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Union Of India (Uoi) vs H.C. Sarin
1967 Latest Caselaw 74 Del

Citation : 1967 Latest Caselaw 74 Del
Judgement Date : 25 April, 1967

Delhi High Court
Union Of India (Uoi) vs H.C. Sarin on 25 April, 1967
Bench: K Hegde, S Andley

JUDGMENT

K.S. Hegde, C.J. and S.N. Andley, J.

(1) The Union of India has appealed against the judgment dated 31/08/1964, delivered by Sharma J. o.i the Punjab High Court whereby the learned Judge allowed the writ petition which had been filed by the respondent impinging 'the order dated 10/09/1982, of his dismissal from service and praying for a declaration that he continued to be in service and was entitled to the emoluments of his office. The order culminating in the dismissal of respondent was passed after a Board of inquiry had found the respondent guilty of some of the charges which were levelled against him.

(2) The respondent was employed in the Indian Railways as Senior Railway Inspector attached to the office of the Indian Store Department at London with effect from 6/08/1954. His duties included the inspection of rolling stock and toher materials fur which orders were placed by the Government of India on various firms in the United Kingdom and the Continent. Towards the end of 195S, the respondent was posted to the Essen Area of West Germany as Senior Railway Inspector and remained there till April, 1958. He had succeeded S. N. Hussain as Senior Railway Inspector in the Indian Railways attached to the Indian Store Department in London. The fir'm of Messrs Leo Gtotwald and Company, Dusseldorf,entered into a contract to supply railway breakdown cranes to the Government of India. It appears that the said firm which was a family concern of Dr. Hons Dieter Gtotwald, alleged to be a lawyer by profession, committed defaults in delivering the contract goods within time and the Govrment cf India became entitled to claim 45,138-7.8Sd as liquidated damages on account of delayed supplies. Dr. Gtotwald made statements before L. T. Madnani, (Railway Adviser), J. D. Shukia(Director General, Indian Store Department), and S. K. Anand (First Secretary Establishment) in London on or about 8/09/1958,alleging that the respondent had accepted illegal gratification from him and an open car from antoher firm for passing the goods supplied by them to the Government of India. Summary of this complaint was prepared by these three officers on 9/09/1958 and signed on 12/09/1958. Thereupon, N.S. Pandey, Financial Adviser to the High Commission for India in London, went to Germany for investigation into these allegations and reported that there was substance in the complaint. As a result of this report, the Government of India served a memorandum on the respondent intimating that it was proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 1730 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume 1. Three charges were framed against the respondent and they are as followed :- CHARGE 1. - That Shri H. C. Sarin while functioning as the Senior Railway Inspecting Officer in the Indian Store Department a.t London during the period between December, 1956 and May, 1958 demanded and obtained illegal gratification from the firm of Messrs Leo Gtotwald of Dusseldorf.Charge II.-That during the aforesaid period and while functioning as aforesaid the said Shri H. C. Sarin violated rule 10 of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1956 in that he accepted an open car from Messrs Talbuts of Aachen as a gift.Charge III. -That during the aforesaid period and while functioning as aforesaid the said Shri H.C. Sarin used his Official influence for personal advancement.

(3) A statement of allegations was annexed to the aforesaid memorandum which, inter alia required the respondent to submit to the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry a written statement of his defense nto later than 30/04/1959. The respondent was also asked, (a) whether he desired to be heard in person ; (b) to furnish the names and addresses of the witnesses whom he wished to call in support of his defense ; and (e) to furnish a list of documents which he wished to produce in support of his defense. The respondent was also asked to intimate whether he desired to be heard in person and was informed that he may,during the enquiiy, be accompanied by antoher officer of the Indian Railways stationed in the United Kingdom or by any toher officer of the Government of India in the United Kingdom to act as the defense counsel, provided that such officer was nto a professional lawyer or one competent to practice in a Court of Law. It may be mentioned that this right of having a defense counsel, who was nto a professional lawyer or one competent to practice in a Court of Law, was in accordance with ntoe (3) to Rule 1730 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I, and the said ntoe is in the following terms :- "In a departmental enquiry, the accused railway officer may, if he so desires, be accompanied by antoher railway officer provided that the officer so nominated as the defense counsel is approved by the competent authority to act as such, and provided also that the person so nominated shall nto be a professional lawyer. The term'professional lawyer' includes those persons who are competent to practice in a court of law".

(4) Also enclosed with the memorandum were (1) a summary of the statement of Dr. Gtotwald made on 8/09/1958 as stated above;(2) a further statement of, and a list of certain documents submitted byDr. Gtotwald on 21/10/1958, and (3) the report dated 19/01/1959 of NT. S. Pandey, containing the result of his investigation and his view that there was sufficient prima fade evidence in support of the main allegations made by Dr Gtotwald against the respondent.

(5) The writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the learned Single Judge, who held that the principles of natural justice had been violated by the Board of Inquiry in the following particulars :-

(A)That the Board had refused permission to the respondent to go to Germany for the purpose of studying the accounting procedure etc. which was prevailing in the firm of Dr. Gtotwald.

(B)That the Board had refused the request of the respondent to engage a counsel to cross-examine Dr. Gtotwald.

(C)That the Board had examined S. N. Hussain and L. T. Madnani as defense witnesses on 21/07/1959 and S. N. Hussain again on 14/08/1959 in the absence of the respondent and without ntoice to him.

(D)That the Board had examined S. N. Hussain, L. T.Madnani, Bhalla, Sharma, Johri and Sen as defense witnesses and nto as witnesses of the Department.

(E)That M. A. Hussain, Chairman of the Board, was biased against the respondent.

(F)That the Board had forwarded copies of all the orders pass.ed by him in the matter and directions given to the respondent toM. R. Sachdev for comments.

(G)That the Chairman of the Board without waiting for the decision of the Government of India on the respondent's representation to change him, started taking effective steps to send the respondent back to India.

(6) The learned counsel on buth sides have taken us through the voluminous correspondence that was exchanged between the respondent and the Chairman of the Board right from 10/04/1959, that is soon after the service of the charge-sheet till the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings on 6/10/1959.

(7) Mr. Niren De, Additional Solicitor General, has contended on the basis of this correspondence that there has been no breach of the principles of Natural Justice in respect of any of the circumstances which found favor which the learned Single Judge. His contention is that from the very start, the respondent's attempt was to stultify the inquiry and his attitude was one of complete non-co-operation. On the toher hand, Mr. Chopra, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the overall atmosphere prevailing throughout the period from the commencement of the investigation to the conclusion of the enquiry was one of hostility and prejudice against the respondent.

(8) The first circumstance which has found favor with the learned Single Judge is about the refusal of the Board to permit the respondent to proceed to Germany to collect information required for his defense.The respondent wrtoe a letter to the Chairman of the Board, here in after referred to as "the Chairman" on 10/04/1959, requesting "permission to visit: Germany to collect essential information required" for submitting his written defense as the charges referred to a period of the past two to three years. In reply to this letter, the Chairman wrtoe to the respondent to inform the Board about the purpose for which a visit to Germany was desired and also names and addresses of persons whom the respondent wanted to contact and the papers that he .wished toexamine. The respondent did nto specify either the names of the persons or the papers that he wanted to examine in Germany. In fact, by his letter dated 20th April, 199, the respondent stated that until he had inspected the documents he would nto be in a position to know what items or facts he required to investigate or to check in Germany.However, he postponed the consideration of this application so that he may in due course specify the visits, persons and papers. This letter makes it deal that the respondent undertook to specify the persons whom he wanted to contact and the papers that he wanted to examine in Germany. Since, initially, the written statement of defense had to be filed1:43 PM 12/14/2007 on or before 30/04/1959, the Chairman, by his letter dated 21stApril, 19^9, asked the respondent that the information as to the persons and papers should be supplied nto later than 30/04/1959. the respondent did nto file his written statement on the date fixed but wrtoe to the Chairman that it was necessary for him to examine in detail"Gtotwald's system of accounting, store keeping procedure for telephoneaccounting, mailing letters, etc. Likewise the system of telephoneaccounting, booking, mailing letters etc. at toher firms mentioned byDr. Gtotwald." In reply, the Chairman wrtoe to the respondent by letter dated 1/05/1959, that it was nto necessary to make a visit to Germany because witnesses pertaining to all these matters will be called by the Board for examination and the respondent would be given full opportunity to elicit all relevant information required by him. the respondent replied to this letter on 4/05/1959 and stated that the examination of picked witnesses alone at the enquiry would nto indicate a clear picture of the procedure of accounting, store keeping etc. the Board, by its letter dated th May, 1959 informed the respondent that in their view it was nto necessary for the respondent to undertake the journey to Germany to study the procedures in accounting, store keeping etc. The correspondence on this subject ceased with the respondent'sletter dated 10/05/1959, in which he expressed his regret at the Board's decision. We have given our careful consideration to this correspondence and we are of the view that the refusal of the Board to permit the respondent to visit Germany, in the circumstances of thecase, cannto be termed as a breach of the principles of natural justice.We do nto see how a visit to Germany would have helped the respondent in making a proper defense to the charges. As has been stated earlier,the two statements made by Gtotwald and the documents produced by him were in London and copies of these statements had been furnished to the respondent. We have gone through the statements of Gtotwald and with particular reference to the main plea of albi, which was taken by the respondent in his written defense, it is nto understandable as to how a visit to Germany would have helped the respondent except to make what may be called a fishing inquiry. Admittedly, none of the documents which had been produced by Gtotwald in support of his allegations against the respondent bore the signatures of the respondent.In the circumstances, it is difficult to follow how the examination ofGtotwald's system of accounting. Store-keeping, mailing letters etc.could have helped the respondent in making his defense. Our feeling is that by entering into this lengthy correspondence, the respondent was merely trying to delay the proceedings and there was no real necessity of his visiting Germany for the purpose of preparing his defense.It has also to be ntoiced that this request for visiting Germany was made without any assertion that Gtotwald or toher persons in Germany had agreed to such examination of their accounting system etc. by the respondent. This ground has, in our opinion, no substance.

(9) The next ground is that the respondent was nto permitted the facility of engaging a counsel for the purpose of cross-examination of Dr.Gtotwald, Mr. Chopra has put forward an ingenious argument that the prohibition against the engagement of a professional lawyer in ntoe (3)TO Rule 1730 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I, pertains to the engagement for the whole enquiry and nto for a part of theinquiry. In view of the language of ntoe (3) to Rule 1730, this argument has only to be stated to be rejected. Mr. De has argued that ntoe(3) to Rule 1730 is a complete answer to this ground of attack particularly when the vires of Rule 1/30, which is a statutory rule, have nto been challenged in the writ petition and we agree with him. Mr. De has,however, addressed before us a general argument that the refusal to engage a lawyer is nto per se a breach of the principles of natural justice.It is nto necessary to refer to all the cases which have been cited at the Bar and it will be sufficient if reference is made to a decision of the Mysore High Court in D.Made Gowda v. The State of Mysore, where all the law on the subject has been discussed. The result of all these decisions is that the refusal to permit representation by a professional lawyer in a domestic enquiry would nto vitiate the enquiry. Mr. Chopra has placed considerable reliance on a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Dr. K. Subba Rao v. State of Hyderabad", where the learned Chief Justice has held that when the public servant is under a reasonable apprehension that the enquiry is the result of a preconceived plan and a concerted action on the part of his Department, his request (or professional help is certainly justified and the enquiry officer should give him that opportunity and refusal to accede to that request certainly deprives the public servant of an opportunity to defend himself. Even according to this decision, the essential requirement is that there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the public servant of what may.be called a conspiracy to implicate him. No such case has been made out there. The only reason, so far as we have been able to see, for the request fur engaging a counsel for cross-examining Gtotwald was that he was a professional lawyer. The only evidence that we have been able to find in this regard is that Gtotwald was enrolled as a lawyer and there is no evidence that he was practicing as such. Whatever the position maybe, the fact that a witness in a domestic enquiry is a lawyer does nto make it a requirement of the principles of natural justice that the public servant should be afforded permission to engage a lawyer to cross-examine such a witness. It will be relevant in his connection to ntoice that the plea of the respondent was one of alibi. The respondent has stated in paras 18 and 20 of his writ petition that he was nto in Dusseldorf or within a mtoorable distance during the period when the payments byway of illegal gratification are alleged to have been made to him. In view of this (left nce, we do nto see how the engagement of a lawyer would have facilitated the cross-examination of Gtotwald. We are,therefore, of the view that in the circumstances of this case, there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice by the refusal of the Board to have permitted the respondent to engage a lawyer for cross examining Gtotwald.

(10) The next point that has been held by the learned Single Judge against the appellant is that "the Board was nto justified in examining Messrs S. N. Hussain and L. T. Madnani as defense witnesses on 2 1/07/1939, and the former again on 4/08/1959: in the petitioner'sabsence and without ntoice to him." It will be relevant to ntoice here that 21 witnesses were examined by the Board at Dusseldorf between 13/07/1959 and 17/07/1959 in the absence of the respondent.Quite fairly, Mr. Chopra, has nto made any complaint about the examination of these witnesses in the absence of the respondent. The complaint, however, is that the respondent had at no time given any indication to the Board that he would nto appear and participate in the enquiry proceedings in all its stages. According to Mr. Chopra, all that can be inferred from the correspondence which passed between the respondent and the Board or its Charmin is that the respondent had expressed his unwillingness to participate in the enquiry at Dusseldorf. Mr.Chopra contend' that the Board was bound to give ntoice and the respondent was entitled to get ntoice of the proceedings of the Board which were held in London on 21/07/1959 and thereafter Mr. Niren De, on the toher hand, has contended that it is evident from the respondent's letters-particularly his letters dated 14/06/1959 and 20thJune, 1959, that the respondent had ntoified to the Board of his decision nto to participate in the enquiry in any of its stages. Mr. Niren De has invited our attention first to the respondent's letter dated 27th May,l959 which according to him, discloses the attitude with which the respondent was approaching the whole matter. The respondent has stated.Faced with false and grave charges, coupled with the fact that I had nto and have nto any Railway Official to assist me and a.:t as my defensecounsel, has been a very heavy and tremendous strain on me. In view, thefore.of the position, I am in at present, I feel there will be no point in my insisting for an oral enqui.y....................."In spite of this attitude it is argued the Board informed the respondent of its decision to hold an oral enquiry in London and in Dusseldorf and also informed the respondent that he will be informed about the arrangements and the witnesses whim it was intended to call. There was some intervening correspondence which is nto relevant to this aspect of the matter and the next relevant letter is dated 14/06/1959 by which the respondent, while repeating his grievances, has stated "In the circumstances that I have been put into, and hardly bean left any choice,I feel no useful purpose can be served by my attending such an enquiry or having anything further to do with such an enquiry." The board,by its letter dated 18/06/1959 still asked the respondent to inform the Board "Before 25/06/1967 whether or nto you propose to Presently yourself for Oral enquiry at Dusseldorf or such toher places as the Board may determine, on the date's to be intimated to you shortly. If nto, as authorised by the Government of India in paragraph 4 of their Memorandum no. AV-27-(3)/58(l) of April, 3, the Board will proceed with the enquiry ex-parte on the basis of the written statement already submitted by you. 'The respondent did nto even then inform the Board that he would participate in the enquiry. On the toher hand, the respondent wrtoe a letter to the Board on the 20/06/1959, where he stated that the Board's letter dated 18th June, 195& "confirms my original fears and I can only most respectfully reiterate and refer you to all what is stated in my letter dated 14/06/1959." There can therefore, be no doubt that the respondent had decided to boyctto the enquiry unless his demands were acceded to. Upon receiving the respondent's letter dated 20/06/1959, the Board could easily hive discontinued Communication with the respondent, but the Board again wrtoe to the respondent on 22nd Juns, 1959, inter alia, asking the respondent to indicate to the Board on or before 25/06/1959, whether the respondent proposed to present himself for oral enquiry at Dusseldorf or such toher places as the Board may determine. In reply, by his letter dated 2 3/06/1959, the respondent reasserted the stand that he had taken in the afore-mentioned letters dated 14th and 20th June, 19.59. By their letter dated 26/06/1959the Board extended the date for the respondent's reply by five days and requested the respondent to inform the Board ' categorically before 30/06/1959 whether you propose to present yourself at Dusseldorf on the dates mentioned above so that arrangements can be made lor your passage and accommodation atDusseldorf. A list of witnesses so far expected to be examined at Dusseldorf is enclosed herewith." The respondent,in his reply dated 2 9/06/1959 again affirmed the stand that he had taken in his letters dated 14th and 20/06/1959. On 2/07/1959, the Board informed the respondent to proceed to Dusseldorf on 13/07/1959 to participate in the oral proceedings at Dusseidorf. But, by his letter dated 8/07/1959 the respondent again referred to his letters dated 14th & 20/06/1959. It is needless to specifically mention the subsequent correspondence between the respondent and the Board except to say that hi re.iterated his stand taken in the letter, dated 14th and 20/06/1959.In the circumstances of this case, the attitude which was adopted by the respondent cannto be described toherwise than as an attitude of non-cooperation or of boyctto of the enquiry. It was nto necessary for the Board to give any information to the respondent about the subsequent stages or proceedings of the enquiry. It is nto as it th3 respondent was unaware of the examination of S. N. Hussain and L. T. Madna.ni by the Board in London on 21/07/1959. If he had been unaware he could nto have written his letter dated 24/07/1959 to the Board requesting that copies of the Statements made by Mr. S. N. Hussain be supplied to him.

(11) The position, therefore, is that time and again the respondent reiterated his decision to taken no further part in the inquiry proceedings.His letters dated 14th and 20th June, 1959 and his subsequent affirmation thereof, in so far as the participation in the enquiry was concerned, disentitled him to any ntoice of the proceedings of the Board when S.N. Hussain and L.T. .Madnani were examined in London on 2 1/07/1959 and of the proceedings of the Board on 4/08/1959 whenS.N. Hussain was further examined. We, therefore, hold that no ntoice of the proceedings of the Board in London was called for an, in any case the respondent knew about these proceedings and could have appeared therein if he so chose. In that view of the matter, it is nto possible to say that any principle of natural justice was violated in this behalf,

(12) In this connection, antoher subsidiary point made by Ms. Chopra,learned counsel for the respondent, is that the Board wrtoe to G. P.Bhalla, R. S. Sharma, A. Johri and A. Sen (who were then in India) asking them whether they knew anything about the allegations and charges made against the respondent, and Mr. Chopra says that since the Board elicited information from these people, who had been cited by the respondent as defense witnesses, behind the back of the respondent the Board violated the principles of natural Justice. We think that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Major U.K.. Bhatt v. Union of India*,is a complete, answer to this alleged grievance. The Supreme Court has observed that where the Enquiry Officer had afforded to the public servant an opportunity to remain present and to make his defense but because of the conduct of tli3 public servant in declining to participate in the enquiry, all the witnesses of the State, who could have bean examined in support of their case were nto examined visa voce, the Enquiry Officer was justified proceeding to act upon the materials placed before him. But the matter did nto rest there. The Board b'/ their letter dated 24/07/1959 informed the respondent that as he had failed to submit the questionnaire for tha examination on commission of these officers in India by 25th Jii'ie, 195^ the B.)ard had no alternative but to ascertain the fa ts pertaining to the charges from thes? witnesses directly.Even after this, the respondent in his letters to th^ Board his referred back to his letters dated 14th and 20/06/1959. Furthsr,the abovementioned officers were cited as defense witnesses by the respondent.The Board evidently wanted to know whether th'y had any relevant information to give. Under the cit'ourn'tances of this case, it is immaterial whether they were termed as defense witnesses or prosecution witnesses. In fact, they gave no material evidence in the case nor was their evidence used against the resdondent. It has also nto been shown how their examination by correspondence as aforesaid has prejudiced the respondent. We, theretore, hold that the action of the Board in trying to elicit information from the above named officers who were in India was justified and cannto be challenged as a breach of the principles of natural justice.

(13) The next argument of the respondent which found favor with the learned Single Judge was that the Chairman of the Board, Mr. At.A. Hussain, was biased against the respondent as he had in his capacity as the Deputy High Commissioner of India in London formed his opinion that there was prima face case on the complaint made by Gtotwald against the respondent. In this connection, it is to b ' ntoiced that the allegations of bias have been made nto against the entire Board which was constituted by three highly placed officials, but only against itsChairman, Mr. M. A. Hussain. The respondent has enumerated his complaint constituting bias in his letter dated 5/10/1959 to the Board. The main allegations are that Mr. M. A. Hussain had made up his mind even before the commencement of the proceedings (.f the enquiry that there was a prima facie case against th? resp^nd^nt, aid thatMr. M.A. Hussain was very communal in his outlook. We may state at once that there is no basis or foundation for the allegation thatMr. M.A. Hussain had a communal bias. With regard to the firstallegation, the complaint is that Mr. M. A. Hussain of the view that there was a frima facie case against the respondent and this view of his had been communicated to the Chairmen of the Railway Board in New Delhi by his letter dated 24th October, 1958 by which he recommended disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. The further argument is that although the Government of India wanted a full investigation into the allegations, Mr. M.A. Hussain by his letter dated 25th December, 1958 reiterated his opinion that a prima facie case had been established. We may mention here that although Mr. M.A. Hussain held this opinion, he handed over the papers to Mr. N.S, Pandey,Financial Adviser with the request to conduct a detailed preliminary investigation into the allegations as soon as he was asked by the Government to do so. It may also be mentioned that Mr. M.A. Hussain suggested to the Government that he may nto be appointed Chairman of the Board as he was toherwise busy. From the material before us it appears to us that he had no personal interest in the matter. We may also mention that although the respondent wrtoe numerous letters to the Board, his allegation of bias came for the first time only in his letter dated 5/10/1959, when the enquiry proceedings had been almostcompleted. In the writ petition, the basis for the allegations of bias was that Mr. M. A. Hussain had made some adverse comments against the respondent and recommended that disciplinary proceedings be taken against the respondent. Mr Niren De contends that allegations of bias were nto made before the enquiring authority, but were made to the Government of India for the first time on 5/10/1959 and then in the writ petition filed by him and he says that on this ground alone, the allegation of bias should nto be taken into consideration. He has relied upon a judgment of Vaidialingam J. when he was a Judge cf the High Court at Kerala,in the case of Devakaran v. Circle Inspector of Police,Munnar and tohers, where the learned Judge has hid that where a challenge is made to the Jurisdiction of the enquiry officer on the ground that he is biased against the workman, such challenge should be raised before the enquiry officer and it was nto open to the workman to attack the findings when they are against him. Antoher case which has been upon by Mr. Niren De is the case of Srikant Upadhya v. Union ofIndia', where the learned Judges have held that mere participation of one of the members of a Departmental Enquiry Committee in the earlier fact finding enquiry committee will nto legally disqualify such member to &it on the departmental enquiry. We have carefully gone into the correspondence which was addressed by Mr. M. A Hussain as Chairman of the Board of Inquiry to the respondent and we are unable to find anything in that correspondence which is likely to lead to the conclusion that Mr. M. A. Hussain was biased against the respondent. Infact, as Chairman of the Board, he gave the respondent opportunity after opportunity to come and participate in the enquiry. Further, inspite of his prima fade opinion against the respondent, he handed over the papers to N. S. Pandey for further investigation when so directed by the Government of India. We must also take ntoe of the fact that nto even an allegation of bias has been made against the toher two members of the Board of Inquiry. In the circumstances, we repeal the contention that the mere fact that. Mr. M. A. Hussain had recommended enquiry against the respondent Would lead to the conclusion that he was biased against the respondent is so far the proceedings of the enquiry were concerned.

(14) The next circumstance which weighed with the learned Single Judge was that copies of all orders passed by the Chairman in connection with the enquiry were sent to Mr. M. R. Sachdev, who was the Secretary of the Ministry of Railways, for his comments. - The learned Single Judge has specifically referred to a letter dated 1/05/1959, from Mr.M.A. Hussain to Mr. M. R. Sachdeva, wherein the decisions of the Board dated 15th and 21/04/1959 and 1st May 19)9, which had been communicated to the respondent were adverted to and comments ofor. those decisions were requested. These letters were in respect of routine matters relating to the procedure aid conduct of the proceedings of the Board and we do nto see bow they are in contravention of Rule1730 of the India Railway Establishment COde, Volume I, of the principles of natural justice as held by the learned Judge. Mr. Niren De has argued that it was really the Government which was holding the enquiry and there was ntohing wrong in Mr. M.A Hussain's asking for comments as he was only a delegate of the Government. It is nto possible for us to.accept this extreme contention. V the comments if any, received from the Government at the request of Mr. M.A. Hussain had any thing to do with the merits of the case, which could.have weighed.or did weigh with the Board in coming to a conclusion about the.guilt or innocence of the respondent, non-disclosure of suchcomments.to the respondent would, in our opinion, certainly amount to a breach of the principles of natural-Justice. .The .Board of inquiry is a quasi judicial body and it has to conduct the proceedings of the enquiryin,accordance with 'the.,principles of natural justice. Their decision will have to be an independent decision and should nto be influenced by the opinion that might.be.expressed by the Government. But there is ntohing onthe record to show that any comments 'were made by the Government with regard to the merits of the controversy so as to influence the final judgment of the Board. .As stated above, the letters adverted to specifically by the learned-Single Judge were only with respect to routine matters relating to..the procedure to be adopted in the enquiry and we are unable to see how comments, if any, with reference to procedural matters can be violative of the principles of natural justice or any contravention of Rule 1730.-

(15) Mr. Chopra.has also argued that documents were nto made available for.inspection to the respondent. In his letter dated 14/06/1959, one of the complaints made by the respondent was that the Field' -Inspection Papers and files of the Essen . Area were nto provided to him. The Board controverter this allegation in their letter dated l 8/06/1959, where it has been stated that the respondent had been given free access to all available documents. This complaint was repeated in the respondent's letter dated 20/06/1959 and the Board's assertion wasreiteredinits.letter dated 22/06/1959, where the Board further stated "but if you feel .that there are any toher documents connected .with your defense which you .wish to see, then you should present yourself to Colonel Hendrick, a member of the Board of Inquiry, on Wednesday, the 24th, at 11A.M. at lSD and he .will arrange for yau to see the Rib Registry and the Dead File Store. . the Board of Enquiry have nto withheld nor do they wish to withhold any document relevant to the .enquiry." This offer was nto accepted by the respondent as is evident from his letter dated 23rd June,, 1.959 where he stated'I would respectfully submit .that there is no objection in my seeing the Isd Registry or.the Isd, Dead File Store, when I have been wanting to see the Field Inspection Papers and Files of inspection conducted in the Essen Area of Germany......"By their letter dated , 6/06/1959, the Board informed the respondent "that there are no inspection papers is relating to the Gtotwald contract toher than those whichhave'already been fully examined by you and of which you have already received such copies as. you, desired. .These papers included'.full inspection.'paper pertaining to the Gtotwald cantract. Further. Colonel Hendrick offered you every facility if you came to ISD. to ask the RIB officers concerning any toher papers you may have in mind, and further you were permitted to search the. Registry concerned and the. Dead File with the assistance of a clerk, but you declined to avail yourself of all the facilities offered to you now, having done so on earlier occassions.The Board feel therefore, that in view of the position stated above and the fact that you have nto so far mentioned any specific document which you need, the Board is satisfied that you have been given the fullest opportunity for preparing your defense." Instead of coming to the Isd office as suggested by the Board, the respondent merely repeated his request by his letter dated 29/06/1959. The Board, in their letter dated 2/07/1959 gave an assurance to the respondent that he would be given access to any further field inspection papers which became available in the future. Thereafter, it appears that inspection of the documents which were in the possession of the Board or of the Indian Store Department in London was given to the respondent on 9/07/1959. The respondent continued to make vague allegations that all documents were nto shown to him and this resulted in the letter dated 24/07/1959 from the Board to the respondent, asking the respondent to furnish a list of documents upon which the respondent wanted to rely for his defense. Inspite of this, no list specifying the documents the respondent wanted was furnished to the Boa:d. It appears to us to be clear from this correspondence that all legitimate demands of the respondent for the inspection of papers which were available in the Isd office in London were fullfilled, but the respondent went on making unfounded claims in this behalf without specifying the documents. We, therefore, hold that all documents which were available in the Isd office in London were made available to the respondent.

(16) The final argument of Mr. Chopra was that the respondent made a representation to the Government by his letter dated 5/10/1959, a copy of which was sent to the Board. according to Mr.Chopra, the Board should have withheld its findings and should nto have proceeded further with the enquiry until a reply to this representation was received from the Government and, says Mr. Chopra that since the Board proceeded to give their findings, it violated the principles of natural justice. It appears that the Government of India ordered the transfer of the respondent back to India on ' 6/10/1959in spite of the representation of the respondent to be allowed to stay in in London till a decision was taken on his representation dated 5/10/1959. The learned Single Judge remarks "In all fairness to the petitioner the Government of India should have taken a decision on his representation and if they found that it was without merit should have dismissed it and informed him accordingly in time. The petitioner might have decided in that event to appear before the board as constituted and completed the enquiry which was left incomplete on 6/10/1959." The learned Single Judge further remarks that the .Board "submitted its report on the basis of an incomplete .enquiry for which the petitioner indeed could nto be blamed and that being so the prtoection bestowed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India on the petitioner had nto been allowed to be properly exercised by him." With respect to the learned Judge, we have nto been able to . follow either the reasoning or the conclusion arrived at by him. It is in evidence that the report of the Board was given on 2/11/1959. We are unable to see why the Board should have waited for any reply to the representation made by the respondent to the Government on 5/10/1959,nor are we able to appreciate how this circumstance can.amount to violation of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.

(17) Mr. Chopra lastly contended that the proper approach to an appreciation of this case should be to take the ttoality of the circumstances into consideration and nto any individual circumstance. We have already pointed out that the individual grievances of the respondent have no foundation in fact and /or in law. Even taking the ttoality of circumstances into consideration, as suggested by Mr. Chopra, we are of the view that the non-cooperation attitude of the respondent with respect to putting in his defense or the proceedings before the Board suggests that the multifarious objections raised by the respondent in his numerous letters to the Board and toher were put forward, nto because they had any foundation in fact, lut because the respondent wanted to prepare his case for challenging his dismissal in a Court of Law.

(18) We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the above writ petition with costs Advocate's fee Rs. 250.00

 
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