Smt. Bharti Deewan vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2026 Latest Caselaw 1511 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Smt. Bharti Deewan vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 9 April, 2026

NIRMALA                                         1
RAO




                                                               2026:CGHC:16324


                                                                                 NAFR

                 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                       WPS No. 3667 of 2022

      1 - Smt. Bharti Deewan W/o Late Shri S.K. Deewan Aged About 53 Years Resident
      Of Amapara , Kothari Chowk, Near Petrol Pump, Kanker District Kanker
      Chhattisgarh.,             District       :         Kanker,             Chhattisgarh


      2 - Smt. Bhavna Dubey Sharma W/o Vimal Sharma Aged About 46 Years Resident
      Of Rajeev Lochan Chowk, Rajim Gariyaband , District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh.,
      District               :                  Gariyabandh,                  Chhattisgarh


      3 - Smt. Anshu Minz W/o T.K. Minz Aged About 48 Years Resident Of G.H.S.S.
      Gangalur, Bijapur, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh., District : Bijapur, Chhattisgarh


      4 - Surendra Kumar Dewangan S/o Hira Singh Dewangan Aged About 49 Years
      Resident Of Pujaripara , Tong Kongera , P.O. Mangnar , Block Bakawand, District
      Bastar                                                                 Chhattisgarh.


      5 - Mohammad Salim Son Of S.A Shaikh Mohideen , Resident Of Behind Hotel
      Reekha Frezerpur, Shanti Nagar, Ward Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.


      6 - Dr. Lilesh Kumar Sahu S/o Late Prabhu Lal Sahu Aged About 49 Years Resident
      Of Rest House Road, Antagad, Kanker , District Kanker Chhattisgarh., District :
      Kanker,                                                                 Chhattisgarh


      7 - Raj Kumar Shukla S/o Shri Shiv Kumar Shukla Aged About 50 Years Resident Of
      House No. 625, Kargil Chowk, Sunder Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.


      8 - Seema Siwana D/o Sunder Lal Siwana Aged About 42 Years Resident Of Ekta
      Nagar, Thelka Board , P.O. Govindpur , Kanker , District Kanker Chhattisgarh.
                                                                    ... Petitioner(s)
                                                 2

                                              versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural
Development , Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantrlaya Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District
Raipur          Chhattisgarh.,          District          :    Raipur,        Chhattisgarh


2     -       Commissioner           Bastar        Division,   Jagdalpur     Chhattisgarh.


3 - Chief Exeuctive Officer Zila Panchayat Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.


4 - Office Of The Lok Ayukt Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.
                                                                         ... Respondent(s)

(Cause Title is taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner/s : Shri C.K. Sahu, Advocate.

           For Respondent/ State          : Ms. Soumya Sharma, PL.
           For Respondent No.3            : Shri C. Jayant K. Rao, Advocate.



                     Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
                                       Order on Board
09.04.2026

1. The petitioners have filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:

"(i) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to consider claim/representation of the petitioners for reinstatement and to take decision on reinstatement in view of subsequent development i.e. order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge and further direction may be issued for reinstatement of the petitioners with all consequential benefit within stipulated time, in the interest of justice.

(ii) Any other relief which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted."

2. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioners were appointed on the post of

Shiksha Karmi Grade-I & II vide order dated 22.7.1998. Subsequently,

the order of appointment was cancelled by respondent No.3 (the

Commissioner, Division Jagdalpur) vide order dated 11.10.1999 in suo

moto Revision Case No.8/A-89-A/1998-99 on the grounds that the

documents placed before the Selection Committee were manipulated.

A criminal case was also registered against the petitioners and later on,

they were acquitted.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that as no criminal

case is currently pending and since the appointment orders were

cancelled without affording the petitioners an opportunity to be heard,

they should be permitted to submit representations to the authorities.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose

the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners. They would

submit that the petitioners were appointed on 22.7.1998 and their

appointments were cancelled by the Commissioner, Jagdalpur

Division, vide order dated 11.10.1999. He would submit that this

petition has been filed in the year 2022 but the order of cancellation of

their appointment has not been assailed. They would submit that the

petitioners have sought a direction to the respondent authorities to

decide their pending representation.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

documents present on record.

6. A perusal of the documents would show that the petitioners were

appointed in the year 1998 and their appointments were cancelled on

11.10.1999. Despite this, the petitioners filed the instant petition in the

year 2022. In para 7, it is stated that there is no delay in filing the

instant petition.

7. Admittedly, this writ petition suffers from delay and laches. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera Vs.

State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883, held

in para 21 as under:-

"21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court:

(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:

"To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition."

(emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:

"Delay, laches and acquiescence

20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

Laches

21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.

23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence.

Acquiescence

24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.

25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis."

(emphasis supplied) (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301:

"36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case.

X x x

38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v.

Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action.The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 :

1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 :

(2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England :

(Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213) "12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows:

'In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:

(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part;and

(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.

Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.'

13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?"

39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between "acquiescence" and "delay and laches". Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with

that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See "Introduction", U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures

-- Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.

40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation."

8. Considering the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera

(supra), in the opinion of this Court, the petition is liable to be and is

hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

9. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No cost(s).

Sd/-

(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nimmi