Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3276 Chatt
Judgement Date : 6 May, 2022
1
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Criminal Revision No. 394 of 2022
Siraj, S/o. Late Shri Noor Mohammad, aged about 40 years, R/o.
Mominpara Parradand, Jilani Painter Street, P.S.-Kotwali,
Ambikapur, Distt. - Surguja (C.G.)
---- Petitioner
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh, Through the District Magistrate, Ambikapur,
Distt. Surguja (C.G.)
----Respondent.
For Petitioner : Mr. Sunil Sahu, Advocate.
For Respondent : Mr. Lalit Jangde, Govt. Advocate.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.K. Chandravanshi
Order On Board
06-05-2022
Heard on admission.
1. This criminal revision has been preferred against the order dated
23.03.2022 passed by Special Judge (NDPS), Ambikapur, District
Sarguja in Special Case No. 17/2022 (State of Chhatisgarh v. Siraj)
whereby an application filed by the petitioner under Section 167(2) of the
Cr.P.C. for grant of default bail was dismissed.
2. Facts
of the case, in brief, are that on 21.09.2021 at about 10
O'clock at night, police of police Station Gandhi Nagar, District Sarguja
on the basis of secret information received from the informer, seized 99
nos. sealed bottle, each containing 100 ml, total 9900 ML (9.900 L) of
psychotropic substance, namely, Maxcoff syrup from the illegal
possession of the applicant. On the basis of above facts, FIR No. 0507
under Section 22(c) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985 (henceforth "NDPS Act") was registered against the
applicant and at about 2.10 at night he was arrested and on the same
day i.e. on 22.9.2021, he was produced before the Special Judge,
Sarguja at Ambikapur alongwith application for grant of judicial
remand. On 22.9.2021 itself first remand was granted till 5.10.2021,
subsequently, judicial remand was taken in several occasions. Lastly,
the judicial remand was obtained up-till 21.03.2022. On 21.03.2022,
again application for grant of judicial remand was filed but the same
was dismissed by learned Special Judge, Ambikapur, Sarguja holding
that 181 days of judicial remand of the applicant was completed on
21.03.2022, despite that charge-sheet was not filed and further
remand for one day i.e. up till 22.3.2022 has been sought, but no
report has been enclosed with the remand application as per proviso
to Section 4 of Section 36(A) of the NDPS Act, which could
demonstrate sufficient reasons for further detention of applicant and
since extended period of filing final report i.e. 180 days has already
been elapsed, therefore, learned Special Judge dismissed the
application for grant of judicial remand.
3. On 22.3.2022, applicant filed an application under Section 167
(2) of the Cr.P.C. for grant of default bail. After hearing applicant and
the prosecution, the case was posted for orders on 23.3.2022 and on
23.3.2022, learned Special Judge dismissed the application for grant
of default bail, hence this criminal revision.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that
present crime has been registered against the applicant under Section
22(c) of the NDPS Act, as alleged psychotropic substance comes
under commercial quantity, hence, as per Sub-Section 4 of Section 22
of the NDPS Act, charge-sheet should have been filed within the
extended period for filing of charge-sheet i.e. 180 days but in the
instant case, the police filed charge-sheet on 182 nd day after first
judicial remand of the applicant, despite that learned court below has
refused to grant default bail and denied indefensible right of bail to the
applicant, which is not in accordance with law. It is further submitted
by learned counsel for the applicant that on 21.3.2022, applicant had
objected orally for grant of further judicial remand, as police did not file
charge-sheet within a period of 180 days and further remand was
denied by learned Special Judge. On the same day i.e. on 21.03.2022,
applicant prepared application for grant of default bail and filed before
learned Special Judge. But his application was not decided on
22.3.2022 and fixed the case for orders on 23.3.2022 and on
23.3.2022, his application was rejected holding that charge-sheet is
filed on 22.3.2022 and thereafter application for default bail was filed
by the applicant whereas since the police did not file charge-sheet
within a period of 180 days, hence, indefensible right of
accused/applicant was accrued in his favour, therefore, learned
Special Judge ought to have granted default bail to the applicant,
hence, it is prayed that revision petition be allowed and default bail
may be granted to the applicant. He placed reliance upon the
judgments of the Supreme Courts in the matters of M. Ravindran v.
Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 1, Uday
Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra 2 & Vinay Dubey &
another v. State of C.G. 3 in support of his submissions.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State vehemently
opposes the submissions made by counsel for the applicant and
submits that although challan was not filed within extended period of
180 days from the date of first remand and the same was filed on
182nd day and on the same day applicant has also filed an application
for grant of default bail but the impugned order dated 23.03.2022 itself
shows that applicant has filed an application under Section 167 (2) of
the Cr.P.C. for grant of default bail after filing of charge-sheet. Thus,
since charge-sheet was filed before filing of application for grant of
default bail, due to this, applicant is not entitled for grant of default bail,
and, therefore, learned Special Judge has not committed any illegality
or infirmity in rejecting the default bail application filed by the applicant.
6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and
perused the case diary as well as material available on record.
1 (2021) 2 SCC 485 2 (2001) 5 SCC 453 3 2022 (1) CGLJ 193
7. Perusal of case diary and impugned order would go to show that
the instance case pertains to illegal possession of psychotropic
substance, which comes under the commercial quantity, which is
punishable under Section 22 (c) of the NDPS Act, therefore, as per
proviso to Sub-Section 4 of Section 36 of the NDPS Act, charge-sheet
should have been filed within the extended period of 180 days from the
first judicial remand dated 22.9.2021. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. Nazir Ahmed Sheikh 4
has held that the period for filing of charge-sheet would begin to run
and be counted from the next date of arrest of the accused. However,
the date of accused being sent on remand would be excluded but the
date on which charge-sheet was filed is to be included. Thus, in the
instant case the charge-sheet was to be filed till 21.3.2022 but the
same was filed on 22.3.2022 i.e. 182nd day from the date of first judicial
remand and since, charge-sheet was not filed within 180 days,
therefore, right of default bail had arisen in favour of applicant.
8. Certified copy of the order-sheet dated 22.03.2022 would go to
show that application for default bail under Section 167 (2) of the
Cr.P.C. was filed by the applicant on 22.03.2022. Order sheet dated
dated 23.03.2022 would also go to show that on 22.03.2022, charge-
sheet of the case was also filed by the police against the applicant.
Thus, application for default bail and charge-sheet was filed on the
same day but impugned order specifically demonstrate that after filing
4 AIR 1996 (83) SC 2980
of charge-sheet, application under Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. for
grant of default bail was filed by the applicant, therefore, his
application for grant of default bail has been dismissed by the learned
Special Judge (NDPS).
9. Thus, issue involved in this case is whether right of default bail
under Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. survives, when charge-sheet
already is filed before filing of default bail application ?
10. Period for filing of charge-sheet has been provided under the law
to saddle the liability upon the Investigating Agency for the purpose to
investigate the matter as early as possible or up till the period
prescribed under the law. If Investigating Agency is failed to file
charge-sheet within the prescribed period, then indefensible right of
default bail under Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. comes into play, on
account of fault committed by the Investigating agency by not filing
charge-sheet within the prescribed period. But after prescribed period,
if the applicant/accused does not claim his right of default bail and
prior to that charge-sheet is filed, then status of right of default bail got
changed.
11. In the matter of Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of
Maharashtra 5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held as
under :-
5 (2001) 5 SCC 453
"23. The Constitution Bench in the aforesaid judgment [Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI 6 ] has clearly laid down that the indefeasible right of the accused `is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if not already availed of . [Emphasis added]. It has further laid down that custody of the accused after challan has been filed is not governed by the provisions of Section 167 of the Code, but different provisions of the Code. The right of the accused cannot be enforced after the challan is filed `since it is extinguished the moment challan is filed . The case of Sanjay Dutt also referred to the views expressed by the three earlier Constitution Benches of this Court in connection with writ of habeas corpus on the ground that there was no valid order of remand passed by the court concerned. It has reiterated that a petition seeking writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused has to be dismissed if on the date of the return of the rule the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order."
12. The said proposition has been relied upon by the Supreme Court
in the matter of M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of
Revenue Intelligence 7 with full rigour and held thus:-
"25.2 The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution
6 (1994) 5 SCC 410 7 (2021) 2 SCC 485
before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court.
25.3 However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC."
13. Applying the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the afore-cited cases (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is quite
vivid that as per impugned order though on 22.3.2022 charge-sheet
was filed against the applicant under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act
but on the same day application for default bail under Section 167(2)
of the Cr.P.C. was also filed by the applicant. It also appears that
though, according to counsel for the applicant default bail application
was filed by the applicant on 21.3.2022 but order sheet of learned
Special Judge does not support his contention, because, as per order
sheet dated 22.3.2022 that application was filed by the applicant on
22.3.2022 itself. Even endorsement on the application also shows that
it was filed on 22.3.2022 only. Contention of paragraph 3 of default bail
application also shows that application and charge-sheet was filed on
the same day, therefore, aforesaid submission made by counsel for
the applicant is baseless. But order impugned clearly demonstrates
that on 22.3.2022, earlier charge-sheet was filed by the police and,
thereafter, applicant filed an application for default bail under Section
167 (2) of the Cr.P.C., therefore, in view of the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases (supra), applicant's right
of default bail was extinguished. Thus, I do not find any infirmity or
illegality in the order impugned rejecting the application for grant of
default bail filed by the applicant.
14. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the
criminal revision, being devoid of substance, is liable to be and is
hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself.
Sd/-
(N.K.Chandravanshi) Judge
D/-
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