Chattisgarh High Court

Mahesh Kumar Sahu @ Sonu vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 7 May, 2025

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                        1




                                                       2025:CGHC:20906-DB


                                                                         NAFR

           HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                            CRA No. 1598 of 2021

1 - Mahesh Kumar Sahu @ Sonu S/o Shyamlal Sahu Aged About 21 Years R/o
Raipura High School Ke Pichhe Narendra Pan Thela Ke Paas Thana D.D.
Nagar Raipur, Present Address Amleshwar Housing Board Colony Thana
Amleshwar, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
                                                             ... Appellant(s)
                                     versus


1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Utai, District- Durg,
Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh                 ...Respondent(s)

For Appellant : Ms. Smita Jha, Advocate.

For Respondent/State : Mr. Swajeet Singh Ubweja, Panel Lawyer.

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge.

07.05.2025

1. Heard Ms. Smita Jha, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard

Mr. Swajeet Singh Ubweja, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the

respondent/State.

2. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 372(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure 1973 (now Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is directed against the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 17.11.2021, passed by the

learned Additional Session Judge (Second F.T.C.) /Special Court (The

Protection of Children From Sexual Officences Act, 2012) Durg District

Durg (C.G.) in Special Session Trial No. 26/2019, whereby the appellant

has been convicted and sentenced as under:

Conviction Sentence

Section 5(1) of the Protection of Rigorous imprisonment for life (till the

Children From Sexual Offices death of applicant) and fine of Rs.5000/-

Act, 2012 in default of payment of fine, 06 months

R.I

Section 6 of the Protection of Rigorous imprisonment for life (till the

Children From Sexual Offices death of applicant) and fine of Rs.5000/-

Act, 2012 in default of payment of fine, 06 months

R.I

Section 376 (3) of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for life (till the

death of applicant) and fine of Rs.5000/-

in default of payment of fine, 06 months

R.I

Section 363 of the Indian Penal Rigorous imprisonment (for short, 'R.I.')

Code (for short, 'IPC') for 3 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 02 month R.I.

more.

Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 4000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 04 months R.I.

3. Brief facts of the case are that, the father (PW-2) of the victim,

lodged a written complaint at Police Station Utai mentioning therein that

on 06.12.2018 his daughter/victim aged about 16 year went from house

without informing to anyone and did not return home, he has searched

every relatives and neighbor but she found missing. Unknown person has

abducted his minor daughter (victim). Based upon the said report, FIR

(Ex.P/7) was registered against the appellant for offence punishable under

Sections 363 of Indian Penal Code. During investigation, on 12.01.2019

victim girl (prosecutrix) was recovered.

4. Statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. of the witnesses were

recorded by the police. After completing the entire investigation, charge-

sheet was filed before the learned Additional Session Judge (Second

F.T.C.) /Special Court (The Protection of Children From Sexual Officences

Act, 2012) Durg District Durg (C.G.) for the commission of offence

punishable under Sections 363, 366 & 376 and 450 of IPC and Section 3

& 4 of the POCSO Act.

5. Learned trial Court framed charges for the offences punishable

under Sections 363, 366 & 376 of IPC and Section 5, and 6 of the

POCSO Act read over and explained to the accused, who abjured his

guilt.

6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as

many as 9 witnesses and exhibited 30 documents in support of case of

the prosecution. The appellant has neither examined any witness in his

defence nor exhibited any document.

7. Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of

the Cr.P.C. in which he denied all the circumstances appearing

against him and stated that he is innocent and has been falsely

implicated. The defence has neither examined any witness nor has

exhibited any document.

8. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence

produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the

appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in paragraph 02 of this

judgment. Hence this appeal.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the

prosecution have failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There

are material omission and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution

witnesses. The prosecution has failed to produce the cogent and legally

admissible evidence with respect to age of the victim to hold that on the

date of incident she was minor. The author of the School Admission and

Discharge Register have not been examined and the basis on which the

date of birth of the victim is recorded in the said school register have also

not been proved. No any Kotwar register, birth certificate or ossification

test report have been produced by the prosecution for determination of

the actual age of the victim.

10. He would further submit that the victim was having love affair with

the appellant and she herself eloped with him on her own sweet will and

resided with him for about 36 days at Tikarapara Bilaspur and she has not

made any complaint to anyone while going with the appellant by Bus or

Train. She has not raised any alarm while she has been taken by the

appellant and also while staying with him and making physical relation

with him. The evidence of the victim does not inspire the confidence and

therefore no offences under POCSO and IPC are made out against the

appellant and he is entitled for acquittal.

11. On the other hand learned counsel for the State opposes the

submissions advanced by the counsel for the appellant and have

submitted that on the date of incident the victim was minor and below 18

years of age which is proved by the PW-6 who is the Principal of the

Indian Public School, Utai District Durg (C.G.). The school register duly

proved by the the witness in which the date of birth of the victim is

recorded as 06.08.2023. She being the minor girl, was kidnapped by the

appellant and kept away from the lawful guardianship of the parents and

committed sexual intercourse with her, by which she became pregnent,

thereby committed offence of rape defined under IPC. Considering the

entire evidence, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the

appellant which is justified and the appeal of the appellant is liable to be

dismissed.

12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection.

13. The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be

whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of

incident or not ?

14. In order to consider the age of the victim we have examined the

evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. The

prosecution has mainly relied upon the School Admission and Discharge

PW-3 in his deposition has stated that he is posted as Incharge Principal.

The police had seized School Admission and Discharge register with

respect to date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo Ex.P/22 and

according to which the date of birth of the victim is recorded as

06.08.2023. In the school register the victim was admitted in Class -2nd on

04.07.2009. In cross-examination, she has admitted that the endorsement

with respect to date of birth of the victim in the said school register is not

in her handwriting. He did not know as to who had taken her to the school

for her admission. He also did not know as to on what basis her date of

birth has been recorded in the said school register.

15. The victim (PW-1) has deposed in her statement that her date of

birth is 06.08.2003. She has not stated anything in her deposition as to on

what basis she is saying that her date of birth is 06.08.2003.

16. PW-2 father of the victim has stated in his deposition on the date of

incident, the age of the victim would be 16 years and he does not know

actual date of birth of the victim.

17. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and

evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not

produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the

date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that on the date of incident

she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of school

Dakhil-kharij register, it would not be safe to hold that the victim was

minor on the date of incident. The statement of the prosecution witnesses

are contradictory to each other with regard to the age of the victim and

does not inspire confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of

the victim is 06.08.2003.

18. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5

SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi

Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

has held as under :-

"26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded."

19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of

its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by

Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, has observed as under:

"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,

who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:-

"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents.

Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue."

44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-

"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly

be convicted."

20. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &

Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:-

"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of

evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a

mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

21. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by

Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme

Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :

"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which

is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i),

(ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate

not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."

22. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim (PW-1) has

stated in her deposition that her date of birth is 06.08.2003. Her father

(PW-2) has deposed in his statement that she would be 16 years at the

time of incident and he does not know the actual date of birth of the victim.

D Shankar (PW-6) though has admitted that in the Dakhil-kharij Register

(Ex.P-27), date of birth of the victim has been mentioned as 06.08.2003,

but in her cross-examination, he has admitted that the endorsement with

respect to date of birth of the victim in the said school register is not in his

handwriting and on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded

in the school, he did not know.

23. Except for these evidences, no other evidence like Kotwari register

or birth certificate have been produced by the prosecution to determine

her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years

of age. The oral evidence of the witnesses i.e. victim herself (PW-1),

father of the victim (PW-2) and D Shankar (PW-6) and also Dakhil-kharij

Register ((Ex.P-27) are not sufficient to hold that the victim was minor on

the date of incident because of the reason that no documents has been

shown to ascertain the fact that on what basis the date of birth of the

victim was recorded. The entry with regard to age of the victim has been

mentioned in the Dakhil-kharij Register (Ex.P-27) is not sufficient to hold

actual date of birth of the victim. There is every possibility that the date of

birth of the victim is recorded on assumption otherwise, the prosecution

must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of

birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the

prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that sterling

quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore,

there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the

date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor.

24. So far as issue of kidnapping and forceful sexual intercourse by the

appellant with victim is concerned, we have carefully perused the

evidences of the victim. In her evidence, the victim PW-1 has stated that

she lives in Selud District Durg, she knows the accused well and the

accused oftenly. On 06.12.2018 she and appellant went from Selud to

Raipur by bus and thereafter went to Bilaspur by train, where she resided

with the appellant for 36 days in a rented house. During the said period,

On the pretext of marriage, the accused had established physical relation

with her and she did not resist the accused from having physical relation.

25. The policemen interrogated and recorded her statement in which

she has stated that her date of birth is 06.08.2003 at the time of incident.

On being asking from the victim, she disclosed that the appellant has

taken her with him and they voluntarily made physical relation.

26. PW-7, the Doctor who has medically examined the victim have not

found any external injury on her body but she was pregrent and she has

advised for sonography test. There is no evidence on record that the

victim was ever resisted by making scratch by nail or tried to teeth bite on

the body of the appellant to save herself while the appellant committed

sexual intercourse with her. Even the father (PW-2) or any other witness

have not stated anything that she had sustained any injuries which goes

to suggest that such statements were an afterthought.

27. On perusal of the evidence, it appears that there is no evidence that

she has raised any alarm or has shouted when she was allegedly

subjected to forceful sexual intercourse by the appellant. She travelled

with the appellant by Bus and Train upto District Bilaspur but she has not

made any complaint to any of the passengers or persons she met while

she was travelling with the appellant. From the close scrutiny of the

evidence makes it clear that the victim neither was taken by force nor she

was kidnapped by the appellant, she herself accompany with the

appellant on her own will and consent. Further the appellant has not

committed any forceful sexual intercourse with her without her will or

consent and she engaged in making physical relation with the appellant

consensually.

28. The version of the victim commands great respect and

acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt

in the mind of the Court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will

not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. The law is well settled

that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of

sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which

is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though

the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her

statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The

prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant

beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in

the instant case.

29. Considering the entire evidence available on record, the evidence

with regard to the age and conduct of the victim, her evidence, absence of

any injury over her body as also the evidence that she was in love affair

with the appellant, we are of the opinion that prosecution has failed to

prove that on the date of incident the victim was minor, she has not been

kidnapped by the appellant and has not been taken by force and she

herself eloped with him and made physical relation with him consensually,

therefore, in view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, the

offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2) of IPC and 5(1) and 6 of

POCSO are not made out against the appellant.

30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned

judgment of conviction and sentence dated 17.11.2021 is set aside. The

appellant is reported to be in jail, he be released forthwith, if not required

in any other case.

31. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now

Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the

appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form

No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.

25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned

which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an

undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the

instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of

notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

32. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent

back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and

necessary action.
                                 Sd/-                               Sd/-

                     (Arvind Kumar Verma)                     (Ramesh Sinha)
                             Judge                              Chief Justice




Jyoti
Digitally
signed by
JYOTI JHA
Date:
2025.05.12
11:27:07
+0530
 