[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Kanshiram vs Kachru And Ors on 17 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:17562
Digitally
signed by
JYOTI
JYOTI SHARMA
SHARMA Date:
2026.04.21
11:28:48
NAFR
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 353 of 2013
Kanshiram S/o Dukuram Sahu Aged About 53 Years R/o
Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G.,
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Kachru And Ors S/o Jhadu Marar Aged About 45 Years R/o
Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G.,
Chhattisgarh
2.a.Chamru S/o Sukalu Aged About 55 Years R/o Badhiyatola,
Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
2.b. Mukti Bai W/o Chain Aged About 53 Years R/o Andi, Tah.
Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
2.c. Amru S/o Sukalu Aged About 53 Years R/o Badhiyatola, Tah.
Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
2.d. Sajan Bai W/o Manharan Aged About 49 Years R/o
Itwaribazar, Khairagarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District :
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
2.e. Surju S/o Sukalu Aged About 47 Years R/o Bhimnagar,
Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
2.f. Surajbai W/o Jagdish Aged About 45 Years R/o Near House Of
Gram Sewak, Bhadiyatola, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G.,
District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
2.g. Surati S/o Sukalu Aged About 43 Years R/o Bhimnagar,
2
Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
2.h.Surjin Bai W/o Hemu Aged About 41 Years R/o Dokrabhata,
Chuikhadan, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
2.i. Bitawan Bai W/o Pardesi Aged About 39 Years R/o Bichbasti,
Pandadah, Tah. Khairagarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District :
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
3. Ramsukh S/o Chaitram Kalar Aged About 57 Years R/o
Bhadiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District :
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
4. Khedi Bai W/o Jhaduram Aged About 65 Years R/o Badhiyatola,
Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
5. State Of Chhattisgarh W/o Thru- District Magistrate, Tah.
Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh
6. Bharat S/o Jhadu Marar R/o Gaajmarra, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt.
Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pallav Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent/ : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. G.A.
State
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
17.04.2026
1. The plaintiff/appellant, has preferred this second appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for
brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated
15.03.2013 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge,
Dongargarh, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 15-A/2007 (Kanshiram
Vs. Kachru & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree
dated 14.02.2006 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No.
18-A/2000 (Kanshiram Vs. Kachru & Ors.) whereby the
learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/
appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be
referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.
2. The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration that the
registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998 (Ex.D/2) executed in
favour of defendant No.3 be declared ineffective and not
binding upon him, along with a decree for specific
performance of the prior agreement of sale pleading inter alia
that suit property is agricultural land bearing Khasra No.
308/1, area 0.12 acre, situated at Village Badhiyatola, Tahsil
Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon, recorded in the names of
defendant No. 1 (Kachru), defendant No. 2 (Sukalu),
defendant No. 4 (Khedibai) and deceased Phulbati Bai.
According to the plaintiff, in a prior family partition between
defendants Jhaddu (father of Kachru) and Sukalu, the suit
land fell to the share of defendant No.2 Sukalu, who became
its exclusive owner and was in possession thereof. It was
pleaded that on 31.03.1994 (Ex. P-4) defendant No.2 Sukalu
agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of
Rs.6,750/-, executed a written receipt/agreement in the
presence of witnesses, received the full sale consideration
and delivered possession to the plaintiff, with an assurance
that a registered sale deed would be executed whenever
demanded. Since the plaintiff was a marginal farmer and
used to work as a labourer at Nagpur, he could not
immediately get the sale deed registered. The plaintiff further
pleaded that he later came to know, upon receiving notice
from the Tahsildar on 23.10.1999 in proceedings initiated by
defendant No.3 Ramsukh, that defendant No.3 had obtained
a registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998 in his name, by
playing fraud upon defendants No.1 and 2. It was alleged that
Ramsukh, along with others, misrepresented to the vendors
that the sale deed was being executed in favour of the
plaintiff, obtained their thumb impressions/signatures, and
thereafter got the deed registered in his own name and
mutated his name in the revenue records. The plaintiff
contended that since he had already paid the entire sale
consideration and obtained possession in 1994, only the
formality of execution of the registered sale deed remained,
and therefore the subsequent sale deed in favour of
defendant No.3 was void and ineffective against his rights.
3. Defendants No.1 and 4, in their written statement, while
admitting certain formal facts, denied the plaint allegations
and contended that the suit land bearing Khasra No.308/1,
area 0.12 acre, situated at Village Badhiyatola, was originally
recorded in the names of defendants No.1, 2, 4 and 6, sons of
Jhadu, and was validly purchased by defendant No.3 through
a registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998. It was pleaded that
defendant No.2 as well as defendant No.3 had signed the
sale deed and that defendants No.4 Khedibai and Bharat
(defendant No. 5) had also consented to the transaction.
Pursuant thereto, the name of defendant No.3 was duly
mutated in the revenue records and he became the lawful
owner of the suit land. They further denied that the plaintiff
was present at the time of registration or that any fraud had
been committed. According to them, the plaintiff never
purchased the land from defendant No.2. Since the suit land
was adjoining the badi of the plaintiff, he intended to purchase
it but could not do so. When defendant No.3, being a
neighbour, purchased the property and got his name
mutated, the plaintiff became aggrieved and, in collusion with
defendant No.2 Sukalu, concocted a false case to grab the
land. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation,
no cause of action had arisen, and insufficient court fee had
been paid.
4. Defendant No.2 and his legal representatives, in a separate
written statement, supported the case of the plaintiff and
admitted the plaint averments. They pleaded that defendant
No.3 Ramsukh, along with Bisauha and Kaluram, had
deceived Sukalu and fraudulently got the sale deed executed
in favour of defendant No.3. It was further stated that on the
basis of the said fraudulent sale deed, defendant No.3 got his
name mutated in the revenue records without any public
proclamation or notice to Sukalu. Defendant No.2 asserted
that he had objected before the Patwari and had also lodged
a complaint with the police regarding the fraudulent
registration. It was further alleged that the Tahsildar, without
notice or consent of defendant No.2, ordered mutation of the
suit land in favour of defendant No.3 on 04.12.1998,
knowledge whereof was later obtained during proceedings
under Section 250 of the Land Revenue Code. Accordingly,
defendant No.2 prayed that the reliefs sought by the plaintiff
be granted.
5. Defendant No.3, also filed in his written statement, denied the
plaint allegations except such facts as were specifically
admitted. He pleaded that the suit land originally stood
recorded in the names of defendants No.1, 2 and 4 and 6.
About 35-40 years earlier, upon a family partition between
Jhadu and Sukalu, the suit land had fallen to the share of
defendant No.2 Sukalu. Thereafter, on 25.08.1998,
defendant No.2 validly sold the suit land to defendant No.3 by
a registered sale deed, to which defendant No.4 Khedibai and
defendant No. 6 Bharat had also consented. On the basis of
the said sale deed, the name of defendant No.3 was duly
mutated in the revenue records and he became the lawful
owner of the suit property. Defendant No.3 further contended
that the plaintiff never purchased the suit land from defendant
No.2, nor was he ever delivered possession thereof. It was
asserted that the allegations of fraud, deception and collusion
were false, imaginary and concocted. According to defendant
No.3, the plaintiff had no right to seek re-execution of any sale
deed in his favour, as no prior agreement or enforceable right
existed. It was further pleaded that the suit was baseless,
contrary to law, barred by limitation, unsupported by sufficient
cause of action, and insufficiently valued for the purposes of
court fee. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit with costs was
prayed for. In support of his defence, defendant No.3
produced the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998, the
consent/ratification documents, revenue records including B1
and Khasra entries, the mutation application submitted before
the Tahsildar, and the related mutation order.
6. Defendant No.6 also filed a written statement substantially
supporting the stand of defendant No.3. It was reiterated that
the suit land had been lawfully purchased by defendant No.3
through the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998 with the
consent of the recorded co-sharers, and that his name had
been duly mutated in the revenue records. It was further
stated that the plaintiff was not present at the time of
registration, had never purchased the property from Sukalu
(defendant No. 2), and had instituted the suit in collusion with
defendant No.2 only after defendant No.3 purchased the
adjoining land and got his name recorded. It was therefore
pleaded that the suit was devoid of cause of action, barred by
limitation, insufficiently stamped, and liable to be dismissed
with costs.
7. After framing the issues, the Trial Court upon appreciation of
the oral and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff
failed to prove that defendant No.2 Sukalu had validly entered
into an agreement dated 31.03.1994 to sell the suit land in his
favour for a consideration of Rs.6,750/-. It was observed that
the alleged document (Ex.P/5) was unregistered, vague in
description of the property, did not contain essential
particulars such as khasra number and boundaries, and was
insufficient to establish a concluded contract of sale or
delivery of possession. The Court further found that the
plaintiff failed to prove his continuous readiness and
willingness to perform his part of the alleged contract. The
Court also considered the evidence of the attesting
witnesses to the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998.
Defendant witnesses, including the executants and attesting
witness Kalu Ram, supported the execution of the sale deed
in favour of defendant No.3 Ramsukh and deposed that
Sukalu had voluntarily appeared before the Sub-Registrar
and executed the document after receiving consideration.
Their testimony remained substantially unshaken in cross-
examination and corroborated the registered sale deed. On
the contrary, the allegation of fraud and deceit set up by the
plaintiff was held unproved, as no reliable evidence was
adduced to discredit the registered instrument or the
testimony of its witnesses. The Court therefore accepted the
case of defendant No.3 that he had lawfully purchased the
suit property through the registered sale deed, pursuant to
which his name was duly mutated in the revenue records.
Though the suit was held to be within limitation, the Court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish any enforceable
right, title, or entitlement to seek declaration, cancellation of
the registered sale deed, or specific performance.
Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.
8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated
14.02.2006, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned
First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on
re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the
findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal
by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the
Courts have committed grave error in dismissing the suit by
recording findings contrary to the evidence available on
record. It is contended that the agreement to sell in favour of
the appellant was duly proved, yet the Trial Court wrongly
held that the same was not legally executed and further erred
in holding that the appellant was not ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. It is further submitted that the
Courts failed to frame and consider the material issue
regarding possession of the appellant over the suit land,
though the demarcation report and oral evidence clearly
established his possession since 1994. Learned counsel also
submits that the admissions made by the respondents
regarding title of Sukalu and the testimony of witness Suraj
were not properly appreciated. Therefore, the impugned
judgments suffer from perversity and raise substantial
questions of law for consideration in the present second
appeal.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the
question of admission, and the impugned judgments and
decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned
First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.
11. This Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission
as from the findings recorded by the Trial Court, the
submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant do not
stand. The Trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the
evidence, held that the appellant failed to prove existence of
any valid and enforceable agreement to sell in respect of the
suit land. The alleged document relied upon by the appellant
was found vague, unregistered, and lacking essential
particulars of the property, and therefore incapable of
creating any right in his favour. Hence, no interference is
warranted with the concurrent findings recorded by the
Courts below.
12. The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree
of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal holding that no
infirmity was made out in the findings recorded by the Trial
Court. It further held that the plaintiff failed to prove the
alleged agreement/document Ex.P/4 in accordance with law.
Though the plaintiff examined certain witnesses in support of
the alleged transaction, none of them satisfactorily proved the
execution of Ex.P/4 as a valid and concluded sale agreement
relating specifically to the suit land. The witnesses gave only
general statements regarding an alleged sale for
consideration, but they could not establish the identity of the
property, as the document itself did not mention the khasra
number or boundaries. No reliable attesting witness proved
that the executant Sukalu consciously executed the
document after understanding its contents. In contrast, the
registered sale deed Ex.D/2 in favour of defendant No.3
stood duly proved through the evidence of its attesting
witness Kalaram and other witnesses, who specifically
deposed about execution before the Sub-Registrar and
signatures/thumb impressions of the executants. Therefore,
the Court held that the plaintiff's unregistered document
remained unproved, whereas the defendant's registered sale
deed was duly established by cogent evidence. Further, the
plea of fraud or impersonation set up by the plaintiff was
found unsupported by cogent evidence. Though the plaintiff
was found in possession during demarcation, such
possession was held not to be lawful or based on a valid title.
Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the findings
of the Trial Court were based on proper appreciation of
evidence and required no interference, and therefore
confirmed the dismissal of the suit.
13. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely
limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal
involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of
fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with
unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no
evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.
14. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the
basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/
plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and
sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate
any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the
findings so recorded.
15. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second
Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and
challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do
not give rise to any substantial question of law within the
meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
16. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of
fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
17. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv
Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating
the settled proposition, it has been held that when any
concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the
appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it
was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading
of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against
any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no
Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.
18. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel
for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be
regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question
of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These
questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The
appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law
which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event,
the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of
law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case
is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments
impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by
the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and
there is no illegality and infirmity at all.
19. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above
settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this
appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less
any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section
100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed
by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The
findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and there is no illegality or
perversity in the same and they does not call for any
interference.
20. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby
dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree
passed by the learned Appellate Court.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Jyoti
