[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Arun Vasant Bapat vs Union Of India Th. C.B.I on 13 March, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1
2026:CGHC:12098
The date when The date when The date when the
the judgment the judgment is judgment is uploaded on
is reserved pronounced the website
Operative Full
09.12.2025 13.03.2026 -- 13.03.2026
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment reserved on: 09.12.2025
Judgment delivered on: 13.03.2026
CRA No. 299 of 2006
1 - Arun Vasant Bapat, S/o Vasant Vinayak, Aged about 42 years, R/o
C-6, Parijat Colony Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.).
---Appellant
Versus
1 - Union of India Though C.B.I. Anti Corruption Br. Jabalpur, M.P.
--- Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Gopa Kumar, Advocate
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
CAV Judgment
1. The present appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 04.04.2006 passed by the
learned Special Judge (Central Bureau of Investigation), Raipur,
Chhattisgarh, in Special Criminal Case No. 21/2004. By the said
judgment, the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable
under Sections 468, 471, 420 read with Section 511 and Section
477-A of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and
was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for each offence. In default
of payment of fine, the appellant was directed to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months for each
offence.
2. According to the prosecution (CBI), during the relevant period the
appellant dishonestly fabricated documents relating to three LIC
policies bearing Nos. 380912503, 380910103 and 380503062 in
the names of Ku. Anju Pandit, Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ku.
Vibha Jagum. It is alleged that he forged policy papers, transfer
records and signatures, falsely showing the policies as transferred
to the Bilaspur Branch, with intent to obtain LIC loans amounting
to Rs.1,85,096/-. Although the loans were sanctioned by the
Branch Manager, the amounts were never disbursed. After
completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against
the appellant and the learned Trial Court thereafter framed
charges against him accordingly to which, appellant abjured his
guilt and claimed to be tried.
3. To establish its case, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses. The
statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein he denied all the
incriminating circumstances appearing against him and claimed
innocence as well as false implication. He did not adduce any
evidence in his defence.
4. The learned trial Court, upon appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence available on record convicted and
sentenced the appellant as detailed in para 1 of this judgment.
Hence, this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial
Court has gravely erred in law and on facts in holding the
appellant guilty. The appellant, being merely an Assistant Clerk,
had no authority or capacity to sanction or secure LIC loans and
has been falsely implicated as a scapegoat to shield the real
offenders. The findings of conviction are against the weight of
evidence and rest on conjectures and surmises, with no proof of
mens rea. Material facts were ignored, including the lack of
authority of the Branch Manager to sanction loans of such amount
and the handwriting expert's opinion, which does not support the
prosecution case. The impugned judgment is therefore
unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Trial
Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and
recorded findings of guilt based on proved acts of fabrication,
forgery, and conspiracy. The Trial Court has duly considered all
material aspects and no perversity or illegality is shown. The
impugned judgment is reasoned, lawful and calls for no
interference.
7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available
on record.
8. It is evident from the record of the learned Trial Court that charges
were framed against the appellant under Sections 468, 471, 420
read with Section 511 and 477-A of the IPC as well as under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. After appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the
appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 468, 471,
420 read with Section 511 and 477-A of the IPC and under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
9. It was not in dispute before the learned Trial Court that the
appellant/accused, Arun Vasant Bapat, was posted as an
Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Branch Office,
Bilaspur, during the year 1994-1995.
10. M. Karketta (P.W.-3), the then Senior Branch Manager of the Life
Insurance Corporation of India, Bilaspur, deposed that the
accused, Arun Vasant Bapat, was posted as an Assistant at the
said Branch Office. He further stated that the policy forms
pertaining to Ku. Anju Pandit, Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ku.
Bibha Jagam Hudko were placed before him for the purposes of
loan and surrender. Upon verification and enquiry, it was revealed
that the said policies had never been transferred from Ambikapur
and that the policies in the names of Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and
Ku. Bibha Jagam Hudko had, in fact, never been issued. He
further deposed that Ex. P-19 was the payment voucher relating
to policy document Ex. P-11, on the basis of which cheque Ex. P-
20 was drawn and issued on 30.05.1995 in the name of Ms. Vibha
Jagam. However, the payment of cheque Ex. P-20 was
subsequently stopped after verification revealed that the policy
shown to have been transferred had not actually been transferred.
In his cross-examination, he stated that,"..... मैं बिलासपुर क्र. 1
में था यह कहना गलत है कि बिलासपुर क्र. 1 में पांच शाखा थी फिर साक्षी से बचाव
पक्ष द्वारा पूछा गया कि बिलासपुर क्र. 1 में पाँच अलग अलग सेक्शन थी तब साक्षी ने
कहा कि हाँ सेक्शन अलग अलग थी उन सेक्शनों में अकाउंट, पालिसी सर्विसिंग,
ओ.एस. डिपार्टमेंट, न्यूबिजनेस डिपा., सैल्स डिपार्टमेंट थे। यह बात सही है कि इन
पांच विभागों में लिपिक के पद पर कार्यरत् असिस्टेन्ट अलग अलग पोस्टिंग होती है
कि कौन सा असिस्टेन्ट किस विभाग में कार्य करेगा । यह बात भी सही है कि
असिस्टेन्ट के तबादले लिखित में होते हैं। यह बात भी सही है कि असिस्टेन्ट के उक्त
आदेश सम्बंधित शाखा से ही पारित किये जाते हैं। अभियुक्त बापट कब तथा किस
विभाग में कार्य किया है इसका लेखा जोखा बिलासपुर कार्यालय में होना चाहिये।
साक्षी ने स्वतः कहा कि मैं जब से आया हूँ तब से अभियुक्त बापट पालिसी सर्विसिंग
विभाग में है।, he again stated that, मैं रिकार्ड देखे बिना नहीं बता सकता कि मैंने
अभियुक्त बापट का ट्रांसफर सितम्बर 94 में इन एण्ड आउट विभाग में किया था या
नहीं ।"
In para 9, he stated that, "यह बात सही है कि लेजर पोस्टिंग विभाग
अलग है और उसका असिस्टेन्ट लिपिक भी अलग होताहै। यह बात भी सही है कि
एक ही असिस्टेन्ट को सभी काम एक साथ नही सौंपे जाते और अलग अलग विभाग में
अलग अलग असिस्टेन्ट कार्यरत हैं। यह सही है लेजर प्रीमियम जमा करने की प्रविष्टि
लेजर सेक्शन में होती है। यह सही है कि हरेके पालिसी की लेजर में अलग अलग
प्रविष्टि होती है। "
In para 12, he stated that, " इस प्रकरण में जो पालिसी बॉन्ड पेश है
उनके बारे में मैंने बिलासपुर ऑफिस से जानकारी नहीं लिया कि यह कब और
किसको इशू किये गए है। जानकारी क्यों नहीं लिया इसका कोई कारण नहीं है। यह
कहना गलत है कि सभी पालिसी बॉन्ड के निरंक प्रोफोर्मा मैने स्वयं प्राप्त किया था,
इसलिए मैंने इसके बाबत जानकारी प्राप्त नहीं किया था। प्र. पी. 14, प्र. पी. 3 ए, प्र.
पी. 7 ए, आदि में जो मोनो ग्राम है वह जब से एल. आई. सी. बनी है तब से चालू है। "
In para 33, he admitted that,"....... यह बात सही है कि 912 नं. की
पालिसी, में मैंने जिन तीन दस्तावेजों का उपर वर्णन किया है सिर्फ वे ही दस्तावेज
उक्त पालिसी डॉके ट में थी और यह भी सही है कि शेष सभी दस्तावेज जो डॉके ट में
होना चाहिए डॉके ट में नहीं थी और यही मैने बांदे साहब को बतलाया था। मुझे इस
बाबत कोई जानकारी नहीं है कि 912 नं. की पालिसी के शेष दस्तावेज कहाँ पर चले
गए। मैंने उक्त मिसिंग दस्तावेजों को ढूंढने का प्रयास किया था लेकिन वे दस्तावेज मुझे
नहीं मिले। जब सी. बी. आई. वाले दस्तावेज जप्ती करने आये तब भी मुझे उक्त 912
की पालिसी के गुमे हुए कागजात नहीं मिले थे और मैंने उक्त तीनो कागजात को डॉके ट
में सी. बी. आई. को दे दिए थे। "
In para 37, he admitted that, "यह सही है कि सीनियर ब्रांच मैनेजर
होने के नाते मुझे के वल 75,000/- का ऋण सैंक्शन करने का अधिकार है। यह भी
सही है कि 75,000/- से ज्यादा का ऋण है तो उसे डिविशनल हेडक्वार्टर स्वीकृ ति
के लिए भेजा जाना चाहिए। 75 हजार रु. तक ए. ओ. (प्रशासनिक अधिकारी ) कर
सकता है। और उसके ऊपर का डिविशनल ऑफिस भेजा जाता है। ब्रांच मैनेजर भी
75 हज़ार तक स्वीकृ त कर सकता है। मैंने अंजू पंडित का एक लाख का लोन सैंक्शन
कर दिया था। जो मुझसे गलती हो गयी थी जिसके लिए मुझे मंडल कार्यालय से
वार्निंग भी मिली थी। यह कहना गलत है कि मैं एक लाख रूपए का ऋण स्वीकृ त कर
दिया था क्योंकि मैं भी इस फोर्जरी में शामिल था। "
In para 38, he stated that, " कै लकु लेशन सीट नितिनलाल ने बनाया था
या नहीं मैं बिना दस्तावेज देखे नहीं बता सकता। यह कहना गलत है कि मैंने डॉक्यूमेंट
दुबारा तैयार करवाया था। यह भी कहना गलत है कि नितिन लाल ने दुबारा
कै लकु लेशन सीट बनवाने से इंकार कर दिया था। इसलिए 912 में कै लकु लेशन सीट
नहीं लगा है। यह कहना गलत है कि हमारे सारे ऑफिसर मिलकर यह प्लान बना
लिया था कि बापट को फ़साना है बाकी सब अधिकारी को बचाना है। यह भी गलत है
कि अधिकारियो को बचाने के लिए एवं अधिकारियो को बचाने के लिए सारी पुलिसिया
बापट से भरवाई थी। "
11. Nitin Lal (P.W.-5) admitted his signatures on the loan surrender
review slip (Ex. P/2), the payment voucher (Ex. P/22) and the
policy document of Anju Pandit (Ex. P/15). He further admitted his
signatures on the loan surrender review slip of Jagdish Prasad
Tiwari (Ex. P/6) and the payment voucher (Ex. P/16).
In para 6 of his deposition, he stated that on the basis of the
written information (Ex. P/15) submitted by him to the Senior
Branch Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bilaspur
Branch, the Senior Branch Manager had sought information from
the Ambikapur Branch regarding Policy No. 380912503 as to
whether the said policy had been issued from that Branch. He
further stated that the information received from the Ambikapur
Branch revealed that the said policy had neither been issued nor
transferred in the name of Anju Pandit from the Ambikapur
Branch.
In para 8, he further stated that whenever a policy was
submitted for surrender value or loan approval, there was a
prescribed procedure for processing the same. He stated that the
Corporation had a printed proforma for loan applications for both
purposes, although the policyholder could also submit an
application on plain paper. He clarified that it was not the practice
that the policyholder's application was first taken on plain paper
and thereafter the policyholder was called to the office to fill up the
printed proforma. He further stated that the application form was
initially submitted to the dealing clerk, and in the absence of the
dealing clerk, the same was submitted to the Higher Grade
Assistant (HGA). He also stated that when both the policies
relating to Anju Pandit were submitted for loan surrender and loan
approval, he was the dealing clerk and Mr. Basing was the HGA.
He further stated that every policy submitted for surrender value
or loan approval had a docket.
In para 14, he stated that prior to taking action regarding the
approval of a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of Anju Pandit, he
had called for the docket and perused it. However, he admitted
that he had not verified the documents in detail and had only seen
whether the documents were attached to the docket or not. He
further stated that most of the documents were available in the
docket, though he had neither counted the documents nor
examined them individually.
In para 20 of his deposition, he stated that he was not
certain as to whether the docket relating to the approved loan of
Rs.1,00,000/- had been lost. He further stated that it was not
correct to say that the docket had been lost and, therefore, his
calculation sheet and the duplicate policy were not available in the
branch case. However, he admitted that the documents presently
available on record did not contain either the said calculation
sheet or the duplicate policy.
12. Babulal Bande (P.W.-7) deposed regarding the procedure
relating to the transfer of policies from one branch to another and
the manner in which a policy was surrendered and a cheque was
prepared. He further stated that the policy of Ms. Anju Pandit had
also been directly processed by the accused Bapat without
obtaining approval from any competent authority. He stated that
his report was Ex. P/28 and that Ex. P/28A was the statement
given to him by the accused Bapat.
In his cross-examination, he admitted that, to his knowledge,
a stop payment advice had been sent only with regard to the
policy of M.R. Sahu. He stated that he had seen the stop payment
document but could not say whose signature appeared on the
stop payment letter that had been sent. However, he stated that
since Bapat was working in that section, it could be presumed that
Bapat must have sent the said letter.
In para 19, he stated that he was not earlier aware that
Bapat had detected fraud in all four policies, but M. Karketta had
informed him about the said fraud during the course of the
investigation. He further stated that, as per the rules, the Raipur
Divisional Office had not been informed regarding the fraudulent
policies, and that he came to know about the fraud only when he
visited the Bilaspur Branch, where M. Karketta had informed him
about the same.
In para 20, he stated that he had asked M. Karketta as to
why, despite the irregularities in all four policies having been
reported in August 1994, the information had not been sent to the
Divisional Office. He stated that M. Karketta informed him that he
had sent a letter to the Senior Divisional Manager, Raipur, in June
1995.
In para 28, he stated that there were separate stationery
sections in both the Divisional Office and the Branch Offices. He
stated that a register of issued forms was maintained and entries
were made therein. He further stated that policies were issued by
the New Business Section and that blank policy forms were
issued to the Officer on Special Duty (OSD) of the New Business
Section. He stated that generally such blank policy forms were not
issued to other sections; however, officials in the Insurance
Department (PS) who were required to issue duplicate policies
were also supplied with policy bond forms. He further stated that
policies in respect of which duplicate policies were issued were
also entered in the register. He admitted that he had not checked
the register maintained in the stationery section as he did not feel
it necessary to do so. He further stated that he had been serving
in LIC for 28 years and that his first appointment was as an
Assistant. He also stated that the LIC monogram remained printed
on every bond.
In para 31, he stated that, as per the rules, loan applications
and other applications were required to be forwarded to the
concerned clerk through the Branch Manager or Supervisor.
However, during the course of his investigation, he found that
such instructions were not being followed in the Bilaspur Branch.
He stated that loan applications were being forwarded directly to
the concerned clerk, who then took action thereon directly. He
further stated that since the aforesaid loan procedure was not
being followed, the policies of Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ms. Anju
Pandit had also been processed directly without obtaining
permission from any higher or competent authority. However, he
admitted that he had not specifically mentioned that Bapat had
taken direct action without the permission of a senior officer with
respect to Policy No. 503 relating to Anju Pandit.
13. Anju Pandit (P.W.-8) stated that she had not taken any policy
from the Life Insurance Corporation in her name and that she had
never signed any such documents.
In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not know
whether her father had any insurance policy or not. She further
stated that she did not remember whether any documents relating
to the investigation had been shown to her and also did not
remember whether the CBI had obtained her signatures on any
papers.
14. Vibha Jagam (P.W.-11), the wife of Arun Bapat, stated that she
had taken a policy in her name in the year 1989 and had
submitted Ex. P-40 in relation to the said policy for tax purposes.
She further stated that she did not remember the policy number;
however, the said policy was Ex. P-11.
She further stated that the handwriting appearing on the
policy surrender application (Ex. P-12) was not her handwriting.
In her cross-examination, she stated that her husband had
again been called the next day and was released at about 3:00
a.m. She further stated that, according to her, her husband had
been forced to fill out certain forms.
15. Upon close scrutiny of the statements of the witnesses, it
appears that the policy surrender forms and calculation sheets
were admitted by Nitin Lal (P.W.-5). M. Karketta (P.W.-3) also
admitted that he had sanctioned a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- though he
did not possess the authority to sanction such an amount.
However, the charge-sheet was filed only against the accused
Arun Bapat.
16. The allegation against the accused Arun Bapat was that while he
was posted as an Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation of
India, he had entered into a criminal conspiracy and had prepared
forged and fictitious insurance policies. It was alleged that he had
utilized the policy numbers of lapsed ("dead") policies and, on that
basis, had fraudulently prepared fake payment vouchers, some of
which were later subjected to stop payment. However, from the
record it appears that the prosecution did not produce any
document to establish in which section the accused Arun Vasant
Bapat was posted at the relevant time, in what capacity he was
working, or how he was responsible for preparing the alleged
forged documents.
17. Nitin Lal (P.W.-5) admitted his signatures on the calculation
sheets and vouchers. He also admitted that when the CBI had
seized certain documents, some of the documents were found to
be missing.
18. M. Karketta (P.W.-3) also admitted that the documents relating to
Policy No. 912 were missing. He further admitted that he was the
Senior Branch Manager and had the authority to sanction loans
only up to Rs.75,000/-, but he had sanctioned a loan of
Rs.1,00,000/-. He stated that the said loan had been sanctioned
by him by mistake.
19. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the accused Arun Vasant Bapat, while
replying to Question No. 187, stated that he had not committed
any offence. He further stated that he had filed a complaint
against the Branch Manager Karketta, Nitin Lal and Shri Ghosh
and, due to this reason, they had reported the matter to the CBI
with the intention of falsely implicating him in the present case. He
also alleged that the CBI had harassed him and his wife..
20. In Indrajeet Singh Solanki and other connected matters
decided in Criminal Appeal No. 712/2007, this Court, vide
judgment dated 12.12.2025, held in paras 34, 35 and 37 as
under:-
34. In the matter of Sheila Sebastian (supra), the
Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paras 26 to 30 of the
judgment, held as under:-
"26. The definition of "false document" is a part
of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read
together. "Forgery" and "fraud" are essentially
matters of evidence which could be proved as a
fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn
from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is
no finding recorded by the trial court that the
respondents have made any false document or
part of the document/record to execute
mortgage deed under the guise of that "false
document". Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor
Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the
forged documents. It is the imposter who can
be said to have made the false document by
committing forgery. In such an event the trial
court as well as the appellate court misguided
themselves by convicting the accused.
Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted
the accused based on the settled legal position
and we find no reason to interfere with the
same.
27. A reasonable doubt has already been
thoroughly explained in Latesh v. State of
Maharashtra wherein "reasonable doubt" has
been enunciated by this Court as (at SCC p. 83,
para 46) "a mean between excessive caution
and excessive indifference to a doubt, further it
has been elaborated that reasonable doubt
must be a practical one and not an abstract
theoretical hypothesis".
28. In this case at hand, the imposter has not
been found or investigated into by the officer
concerned. Nothing has been spilled on the
relationship between the imposter and
Respondent 1. Law is well settled with regard to
the fact that however strong the suspicion may
be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong
suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot
take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast
upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does
not take place of the legal proof. In this case,
the trial court as well as the appellate court got
carried away by the fact that accused is the
beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage
deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the first transaction i.e. PoA as a
fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard
of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond
reasonable doubt because the right to personal
liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by
the standard of preponderance of probability.
29. This case on hand is a classic example of
poor prosecution and shabby investigation
which resulted in the acquittal of the accused.
The investigating officer is expected to be
diligent while discharging his duties. He has to
be fair, transparent and his only endeavour
should be to find out the truth The investigating
officer has not even taken bare minimum care
to find out the whereabouts of the imposter who
executed the PoA. The evidence on record
clearly reveals that PoA was not executed by
the complainant and the beneficiary is the
accused, still the accused could not be
convicted. The laches in the lopsided
investigation goes to the root of the matter and
fatal to the case of prosecution. If this is the
coordination between the prosecution and the
investigating agency, every criminal case tend
to end up in acquittal. In the process, the
common man will lose confidence on the
criminal justice delivery system, which is not a
good symptom. It is the duty of the investigating
officer, prosecution as well as the courts to
ensure that full and material facts and evidence
are brought on record, so that there is no scope
for miscarriage of justice.
30. Although we acknowledge the appellant's
plight who has suffered due to alleged acts of
forgery, but we are not able to appreciate the
appellant's contentions as a penal statute
cannot be expanded by using implications.
Section 464 IPC makes it clear that only the
one who makes a false document can be held
liable under the aforesaid provision. It must be
borne in mind that where there exists no
ambiguity, there lies no scope for interpretation
The contentions of the appellant are contrary to
the provision and contrary to the settled law.
The prosecution could not succeed to prove the
offence of forgery by adducing cogent and
reliable evidence. Apart from that, it is not as
though the appellant is remediless. She has a
common law remedy of instituting a suit
challenging the validity and binding nature of
the mortgage deed and it is brought to our
notice that already the competent civil court has
cancelled the mortgage deed and the appellant
got back the property."
21. Further in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held in paras 18 to 20 as under:-
"18. We are unable to accept her submission on
this score too. There is nothing on record to show
the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake
document which is a sine qua non to attract
Section 465 IPC [punishment for forgery]. In fact,
the original fabricated document had not been
recovered.
19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj [(2018) 7
SCC 581, para 25], this Court held to attract
Section 464 IPC [Making a false document], the
prosecution must establish that the accused had
made the fake document. No material connecting
the appellant to the making of the fake document
has been adduced in the impugned charge sheet.
20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC
[forgery for purpose of cheating] and Section 471
IPC are not attracted, as the requisite mens rea,
i.e., dishonest intention to cause wrongful loss to
the Education Department and wrongful gain to
himself has not been demonstrated as the
issuance of the recognition was not dependent on
the production of the alleged forged NOC."
22. In light of the above discussion, it appears that the prosecution
has only been able to establish that at the relevant time the
accused, Arun Vasant Bapat, was working as an Assistant in the
Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). It has further been established
that certain cheques were issued in favour of policyholders in
respect of policies shown to have been transferred. However,
upon enquiry it was revealed that several such policies had never
been transferred from the Ambikapur Branch to the Bilaspur
Branch.
23. M. Karketta (P.W.-3) and Nitin Lal (P.W.-5) admitted that they
had signed the calculation sheets and payment vouchers. Babulal
Bande (P.W.-7) also admitted that M. Kerketta (P.W.-3) had not
informed the Divisional Office, Raipur about the alleged fraud. He
further admitted that, as per the prescribed rules, loan applications
were required to be processed through the proper channel, i.e.,
through the Branch Manager and Supervisor before being dealt
with by the concerned clerk.
24. The defence of the accused is that both senior and junior
officers of the LIC had conspired among themselves and when
certain irregularities and illegalities came to light, the accused was
falsely implicated in the present case.
25. The evidence adduced by the prosecution itself indicates that
the procedure followed in the LIC office involved several stages of
scrutiny and verification, with multiple safeguards before any
policy transaction could be completed. Despite the existence of
such procedural safeguards, the prosecution has merely assumed
that the payment vouchers were prepared by the accused. A
careful reading of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
does not disclose how the appellant, Arun Vasant Bapat, had
entered into any conspiracy or participated in the preparation of
forged policies or other forged documents. The prosecution
witnesses have admitted the suggestion that the accused had
attempted to stop the payment of certain vouchers. It has also
been admitted that important documents were found missing at
the time of seizure by the CBI. Although LIC officials have
acknowledged the existence of several internal checks and
safeguards, no specific, reliable or legally admissible evidence has
been produced to establish that the appellant had bypassed such
safeguards or had played any role in the alleged acts of forgery.
On the contrary, M. Karketta (P.W.-3) admitted that he had
mistakenly sanctioned a loan in excess of his authorized limit.
Thus, in the absence of clinching or admissible documentary
evidence from the LIC records, the prosecution has failed to prove
its case, whereas the defence put forth by the accused that the
superior officers conspired among themselves and falsely
implicated the appellant in order to shield themselves appears to
be a probable defence.
26. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that
suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In the
absence of cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence
establishing conspiracy or any active role of the appellant, the
prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts
necessary to sustain the charges under Sections 468, 471 and
420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 477-
A of the Indian Penal Code, and Sections 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
27. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon appreciation of the
entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has
failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. The case rests merely on suspicion without any
cogent, reliable or legally admissible evidence establishing forgery,
conspiracy, or involvement of the appellant.
28. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside and the appellant
is hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled against him.
29. Appellant is reported to be on bail and, therefore keeping in
view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the
B.N.S.S.), appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal
bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like
amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a
period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of
filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for
grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof
shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
30. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record
be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and
necessary action if, any.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey)
JUDGE
Ruchi
RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV
