For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Yogesh Chandra, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate
1. The petitioners have filed this petition seeking the following relief:-
1) and remand the matter for fresh consideration over the
claim giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
direct the respondent authorities to grant employment to
the petitioner No.2 in the lieu of the land acquired by the
respondent company as per their prevailing Rehibiliation
Policy.
10.3 That, the Hon'ble Court be further pleased to grant
such other relief(s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the
interest of justice and fair play."
2. The facts in brief are that the land bearing survey Nos. 335, 370, 385/2,
387, 388, 569, 570/1, 578, 585, 586, 587, 589/3, 640/2, total
admeasuring 4.47 acres, were earlier recorded in the name of father of
petitioner No. 1, i.e. Girdhari, who died in the year, 1976, thereafter,
petitioner No.1 inherited the aforesaid lands. Later on, the aforesaid
land were acquired by the National Thermal Power Corporation in the
years 1978-1979, and an award was passed on 28.03.1980.
Compensation was also awarded to the landholder to the tune of Rs.
35,950.15. Petitioner No. 2 is the son of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No.
2 applied for employment in lieu of land acquired for construction of
Railway Track on 02.04.2021. As the claim was not considered &
decided, therefore, WPS No. 5044 of 2021 was filed, which was
disposed of vide order dated 21.09.2021 with a direction to the
respondents to decide the claim within a period of three months. The
respondent authorities rejected the claim of the petitioner No.2 vide
order dated 19.01.2022. Against the said order, the present petition has
been preferred.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would argue that the
respondent authorities rejected the claim of the petitioner No.2 on the
ground that at the time of land acquisition, the name of petitioner No.
2 was not nominated by the landholder for employment. It has been
held in the order impugned that only son/daughter or spouse of the
landholder may apply for employment according to the rehabilitation
policy. He would contend that petitioner No. 2 is the son of petitioner
No. 1. Petitioner No.1 is daughter of the original landholder; therefore,
he would come within the definition of "dependent"; thus, the finding
recorded by respondent No. 2 is bad in law and contrary rehabilitation
policy.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
would oppose the submission made by counsel for the petitioners and
submit that the land of the father of petitioner No. 1 was acquired in
the year 1978-79 and immediately thereafter award was passed. He
would contend that the name of petitioner No. 2 was never nominated
by Girdhari for employment. The petition has filed in the year 2021
claiming employment in lieu of land acquisition which was disposed of
with a direction to the respondent authorities to decide the claim of the
petitioner No.2.
5. He would contend that petitioner No. 1, who is daughter of the original
landholder, is claiming employment for her son, who would not come
within the definition of dependent according to the rehabilitation
policy; thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents.
7. In the present case, the land was acquired in the year 1978-79 and
thereafter award was passed; whereas the present petition has been
filed in the year 2022. It is admitted fact that earlier a writ petition was
filed. However, the said petition was disposed of with a direction to the
respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioners and to
take a decision within a period of three months.
8. In the instant petition, the petitioners have claimed employment after
42 years as land was acquired in the year 1978-79 & award was also
passed thereafter. The claim of the petitioner is hit by principle of delay
and latches.
9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v.
Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the
principles with regard to delay & latches in the following manner:-
"7. To summarise, normally, a belated service
related claim will be rejected on the ground of
delay and laches (where remedy is sought by
filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy
is sought by an application to the Administrative
Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is
cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a
service related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a
long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to
the date on which the continuing wrong
commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception to the exception. If the grievance is in
respect of any order or administrative decision
which related to or affected several others also,
and if the reopening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the claim will
not be entertained. For example, if the issue
relates to payment or re fixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as
it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if
the claim involved issues relating to seniority or
promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would
render the claim stale and doctrine of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a
past period is concerned, the principles relating
to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally
to a period of three years prior to the date of
filing of the writ petition."
10.From the above quoted judgment, it is clear that delayed service-
related claims are generally rejected due to delay or limitation;
however, an exception exists in cases of a continuing wrong where
relief may still be granted despite delay. Nevertheless, this exception
does not apply if granting relief would disturb the settled rights of third
parties (such as in matters of seniority or promotion). In such cases, the
claim will be treated as stale. Further, even where relief is granted,
arrears are usually limited to a period of three years prior to filing the
petition.
11.In paragraph 7 of the petition, it is stated that there is no delay in filing
the petition; thus, the petitioners have failed to explain sufficient cause
for such long delay.
12.The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Tridip Kumar Dingal &
ors v. State of West Bengal & others, (2009) 1 SCC 768, in
paragraph 56 to 58 held as under:-
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt
true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But
while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,
226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into
account certain factors and one of such considerations is
delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching
a writ-Court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is
discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is
guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ-
Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably
possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion
for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to
exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object
of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims
and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in
the meantime [vide State of M.P. & Anr. V. Bhailal Bhai,
(1964) 6 SCR 261; Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR
1967 SC 1450; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (1992) 2
SCR 969]. This principle applies even in case of an
infringement of fundamental right [vide Trilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110; Durga Prasad v.
Chief Controller, (1969) 1 SCC 185; Rabindranath Bose v.
Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84].
57. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to
when a person can approach a Court. The question is one of
discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before
the Court depending on and vary from case to case. It will
depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."
13.It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is
to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously
oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. A court is
not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons; such delay
does not deserve any indulgence, and on the said ground alone, the
writ petition may be dismissed. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for
that matter, statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a
person must approach the court for a remedy. Otherwise, there would
be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties.
14.Accordingly, the petition being hit by delay and laches, deserves to be
and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
Rakesh Mohan Pandey
JUDGE
Nadim
