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Karan Prasad vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2022 Latest Caselaw 3199 Chatt

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3199 Chatt
Judgement Date : 4 May, 2022

Chattisgarh High Court
Karan Prasad vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 4 May, 2022
                                     1

                                                                          AFR

              HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                   Criminal Appeal No.533 of 2014

     Karan   Prasad  S/o   Shri  Mangatu   Satnami (wrongly
     mentioned as "Mangalu Satnami" in the judgment dateed
     09.04.2014), Aged About 32 years, R/o Village Chhata,
     Police Station­Lalpur, Distt.­Mungeli (CG)

                                                           ­­­­ Appellant
                                                               (In Jail)
                                   Versus

    State     of    Chhattisgarh     Through      -    Police   Station     -
    Lalpur, Distt.­Mungeli (CG)
                                                          ­­­­ Respondent

For Appellant:        Ms Savita Tiwari, Advocate
For Respondent/State: Mr.Sunil Otwani, Addl.A.G. with
                      Mr.Devesh Chand Verma, Govt.Advocate


         Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and
              Hon'ble Smt.Justice Rajani Dubey

                            Judgment on Board
                                (4.5.2022)

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC

is directed against the impugned judgment dated

9.4.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,

Mungeli, in Sessions Trial No.13/2013, by which the

appellant herein has been convicted for offences under

Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced him to

undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/­, in

default of payment of fine to further undergo

imprisonment for one month and rigorous imprisonment

for seven years and fine of Rs.1000/­, in default of

payment of fine to further undergo imprisonment for one

month. Both sentences were directed to run

concurrently.

2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the

appellant/accused on 13.1.2013 at 4 p.m. committed

murder of his wife Baijantibala by strangulation and

caused disappearance of the evidence by falsely

informing the police that she died by electrification.

It is further case of the prosecution that the

appellant along with his two daughters Rameshwari and

Chandani had visited village Lalpur on 18.12.2013 to

Ghasidas mela organized therein and from where the

parents of the deceased namely Rohit Kumar (PW­1) and

his wife Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5) also met them and

thereafter they had gone to the house of Rohit Kumar

(father of the deceased) at village Baigakapa, wherein

the appellant herein demanded money from his wife,

which she refused to give and the appellant also

assaulted to her and thereafter the appellant came back

to village Chhata along with his daughters on

19.12.2012. Thereafter on the understanding given by

Golu and Govind from village Chhata, Baijantibala

(deceased) came back to stay with the appellant on

1.1.2013, but on 13.1.2013, Rohit Kumar (PW­1) (father

of the deceased) received information that his daughter

became unwell and thereafter also received information

that Baijantibala has died, then he came to village

Chhata along with other 4­5 persons and on being asked,

the appellant informed to him that Baijantibala is said

to have died by electrification. Rohit Kumar (PW­1)

reported the matter to Police Station Lalpur vide merg

intimation (Ex.P­1) and thereafter First Information

Report was registered vide Ex.P­10. Jurisdictional

Judicial Magistrate First Class was informed about the

incident. Thereafter the Station House Officer, Police

Station Lalpur reached to the spot and served notices

to the witnesses. Naksha panchnama was prepared vide

Ex.P­3. Spot map was prepared by investigating officer

vide Ex.P­5. Dead body of deceased Baijantibala was

sent for postmortem to Government Hospital, Mungeli

vide Ex. P­11, where postmortem was conducted by

Dr.Deepak Dhritlahre (PW­9) vide Ex.P­14 in which he

opined that cause of death was asphyxia due to

strangulation. Thereafter the accused was arrested, he

was given memorandum statement on 12.2.2013 (Ex.P­7),

but no recovery pursuant to memorandum statement was

made. However, sari was recovered from possession of

the appellant on 14.1.2013 vide Ex.P­4. The appellant

was charge­sheeted before the Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Mungeli, who was committed the case to the Court

of Session, Mungeli, from where the Additional Sessions

Judge, Mungeli received the case on transfer for trial.

The accused/appellant abjured the guilt and entered

into defence.

3. In order to prove the prosecution case, the prosecution

examined as many as 9 witnesses and exhibited 14

documents Exs.P­1 to P­14. Statement of the

accused/appellant under Section 313 of the CrPC was

recorded in which he denied guilt. However, the accused

took a plea of alibi and examined 4 witnesses to prove

his defence and brought out statement of Shail Bai in

his favour as Ex.D­1.

4. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and

documentary evidence available on record, by its

judgment dated 9.4.2014, convicted the appellant herein

holding that death of deceased Baijantibala was

homicidal in nature and further theory of last seen

together has been established and it is only the

appellant who has caused murder of his wife

Baijantibala and also caused disappearance of the

evidence and sentenced him as aforementioned, against

which, this criminal appeal has been preferred by the

appellant herein.

5. Ms Savita Tiwari, learned counsel for the

appellant/accused, would submit as under:­

(i) That death of deceased Baijantibala was not

homicidal in nature as it is the case of hanging.

(ii) That theory of last seen together which is one of

the incriminating piece of evidence has not been

established as according to Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5)

(mother of deceased Baijantibala), prior to and on the

date of incident, the accused was residing along with

his father, mother, two sisters, his brother Gaukaran,

Gaukaran's wife Sulakshana and two daughters Rameshwari

and Chandani. As such, the prosecution has failed to

establish the plea of last seen together on the date of

offence.

(iii) Assuming though not admitting that the plea of

last seen together is established, yet in statement

recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant has not

been afforded an opportunity to explain such an

incriminating evidence against him, which the trial

Court was obliged to offer in order to act upon the

self­serving incriminating piece of evidence of last

seen together, otherwise he would have explained the

said incriminating piece of evidence allegedly made out

by the prosecution.

(iv) That the appellant has established the plea of

alibi and on the date of offence he along with his

family members had gone for threshing paddy and he was

not present in the house and he was informed by his

daughter Rameshwari (DW­4) and they have clearly proved

that the appellant was not present in the house on the

date of commission of offence and even in cross­

examination, this witness has maintained her version

and as such, the plea of alibi is fully established.

Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set­

aside.

6. On the other hand, Mr.Sunil Otwani, learned Additional

Advocate General with Mr.Devesh Chand Verma, learned

Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State,

would submit that the prosecution has adduced

sufficient evidence of clinching nature to demonstrate

that it is only the appellant who has committed murder

of deceased Baijantibala and therefore, the trial Court

has rightly convicted the appellant herein for offences

under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. They would

further submit that death has rightly been held to be

homicidal in nature as it is proved by medical evidence

adduced on behalf of the prosecution particularly by

Dr.Deepak Dhritlahre (PW­9), who has conducted

postmortem on the body of the deceased and in para­7,

he has clearly stated that it is the case of

strangulation. Therefore, death of the deceased to be

homicidal in nature is clearly established. They would

also submit that on the date of offence, the appellant

and the deceased were staying together as husband &

wife and they have seen together in good health and on

the same date, she (Baijantibala) has been found dead

in the house of the appellant herein. As such, it has

fully been established that death was caused by the

appellant herein and therefore, criminal appeal

preferred by the appellant herein deserves to be

dismissed.

7. We have heard learned appearing for the parties,

considered their rival submissions made herein­above

and also went through the records with utmost

circumspection.

8. The first question for consideration would be, whether

the trial Court was justified in holding that death of

the deceased Baijantibala was homicidal in nature. The

trial Court has answered the issue in affirmative

relying upon medical evidence of Dr.Deepak Dhrithare

(PW­9), who has conducted postmortem on the body of the

deceased. For sake of convenience, paras 2 to 6 are

relevant and being reproduced hereinbelow:­

2& ijh{k.k djus ij nks cts esjs }kjk &'kjhj dks ih0,e0 Vscy esa fpr voLFkk esa FkkA jkbxj ekfVZl mi0 FkkA nksuksa gkFk ,oa iSj esa vdMu FkkA eaqg can Fkk] psgjk uhyxw Fkk] I;wfiy cMk Fkk] vka[k yky FkkA xys esa rhu czswt mifLFkr FkkA nwljk czswt xys ds e/; Hkkx esa Fkk] ftldk vkdkj 2 x 1-5 lseh FkkA nwljk czswt& Fkk;jkbZV dkftZyst ds uhps Fkk] vkSj LVueZ ds mij Fkk ftldk vkdkj 2-1 x 2-9 lseh- FkkA rhljk czwt xnZu ds nkfgus lkbZTk esa Fkk ftldk vkdkj 2-1 x 1-3 lseh- FkkA rhuksa czwt Hkwjs jax dk FkkA gYdk lk lw[kk FkkA peMs ds mij dkxt tSlk gks x;k FkkA igys czwt ds ysVjsjy lkbZt esa nks uk[kwu ds fu'kku v/kZ pUnzkdj esa FkkA ftldk vkdkj 1 lseh FkkA e`frdk dh pksaVs & ,aVheksVZe FkkA 3& esjs }kjk vkarfjd ijh{k.k djus ij [kksiMh diky d'ks:dk flYyh] esa dqN ugha Fkk lkekU; FkkA efLr"d vkSj es:jTtw datsLVsM FkkA rFkk NksVs NksVs lqbZ ds vkdkj dk [kwu fjlko dk pksaV FkkA inkZ] ilyh dkseyl lkekU;] QwLQwl datsLVsM] daB vkSj 'okl uyh] esa Fkk;jkbZV dkfVZyst dk QSDpj Fkk] Vªsfd;k jIpj gks x;k Fkk] f=dk;sM dkfVZyst dk QSDpj FkkA nka;k QsQMk datsLVsM Fkk ,oa lc I;wyk ds uhps gsejst FkkA 4& cka;k QsQMk datsLVsM Fkk] isufØ;kl datsLVsM Fkk] ân; ds nkfgus rjQ [kwu Hkjk Fkk ,oa cka;k [kkyh FkkA o`gn okfgdk lkekU; Fkk] inkZ] lkekU; Fkk] vkarksa dh f>Yyh] eqag xzkl uyh xzluh datsLVsM Fkk] isV [kkyh Fkk] NksVh vkar ,oa mlds Hkhrj v/kipk [kkuk Fkk cMh vkar esa ipk gqvk [kkuk FkkA ;--r Iyhgk xqnkZ datsLVsM FkkA ew=k'k;] Hkhrjh ,oa ckgjh tuusfUnz; lkekU; FkkA 5& eSus rhu ckVy esa Lis'khesu lhycan dj lacaf/kr vkj{kd dks fn;k FkkA 6& esjs erkuqlkj e`rd ds 'kjhj ij ik;h x;h pksaVs ijh{k.k ds 24 ? k.Vs ds vanj dh FkhA e`frdk dh e`R;q xyk nckus ls ne ?kqVus ls 'okl vojks/k gksus ds dkj.k mlds ân; ,oa QsQMs dke djuk can gksus ls mldh e`R;q gqbZA esjh fjiksVZ iz0ih014 gS] ftlds v ls v Hkkx ij esjs gLrk0 gSA

9. In his cross­examination, it was suggested by defence

to Dr.Deepak Dhrithare (PW­9) that in case of hanging

also, there can be rapture to thyroid and trachea,

which he answered in affirmative, but he has further

clarified that in the instant case in view of nature

of injuries, it is the case of strangulation. Nothing

further has been brought out to demonstrate that it is

the case of hanging and not the case of strangulation.

After going through the records and after hearing

learned counsel appearing for the parties, we are of

the considered view that the learned trial Court is

absolutely justified in holding that it is the case of

strangulation and not the case of death by hanging. We

affirm the finding so recorded by the trial Court.

10. The next question for consideration would be, whether

death of deceased Baijantibala was caused by the

appellant herein, which the trial Court has held that

it has been caused by the appellant herein and

convicted & sentenced for the said offence.

11. From the statements of Rohit Kumar (PW­1) (father of

the deceased), Tileshwari (PW­2) (sister of the

deceased), Minakshi (PW­4) (sister of the deceased) and

Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5) (mother of the deceased), it is

established fact that the appellant along with his two

daughters namely Rameshwri and Chandani had visited on

18.12.2013 to Ghasidas mela organized at village Lalpur

and on that place, the deceased parents Rohit Kumar

(PW­1) and Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5) had also joined therein

and thereafter all of them went back to village

Baigakapa (resident of the deceased father and mother)

and in the next morning, the appellant demanded money

from Baijantibala, which she refused to give stating

that she left out the money for payment of insurance,

then the appellant became annoyed and assaulted his

wife Baijantibala and came back to village Chhata along

with his two daughters on 19.12.2013. Thereafter, the

appellant sent his nephew Golu and one other relative

Govind to village Baigakapa to bring Baijantibala to

his house and on understanding given by that two

persons, the appellant's wife Baijantibala came back

to the accused house on 1.1.2013 and thereafter she was

staying with her husband.

12. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the

statement of Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5) (mother of the

deceased), she has clearly stated in his statement

before the Court that the deceased used to stay with

the appellant in joint family. In para­11, she has

clearly stated that the appellant used to stay with his

parents, two sisters, his two daughters Rameshwari and

Chandani, his brother Gaukaran and Gaukaran's wife

Sulakshana (DW­2). As such, it is established fact that

the appellant used to stay in joint family along with

above­stated persons in house in question where

Baijantibala died and it is not the case that on the

date of offence, he was staying with Baijantibala

alone.

13. Deceased Baijantibala was found dead on 13.1.2013 at 4

p.m. as Rohit Kumar (PW­1) (father of the deceased) was

informed by Vedkumar Satnami (not examined) about

Baijantibala became unwell, then Rohit Kumar (PW­1)

along with 4­5 persons visited to village Chhata where

he found his daughter Baijantibala to be dead and

accordingly, he reported the matter to the police

station and wheels of investigation started running

which culminated into filing of charge­sheet against

the appellant herein for the aforesaid offences. The

trial Court after recording the death to be homicidal

in nature that she died by strangulation further

proceeded to hold that the deceased and the appellant

both were residing as husband and wife in the house and

the deceased and the appellant both were seen in

healthy condition and on the same date, Baijantibala

was found dead in the house of the appellant.

14. Now the question for consideration would be, whether

the plea of last seen together can be held to be

established, which is based on Section 106 of the

Evidence Act.

15. Section 101 of the Evidence Act states as under:­

"101. Burden of proof.­Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of

proof lies on that person."

16. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, whoever desires

any Court to give a judgment as to a liability

dependent on the existence of facts, he must prove that

those facts exist. Therefore, the burden is always on

the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused

beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Section 106

constitutes an exception to Section 101.

17. Section 106 of the Evidence Act states as under:­

"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. - When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

Illustrations

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him."

18. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to

those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in

establishing the facts from which a reasonable

inference can be drawn regarding the existence of

certain other facts which are within the special

knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to

offer proper explanation about the existence of said

other facts, the Court can always draw an appropriate

inference.

19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Bodhraj alias Bodha

and others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir 1 has laid down

the principle on which last seen theory can be invoked

into and held as under:­

"31. The last­seen theory comes into play where the time­gap between the point of time when the accused and deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that deceased, A­1 and A­2 were seen together by witnesses. i.e. PWs 14, 15 and 18; in addition to the evidence of PWs l and 2."

20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti

Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra 2 has held that when the

death had occurred in his (the appellant therein)

custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a

plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his

statement under Section 313 CrPC. It was observed as

under:­

"22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for

1 (2002) 8 SCC 45 2 (2006) 10 SCC 681

commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of H.P.3 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with "khukhri" and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra4 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife...."

21. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of State of

Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh5 relying upon the decision of

the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of

Ajmer6 has held as under:­

"16. Way back in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer this Court dealt with the interpretation of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and held that the section is not intended to shift the burden of proof (in respect of a crime) on the accused but to take care of a situation where a fact is known only to the accused and it is well­nigh impossible or extremely difficult for the prosecution to prove that fact. It was said: (AIR p. 406, para 11) "11. This [Section 101] lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are 'especially' within the knowledge

3 (1972) 2 SCC 80 4 (1992) 3 SCC 106 5 (2014) 12 SCC 211 6 AIR 1956 SC 404

of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.

The word 'especially' stresses that.

It means facts that are pre­eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not."

22. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vikramjit Singh

alias Vicky v. State of Punjab 7 has held that Section

106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the

prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable

doubt. Only when the prosecution case has been proved

the burden in regard to such facts which was within the

special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the

accused for explaining the same. It was observed as

under:­

"14. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution case has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within the special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for explaining the same. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule e.g. where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of a statute."

23. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of

principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the

above­stated judgments (supra) qua principle of

invocation of theory of last seen together and

incriminating evidence on behalf of the prosecution, it

7 (2006) 12 SCC 306

would be appropriate to consider the nature of evidence

available on record as to whether on the date and time

of offence only the appellant alone was present in

house in question along with his wife deceased

Baijantibala. Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5) (mother of deceased

Baijantibala) in para­11 of her cross­examination has

clearly stated that the appellant used to stay along

with his father, mother, two sisters, two daughters,

one brother Gaukaran and Gaukaran's wife Sulakshana.

Gaukaran's wife Sulakshana has been examined as DW­2.

Sulakshana (DW­2) has also clearly stated in her

examination­in­chief that prior to the date of alleged

offence she has delivered a baby, therefore, she was in

the house on that very day and the deceased was also

sleeping in next room (after one wall) and in the

afternoon, Rameshwari (daughter of the

appellant/accused) has come to drink water and then she

cried and found her mother hanging, then she told

Rameshwari to inform her father and thereafter her

father Karan Prasad / appellant herein and Dhansai

Ratre who were working in the house of Bhat Maharaj

came to their house and saw her dead body hanging. As

such, the prosecution has failed to establish that on

the date and time of offence, only the appellant and

the deceased were staying in the appellant's house,

rather it has been established on record by the defence

and that too with the help of prosecution witness

Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5) (mother of the deceased) that

apart from the appellant, several other members i.e.

father, mother, brother Gaukaran, brother's wife

Sulakshana, two sisters and two daughters all were

staying in the house in question where death of the

deceased has occurred. As such, in case in hand,

Section 106 of the Evidence Act has wrongly been

invoked and applied in by the trial Court.

24. Furthermore, the appellant has taken the plea of alibi

as contained in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that he

was not present in the house on the date of offence. In

order to prove the same, he has been examined four

defence witnesses namely Janakram (DW­1), Sulakshana

(DW­2), Dhansai (DW­3) and Rameshari (DW­4). It is the

case of the appellant herein that on the date of

offence he was working in the house of Bhat Maharaj

along with his father Mangtu and involved in the work

of threshing paddy. Janakram (Aam Mukhtir of Bhat

Maharaj) has been examined as DW­1. He has clearly

stated in para­3 of his statement that Mangtu (father

of the appellant) and his son Karan / appellant herein

both were working in the house of Bhat Maharaj and

involved in threshing of paddy on that day, at that

time, the appellant's daughter Rameshwari came and

informed, which he could not hear properly. Sulakshana

(DW­2) has also stated that on the date of offence, the

appellant, his father, his mother Smt.Shail Bai (PW­5)

all were in barn (kothar) of Bhat Maharaj. In her

cross­examination, she has refuted the adverse

questions asked from her. Dhansai (DW­3) has also

stated the same lines and the appellant's daughter

Rameshwari (DW­4) has stated the same lines. Rameshwari

(DW­4) has been subjected to cross­examine on behalf of

the prosecution. She has clearly stated that on the

date of offence, her father has gone to barn (kothar)

of Bhat Maharaj for threshing paddy and further

suggestion given on behalf of the prosecution that her

father has left barn for a period of one hour, but she

has maintained her version that her father has

throughout in barn of Bhat Maharaj for the purpose of

threshing paddy. As such, the prosecution has failed to

prove the plea of last seen together and further failed

to prove that on the date and time of offence the

appellant and the deceased only were present in the

house of the deceased, whereas the defence has proved

the fact that on the date of offence, the appellant

herein was in barn of Bhat Maharaj for the purpose of

threshing paddy as adhiyadar. Furthermore, even it is

assumed as argued that theory of last seen together has

been established, but the appellant has not been

afforded an opportunity to explain those adverse

circumstances of last seen together while examining him

in statement under Section 313 CrPC.

25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Kumar Singh

alias Raju alias Batya v. State of Rajasthan 8 while

highlighting the object and purpose of examining the

8 AIR 2013 SC 3150

accused person under Section 313 CrPC has held as

under:­

"25. In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused person under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice i.e. audi alteram partem. This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the court must take note of such explanation. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the incriminating material that has surfaced against him. The circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration."

26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vikramjit Singh

(supra) has held that the circumstances which according

to the prosecution lead to proof of the guilt against

the accused must be put to him in his examination under

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

27. In the instant case, admittedly, the trial Court has

held the theory of last seen together as incriminating

piece of evidence against the appellant herein, but

surprisingly under Section 313 CrPC though as many 33

questions had been put to the accused, but no such

question qua the alleged incriminating circumstance of

his last seen together with the deceased has been put

to the accused asking him to furnish explanation with

that regard, yet on the basis of his last seen together

with the deceased, guilt of the appellant has been

recorded by which he has sufficiently suffered

prejudice in not affording an opportunity to explain

the circumstances as he has specifically taken the plea

of alibi by examining defence witnesses which have been

discussed hereinabove.

28. As a upshot of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that though the prosecution has

succeeded in proving the death of deceased Baijantibala

to be homicidal in nature, but further failed to

establish the plea of last seen together as

incriminating piece of evidence and also failed to

prove that it is only and only the appellant who has

committed murder of the deceased by strangulation.

Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment dated

9.4.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,

Mungeli in Sessions Trial No.13/2013. The appellant is

acquitted of the charge under Sections 302 and 201 of

the IPC. He is in jail. He be released forthwith if not

required in any other case.

29. The criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated

hereinabove.

                  Sd/­                                             Sd/­

        (Sanjay K. Agrawal)                                  (Rajani Dubey)
             Judge                                                Judge
B/­
 

 
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