[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Subhash Chandra on 12 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:11783-DB
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
BABLU
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.03.12
18:29:44
+0530
WA No. 214 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department, Of Higher
Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur,
District - Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Commissioner, Higher Education , Indravati Bhawan , Nawa Raipur ,
Atal Nagar District - Raipur (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
Subhash Chandra S/o Late Shri B.L. Jain Aged About 80 Years R/o B/10 ,
Kranti Nagar (Wrongly Written As Franti ) Opposite Park , Bilaspur, District
- Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellants : Mr.S.S.Baghel, Government Advocate
For Respondent(s) : None present
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
12/03/2026
1. Heard Mr. S.S.Baghel, learned Government Advocate for the
appellants/ State. No one is present on behalf of the respondent
when the case is called out for hearing.
2. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the appellants/State
submits that the appellants have filed this instant writ appeal
challenging the order dated 23.10.2024 passed by learned Single
Judge in WPS No. 6799 of 2024, whereby, the writ petition has
been allowed and Appellant herein have directed to extend the
benefits of revised pay commission to the Respondent who have
retired from service. He further submits that as per the High Court
rules 45 days has been prescribed for filing of writ appeal before
the Division Bench against the order passed by learned Single
Judge, however, that there has been delay in preferring the instant
writ appeal. He also submits that the impugned order has been
passed by learned Single Judge on 23.10.2024. Thereafter, the
department initiated proceeding to file writ appeal against the
impugned order before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High
Court. Office of the Advocate General has given opinion to prefer
writ appeal before Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court on
03.01.2026. Thereafter, on 27.01.2026 Law & Legislative
AffairsDepartment, Government of Chhattisgarh has granted
permission for filing aforesaid writ appeal. The Under Secretary,
Law & Legislature Department, Government of Chhattisgarh
directed to file writ appeal against the impugned order before the
Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court and Deputy Director
Higher Education Department was appointed as Officer-in-Charge
of the case and the relevant documents have been received by the
concerned Officer-in-Charge on 27.01.2026 and then the process
for filing aforesaid writ appeal was initiated by the Officer-in-Charge
and writ appeal has been prepared and filed before the Division
Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. The aforesaid delay has been
caused due to departmental procedure, which is bonafide and not
intentional. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay
of 424 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has
been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and
others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such,
the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 464 days in
preferring the appeal may be condoned.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents annexed herewith.
4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to file an appeal
against the order passed by the writ Court.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant
with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because
the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that
in a matter of condonation of delay when
there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform
all the government bodies, their agencies
and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bonafide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-tape
in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation
to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be
used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the
Department for the delay except mentioning
of various dates, according to us, the
Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly,
the appeals are liable to be dismissed on
the ground of delay."
6. Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,
2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some
directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a
case has been presented in the Court
beyond limitation, the petitioner has to
explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court
within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC
1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the
rights of a party, it has to be applied with
all its rigour when prescribed by statute.
A reference was also made to the
decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v.
Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj
v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
[(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an
application for condonation of delay for
lack of sufficient cause has concluded in
Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found
to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is
to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not
commit any mistake in dismissing the
delay condonation application of the
present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the
discretion to condone the delay has to
be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and
that, the expression 'sufficient cause'
cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir,
2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the
issue, it was in unequivocal terms
observed by this Court that delay should
not be excused as a matter of
generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of
the same is profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going
to look into the merits of the matter as
long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for
condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is
a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court
long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant provisions
of the law, then he cannot turn around
and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We
are in 2024. Almost 43 years have
elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap
the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the
delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to
undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not.
From the tenor of the approach of the
appellants, it appears that they want to
fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter.
The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered
by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question
of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the 'Sword of
Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time
to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned
order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay should
not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice
is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to
prove that they were reasonably diligent
in prosecuting the matter and this vital
test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to
the facts of the present case, we are of
the opinion that the High Court correctly
refused to condone the delay and
dismissed the appeal by observing that
such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible
reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply
brush aside the delay occurred in
preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on
the part of the officials functioning in
the State machinery. Though the
Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues
and preferring the petitions/
applications/ appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of
the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge
revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present
case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days
occasioned in preferring the second
appeal due to the lapses on the part
of the officials functioning under the
State, though valuable Government
lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the
machinery touching the legal issues,
offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix
the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the
officer(s), who is/are responsible for
delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any,
to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have
to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over
a period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of
delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation
starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years
or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation
is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was
unable to institute the proceedings within
that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of
no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party
that it was unable to file it between the 1st
day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation
for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because
of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No
event or circumstance arising after the
expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of
limitation which may further delay the filing
of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal
being filed must be traced to a cause arising
within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit
Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of
Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733)."
7. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and
Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government
departments are under a special obligation to discharge their
duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is
an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of
right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts
its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to
confer undue advantage upon a select few.
8. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional Courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the
delay in filing the present appeal. The only reason cited is that the
the Under Secretary, Law & Legislature Department, Government
of Chhattisgarh directed to file writ appeal against the impugned
order before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court and
Deputy Director Higher Education Department was appointed as
Officer-in-Charge of the case and the relevant documents have
been received by the concerned Officer-in-Charge on 27.01.2026
and then the process for filing aforesaid writ appeal was initiated by
the Officer-in-Charge and writ appeal has been prepared and filed
before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. However, this
sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does
not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State
has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the
condonation of an inordinate delay of 424 days.
10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The
learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any
convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no
justification for condoning the delay of 424 days in filing the present
appeal.
11. In view of the above and considering the fact that the SLP filed by
the State before the Apex Court has already been dismissed vide
order dated 07/11/2025 on the ground of delay, the instant writ
appeal is also dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
