M.L. Dhawan vs Capri Ltd., New Delhi And Ors.
1967 Latest Caselaw 116 Del

ORDER

(1) This application for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court had been dismissed for default in appearance by us on 10-7-1967, but was restored on 14-7-1967.

(2) The present application arises out of a suit instituted by Messrs Capri Ltd., against five defendants,, the present petitioner Shri M. L. Dhawan being defendant No.1 on the allegation that the defendant was employed by the plaintiff-company as Manager of its business and allowed to occupy room No. 9 in the second floor by virtue of his service as an employee of the plaintiff and that on the termination of his services on 31-7-1952, he was no longer entitled to occupy room No. 9 In regard to room No .12 it was averred that defendant NO. 1 had forcibly taken possession of this room. The suit was for possession of rooms Nos. 9 and 12 in the Regal Buildings, New Delhi and also for a decree for Rs. 1,500/- on account of damages of use and occupation of these tow rooms.

(3) The written statement by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 put forth the plea, inter alia, that defendant No. 1 was in the service of the plaintiff for a short while, but since the plaintiff-company's business was small, it let out the first floor to the Standard Restaurant and entered into an arrangement with defendant No.1 in regard to the second floor of that building, whereby all the rooms on that floor, except rooms Nos. 1 and 2, already let out to Messrs New India and Messrs Standard Restaurant, were handed over and placed in the exclusive possession, control and management of defendant No. 1 as a lessee who agreed to pay a net sum of Rs. 500/- per month as rent of those rooms to the plaintiff with full authority to sublet those rooms on board and lodging basis or toherwise.

(4) The learned Subordinate Judge, Shri Tilak Raj Handa, trying this case came to the conclusion that the defendant had nto been put in possession of the premises in dispute in his capacity as Manager of the plaintiff-company and with this finding, he did nto consider it necessary to decide the issue of liability of defendant No. 1 to be ejected on account of termination of his services. Issue No. 3, which is in the following words: "Did defendant No. 1 take the premises in dispute besides some toher rooms from the plaintiff as a managing contractor with a right to sublet the same or any portion thereof? If so, what were the toher terms of the contract?"

was decided in the defendant's favor and the plea of forcible entry by defendant No. 1 in room N0. 12 was decided against the plaintiff. To be precise in regard to his conclusion on issue No. 3, he found that the possession of defendant No. 1 was under some agreement with the plaintiff and that agreement was an agreement of lease. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to refer to the toher findings of the learned Subordinate Judge.

(5) On appeal in this Court, a Division Bench reversed the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and in the course of the order observed thus: "The case of the first defendant, therefore, must fail on the short ground that the lease which he set himself to prove in the written statement has nto been established. The first defendant can have no toher interest in the property in suit except as a lessee and if the tenancy is nto proved he is no more a trespasser. It is nto denied that ntoice of ejectment had been duly served and there really is no answer to the suit for possession brought by the plaintiff."

In so far as claim for damages is concerned, a decree for Rs. 1,500/- was awarded.

(6) The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been presented by Shri M. L. Dhawan alone. In support of this application , Shri Raghbir Singh has primarily relied on the argument that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal is nto less than Rs. 20,00/- and in the alternative that the impugned judgment and decree involve directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property which is called the Regal Buildings, nor does he assert title to rooms Nos. 9 and 12. His sole argument, as we can understand, has been that the plaintiff had filed a suit for possession of these two rooms which were asserted to be in possession of defendant No. 1 (petitioner in these proceedings), with the result that the suit must be held to involve indirectly some claim or question respecting property worth more than Rs. 20,000/-. It is nto denied that in the Court below, the parties had agreed by means of a statement that the market value of the site in dispute is Rs. 15,000/- and the Court-fee may be assessed according to this valuation. The learned counsel, Shri Raghbir Singh, however, argues that that was only an admission for the purpose of Court-fee and that the real value can be asserted by him now to be more than Rs. 20,000/-. We are unable to uphold this submission. It was a case in which some valuation for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction could be fixed. It is, therefore, nto easy for us to permit the present petitioner (defendant No. 1) to assert higher valuation than was agreed to by him in the trial Court. The learned counsel has nto shown the basis on which the value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the trial-Court or on appeal can be determined to amount to Rs. 20,000/- or more. The appeal thus does nto lie as of right.

(7) The only toher point, therefore, which calls for examination is if the present case can be considered to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court as required by Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. On this point precious little has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and all that he has said is that Section 53-A, Transfer of Property Act, applies to the case and, therefore, he is entitled to a certificate of fitness from this Court. We are wholly unimpressed by this submission.

(8) Clause (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution is clearly intended to meet special cases like those in which the point in dispute is nto measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance. We have nto been persuaded to hold that there is any question of great public or private importance which falls for determination in this Court. It may be remembered that normally an appeal us allowed to the Supreme Court when the proposed appellant satisfies the Court that the subject-matter of the suit and that of the appeal is Rs. 20,000/- or more. In certain cases, for example, those of the appellate judgment being in the affirmative, there should be also some substantial question of law involved. But since there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute, the law-giver has created a third category of cases in which this Court is empowered to certify cases to be fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. Those are cases in which questions of wide public or private importance arise and in which the subject-matter in dispute cannto be reduced into actual terms of money. No such question has even been pretended to be argued before us.

(9) The result, therefore, is that this petition must fail and we dismiss the same. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.

(10) Petition dismissed.