N.L. Rathia vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2022 Latest Caselaw 3901 Chatt

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          HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                              WPCR No. 946 of 2019

       N.L. Rathia S/o Late Shri B.L. Rathia Aged About 52 Years Presently
       Posted As S.I. Urga, District Korba, Chhattisgarh, R/o Civil Lines,
       Dharamjaigarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh        ---- Petitioner

                                   Versus

   1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Home Affairs,
      Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh

   2. Director General Of Police (D.G.P.) Police Head Quarter (P.H.Q.), Near
      Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh

   3. Inspector General Of Police (I.G.) Bilaspur Range, I.G. Office, Bilaspur,
      District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

   4. Superintendent Of Police (S.P.) Bastar-Jagdalpur, S.P. Office, District
      Bastar-Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh,                   ---- Respondents

For Petitioner :Shri Shahil Singh, Advocate appears on behalf of Shri Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate.

For Respondent/ State :Shri Sanjay Pathak, PL.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Goutam Bhaduri

Order On Board 21/06/2022

Heard.

1. Instant petition has been filed to expunge the remarks/ observations

made by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Raigarh

while deciding Sessions Case No.50/2013 on 30 th July, 2016.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner N.L. Rathia was

posted as SI, Urga, District Korba in the Department of Home Affairs.

While he was posted as Station House Officer, Police Station

Gharghoda, District Raigarh he investigated Crime No.06/2013 for

various offences under Sections 365, 376 IPC against three accused

Rajkumar Patel, Mamta Patel and Roopnarayan Patel. The accused

after the charge sheet were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge,

Fast Track Court, Raigarh in Sessions Case No.50/2013 for offences

punishable under Sections 120 B, 365, 376, 384 read with Section 34

IPC read with Section 66 E of Information Technology Act, 2000 and

convicted the accused. While convicting the accused learned trial court

made some remarks against the petitioner which are at para 51 and 52

of the order which reads as under:-

[email protected] ihfM+rk dks dkQh le; ls izrkfM+r fd;k tk jgk Fkk] ihfM+rk }kjk fnukad

12-01-2013 dks fyf[kr fjiksVZ izLrqr fd, tkus ds ckotwn Hkh mls xaHkhjrk ls u fy;s

tkus ds dkj.k vkjksihx.k dks lk{; foyksfir djus ,oa izHkkfor djus dk i;kZIr

volj izkIr gqvk gSA izdj.k esa nksuksa foospukf/kdkjh Jh ch- ih- tkWxM+s vkSj ,u- ,y-

jkfB;k dh Hkwfedk lafnX/k jgh gSA ,sls ekeys esa tgka iqfyl dh Hkwfedk lafnX/k jgh

gS] vkjksihx.k ;g cpko ugha ys ldrs fd iqfyl }kjk pkdw tIr ugha fd;k x;k]

eseksjh dkMZ vkSj QksVks tIr ugha fd;k x;k A izdj.k esa laiw.kZ ?kVukdze ph[k ph[k

dj vfHk;kstu dgkuh dh fo'oluh;rk dks n'kkZ jgh gSA

[email protected] foospukf/kdkjh }kjk dh xbZ =qfV;ksa dk ykHk cpko i{k dks rc rd iznku ugha fd;k tk ldrk] tc rd fd vfHk;kstu ekeys ij ;qfDr;qDr lUnsg vf/kjksfir u dj fn;k tkosA bl laca/k esa U;k; n`"Vkar Shyamlal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 2012 Supreme Court 3539 rFkk dju flag cuke gfj;k.kk jkT; ,oa ,d vU; 2014 ¼1½ lh lh ,l lh 49 ¼,l lh½ voyksduh; gSA U;k; n`"Vkar vejflag vejflag cuke cyfoanjflag vkfn 2003 ¼2½ ,l lh lh 518 esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk ;g funsZf'kr fd;k x;k gS fd =qfViw.kZ vuqla/kku ,dek= nks"keqfDr dk vk/kkj ugh gks ldrk] cfYd mu ifjfLFkfr;ksa dk ewY;kadu Hkh djuk pkfg, fd izdj.k fo'ks"k esa bldk D;k izHkko iM+rk gSA ,sls ekeyksa esa U;k;ky; dks izdj.k dh lw{e lafo{kk djuh pkfg, ftlls fd mDr izdkj dh =qfV;ka iqfyl ds vuqla/kku esa i'pkrorhZ fdlh izde ij u gksA iq f yl }kjk brus xaH khj iz d j.k esa rRijrkiwo Z d dksb Z dk;Z o kgh u djrs gq , ,oa fu;ekuq l kj foosp uk u djds bl ekeys esa tks yhikiksr h dh xbZ gS mlds fy;s foosp ukf/kdkjh Jh ch- ih- tkW x M+s vkS j ,u- ,y- jkfB;k dh ;g U;k;ky; dM+s 'kCnksa esa Hkjiwj HkRlZ u k djrh gS A

3. It is contended that thereafter, the petitioner made several

representations to the department of police to expunge the disparaging

remarks, but the same could not be considered.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that since the

petitioner has acted in discharge of his duties, therefore, without giving

any opportunity of hearing to him, the observations made by the

Learned Sessions Judge about the dereliction of duty etc. would be

against the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of State

(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Vs. Pankaj Chaudhary reported in 2019

(11) SCC 575.

5. Return has been filed by the State opposing the averment made in this

writ petition and justifying the initiation of action against the petitioner

for the negligent performance of his duty by the Learned Session

Judge.

6. In the likewise judgment while passing the direction in session trial

against the Investigating Officer in the case cited supra, the supreme

court in the case of State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (supra) has

observed at para 42, 43 and 45 which are reproduced as under :-

42. While passing disparaging remarks against the police officials and directing prosecution against them, in our considered view, the High Court has failed to bear in mind the well settled principles of law that should govern the courts before making disparaging remarks. Any disparaging remarks and direction to initiate departmental action/prosecution against the persons whose conduct comes into consideration before the court would have serious impact on their official career.

43. In S.K. Viswambaran v. E. Koyakunju this Court held as under :- ( SCC PP. 113 and 116-17, paras 9 and 13-14)

"9. Stung by the remarks made against him without even a hearing......."

* * *

13. We have also to point out a grievous procedural error committed by the High Court. Even assuming for argument's sake that for expunging the remarks against Respondents 2 and 3 the conduct of the appellant required scrutiny and merited adverse comment, the principles of natural justice required the High Court to have issued notice to the appellant and heard him before passing adverse remarks against him if it was considered necessary. By its failure the High Court has failed to render elementary justice to the appellant.

14. In State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, it was held as follows: (AIR P707, para 10)

10. "If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time, it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also

been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve."

This ratio has been followed in R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan and Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar (to which one of us was a party). Judged in the light of the above tests, it may be seen that none of the tests is satisfied in this case. It is indeed regrettable that the High Court should have lightly passed adverse remarks of a very serious nature affecting the character and professional competence and integrity of the appellant in purported desire to render justice to Respondents 2 and 3 in the petition filed by them for expunction of adverse remarks made against them."

(emphasis supplied)

44. XXXXXXXXX

45. Since the High Court has passed strictures against the police officials who were involved in the investigation in FIR No. 559 of 1997 without affording an opportunity of hearing to them, the disparaging remarks are liable to be set aside.

7. Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of

Pankaj Chaudhary (Supra) the observation made by the learned

Session Judge against the petitioner at para 51 and 52 of the judgment

dated 30th July, 2016 are hereby expunged and the consequential

proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned

judgment is also quashed.

8. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands allowed.

Sd/-

(Goutam Bhaduri) Judge gouri