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Chattisgarh High Court
Vijay Kumar Ojha vs Union Of India Through C.B.I on 26 February, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1
2026:CGHC:10080
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09.12.2025 26.02.2026 -- 26.02.2026
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment reserved on: 09.12.2025
Judgment delivered on: 26.02.2026
CRA No. 600 of 2007
1 - Vijay Kumar Ojha, S/o Late Pandit Chhedi Lal Ojha, Aged about 67
years, Agent, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Branch Office No.1,
R/o Jabdapara, New Sarkanda, Bilaspur, Distt.-Bilaspur, C.G.
---Appellant
Versus
1 - Union of India, through Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. Raipur
(C.G.).
--- Respondent(s)
With
1 - Arun Vasant Bapat, S/o Vasant Vinayak Aged About 42 Years
Occupation - Tuition Resident of C-6, Parijat Colony Nehru Nagar,
Bilaspur (C.G.)
2 - Manne Singh Thakur S/o Lalan Singh Thakur Aged About 33 Years
Occupation - Domestic Servant
3 - Jamuna Bai W/o Shri Manne Singh Thakur Aged About 32 Years
Occupation - Domestic Servant
Both are R/o Surya Nagar, Gogaon Tah. And Distt. Raipur (C.G.)
---Appellants
Versus
1 - Union of India Through C.B.I. Anti Corruption BR. Jabalpur, M.P.
--- Respondent(s)
For Appellants : Mr. Awadh Tripathi and Ms. Sareena Khan,
Advocates
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Gopa Kumar, Advocate
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
CAV Judgment
1. Since both the appeals arise out of same impugned judgment,
therefore they are heard together and are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
2. The present appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 30.06.2007 passed by the
learned Special Judge (Central Bureau of Investigation), Raipur,
Chhattisgarh, in Special Criminal Case No. 22/2004. By the said
judgment, all the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years each and to pay a fine of
Rs. 300/- each for the offence punishable under Section 420 read
with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. In default of
payment of fine, each accused shall undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one month. The accused were further
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two
years each and to pay a fine of Rs.300/- each for the offence
punishable under Section 468 read with Section 120-B of the
Indian Penal Code. In default of payment of fine, each accused
shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
month. For the offence punishable under Section 477-A read with
Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, the accused were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two
years and six months each and to pay a fine of Rs.300/- each. In
default of payment of fine, each accused shall undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. For the offence
punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the accused were sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years each
and to pay a fine of Rs.300/- each. In default of payment of fine,
each accused shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a
period of one month.
3. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that in the year 1994, the
appellant, while working as an LIC Agent, in criminal conspiracy
with co-accused Basant, an Assistant Officer of LIC, and other co-
accused, fraudulently showed closed LIC policies as renewed by
forging entries in the ledger and fabricated documents relating to
five LIC policies. It is alleged that forged signatures of the
concerned policyholders were used with the intent to obtain loan
sanction amounting to ₹1,46,850/-. Further, appellant Nos. 2 and
3 are alleged to have opened fictitious bank accounts to facilitate
the commission of the offence and thereby cheat LIC. Although
the loans were sanctioned by the Branch Manager, no loan
amount was ever disbursed. Upon detection of the alleged
irregularities, the matter was reported to the CBI, and after
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellants,
whereupon charges were framed, to which the appellants abjured
their guilt and claimed to be tried.
4. To establish its case, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses. The
statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they
denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them
and claimed innocence as well as false implication. They did not
adduce any evidence in their defence.
5. The learned trial Court, upon appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence available on record convicted and
sentenced the appellants as detailed in para 2 of this judgment.
Hence, this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Trial
Court has gravely erred both in law and on facts in convicting and
sentencing the appellants, as the impugned judgment is wholly
misconceived and unsustainable. The prosecution has failed to
specify or prove which particular document was allegedly forged
at the instance of any appellant, nor has it established the
existence of any criminal conspiracy or meeting of minds so as to
attract Sections 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B IPC. The
conviction under Section 420 IPC is equally untenable, inasmuch
as there is no finding as to whom the appellants allegedly
cheated, nor any proof of dishonest inducement or delivery of
property. Appellant- Arun Vasant Bapat being merely an Assistant
Clerk, and appellants- Manne Singh Thakur and Jamuna Bai,
being domestic servants, neither possessed the authority nor the
capacity to cheat LIC, and have been wrongly made scapegoats
to shield the real culprits. The prosecution evidence suffers from
material contradictions, is tainted and unreliable, lacks
independent corroboration, and no contemporaneous complaint
was lodged with LIC by any witness, rendering the allegations an
afterthought. There is no proof of mens rea or of any illegal gain
obtained or even attempted by the appellants. The findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court are thus based on conjectures
and surmises, are against the weight of evidence on record, and
consequently, the impugned judgment is perverse and liable to be
set aside.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Trial
Court has rightly convicted the appellants after proper
appreciation of the evidence on record. The prosecution has
proved the active involvement and common intention of the
appellants in the commission of the offences, irrespective of their
official status or designation. The impugned judgment is legal,
reasoned, and calls for no interference.
8. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available
on record.
9. Upon a careful perusal of the record of the learned Trial Court, it
transpires that charges were duly framed against the accused
persons for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471
and 477-A read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, and also for the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
10. M. Karketta (P.W.-2), who was then serving as the Senior Branch
Manager of the LIC, deposed that accused Arun Vasant Bapat
had been posted as an Assistant during the years 1994-1995. He
stated that the duties assigned to the accused included
processing loan surrenders and effecting transfers of insurance
policies. The accused was further entrusted with the responsibility
of making entries of premium deposits in the relevant ledger
registers. He clarified that a separate ledger sheet was maintained
for each individual policy premium and that such ledger sheets
remained in the custody and maintenance of the accused Bapat.
He further deposed that the policy marked as Ex.P/2,
bearing No. 380619091, had been issued from the Bilaspur
Branch in the name of Shri Karunakar Pandey, resident of
Chatidih, Bilaspur, on 28.03.1989 for a sum assured of
₹1,00,000/-. He stated that Ex.P/3 was the application submitted
by Karunakar Pandey for surrender of the said policy and Ex.P/4
was the surrender payment form relating thereto. According to
him, Ex.P/5 was the payment voucher prepared for the surrender
value of the said policy, reflecting payment of ₹10,956/- and dated
29.07.1994. Ex.P/6 was another payment voucher dated
02.08.1994 relating to the survival benefit (money-back) under the
same policy. He further stated that Ex.P/8 was the surrender
review slip/calculation sheet prepared by the accused Arun Bapat,
on the basis of which the payment voucher (Ex.P/5) had been
prepared. A cheque was issued pursuant to the said voucher and
the same was received by Vijay Kumar Ojha. He also stated that
the policy bond Ex.P/9, bearing No. 380614027, had been issued
in the name of S.R. Agrawal on 28.12.1987 by the Bilaspur
Branch and that the ledger sheet pertaining to the said policy was
Ex.P/10. He further deposed that the application for surrender of
policy (Ex.P/9) submitted by S.R. Agrawal was Ex.P/11. He stated
that Ex.P/13 was the payment voucher relating to the said policy,
showing payment of Rs.22,000/- through cheque No. 214475,
which cheque was received by V.K. Ojha. He further stated that
policy Ex.P/14, bearing No. 380614030, had been issued in the
name of Dhanesh Prasad Agrawal on 28.12.1987 by the Bilaspur
Branch and the ledger sheet relating thereto was Ex.P/15. The
surrender application submitted by the policyholder on 08.08.1994
was marked as Ex.P/16, the surrender payment form was
Ex.P/17, and the payment voucher prepared on its basis was
Ex.P/18, reflecting payment of ₹9,053/- through cheque No.
214476. He stated that the relevant entry in Ex.P/18 (portion A to
A) and the portion B to B of Ex.P/8 bore the signature of accused
Arun Bapat. He further deposed that the said cheque was
dispatched to Dhanesh Prasad Agrawal by post vide Ex.P/19
dated 16.08.1994. He added that a further payment towards
survival (money-back) benefit of Rs.11,000/- in respect of policy
Ex.P/14 was made through payment voucher Ex.P/20, and the
cheque issued in that regard was received by Vijay Kumar Ojha.
He further stated that policy Ex.P/21 had been issued on
28.01.1989 for ₹1,00,000/-, the original policy document being
Ex.P/21 and the ledger sheet relating thereto being Ex.P/22.
He deposed that the said policy had been procured through
Vijay Kumar Ojha. The surrender application was Ex.P/23, the
surrender payment form was Ex.P/24, and the surrender value
amounting to Rs.12,286/- had been processed accordingly. He
further stated that Ex.P/25 was the surrender value calculation
sheet prepared by accused Arun Bapat. He further deposed that
policy No. 380618033 dated 06.02.1989, issued in the name of
Smt. Rukmani Singh Thakur for Rs.1,00,000/-, was marked as
Ex.P/30. The ledger sheet relating to the said policy was Ex.P/31,
and the policy had also been procured through Vijay Kumar Ojha.
The surrender application was Ex.P/32, and Ex.P/33 was the
surrender value payment form indicating surrender value of
Rs.23,460/-. Ex.P/34 was the surrender review slip/calculation
sheet prepared by accused Arun Bapat, and Ex.P/35 was the
carbon copy of the payment voucher prepared on the basis
thereof, though the witness stated that he could not say who had
prepared the same. According to Ex.P/35, payment of Rs.23,460/-
was made through cheque No. 380. He further stated that Ex.P/37
was the DP print relating to policy No. 380614027 in the name of
Salik Ram Agrawal, which indicated that no premium had been
deposited since September 1988 and the policy had lapsed from
that date. Similarly, Ex.P/38, the DP print relating to policy
Ex.P/14, also showed non-deposit of premium since September
1988 and that the said policy had likewise lapsed from that period.
In para 8 he stated that, " उपरोक्त वर्णित पॉलिसियों में जो समर्पण मूल्य
का भुगतान किया गया है उसकी जाँच अंजू पंडित की पालिसी के सरेंडर किये जाने
के समय किया गया था तो यह पाया गया कि उपरोक्त पॉलिसियों की डी.पी. प्रिंट में
प्रमियम जमा करने की पोजिशन दिखाई गई है तथा सम्बंधित लेज़र शीट में जो
पोजिशन दिखाई गई है डी.पी. प्रिंट के आधार पर जानकारी हुई थी कि उपरोक्त
पालिसी लेप्स हो चुकी थी तथा उनमें भुगतान नहीं किया जा सकता था। जिस पर
हमने विजय कु मार ओझा को कांटेक्ट किया था कि उनके द्वारा जो चेक प्राप्त किये गए
है वे उन्हें वापस करे। जिस पर उनके द्वारा इन पालिसियों के अतिरिक्त अन्य
पॉलिसियों के प्राप्त किये गये चेक में से दो चेक वापस किये थे तथा दो चेक वापस नहीं
किये थे उन वापस नहीं किये गए दो चेक का भुगतान रोकने के लिए हमने बैंक ऑफ़
बड़ौदा बिलासपुर शाखा को लिखा था। तथा उपरोक्त वर्णित पालिसियों से संबंधित
चेक का भुगतान हो गया था ऐसी बैंक से जानकारी प्राप्त हुई थी। "
In para 10, the witness stated that, without referring to the
records, he was unable to say whether he had transferred
accused Arun Vasant Bapat to the Transfer In & Out Department
in September 1994. He admitted that the Transfer In & Out
Department was responsible for maintaining records of all policies
transferred from the Bilaspur Branch to the said department as
well as policies received from outside branches, and that such
work ordinarily fell within the duties of an Assistant. He further
stated that he was unable to say whether the accused Arun Bapat
had been working in the Transfer In & Out Department from
September 1994 until his suspension in August 1995.
In para 11 he stated that,"सी. बी. आई. वालो ने अभियुक्त बापट के
सम्बन्ध में कि वह कब से कब तक किस किस बिभाग में काम किया है इस बाबत
मुझसे कागजात जप्त नहीं किया है शायद रायजादा से जप्त किया है। "
In para 16, the witness stated that it was incorrect to suggest
that the cases relating to Banwarilal Agarwal, Ramesh Shukla and
Malik Ram Sahu had been handled by the accused Arun Bapat,
and he further denied that the said cases had been placed before
him by the accused.
In para 19, he admitted that he had undergone a
departmental enquiry, though he later asserted that no such
departmental enquiry had been conducted against him. He further
stated that an RDA had been initiated against him and that
departmental enquiries were pending against Raijada, Bapat,
Basin and Nitinlal.
In para 20, he admitted that the nine policies were found to
be correct and, accordingly, after signing, the cheque had been
sent to the bank for payment. He denied the suggestion that he, in
collusion with the CBI, had altered the policies or introduced new
policies. He also denied the allegation that a false case had been
fabricated against accused Arun Bapat.
In para 23, he stated that," पहले लोन सरेण्डर के लिये एप्लीके शन
आता है फिर असिस्टेंट प्रीमियम के साथ कै लकु लेशन करता है फिर हायर
सुपरवायजर के पास चैकिं ग के लिये जाता है अगर कै लकु लेशन सही मिला तो पेमेन्ट
वाउचर बनाया जाता है सब फारमल्टी पूरी होने के बाद सक्षम अधिकारी के पास, पास
होने के लिये आता है फिर चैक बनने लेखा विभाग में जाता है। फिर चैक बनने के बाद
चैक पर दो काउण्टर साइन होता है और उसके बाद उसे डिस्पैच सेक्शन भेजा जाता
है जहां से डिस्पैच होता है। संबंधित लिपिक ने जो लेजर में एन्ट्री थी उसी के आधार
पर अपनी प्रक्रिया किया था । लेजर में एन्ट्री गलत कराई गई थी, थी नहीं। यह सही है
कि एन्ट्री कम्प्यूटर में रहती है। यह सही है कि भुगतान के पूर्व पार्टी को पोजीशन के
लिये कम्प्यूटर में प्रीमियम चैक किया जाता है परन्तु इस प्रकरण में नही किया गया था
इस प्रकरण में सब कु छ ठीक दिखा था ।"
In para 28, he stated that, " यह सही है कि जब कोई पालिसी सरेण्डर
किया जाता है तो सक्षम अधिकारी का यह डियूटी होता है कि वह सारी बातों को चेक
करे और सन्तुष्ट होने के बाद ही सरेण्डर वैल्यू को रिफण्ड करनें के लिये सेंक्शन करे।
यह सही है कि सब चीज इसलिये चेक करना होता है क्योकि यदि गलत पेमेंट हो
जावेगा तो उसके ऊपर जिम्मेदारी आएगी ।"
In para 29, he stated that, " मेरे द्वारा सरेण्डर वैल्यू स्वीकृ त नही किया
गया था बिना रिकार्ड देखे नहीं बता सकता कि किसने स्वीकृ त किया था ।"
In para 31, he stated that, " मेरे ऊपर यह आरोप था कि भुगतान करने
के पूर्व सभी विवरणों की जांच कर पेमेन्ट क्यों नही किया गया। यह सही है कि चैकिं ग
को अंतिम अथॉरिटी मैं ही था परन्तु नियमानुसार असिस्टेन्ट से प्रक्रिया प्रारंभ होती
है। यह सही है कि प्रीमियम का पैसा एजेण्ट या पार्टी कोई भी जमा कर सकता है
कम्पनी को के वल प्रीमियम से मतलब है। पार्टी ने एजेण्ट को पैसा दिया या नहीं या
कब दिया हम नही बता सकते यह सब गुड फे थ में चलता है।"
11. Sudhir Laxman Kate (P.W.-3) stated that cheques marked as
Ex.P/40 to Ex.P/44 had been drawn on the Bank of Baroda,
Bilaspur Branch.
12. Smt. Uma Mishra (P.W.-4) deposed that she had been posted as
an Assistant in LIC Branch No. 1, Bilaspur, and that her duty was
to prepare cheques on the basis of duly sanctioned vouchers. She
stated that after preparation, the cheques were forwarded to the
Accounts Officer and the Branch Manager for their signatures
and, upon their return after signing, she entered the particulars of
the cheques in the cheque-handling register and thereafter sent
them to the dispatch section.
In her cross-examination, she stated that her duty was
confined only to preparation of cheques on the basis of
sanctioned vouchers.
13. Bodhi Singh (P.W.-5) stated that he had purchased two LIC
policies, each for a sum assured of Rs.1,00,000/-, through agent
Vijay Kumar Ojha. He deposed that he paid the premiums for both
policies for about three years, after which the policies lapsed as
he was unable to continue payment of the premiums. He further
stated that he approached his agent Vijay Kumar Ojha for revival
of the policies, whereupon the agent informed him that if he
required money, some amount could be arranged and a certain
deduction would be made from the policy amount. He stated that
thereafter Vijay Kumar Ojha brought him a sum of Rs.14,000/-.
In cross-examination, he stated that the amount of
Rs.14,000/- received by him was in respect of the policy which
had lapsed.
14. Anand Swaroop Gupta (P.W.-6), a handwriting expert, stated that
he had examined the questioned documents and submitted his
report, which was marked as Ex.P/92. In his cross-examination,
he admitted that the specimen/admitted handwriting documents,
on the basis of which he had expressed his opinion, had also
been supplied to him by the CBI.
15. Mukesh Vishwakarma (P.W.-7) deposed regarding the procedure
followed for preparation of vouchers relating to surrendered
policies and stated that such vouchers had been prepared by the
accused Arun Vasant Bapat.
In para 7 of his cross-examination, he stated that," प्र. पी. 95
शालिक राम अग्रवाल और प्र. पी. 96 धनेश प्रसाद अग्रवाल से सम्बंधित है। और
दोनों के साथ दोनों खाताधारकों को ओरिजिनल पालिसी थी जिसे मैंने देखा था। प्र.
पी.95 एवं प्र. पी. 96 में बी से बी भाग पर ए. ओ. श्री एन के रायजादा के हस्ताक्षर
है। यह सही है कि स्लिप बनने के बाद पहले दस्तखत के लिए ए.ओ. के पास जाता है
और उसके दस्तखत के बाद फिर मेरे पास आता है और उसके बाद मेरे व्दारा पेमेंट
वाउचर बनाया जाताहै ।
In para 8, he stated that, " वाउचर बनने के बाद ब्रांच मैनेजर के पास
जाता है उस समय करकटा ब्रांच मैनेजर का प्र.पी.95 एवं प्र. पी. 96 में सी से सी
भाग पर करके टा कलधु हस्ताक्षर है। यह सही है कि ब्रांच मैनेजर की भी जिम्मेदारी है
कि वह डाके ट में जो दस्तावेज है उनकी जाँच करे और रिव्यु स्लिप को भी देखे। और
जब वह देखने के बाद सही पाता है तभी ब्रांच मैनेजर दस्तखत करता है। ए.ओ. की
पूरी जिम्मेदारी है कि वह दस्तावेजों को देखे और जाँच करने के बाद में हस्ताखर करे।
यह सही है कि एस. बी. क्लेम के स के साथ नियमानुसार डी. पी. प्रिंट की कॉपी आनी
चाहिए परन्तु इस प्रकरण में डी. पी. प्रिंट की कॉपी नहीं आया था। मैंने डी. पी. प्रिंट
के सम्बन्ध में के शियर से चर्चा किया और फिर उन्होंने कहा कि लेजर प्रिंट सही है
और डी. पी. प्रिंट नहीं है तो भी पास कर दो मैंने पास कर दिया था। उस समय बहुत
भीड़ भाड़ थी बाकी दस्तावेज सही पाया था इसलिए मैंने डी. पी. प्रिंट नहीं देखा था।
16. Babulal Bande (P.W.-8) stated the procedure relating to
preparation of vouchers and disbursement of payments, and
deposed that he had recorded the statement of accused Arun
Vasant Bapat and prepared his report, which was marked as
Ex.P/98A.
In his cross-examination, he stated that he had not specified
in his report the periods during which the accused Bapat had
worked or the particular sections in which he had been posted. He
further stated that he had not received any duty lists indicating the
periods and sections in which the accused had worked during the
years 1993-1994. He also stated that, as they were not
accustomed to speaking in English and the conversation had
taken place in Hindi, he did not ask the accused to give his
statement in English. He stated that he first recorded the
statement of the accused in Hindi and thereafter translated it into
English.
Further in para 31, he stated that," यह बात सही है कि नियमानुसार
ऋण आवेदन अथवा अन्य आवेदन शाखा प्रबंधक या सुपरवाईजर के माध्यम से ही
सम्बंधित लिपिक के पास कार्यवाही हेतु आना चाहिये । लेकिन मैंने अपनी जांच में
यह पाया था कि उक्त निर्देशों का बिलासपुर शाखा में पालन नहीं हो रहा था। और
आवेदन पत्र ऋण के सबंध में सीधे सम्बंधित लिपिक के पास ही आ रहे थे। और
सम्बंधित, लिपिक द्वारा सीधी कार्यवाही की गई थी। यह बात सही है कि चूंकि लोन के
संबंध में नियमो कापालन जो उपर बताये गये है नहीं किया जा रहा था और इसी
कारण जगदीश प्रसाद तिवारी एवं कु . अंजू पंडित की पालिसी पर भी अभि. बापट द्वारा
बिना किसी उच्च व अथवा सक्षम अधिकारी के आदेश के सीधी कार्यवाही की गई थी।
मैंने पालिसी क्र. 503 जो कि अंजू पंडित के सम्बन्ध में है अलग से यह नहीं लिखा है
कि बापट ने वरिष्ठ अधिकारी के आदेश के बिना सीधी कार्यवाही कर लिया है ।"
In para 32, he stated that, " यह बात सही है कि मैंने प्र. क्र. 64/96 में
अपने बयान में पालिसी क्र. 380503062 जो कु . विभा जगम से सम्बंधित पालिसी
है यह नहीं लिखा कि मैंने अभियुक्त बापट से इस प्रकरण के बारे में पूछा था तो उसने
कथन किया था कि यह दस्तावेज उसी ने तैयार किये है। मेरा दो बार बयान हुआ था
एक बार चौहान ने लिया था और एक बार राजीव कु मार ने बयान लिया था। यह बात
सही है कि मैंने पुलिस बयान मे पूरा प्रोसीजर के बारे में बयान दिया है क्योकि मुझसे
प्रोसीजर के बारे में पूछा गया था। "
17. Salikram Agrawal (P.W.-11) stated that he had purchased an LIC
policy through agent Vijay Kumar Ojha, the policy being marked
as Ex.P/9A. He deposed that as he had not deposited the
premiums, the policy had lapsed. He stated that he had not
submitted any application for surrender of the policy and that the
signature appearing on the surrender form (Ex.P/11) was not his.
He further stated that the payment voucher (Ex.P/109) also did
not bear his signature and that he had never opened any account
in Canara Bank, Bilaspur.
18. Dhanesh Prasad Agrawal (P.W.-12) stated that he had
purchased an insurance policy in the name of his son through
agent Vijay Kumar Ojha, the policy being marked as Ex.P/14, and
that the annual premium of the said policy was Rs.1,812/-. He
stated that he paid the premium for only three years and
thereafter, due to financial constraints, he stopped making
payments. He further stated that he had never submitted any
application for surrender of the policy, had not received any
amount under the said policy, and had never opened any account
in Canara Bank, Bilaspur.
19. Dr. K.K. Dev (P.W.-15), Assistant General Manager, Canara
Bank, stated that Ex.P/55 was the application form for opening a
savings bank account in the name of Salikram Agrawal and
Ex.P/63 was the application form for opening a savings account in
the name of Dhanesh Prasad Agrawal, and that both the account
holders had been introduced/identified by Vijay Kumar Ojha. He
further stated that the ledger sheets marked as Ex.P/117 and
Ex.P/118 had been seized from him by the CBI.
In his cross-examination, he admitted that the signatures on
the said documents had not been made in his presence.
20. Ramchandra Mishra (P.W.-16), Assistant Manager, Urban
Cooperative Bank, stated that a savings bank account had been
opened in the name of Bodhi Singh Thakur on 15.05.1996 and
that the account opening form was marked as Ex.P/70. He
deposed that Bodhi Singh Thakur had been introduced/identified
by Vijay Kumar Ojha, who was an existing account holder of the
bank. He further stated that the account opening form of Rukmini
Singh Thakur, marked as Ex.P/79, related to the wife of Bodhi
Singh Thakur, and that she had also been identified by Vijay
Kumar Ojha.
In para 12 of his cross-examination, he stated that, " यह कहना
सही है कि नागरिक कोआपरेटिव कार्बर्शिल बैंक में बर्ष 1990 में चुनाव हुए थे। यह
कहना सही है कि वर्ष 1990 में हुए चुनाब में अभियुक्त बिजय कु मार ओझा डायरेक्टर
पद के उम्मीदवार थे। यह कहना गलत है कि बिजय कु मार ओझा चुनाव लड़ते समय
मेरी अनिमितताओं को लेकर मुद्दा बनाकर चुनाव लड़े थे जिसके कारण उनसे मेरा
विवाद हो गया था। साक्षी स्वतः कहता है कि उक्त चुनाव निरस्त हो गया था। जिस
समय कि यह घटना है, उस समय ब्रांच मैनेजर के पद पर बद्रीप्रसाद शर्मा थे।"
In para 13, he stated that, " बैंक में खाता खोलने एवं पैसा निकालने के
संबंध में वेरिफिके शन ब्रांच मैनेजर करता है, उनकी अनुपस्थिति से उक्त कार्य मेरे द्वारा
किया जाता है। यह कहना सही है कि प्रदर्श पी -70 का परिचय देने वाले का नाम एवं
हस्ताक्षर दोनो कक्ष प्रभारी के समक्ष निष्पादित किये गये थे। पैसा निकालने बाबत्
प्रदर्श पी-74, पी-75, पी-76 एवं पी-77 में किये गये हस्ताक्षर का बेरीफिके शन नमूना
हस्ताक्षर कार्ड से कक्ष प्रभारी सुश्री मीना रजक के द्वारा किये गये थे। उक्त
बेरीफिके शन मेरे द्वारा नहीं किया गया था। प्रदर्श पी-78 की लिखाबट और ज्ञापन का
निष्पादन कक्ष प्रभारी सुश्री मीनारजक के समक्ष किया गया था। मेरे समक्ष नहीं हुआ
था। प्रदर्श पी-78 का आवेदन मेरे समक्ष कक्ष प्रभारी ने प्रस्तुत किया था, इसलिए
खाता बंद करने की स्वीकृ ति में हस्ताक्षर मेरे द्वारा किया गया है।"
21. In Indrajeet Singh Solanki and other connected matters
decided in Criminal Appeal No. 712/2007, this Court, vide
judgment dated 12.12.2025, held in paras 34, 35 and 37 as
under:-
34.In the matter of Sheila Sebastian (supra), the
Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paras 26 to 30 of the
judgment, held as under:-
"26. The definition of "false document" is a part
of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read
together. "Forgery" and "fraud" are essentially
matters of evidence which could be proved as a
fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn
from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is
no finding recorded by the trial court that the
respondents have made any false document or
part of the document/record to execute
mortgage deed under the guise of that "false
document". Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor
Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the
forged documents. It is the imposter who can
be said to have made the false document by
committing forgery. In such an event the trial
court as well as the appellate court misguided
themselves by convicting the accused.
Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted
the accused based on the settled legal position
and we find no reason to interfere with the
same.
27. A reasonable doubt has already been
thoroughly explained in Latesh v. State of
Maharashtra wherein "reasonable doubt" has
been enunciated by this Court as (at SCC p. 83,
para 46) "a mean between excessive caution
and excessive indifference to a doubt, further it
has been elaborated that reasonable doubt
must be a practical one and not an abstract
theoretical hypothesis".
28. In this case at hand, the imposter has not
been found or investigated into by the officer
concerned. Nothing has been spilled on the
relationship between the imposter and
Respondent 1. Law is well settled with regard to
the fact that however strong the suspicion may
be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong
suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot
take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast
upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does
not take place of the legal proof. In this case,
the trial court as well as the appellate court got
carried away by the fact that accused is the
beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage
deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the first transaction i.e. PoA as a
fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard
of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond
reasonable doubt because the right to personal
liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by
the standard of preponderance of probability.
29. This case on hand is a classic example of
poor prosecution and shabby investigation
which resulted in the acquittal of the accused.
The investigating officer is expected to be
diligent while discharging his duties. He has to
be fair, transparent and his only endeavour
should be to find out the truth The investigating
officer has not even taken bare minimum care
to find out the whereabouts of the imposter who
executed the PoA. The evidence on record
clearly reveals that PoA was not executed by
the complainant and the beneficiary is the
accused, still the accused could not be
convicted. The laches in the lopsided
investigation goes to the root of the matter and
fatal to the case of prosecution. If this is the
coordination between the prosecution and the
investigating agency, every criminal case tend
to end up in acquittal. In the process, the
common man will lose confidence on the
criminal justice delivery system, which is not a
good symptom. It is the duty of the investigating
officer, prosecution as well as the courts to
ensure that full and material facts and evidence
are brought on record, so that there is no scope
for miscarriage of justice.
30. Although we acknowledge the appellant's
plight who has suffered due to alleged acts of
forgery, but we are not able to appreciate the
appellant's contentions as a penal statute
cannot be expanded by using implications.
Section 464 IPC makes it clear that only the
one who makes a false document can be held
liable under the aforesaid provision. It must be
borne in mind that where there exists no
ambiguity, there lies no scope for interpretation
The contentions of the appellant are contrary to
the provision and contrary to the settled law.
The prosecution could not succeed to prove the
offence of forgery by adducing cogent and
reliable evidence. Apart from that, it is not as
though the appellant is remediless. She has a
common law remedy of instituting a suit
challenging the validity and binding nature of
the mortgage deed and it is brought to our
notice that already the competent civil court has
cancelled the mortgage deed and the appellant
got back the property."
22. Further in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held in paras 18 to 20 as under:-
"18. We are unable to accept her submission on
this score too. There is nothing on record to show
the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake
document which is a sine qua non to attract
Section 465 IPC [punishment for forgery]. In fact,
the original fabricated document had not been
recovered.
19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj [(2018) 7
SCC 581, para 25], this Court held to attract
Section 464 IPC [Making a false document], the
prosecution must establish that the accused had
made the fake document. No material connecting
the appellant to the making of the fake document
has been adduced in the impugned charge sheet.
20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC
[forgery for purpose of cheating] and Section 471
IPC are not attracted, as the requisite mens rea,
i.e., dishonest intention to cause wrongful loss to
the Education Department and wrongful gain to
himself has not been demonstrated as the
issuance of the recognition was not dependent on
the production of the alleged forged NOC."
23. Further in the matter of Vishal Noble Singh (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paras 17 to 21 and 24 as
under:-
17. On a reading of the FIR as well as the
charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences
aforestated is made out at all. We do not find
any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating
by impersonation. There is also no cheating
and dishonestly inducing delivery of property,
nor has any documents referred to any
forgery or security or any forgery for the
purpose of cheating. There is no reference to
any document which has been forged so as
to be used as a genuine document and much
less is as there any criminal conspiracy which
can be imputed to the appellants herein in the
absence of any offence being made out vis-a-
vis the aforesaid Sections.
18. In this regard, our attention was drawn to
paras 42-44 and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami
v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1,
dealing with Sections 420 and 467 IPC, which
are extracted hereunder with regard to
Section 420 IPC, it was observed thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it
is manifest that in the definition there are two
separate classes of acts which the person
deceived may be induced to do. In the first
class of acts he may be induced fraudulently
or dishonestly to deliver property to any
person. The second class of acts is the doing
or omitting to do anything which the person
deceived would not do or omit to do if he
were not so deceived In the first class of
cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or
dishonest. In the second class of acts, the
inducing must be intentional but need not be
fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the
intention which is the gist of the offence. To
hold a person guilty of cheating it is
necessary to show that he had a fraudulent
or dishonest intention at the time of making
the promise From his mere failure to
subsequently keep a promise, one cannot
presume that he all along had a culpable
intention to break the promise from the
beginning.
43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of
Section 467 IPC.
44. The following ingredients are essential
for commission of the offence under Section
467 1PC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it;
3. the document is one of the kinds
enumerated in the aforementioned section.
* * *
46. The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta
or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the
accused. On analysis of the aforementioned
cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible rule that would govern the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC
though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is
Justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the statute itself and in the aforementioned
cases. In view of the settled legal position,
the Impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
(emphasis by us)
19. On a careful consideration of the
aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that
none of the offences alleged against the
Accused-Appellants herein is made out. In
fact, we find that the allegations of criminal
intent and other allegations against the
Accused-Appellants herein have been made
with a malafide intent and therefore, the
Judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5
and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above,
squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It
is neither expedient nor in the interest of
justice to permit the present prosecution to
continue.
20. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre,
(1988) 1 SCC 692, reasoned that the criminal
process cannot be utilized for any oblique
purpose and held that while Entertaining an
application for quashing an FIR at the initial
stage, the test to be applied is whether the
uncontroverted allegations prima facie
establish the offence This Court also
concluded that the court should quash those
criminal cases where the chances of an
ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful
purpose is likely to be served by continuation
of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid
observations squarely apply to this case.
21. We find that in recent years the machinery
of criminal justice is being misused by certain
persons for their vested interests and for
achieving their oblique motives and agenda.
Courts have therefore to be vigilant against
such tendencies and ensure that acts of
omission and commission having an adverse
impact on the fabric of our society must be
nipped in the bud.
24. We also find that the reliance by the High
Court upon the judgment of this Court in
Neeharika Infrastructure is not apposite. The
facts in the aforementioned case and the
present case are quite different. The
aforementioned case concerned a special
leave petition filed by a complainant
aggrieved by an interim order of the Bombay
High Court that granted protection to the
applicant therein from 'coercive steps'. The
grievance of the complainant in that case was
that one-and-half-years after securing
protection from arrest from the Sessions
Court, the accused had filed a Writ Petition
before the Bombay High Court to quash the
FIR. Accordingly, this Court had quashed the
interim order of 'no coercive steps' and
cautioned against the practice of directing 'no
coercive steps' while dismissing applications
under Section 482 of CrPC. This Court had
also clarified that it was not expressing any
view on merits of the application for quashing
of the FIR in the said case. Therefore, the
High Court ought not to have relied upon the
said judgment to deny the relief to the present
Accused-Appellants."
24. Upon a close and careful scrutiny of the testimonies of all the
prosecution witnesses, it becomes evident that no direct
documentary evidence has been produced by the prosecution
specifically against the accused/appellants, namely Arun Vasant
Bapat, Manne Singh Thakur and Jamuna Bai. However, on the
basis of the statements of the bank officials and the documents
marked as Ex. P/5, Ex. P/63, Ex. P/70 and Ex. P/79, which were
duly identified by witness Vijay Kumar Ojha, it has come on record
that the alleged account holders, Salikram Agrawal (P.W.-11) and
Dhanesh Prasad Agrawal (P.W.-12) have categorically deposed
before the Court that they never submitted any application for
opening an account in Canara Bank, Bilaspur.
25. The prosecution evidence further reveals that the procedure in
the LIC office involved several stages of scrutiny and verification
and incorporated multiple safeguards before any policy transaction
could be completed. Despite the existence of such internal checks,
the prosecution has merely presumed that vouchers were
prepared in the names of lapsed or dead policies and, on that
basis, implicated the present appellants.
26. A careful reading of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses does not disclose as to how the appellants namely Arun
Vasant Bapat, Manne Singh Thakur and Jamuna Bai entered into
any criminal conspiracy or participated in the preparation of any
forged policy documents. Even the LIC officials admitted the
presence of various internal checks, yet no specific, reliable, or
admissible evidence has been brought on record to establish that
the appellants either bypassed those checks or played any active
role in the alleged forgery. In the absence of clear and cogent
proof of conspiracy, dishonest intention, or wrongful gain on the
part of Arun Vasant Bapat, Manne Singh Thakur and Jamuna Bai,
the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against them
beyond reasonable doubt.
27. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, vide order dated 22.03.2001 passed in CRR No.
550/1997, discharged the appellant Vijay Kumar Ojha from the
offence under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act on the ground that he was not a
public servant. However, the learned trial Court failed to consider
the said order while framing charges on 24.01.2007 and again
framed charges under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, which corresponds to the old
provision, despite the earlier discharge.
28. Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code defines forgery as
under:
"Whoever makes any false document or false
electronic record or part of a document or electronic
record, with intent to cause damage or injury to the
public or to any person, or to support any claim or title,
or to cause any person to part with property, or to
enter into any express or implied contract, or with
intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed,
commits forgery."
29. Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code provides
punishment for forgery and reads as under:
"Whoever commits forgery shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
30. From the evidence on record, it is established that Vijay
Kumar Ojha was functioning only as an insurance agent. The
material on record indicates that he identified certain persons
incorrectly; however, there is no sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction under Sections 420, 468, 471, 477A read with Section
120-B of IPC or under the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. His act, at best, attracts the ingredients of making
or facilitating a false document, thereby constituting an offence
punishable under Section 465 of IPC.
31. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 631/2007 filed by Arun
Vasant Bapat, Manne Singh Thakur and Jamuna Bai is allowed.
They are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them.
32. The Criminal Appeal No. 600/2007 is partly allowed. The
conviction of the appellant, Vijay Kumar Ojha for the offences
punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 477A read with
Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 13(1)
(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges.
However, the appellant- Vijay Kumar Ojha is held guilty and stands
convicted for the offence punishable under Section 465 of the
Indian Penal Code.
33. As regards the sentence to be awarded to the appellant-
Vijay Kumar Ojha for the offence punishable under Section 465 of
the Indian Penal Code, it is evident from the record that at the time
of the impugned judgment he was about 56 years of age and he is
presently more than 70 years old. It has further come on record
that the entire amount relating to LIC has already been
deposited/returned by him. The offence under Section 465 of the
Indian Penal Code is punishable with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both. Having regard to the advanced age of the appellant,
the long lapse of time since the incident and the overall facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court considers it just and proper
to sentence the appellant Vijay Kumar Ojha to payment of a fine of
Rs.10,000/- in lieu of a custodial sentence. In default of payment
of the said fine, the appellant shall undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a period of six months. Any amount of fine, if already deposited
by the appellant, shall be adjusted towards the aforesaid fine
amount.
34. Appellants- Arun Vasant Bapat, Manne Singh Thakur and
Jamuna Bai are reported to be on bail and, therefore keeping in
view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the
B.N.S.S.), appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal
bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in the like
amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a
period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of
filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for
grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof
shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
35. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record
be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and
necessary action if, any.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey)
JUDGE
Ruchi
RUCHI YADAV RUCHI YADAV
