Chattisgarh High Court
State Of C.G vs Sugam Singh on 6 May, 2022
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 23.02.2022
Order delivered on : 06.05.2022
ACQA No. 4 of 2010
State of Chhattisgarh, Through Special Police
Establishment, Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur (C.G.).
---- Appellant
Versus
Sugam Singh, S/o Hukum Singh, aged about 60 years,
Occupation - Employment in Food Corporation of India,
R/o M.I.G. 1078m Aditya Nagar, Durg, District Durg
(C.G.)
---- Respondent
For Appellant/State : Mr. Sushil Sahu, P.L.
For Respondent : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate
Hon'ble Smt Justice Rajani Dubey
C.A.V. Order
1. Heard on admission.
2. The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the State
against the judgment dated 29.08.2008 passed in
Special Case No.03/2003 by the learned Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption), Durg, District Durg, whereby
the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent
herein from the charges punishable under Sections 7
and 13(1)(D) read with section 13 (2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the P.C. Act').
3. Brief facts of the case are that complainant Kulvinder
Singh (PW/11), who is parter of Sai Vishwas Mill, Karanja,
Bhilai, made a written report on 08.07.2002 to
Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment,
Raipur, on the ground that on 28.06.2002, Food
Controller, Durg, issued production certificate to his mill
to deposit 250 quintals of rice in the form of levy.
Thereafter, on 01.07.2002, 250 quintals of levy rice and
production certificate was deposited in F.C.I. by his
Accountant Goukaran Sahu. After testing the goods
(rice), it was verbally passed and accused/respondent
herein demanded Rs.3,000/- to get it passed and when
the demand was not fulfilled, the said rice was rejected.
It was further alleged in the complaint that when the
complainant came to know about the matter, he asked
the accused/respondent herein over telephone to pass
the lot of rice, who denied to pass the same for want of
money. Pursuant to his report dated 08.07.2002, a small
tape-recorder given to the complainant to record all
conversation regarding demand of bribe by
accused/respondent herein. On 09.07.2002,
complainant recorded all the conversation of
accused/respondent regarding demand of bribe. The
accused/respondent also demanded Rs.1,500/- for
further lot of rice, thereafter, the complainant informed
the office of Special Police Establishment over
telephone, upon which he was called on 10.07.2002 at
10.00 am, at Bhilai Hotel along with tape-recorder and
currency note of Rs.3,000/-. After completing necessary
formalities, trap team was constituted. Complainant was
sent to F.C.I. Godown with bribe money on which
phenolphthalein power was applied. After giving bribe
money, the complainant gestured the trap party, who
came to the spot and caught the accused/respondent
red handed. Hands of the accused/respondents were
dipped into a solution of sodium carbonate on which the
colour of the solution turned into pink. Accordingly,
seizure memo was prepared vide Ex.P/12. Map was
prepared by Patwari. Accused/respondent was arrested
vide arrest memo (Ex.P/15) and dehati nalishi was
lodged vide Ex.P/20, pursuant to which, FIR was
registered against the accused/respondent vide Ex.P/26.
4. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet
was filed before the Court of Special Judge, who in turn,
framed charges against the accused/respondent under
Sections 7, 13(1)(D) read with section 13(2) of the P.C.
Act. Before the learned Court below, prosecution has
examined as many as 13 witnesses. Statement of the
accused/respondent was recorded under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C. Accused/respondent also examined one
witness in his defence. The learned trial Court, after
appreciating oral and documentary evidence, recorded
its finding that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the
accused/respondent herein. Hence, this acquittal appeal
by the State.
5. Learned State counsel submits that the learned trial
Court failed to appreciate the evidence recorded in its
true and correct perspective. The prosecution has duly
proved its case of demand of bribe and acceptance by
the accused/respondent herein but the learned trial
Court considering the minor contradictions and
discrepancies, recorded its finding of acquittal, which is
unjustified. The accused/respondent has admitted the
receipt of Rs.3,000/- from the complainant and the said
amount was seized from the possession of the
accused/respondent and the place of incident but the
learned trial Court wrongly acquitted the
respondent/accused from the charges levelleged against
him. As such, the impugned judgment is liable to be set
aside and accused/respondent is liable to be held guilty
under P.C. Act.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for
accused/respondent supported the impugned judgment
and submitted that in the instant case demand and
acceptance have not been proved by the prosecution,
thus, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted him.
To buttress his submission, he would rely upon the
decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of B.
Jayaraj V. State of Andhra Pradesh1.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material available on record.
8. Before the learned trial Court, accused/respondent
submits that he was posted as Assistant Manager in
Food Corporation of India. In question No.107 of his
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he took
the specific defence, which reads thus:-
"eS funksZ'k gw¡A eq>s >wBk "kM;a=iwoZd Qalk;k x;k gSA pkWoy ds
ykV dks fjtsDV djuk ;k ikl djus dk eq>s dksbZ vf/kdkj ugh
gSA ;g vf/kdkj Jh Mh- ih- lkeukuh] rdfudh lgk;d xzsM&1 dk
dk;Z gSA blfy, eq>s fdlh izdkj dh ckrphr djus dk dksbZ iz'u
gh mRiUu ugh gksrkA eSus 'kkldh; lsok esa jgrs vuojr fu"Bkoku
,oa vuq'kklu esa jgdj dk;Z fd;k gSA esjh fn?kZdkyhu lsok ikd
lkQ jgh gSA mlus esjs O;fDrRo esa ,sls yPNu yxk;k tks [kwn
Cysd fyLVsM gS] eq>s }s"kiwoZd blfy, Qalk;k gS D;ksafd gekjs
foHkkx ls mlds fo#/n Fkkuk esa fjiksVZ dh x;h Fkh ftles mlds
fo#/n eSa xokg Fkk okLro es O;fDrxr dHkh Hkh ml O;fDr ls
eqykdkr dHkh ugh gqbZ FkhA "
9. In support of the defence taken by the
accused/respondent herein, one Umakant Dubey (DW/1),
District Manager, F.C.I., has also stated that Technical
Assistant has right to purchase the rice and to reject it
on the basis of quality. If the lot of rice is rejected, the
right is reserved with the rice owner to prefer an appeal
before the District Manager. He has also stated that he
recognize complainant Kulvinder Singh, who is owner of
Sai Vishwas Rice Mill, Bhilai, and Shri Manohar Gyan
Chandani as their entry in the Durg Depot have been
prohibited due to quarrel and fight with their staf
namely Mr. D.P. Samnani, and on 02.07.2002, the order
1 (2014) 13 SCC 55
(Ex.D/6) in this regard had been passed by him. This
witness, in para 4, has stated that Mr. D.P. Samnani
came to him with written complaint that when he was
taking lunch, Mr. Kulvinder Singh and Manohar Gyan
Chandani entered into fight with him. The written
complaint (Ex.D/7) came to him through Assistant
Manager (Purchase) and the accused/respondent herein
and one Mahipal were witness in the complaint (Ex.D/7).
10. Complainant Kulvinder Singh (PW/11) has stated in para
8 of his cross-examination that his entry in the F.C.I. was
prohibited by Collector or Food Controller. He himself has
admitted that District Manager has prohibited his entry
in the F.C.I. office but he had not received any
information in this regard. He has stated that he has
filed a civil suit before the District Court, Durg, in this
regard. He has also submitted that on 08.08.2002, he
had filed the civil suit against the order of District
Manager, and on 08.08.2002, he was not permitted to
enter the office of F.C.I. He has also submitted that he
has impleaded Mr. Manohar Gyanchandani as plaintif in
the suit being the partner of his Sai Vishwas Rice Mill.
This witness has also stated that on 01.07.2002,
qualitative analysis of 250 quintal rice was made by
Technical Assistant Class-I Mr. D.P. Samnani and the
same was rejected due to not being found in accordance
with the qualitative criteria. This witness has also stated
that on 02.07.2002, a case of committing maarpeet was
registered against him.
11. The learned trial Court, while recording the finding of
acquittal, has observed that defence witness Umakant
Dubey (DW/1) has supported the defence of
accused/respondent, which is also evident from
statement of complainant Kulvinder Singh (PW/11), but
demand of bribe was not proved by the prosecution
witnesses.
12. So far as demand of bribe and acceptance is concerned,
Complainant (PW/11), in para 6, has stated that due to
fear, he could not play the tape-recorder, which was
given for recording conversation at the time of giving
bribe amount. The said tape-recorder was seized from
him vide Ex.P/6. The tape-recorder which was earlier
given to him was seized vide Ex.P/7. In his entire
statement, it has not proved that any demand of bribe
was made by accused/respondent. The overall analysis
of the statement of aforesaid witnesses clearly
established the fact that his entry in the FCI office was
prohibited by District Manager (DW/1) due to quarrel with
one staf namely Mr. D.P. Samnani, in which the
accused/respondent herein was a witness. There is no
evidence on record to prove the fact that the bribe
money was recovered from the possession of the
accused/respondent. The prosecution has also failed to
established the fact that how the bribe money came
under the doormat. The learned trial Court also recorded
its finding that acceptance of bribe by the
accused/respondent has not been proved by the
prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt. The statement
of complainant (PW/11) and trap witnesses are
contradictory to each other. The learned trial Court also
recorded its finding that demand and acceptance have
not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt and defence of respondent is probable.
13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of B. Jayaraj
(supra), in para 8, held as under:-
"8. In the present case, the complainant did not
support the prosecution case insofar as
demand by the accused is concerned. The
prosecution has not examined any other
witness, present at the time when the
money was allegedly handed over to the
accused by the complainant, to prove that
the same was pursuant to any demand
made by the accused. When the
complainant himself had disowned what he
had stated in the initial complaint (Ex.P/11)
before LW 9, and there is no other evidence
to prove that the accused had made any
demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the
contents of Ext.P-11 cannot be relied upon to
come to the conclusion that the above
material furnishes proof of the demand
allegedly made by the accused. We are,
therefore, inclined to hold that the learned
trial Court as well as the High Court was not
correct in holding the demand alleged to be
made by the accused as proved. The only
other material available is the recovery of
the tainted currency notes from the
possession of the accused. In fact such
possession is admitted by the accused
himself. Mere possession and recovery of the
currency notes from the accused without
proof of demand will not bring home the
offence under Section 7. The above also will
be conclusive insofar as the offence under
Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in
the absence of any proof of demand for
illegal gratificatin, the use of corrupt or
illegal means or abuse of position as public
servant to obtain any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be
established.
14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Babu V. State of
Kerala2, has laid down the principle to be followed in an
appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 of the
Cr.P.C. and it has been held that Appellate Court should
not ordinarily set aside acquittal in a case where two
views are possible, though the views of Appellate Court
may be the more probable one and held in para 12 as
under:-
"..12. This Court time and again has laid down
the guidelines for the High Court to
interfere with the judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the trial Court. The
appellate Court should not ordinarily set
aside a judgment of acquittal in a case
where two views are possible, though the
view of the appellate Court may be the
more probable one. While dealing with a
2 (2010) 9 SCC 189
judgment of acquittal, the appellate court
has to consider the entire evidence on
record, so as to arrive at a finding as to
whether the views of trial court were
perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The
appellate Court is entitled to consider
whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial court had failed to take into
consideration admissible evidence and/or
had taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record contrary to law.
Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof
may also be a subject matter of scrutiny
by the appellate court."
15. Thereafter, recently in Anwar Ali & Another v. State
of Himachal Pradesh3, Supreme Court has reviewed
its earlier decisions including Babu (supra) reiterating
the principles laid down therein.
16. Reverting back to the facts of the case, in the light of
judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Babu
(supra) and Anwar (supra) dealing with the scope of
appeal against acquittal and further considering the
evidence on record, we are of the considered opinion
that the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in not
believing the evidence of complainant (PW/11) and
further justified in relying upon other evidence of
prosecution to record the judgment of acquittal. I do not
find any illegality in the order impugned acquitting the
accused/respondent particularly when there is a legal
settled position that if on the basis of record two
conclusions can be arrived at, the one favoring the
accused has to be preferred. Even otherwise, the
prosecution thus has utterly failed in proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has been
fully justified in recording the finding of acquittal which
is based on proper appreciation of evidence available on
record. Furthermore, in case of appeal against the
acquittal the scope is very limited and interference can
3 (2020) 10 SCC 166
only be made if finding recorded by the trial Court is
highly perverse or arrived at by ignoring the relevant
material and considering the irrelevant ones. In the
present case, no such circumstance is there warranting
interference by this Court
17. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is dismissed at the
admission stage itself.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey)
JUDGE
PKD
