narrow and limited one and in our view, the issue of a direct ticket from Delhi to a place like Chandigarh, per se. Will nto amount to extension of the route.

17. This conclusion of ours is sufficient to dispose of this part of the case However the petitioner and the first respondent being the States and the question being of recurring importance to them the counsel appearing for the petitioner and the first respondent requested us to give our decision on the question whether a condition prohibiting the issue of a direct ticket like the one in the case, can be attached to the permit pursuant to section 48(3) (xiv) of the Act. Therefore, we give our views on this question also. The terms of S. 48 (3) (xiv) have already been extracted. According to them the condition may require that tickets shall be issued to passengers, such tickets should bear the specified particulars and such tickets should show the fares actually charged and we are omitting that part relating to the records of tickets issued being kept in a specified manner. Since the same is nto relevant for the purpose of this case. There is no dispute about the right of a transport authority to attach a condition requiring the issue of tickets to passengers and requiring that the said tickets should show the fares actually charged.

The only toher point is that the said tickets should bear specified particulars and obviously the particulars are to be specified by the authority attaching the condition. From the very nature of the requirement, it is nto possible for us to infer from this clause, a power to impose a condition that a ticket should nto be issued to a particular destination or beyond a particular destination. All that part of the clause requires is that the ticket should bear the specified particulars may be that the tickets should bear the particulars as to the starting place and the destination, and it is neither possible nor desirable to say what toher particulars can be specified by the transport authority for the tickets to contain. However, in our opinion, the very frame and the language of the clause, do nto authorise the imposition of a condition that the ticket should nto be issued beyond the termini reason for this conclusion of ours is that there is ntohing in law prohibiting the vehicle traveling beyond either termini under the authority of antoher permit lawfully issued.

18. In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, we are of the opinion that even the second preliminary objection of Shri Chawlas and the decisions relieve on by him. Viz. G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., are of no avail. The orders of the Commission and the Tribunal suffer from an error of law patent on the face of the record and they are liable to be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari, and they are accordingly quashed. We also issue a writ restraining the first respondent herein from interfering with the operation of the stage carriages of the petitioner running on the Delhi-Haryana Inter-State routes on the ground that the issue of direct tickets beyond the terminal stations in Haryana on these Inter State routes is prohibited either by the provisions of the Mtoor Vehicles Act or by any condition attached by the State Transport Authority Delhi.

19. Before parting with this case, we want to mention one further fact. Shri Anand Swaroop. Appearing for the petitioner, contended that even assuming that pursuant to Section 48(3) (xiv) of the Act. A transport authority at the time of countersigning a permit can impose a condition prohibiting the issue of a direct ticked for a destination beyond the terminus covered by the inter-State permit, still such a power is available only to a Regional Transport Authority and nto to the State Transport Authority since Section 63(2) of the Act mentions only a Regional Transport Authority. In view of the conclusion we have already come to on the scope of Section 48(3)(xiv). We do nto consider it necessary to express any opinion of ours on this contention, though we are inclined to reject the contention though we are inclined to reject the contention on two grounds: (1) section 63(1) authorises the Regional Transport Authority of the toher region and the State Transport Authority of the toher State Transport Authority concerned to grant the countersignatures and it could nto have been the intention of the legislature to confer the power to impose conditions or to vary the conditions imposed by the issuing transport authority only on the Regional Transport Authority and nto on the State Transport Authority, there being no apparent reason for so doing. (2) As shown already, the first proviso to section 44(1) states that in the Union Territories, the State Government may abstain from constituting any Regional Transport Authority thereby indicating that in the case of Union Territories, a State Transport Authority shall be constituted and in the State Transport Authority will perform the functions of the Regional Transport Authority, and, consequently, the State Transport Authority will have all the powers of Regional Transport Authority for the purpose of the Act unless there is any specific provision in the Act to the contrary.

20.the i writ petition is allowed. However, we do nto make any order as to costs.

21. Petition allowed.