[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Sandeep Mishra on 12 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:11781-DB
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BABLU
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.03.13
10:13:31
+0530
WA No. 212 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Social
Welfare, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Police Staiton Rakhi, Naya
Raipur Chhattsigarh,
2 - Director, Directorate Of Social Welfare, Government Of
Chhattisgarh, D.K.S. Bhawan, Compound Raipur Chhattsigarh,
3 - Superintendent, Sankalp, Special Govt. School For Mentally ,ill/
Retarded Boys And Girls Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh,
... Appellants
versus
Sandeep Mishra S/o Shri D.N. Sharma, Aged About 28 Years R/o
Badadeep Singh, Nagar, Plot No. 139, Street Pole No. 257, Bhilai,
Police Station Supela, District Durg Chhattsigarh,
... Respondent(s)
For Appellants : Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General
For Respondent : Mr.Sharad Mishra, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
12/03/2026
1. Heard Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for the
appellants/State as well as Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent on I.A. No.02 of 2026, which is an
application for condonation of delay.
2. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/
appellants submits that the instant writ appeal is being preferred
by the appellants/State against the order dated 19.06.2025
passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.
4812 of 2015 (Sandeep Mishra vs. State of Chhattisgarh and
others), whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed and set-
aside the order dated 21.07.2015. He further submits that 45
days time is allowed under the law to file an appeal before the
Division Bench against the order passed by learned Single
Judge. It is submitted that the order impugned was passed on
19.06.2025. Thereafter, the Director, Social Welfare,
Chhattisgarh, Raipur sought an opinion from the office of
Advocate General on 13.08.2025. After receiving the order, an
opinion was sought from the office of the Advocate General,
which was given on 10.09.2025. Thereafter, the file was sent to
the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh for obtaining sanction with regard to filing of writ
appeal. The Law & Legislative Affairs Department accorded
sanction on 01.12.2025, which was received by the Department
on 08.12.2025 and thereafter, Officer-in-Charge has been
appointed and he approached the office of the Advocate General
for filing the instant writ appeal. Thereafter, the writ appeal has
been prepared and is being filed before the Hon'ble Court. The
instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 178 days
from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been
placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others,
(1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the
learned State counsel prays that the delay of 464 days in
preferring the appeal may be condoned.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the submissions
made by learned Deputy Advocate General for the
appellants/State.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents annexed herewith.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to file an appeal
against the order passed by the writ Court.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster
General and others v. Living Media India Limited and
another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue
and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant
with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim
that they have a separate period of
limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question
why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact
that in a matter of condonation of delay
when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the
view that in the facts and circumstances,
the Department cannot take advantage
of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery
and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including
the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform
all the government bodies, their agencies
and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bonafide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-
tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation
to ensure that they perform their duties
with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for government departments. The
law shelters everyone under the same
light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the
Department for the delay except
mentioning of various dates, according to
us, the Department has miserably failed to
give any acceptable and cogent reasons
sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay."
7. Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,
2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some
directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a
case has been presented in the Court
beyond limitation, the petitioner has to
explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court
within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC
1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly
affect the rights of a party, it has to be
applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was
also made to the decision of this Court
in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023
SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as
follows:
"13. This Court in the case of
Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while
rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of
sufficient cause has concluded in
Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application
is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without
any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the
considered opinion that the High Court
did not commit any mistake in
dismissing the delay condonation
application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the
discretion to condone the delay has to
be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and
that, the expression 'sufficient cause'
cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir
Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his
legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein,
one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in
unequivocal terms observed by this
Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and
rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances,
we made it very clear that we are not
going to look into the merits of the
matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant
is a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the
court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot
turn around and say that no prejudice
would be caused to either side by the
delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime
in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43
years have elapsed. However, till date
the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would
be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days
and once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a
relevant matter which the court must
take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should
be condoned or not. From the tenor of
the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation. Once
it is held that a party has lost his right
to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for
a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must
not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter
for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the
question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and principles of
equity. We should not keep the 'Sword
of Damocles' hanging over the head of
the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims
and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less
any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the
High Court was exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The appellants have
failed to prove that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to
the facts of the present case, we are of
the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay
and dismissed the appeal by observing
that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient
cause was shown for the same, and no
plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to
reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot
simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second
appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of
the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government
adopts systematic approach in
handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/
applications/ appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of
the officials in merely
communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be
caused to the Government
exchequer. The present case is one
such case, wherein, enormous
delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to
the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though
valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the
State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering
legal opinion, filing of cases before
the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the
officer(s), who is/are responsible for
delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any,
to the value of the loss caused to
the Government. Such direction will
have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the
matter which we must not ignore or
overlook. Over a period of time, we have
noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance
of a private litigant or State the delay is
sought to be explained right from the time,
the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the
end of the same. For example if the period
of limitation is 90 days then the party
seeking condonation has to explain why it
was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the
last is of no consequence. The court is
required to consider what came in the way
of the party that it was unable to file it
between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is
true that a party is entitled to wait until the
last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing
the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause
must establish that because of some event
or circumstance arising before the
limitation expired it was not possible to file
the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of
limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of
limitation which may further delay the filing
of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal
being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. (See:
Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733)."
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot
be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon
all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage
upon a select few.
9. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of
State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity
and lethargy. The constitutional Courts ought to be cognizant of
the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
10. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for
the delay in filing the present appeal. The only reason cited is
that the Director, Social Welfare, Chhattisgarh, Raipur sought an
opinion from the office of Advocate General on 13.08.2025. After
receiving the order, an opinion was sought from the office of the
Advocate General, which was given on 10.09.2025. Thereafter,
the file was sent to the Law & Legislative Affairs Department,
Government of Chhattisgarh for obtaining sanction with regard to
filing of writ appeal. The Law & Legislative Affairs Department
accorded sanction on 01.12.2025, which was received by the
Department on 08.12.2025 and thereafter, Officer-in-Charge has
been appointed and he approached the office of the Advocate
General for filing the instant writ appeal. Thereafter, the writ
appeal has been prepared and is being filed before the Hon'ble
Court. However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or
justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable
explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate
delay of 178 days.
11. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The
learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any
convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is
no justification for condoning the delay of 178 days in filing the
present appeal.
12. In view of the above, the instant writ appeal is dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
