Avinash Pandit vs Union Of India
2026 Latest Caselaw 64 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Avinash Pandit vs Union Of India on 26 February, 2026

Author: Rajani Dubey

Bench: Rajani Dubey

                                    1




                                                           2026:CGHC:10082


        The date when      The date when         The date when the
        the judgment      the judgment is judgment is uploaded on
          is reserved       pronounced               the website

                                               Operative           Full

          09.12.2025         26.02.2026             --         26.02.2026



                                                                  NAFR

          HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                  Judgment reserved on: 09.12.2025
                 Judgment delivered on: 26.02.2026

                         CRA No. 820 of 2005

1 - Avinash Pandit, S/o Late Shri Mahabir Pandit, Aged about 62 years,

Officer Superintendent, D.R.M.'s Office, Bilaspur, R/o House No. 77/1,

New Housing Colony Near Ganesh Mandir, Bilaspur,

Present Address- Kasim Para, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

                                                            --- Appellant


                                 versus


1 - Union of India through: Central Bureau of Investigation, Jabalpur.
                                                         --- Respondent(s)

With

1 - Arun Vasant Bapat, S/o Vasant Vinayak Aged About 42 Years

Resident of C-6, Parijat Colony Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.)

---Appellant

Versus

1 - Union of India, Through C.B.I. Anti Corruption Branch Jabalpur

(M.P.)

--- Respondent(s)

For Appellants : Mr. D.N. Prajapati and Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocates

For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Gopa Kumar, Advocate

Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

CAV Judgment

1. Since both the appeals arise out of the same impugned judgment,

they are heard together and are being disposed of by this

common judgment.

2. The present appeal, filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 18.10.2005 passed by the

learned Special Judge (Central Bureau of Investigation), Raipur,

Chhattisgarh, in Special Criminal Case No. 23/2004. By the

impugned judgment, the appellants-accused were convicted for

the offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 read with

Sections 120-B, 420/120-B, 420/120-B, 471 and 477-A read with

Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year along with

a fine of Rs. 200/- for each of the said offences. The appellants

were further convicted for the offence punishable under Sections

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, and

were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of

one year with a fine of Rs. 200/-. In default of payment of fine, the

appellants were directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment

for a period of two years for each offence.

3. According to the prosecution (CBI), during 1994-95 the appellant,

in conspiracy with co-accused Avinash Pandit, fraudulently

procured sanction and disbursement of an LIC loan of

Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of Anju Pandit against a fictitious policy. It

is alleged that the appellant fabricated policy documents, forged

signatures and falsely showed transfer of the policy from

Ambikapur to Bilaspur, thereby cheating LIC. After completion of

the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the

appellants and the learned Trial Court thereafter framed charges

against them accordingly, to which appellants abjured their guilt

and claimed to be tried.

4. To establish its case, the prosecution examined 19 witnesses. The

statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they

denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them

and claimed innocence as well as false implication. They did not

adduce any evidence in their defence.

5. The learned trial Court, upon appreciating the oral and

documentary evidence available on record convicted and

sentenced the appellants as detailed in para 2 of this judgment.

Hence, this appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Trial

Court has gravely erred in law and on facts in convicting the

appellants. The findings of guilt are against the weight of evidence

and rest on conjectures and surmises. Material facts, including the

lack of authority of the Branch Manager to sanction the loan and

the handwriting expert's opinion not supporting the prosecution

case, were overlooked. The impugned judgment is therefore

unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court

dated 23.03.2012 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 982 of 2004

and other connected appeals in Shivmangal Satnami and

another v. State of Chhattisgarh as well as the judgment dated

19.08.2025 passed in CRA No. 294 of 2009 and other connected

appeals in Umesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Trial

Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and returned

findings of guilt based on proved acts and surrounding

circumstances. The Trial Court has duly considered all material

evidence, and no perversity or illegality is shown. The impugned

judgment is legal, reasonedand warrants no interference.

Reliance has been placed on the decision of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the matter of Reena Hazarika Vs. State of

Assam reported in (2019) 13 SCC 289.

8. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available

on record.

9. From the record of the learned Trial Court, it transpires that

charges were framed against the accused Arun Vasant Bapat and

Avinash Pandit under Sections 468, 471 read with Section 120-B

IPC; Section 420 read with Section 120-B IPC; 420 read with

120B of IPC, Section 471 and 477-A read with Section 120-B IPC;

and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988.

10. It was not in dispute before the learned Trial Court that the

appellant/accused Arun Vasant Bapat was posted as an Assistant

in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Branch Office, Bilaspur

during the year 1994-1995.

11. M. Karketta (P.W.-3), the then Senior Branch Manager of LIC,

deposed that the accused Arun Vasant Bapat had been posted as

an Assistant at Bilaspur on transfer from Ambikapur. He stated

that a policy of Anju Pandit (Ex.P/5) along with a loan application

(Ex.P/6), seeking a loan of Rs.1,00,000/-, was placed before him.

After making inquiry, he signed the application and admitted his

signatures on Ex.P/6 from A to A part and sanctioned a loan of

Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of Anju Pandit. He further stated that

pursuant to the said application, a cheque (Ex.P/7) was issued in

her favour. According to him, initially no fraud was suspected;

however, when a proposal for surrender of the policy of Anju

Pandit was received for the second time, suspicion arose. Upon

inquiry, it was revealed that the policy (Ex.P/5) had not been

transferred from Ambikapur to Bilaspur. Thereafter, a registered

letter was sent to Anju Pandit (Ex.P/8).

He further stated that he addressed a letter to the Branch

Manager, Punjab National Bank, Budhwari Bazar, Bilaspur

seeking information regarding the bank accounts of Anju Pandit

(Ex.P/9). He also submitted a report concerning the proceedings

to the Senior Divisional Manager, Raipur (Ex.P/11) and admitted

his signatures thereon from portion A to A. He deposed that he

personally visited the Ambikapur branch and came to know that

the policy in question was not in the name of Anju Pandit but

stood in the name of some other person.

In cross-examination, he stated that during his inquiry at the

Ambikapur Branch he found the policy to be in the name of

another person, though he expressed inability to disclose that

person's name. He denied the suggestion that he had deliberately

sanctioned the loan wrongly.

In para 12, he stated that, "सामान्यतः जो पेपर ट्रांसफर होकर आते हैं

उसकी सत्यता की जांच की जाती है परन्तु मेरे पास जो पेपर आये थे वह प्रोपर आर्डर

में था इसलिए मैंने अलग से सेंक्शान करने के पूर्व सत्यता के संबंध में सत्यापन नहीं

किया था।"

He denied this suggestion of defence that, "सी.बी. आई. वालो ने

मुझे जाँच के समय रेलवे रिटायरिंग रूम में नहीं बुलाया था किसी को बुलाया गया था

या नहीं मैं नहीं बता सकता। मुझसे तो ऑफिस में पूछताछ किये थे। यह कहना

गलत है कि मुझे तीन चार दिन तक सी.बी. आई. वालो ने रेलवे रिटायरिंग रूम में

बुलाया था मैं नहीं बता सकता कि नितिन लाल, वाशिंग, रायजादा को रेलवे रिटायरिंग

रूम में सी.बी. आई. वालो ने बुलाया था कि नहीं। यह कहना गलत है कि बिलासपुर

ब्रांच के सारे कागजात लेकर जो पालिसी प्रपोजल में, लोन में लगते है उसे लेकर रेलवे

रिटायरिंग रूम में सी.बी. आई. वालो के पास गया था। यह कहना गलत है कि फिर

सी.बी. आई. वालो ने सारे कागजात रेलवे रिटायरिंग रूम में दुबारा टाइप करवाए थे

और बापट से दस्तखत करवाए थे, यह कहना गलत है कि कि इसी तरह सारे

पॉलिसियां जिनके मामले इस न्यायालय में चल रहे है उन्हें बदलकर दुबारा टाइप

करवाया गया भरवाया गया और बापट से दस्तखत करवाया गया।"

12. G.R. Wasing (P.W.-4) deposed that he was posted as an Upper

Division Clerk and that in such capacity, his duties included

verifying the calculation sheet, i.e., the review slip, prepared at the

time of granting a loan against a policy or at the time of surrender

of a policy.

In para 3, he stated that,"अभियुक्त ए. बी. बापट का सहायक के पद पर

यह कार्य था कि कोई पॉलिसी ट्रांसफर होकर आये तो उसका एंट्री करे और रिकॉर्ड

मैंटेन करे और इसी प्रकार हमारे कार्यालय से जाने वाली पालिसी का भी उसी तरह

ट्रांसफर करता था। "

He further deposed that one Nitin Lal was also posted as an

Assistant and that it was his duty to prepare the review slip for the

loan. He stated that Ex.P/6 was the loan application of Anju Pandit

and Ex.P/5 was the policy bond, and that, on the basis of Ex.P/5

and Ex.P/6, a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- was sanctioned in the name of

Anju Pandit.

In para 12, he stated that," यह सही है कि पालिसी के चैकिं ग के संबंध

में हमारे कार्यालय में कई चेक पॉइंट है यह सही है कि कम्प्यूटर फीडिंग भी एक चैक

पाइंट है। यह सही है कि ट्रांसफर इन रजिस्टर भी एक चैक पाइंट है जिसमें बाहर से

ट्रांसफर में आने वाले पालिसी और इस कार्यालय से ट्रांसफर की जाने वाली पालिसी

का उल्लेख रहता है। यह जरुरी नहीं है कि जो पालिसी ट्रांस. होकर आती है उसके

साथ जो लेजर का पाना आता है उसमें संबंधित शाखा के ब्रान्च मैनेजर के हस्ता. व

सील होती है। यह सही है कि जो लेजर पाना आता है उसमें कब तक का प्रीमियम

भुगतान किया है का विवरण दिया रहता है।"

13. Maina Lal (P.W.-6,), deposed that he was acquainted with the

accused Avinash Pandit. He stated that the said accused had

informed him of his intention to open a bank account in the name

of his daughter at Punjab National Bank and requested him to act

as an identifier. He further stated that he accompanied Avinash

Pandit to the bank for that purpose. The account opening form

was marked as Ex.P/19, and he admitted his signatures thereon

from portion A to A.

14. Uma Mishra (P.W.-7), deposed that she was posted as an

Assistant in the Accounts Section at Bilaspur. She stated that her

duty, in that capacity, was to prepare cheques on the basis of

vouchers that had been passed. She further stated that cheque

Ex.P/7, for an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of Anju Pandit,

was prepared by her on the basis of the relevant voucher.

15. Nitin Lal (P.W.-8,), deposed that he was posted as an Assistant in

LIC. He stated that, as per the policy bond (Ex.P/5), Anju Pandit

had submitted a loan application (Ex.P/6) and a loan of

Rs.1,00,000/- was sanctioned in her name. He further stated that

after about four months, Anju Pandit again submitted an

application (Ex.P/16) seeking surrender of Rs.1,00,000/- along

with the bond (Ex.P/14).

16. Shankar Singh Rathore (P.W.-9), Manager, LIC, deposed that the

loan had been sanctioned in the name of Anju Pandit. He stated

that Policy No. 380912912 (Ex.P/5) had not been issued from the

Ambikapur Branch in the name of Anju Pandit and that his

signatures did not appear anywhere on Ex.P/5. He further stated

that the forwarding letter regarding transfer of the policy (Ex.D/7)

had not been issued by the Ambikapur Branch and that his

signatures were not found on the proposal form (Ex.D/2) or on

Ex.D/3, Ex.D/4, Ex.D/5 and Ex.P/20.

In para 8 of his cross-examination, he stated that," मैं नहीं बता

सकता कि मिस अंजू पण्डित एडीशनल जज के नाम से कोई पालसी अंबिकापुर शाखा

में दर्ज था या नहीं। मुझसे सी.बी.आई वालों ने अंजू पण्डित एडिशनल जज के संबंध

में पूछताछ किया था या नहीं, ध्यान नही है परन्तु जो कु छ मुझसे जानकारी मांगा था

उसके संबंध में मैंने प्रपी -23 के द्वारा जानकारी दिया था। महेन्द्र अग्रवाल के नाम पर

पॉलिसी क्र. 380912912 महेंद्र कु मार अग्रवाल के नाम पर अंबिकापुर शाखा के

रजिस्टर में दर्ज था और इसी के आधार पर मैंने जानकारी दिया है। साक्षी ने कहा कि

निश्चित रूप से बता सकता हूँ कि पॉलिसी क्र. 380912912 अंबिकापुर शाखा से

अंजू पंडित एडिशनल जज के नाम पर जारी नहीं हुआ है। "

17. Govindram Patel (P.W.-11), deposed that he was posted in the

dispatch section. He stated that the entries at page 200 of Article

'C', from portion A to A, were in his handwriting and pertained to

dispatch by registered post of cheque No. 213298 for an amount

of Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of Ms. A. Pandit, relating to Policy No.

380912912. He further stated that accused Arun Vasant Bapat

had enquired from him whether the cheque of A. Pandit had been

received from the accounts section and told him that A. Pandit

was a Judge known to him and requested that the work be

expedited.

18. Anju Pandit (P.W.-16), deposed that Avinash Pandit was her

father. She stated that she had neither taken any policy from the

Life Insurance Corporation nor submitted any application in that

regard. She denied her signatures on Ex.P/4 and Ex.P/5. She,

however, admitted her signatures on Ex.P/19, being the bank

account opening form of Punjab National Bank, and stated that

the account had been opened on the advice of her father. She

also admitted her signatures on Ex.P/24, Ex.P/25, Ex.P/26,

Ex.P/27 and Ex.P/33.

19. H.M. Saxena (P.W.-17), Handwriting Expert, deposed that he

examined the disputed signatures and submitted his report

(Ex.P/52). In cross-examination, he admitted that the documents

and handwriting samples had been supplied to him by the CBI for

examination and that the specimen writings had not been taken in

his presence.

20. The principal allegation of the prosecution is that the accused

persons, acting in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, fabricated

and forged insurance policies and misrepresented them as

genuine transfer policies, on the basis of which, the

accused/appellants dishonestly withdrew and misappropriated the

funds.

21. The allegation against accused Arun Vasant Bapat is that, while

posted as an Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation, he, in

collusion with co-accused Avinash Pandit, entered into a criminal

conspiracy and prepared forged and fictitious insurance policies. It

is further alleged that they utilized the policy numbers of lapsed

("dead") policies, in respect of which the policyholders had failed

to deposit the requisite instalments, and on that basis fraudulently

prepared fixed payment vouchers, pursuant to which payments

were dishonestly released.

22. In Indrajeet Singh Solanki and other connected matters

decided in Criminal Appeal No. 712/2007, this Court, vide

judgment dated 12.12.2025, held in paras 34, 35 and 37 as

under:-

34.In the matter of Sheila Sebastian (supra), the Hon'ble

Apex Court has, in paras 26 to 30 of the judgment, held as

under:-

"26. The definition of "false document" is a part of the

definition of "forgery". Both must be read together.

"Forgery" and "fraud" are essentially matters of

evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct

evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In

the case in hand, there is no finding recorded by the

trial court that the respondents have made any false

document or part of the document/record to execute

mortgage deed under the guise of that "false

document". Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor

Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the forged

documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have

made the false document by committing forgery. In

such an event the trial court as well as the appellate

court misguided themselves by convicting the

accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly

acquitted the accused based on the settled legal

position and we find no reason to interfere with the

same.

27. A reasonable doubt has already been thoroughly

explained in Latesh v. State of Maharashtra wherein

"reasonable doubt" has been enunciated by this Court

as (at SCC p. 83, para 46) "a mean between

excessive caution and excessive indifference to a

doubt, further it has been elaborated that reasonable

doubt must be a practical one and not an abstract

theoretical hypothesis".

28. In this case at hand, the imposter has not been

found or investigated into by the officer concerned.

Nothing has been spilled on the relationship between

the imposter and Respondent 1. Law is well settled

with regard to the fact that however strong the

suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof.

Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot

take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast upon the

courts to ensure that suspicion does not take place of

the legal proof. In this case, the trial court as well as

the appellate court got carried away by the fact that

accused is the beneficiary or the executant of the

mortgage deed, where the prosecution miserably

failed to prove the first transaction i.e. PoA as a

fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard of

proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable

doubt because the right to personal liberty of a citizen

can never be taken away by the standard of

preponderance of probability.

29. This case on hand is a classic example of poor

prosecution and shabby investigation which resulted

in the acquittal of the accused. The investigating

officer is expected to be diligent while discharging his

duties. He has to be fair, transparent and his only

endeavour should be to find out the truth The

investigating officer has not even taken bare minimum

care to find out the whereabouts of the imposter who

executed the PoA. The evidence on record clearly

reveals that PoA was not executed by the

complainant and the beneficiary is the accused, still

the accused could not be convicted. The laches in the

lopsided investigation goes to the root of the matter

and fatal to the case of prosecution. If this is the

coordination between the prosecution and the

investigating agency, every criminal case tend to end

up in acquittal. In the process, the common man will

lose confidence on the criminal justice delivery

system, which is not a good symptom. It is the duty of

the investigating officer, prosecution as well as the

courts to ensure that full and material facts and

evidence are brought on record, so that there is no

scope for miscarriage of justice.

30. Although we acknowledge the appellant's plight

who has suffered due to alleged acts of forgery, but

we are not able to appreciate the appellant's

contentions as a penal statute cannot be expanded

by using implications. Section 464 IPC makes it clear

that only the one who makes a false document can be

held liable under the aforesaid provision. It must be

borne in mind that where there exists no ambiguity,

there lies no scope for interpretation The contentions

of the appellant are contrary to the provision and

contrary to the settled law. The prosecution could not

succeed to prove the offence of forgery by adducing

cogent and reliable evidence. Apart from that, it is not

as though the appellant is remediless. She has a

common law remedy of instituting a suit challenging

the validity and binding nature of the mortgage deed

and it is brought to our notice that already the

competent civil court has cancelled the mortgage

deed and the appellant got back the property."

23. Further in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), Hon'ble

Supreme Court held in paras 18 to 20 as under:-

"18. We are unable to accept her submission on this

score too. There is nothing on record to show the

appellant had manufactured the alleged fake document

which is a sine qua non to attract Section 465 IPC

[punishment for forgery]. In fact, the original fabricated

document had not been recovered.

19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj [(2018) 7 SCC

581, para 25], this Court held to attract Section 464 IPC

[Making a false document], the prosecution must

establish that the accused had made the fake document.

No material connecting the appellant to the making of

the fake document has been adduced in the impugned

charge sheet.

20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC [forgery for

purpose of cheating] and Section 471 IPC are not

attracted, as the requisite mens rea, i.e., dishonest

intention to cause wrongful loss to the Education

Department and wrongful gain to himself has not been

demonstrated as the issuance of the recognition was not

dependent on the production of the alleged forged

NOC."

24. Further in the matter of Vishal Noble Singh (supra), the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paras 17 to 21 and 24 as

under:-

17. On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-

sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated

is made out at all. We do not find any criminal

breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation.

There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing

delivery of property, nor has any documents

referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for

the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to

any document which has been forged so as to be

used as a genuine document and much less is as

there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed

to the appellants herein in the absence of any

offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid

Sections.

18. In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras

42-44 and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of

Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, dealing with

Sections 420 and 467 IPC, which are extracted

hereunder with regard to Section 420 IPC, it was

observed thus:

"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is

manifest that in the definition there are two

separate classes of acts which the person

deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of

acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly

to deliver property to any person. The second class

of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which

the person deceived would not do or omit to do if

he were not so deceived In the first class of cases,

the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the

second class of acts, the inducing must be

intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest.

Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the

offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is

necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or

dishonest intention at the time of making the

promise From his mere failure to subsequently

keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all

along had a culpable intention to break the promise

from the beginning.

43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of Section 467 IPC.

44. The following ingredients are essential for commission of the offence under Section 467 1PC:

1. the document in question so forged;

2. the accused who forged it;

3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the aforementioned section.

*                   *                           *

46.   The   court       must   ensure    that       criminal

prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is Justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the Impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

(emphasis

by us)

19. On a careful consideration of the

aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that none of

the offences alleged against the Accused-

Appellants herein is made out. In fact, we find that

the allegations of criminal intent and other

allegations against the Accused-Appellants herein

have been made with a malafide intent and

therefore, the Judgment of this Court in the case of

Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5

and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely

apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither

expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the

present prosecution to continue.

20. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC

692, reasoned that the criminal process cannot be

utilized for any oblique purpose and held that while

Entertaining an application for quashing an FIR at

the initial stage, the test to be applied is whether

the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish

the offence This Court also concluded that the court

should quash those criminal cases where the

chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no

useful purpose is likely to be served by continuation

of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid

observations squarely apply to this case.

21. We find that in recent years the machinery of

criminal justice is being misused by certain persons

for their vested interests and for achieving their

oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore

to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure

that acts of omission and commission having an

adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be

nipped in the bud.

24. We also find that the reliance by the High Court

upon the judgment of this Court in Neeharika

Infrastructure is not apposite. The facts in the

aforementioned case and the present case are

quite different. The aforementioned case concerned

a special leave petition filed by a complainant

aggrieved by an interim order of the Bombay High

Court that granted protection to the applicant

therein from 'coercive steps'. The grievance of the

complainant in that case was that one-and-half-

years after securing protection from arrest from the

Sessions Court, the accused had filed a Writ

Petition before the Bombay High Court to quash the

FIR. Accordingly, this Court had quashed the

interim order of 'no coercive steps' and cautioned

against the practice of directing 'no coercive steps'

while dismissing applications under Section 482 of

CrPC. This Court had also clarified that it was not

expressing any view on merits of the application for

quashing of the FIR in the said case. Therefore, the

High Court ought not to have relied upon the said

judgment to deny the relief to the present Accused-

Appellants."

25. Upon careful consideration of the entire evidence available

on record, including the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

and the documentary material produced before this Court, it is

evident that the prosecution has only been able to establish that at

the relevant time, the accused, Arun Vasant Bapat was working as

an Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). It is further

shown that certain cheques were issued in favour of policyholders

in respect of policies shown as transferred. Upon enquiry, it was

revealed that several policies were dead policies and were never

actually transferred from the Ambikapur Branch to the Bilaspur

Branch.

26. M. Karketta (P.W.-3), Senior Manager and G.R. Wasing (P.W.-

4), Upper Division Clerk have clearly admitted that their duties

included verification of the calculation sheets, i.e., the review slips,

prepared at the time of granting a loan against a policy or at the

time of surrender of a policy. As per the testimony of G.R. Wasing

(P.W.-4), the accused Arun Vasant Bapat was posted merely as an

Assistant and his duty was limited to maintaining the record of

transferred policies.

27. H.M. Saxena (P.W.-17), the handwriting expert, also

admitted in his cross-examination that the questioned documents

and handwriting samples were supplied to him by the CBI for

examination and that the specimen handwriting of the accused

had not been obtained in his presence.

28. The prosecution evidence itself shows that the LIC office

procedure involved several stages of checking and verification,

with multiple safeguards before any policy transaction was

completed. In spite of this, the prosecution has only assumed that

vouchers were prepared in the names of lapsed or dead policies

and, on that basis, has implicated the accused/appellants.

However, a careful reading of the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses does not explain as to how the appellants, Arun Vasant

Bapat and Avinash Pandit, allegedly entered into any conspiracy

or took part in the preparation of forged policies. The LIC officials

have admitted the existence of many internal checks, yet no

specific, reliable, or admissible evidence has been produced to

show that the appellants bypassed those checks or played any

role in the alleged forgery. In the absence of clear proof of

conspiracy or any wrongful gain to the appellants, the prosecution

has failed to prove the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt.

29. It is a well settled principle of law that suspicion however

strong cannot take place of proof. In the absence of cogent and

legally admissible evidence regarding conspiracy and any active

role of appellants, the prosecution has failed to establish the

foundational facts essential for sustaining charges under Sections

468 and 471 read with Sections 120-B and 420/120-B of the

Indian Penal Code; Sections 420/120-B, 471 and 477-A read with

Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13(1)(d)

read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,

read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.

30. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon appreciation of the

entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has

failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond

reasonable doubt. The case rests merely on suspicion without any

cogent, reliable or legally admissible evidence establishing forgery,

conspiracy, or involvement of the appellants.

31. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The impugned

judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside and the

appellants are hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled against

them.

32. Appellants are reported to be on bail and, therefore keeping

in view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the

B.N.S.S.), appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal

bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal

Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in the like

amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a

period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of

filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for

grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof

shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

33. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record

be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and

necessary action if, any.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey) JUDGE

Ruchi

RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV