Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 834 Chatt
Judgement Date : 18 February, 2022
1
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Writ Petition (S) No. 1107 of 2022
Chitrakant Choubey S/o Shri Chhedilal Choubey,
Aged about 35 years, R/o Village Badgadi, Post
Bamhnidih, Tahsil Bamhnidih, Distt. Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh.
Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh through the Secretary,
Department of Food Supply and Consumer
Protection, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal
Nagar, New Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. The Director, Directorate of Department of Food
Supply and Consumer Protection, Block 2, 3rd
Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur,
Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3. Union of India, Ministry of Personnel and Public
Grievances and Pensions and Department of
Personnel and Training, North Block, New Delhi.
4. The Controller of Examination, Professional
Examination Board, Vyapam Bhawan, North Block,
Sector 19, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, Distt.
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Ajay Kumar Barik, Advocate For Resp. 1 & 2/State: Mr. Amrito Das, Addl. A.G. For Respondent 3 : Mr. Tushar Dhar Diwan, Advocate For Respondent 4 : Dr. Saurabh Ku. Pande, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order on Board 18/02/2022
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties on the
question of admission.
2. This writ petition has been filed by the
petitioner seeking quashment of advertisement
dated 04/01/2022 (Annexure P/1) issued by
respondent No. 2 inviting applications for the
post of Food and Civil Supply Inspector stating
that 10% reservation for the economic weaker
section (EWS) of the society has not been
provided in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Lok
Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon
Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan)
(Sansodhan) Ordinance, 2019.
3. Mr. Ajay Kumar Barik, learned counsel for the
petitioner, would submit that providing 10%
reservation to the economic weaker section (EWS)
category is a must in light of the aforesaid
Ordinance promulgated on 04/09/2019 in exercise
of the power contained under Article 213 of the
Constitution of India. He would rely upon the
decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the
matter of Dr. Jaishri LaxmanRao Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, through Chief Minister and Another1.
4. Per contra, Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing on behalf of
respondents No. 1 and 2/State, would submit that
the said Ordinance was issued on 04/09/2019 by
amending the Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Anusuchit
Jatiyon, Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade
Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Act, 1994 thereby
providing 10% reservation to the economic weaker
section (EWS) of the society by virtue of clause
5 of the said Ordinance. Thereafter, the
Legislative Assembly reassembled on 02/10/2019
and on 13/11/2019, six weeks expired in terms of
Article 213(2) of the Constitution of India and
therefore, the Ordinance, 2019 ceased to operate
and pursuant thereof, the impugned advertisement
(Annexure P/1) has been issued on 04/01/2022 by
the Directorate of Department of Food, Civil
Supplies and Consumer Protection, Raipur, which
is absolutely in accordance with law as at
present, there is no such Ordinance in operation
providing reservation as such. He would also
submit that the relief as claimed by the
petitioner seeking direction for providing 10% 1 (2021) 2 SCC 785
reservation to the candidates belonging to EWS
category cannot be granted by this Court in light
of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in
the matter of State of Punjab v. Anshika Goyal2.
5. The Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon,
Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke
Liye Arakshan) Act, 1994 was sought to be amended
by Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon,
Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke
Liye Arakshan) (Sansodhan) Ordinance, 2019
thereby providing 10% reservation in recruitment
at State level arising in a recruitment year in
Class I, II, III and IV posts. The said
Ordinance, 2019 came into force on 04/09/2019 and
the Legislative Assembly reassembled on
02/10/2019 but it was not placed before the floor
of the House and accordingly, the period of six
weeks in terms of Article 213(2) of the
Constitution of India expired on 13/11/2019.
6. In the matter of Irfan Qureshi v. Chhattisgarh
state Public Service Commission through its
Chairman and Anr.3, this Court has held that the
Ordinance, 2019 has ceased to operate and
observed in paragraphs 7 and 11 as under :
2 2022 SCC Online SC 86
"7. The entire reading of clause (2) of Article 213 purports that the ordinance promulgated under the Article shall have the same force of law as an Act of Legislature. However, it will cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks for reassembly of Legislature. Applying the timeline, therefore, would show that the ordinance was promulgated by the Governor on 04.09.2019 and thereafter on 2nd October and 3rd October, the House of State Legislature reassembled. Since the Article 213(2) mandates that the ordinance will expire from six weeks of the date of reassembly of the Legislature, the ordinance having not been laid before the Legislative Assembly, within six weeks it would expire on 13.11.2019. Consequently, the plain reading of Article would show that after 13.11.2019, the ordinance ceased to function in operation. The advertisement by Public Service Commission was made on 27.11.2019, it would not be within the specified target date of 13.11.2019. The submissions of the petitioners that the session of the Legislative Assembly of 2nd and 3rd October was not a session in terms of Article 174 as no legislative business was carried out cannot be appreciated in view of the wordings of Article 174 and any further interpretation of it would amount to addition of word, which is otherwise not in the Article.
11. The laying of an Ordinance before the State Legislature subserves the purpose of Legislative Control over the ordinance making power. Legislation by ordinances is not an ordinary source of lawmaking but is intended to meet extraordinary situations of an emergent nature, during the recess of the legislature. The reassembly of Legislature defines the outer limit for the validity of ordinance promulgated during its absence in session. Within that period, a legislature has authority to disapprove the Ordinance. The requirement of laying an Ordinance before the Legislative body subserves the constitutional purpose of ensuring that the provisions of the Ordinance are debated upon and discussed in the legislature. The legislature has before it a full panoply of
Legislative powers and as an incident of those powers, the express constitutional authority to disapprove an ordinance. If an ordinance has to continue beyond the tenure which is prescribed by Article 213(2)(a), a law has to be enacted by the Legislature incorporating its provisions. In order to assume the character of the enacted law beyond the tenure prescribed by Article 213(2)(a), a law has to be enacted. If such an action has not been adopted by the Legislature, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to Legislature as it would amount to encroaching the turf of the State Legislature."
7. In view of the aforesaid authoritative
pronouncement of this Court, I am of the
considered opinion that the life of an Ordinance
is provided in Article 213(2) of the Constitution
of India wherein if the Ordinance is not laid
before the House, it shall cease to operate at
the expiration of six months from the reassembly
of the legislature. Since the Ordinance, 2019
came into force on 04/09/2019 and the Legislative
Assembly reassembled on 02/10/2019, therefore, by
virtue of Article 213(2) of the Constitution of
India, it ceased to operate on 13/11/2019 as it
was not placed before the House for
consideration. The said issue has also been
considered and concluded by the decision rendered
by this Court in Irfan Qureshi (supra).
8. Now the question for consideration would be,
whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to the
State Government for providing reservation to
particular class or category ?
9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Anshika Goyal
(supra) has clearly held that no writ of mandamus
can be issued directing the State Government to
provide for reservation for the particular class
or category and it should be left to the wisdom
of the State Government. It has been held as
under in paragraph 22(a) as under :
"22. While answering the aforesaid issue, few decisions of this Court referred to hereinabove are required to be discussed.
a) In the case of Gulshan Prakash (Dr.) v. State of Haryana4 it was observed that there cannot e any mandamus by the Court to provide for a reservation for a particular community. In the case before this Court, the State of Haryana did not provide any reservation for SC/ST/backward community at the postgraduate level. A conscious decision was taken by the State of Haryana not to provide for reservation at the postgraduate level. The same was challenged and to that this Court has observed that there cannot be any mandamus by the Court as claimed. In the aforesaid decision, it was further observed and held that Article 15(4) of the Constitution is an enabling provision and the State Government is the best Judge to grant reservation for SC/ST/backward categories at postgraduate level. Any policy and the decision of the State not to make any provision for reservation at postgraduate level suffers from no infirmity. It was 4 (2010) 1 SCC 477
further observed that every State can take its own decision with regard to reservation depending on various factors. At this stage it is to be noted that it was also submitted before this Court that since the Government has decided to grant reservation for SC/ST/backward class communities in admission at MBBS level, i.e., undergraduate level and therefore the State has to provide for reservation at postgraduate level also. To that, this Court observed that since the Government had decided to grant reservation for SC/ST/backward categories in admission at MBBS level, i.e., undergraduate level, it does not mean that it is bound to grant reservation at the postgraduate level also."
10. Thereafter, it was held by Their Lordships in
paragraph 23 as under :
"23. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in issuing a writ of mandamus and directing the State Government to provide for 3% reservation/quota for sports persons, instead of 1% as provided by the State Government. A conscious policy decision was taken by the State Government to provide for 1% reservation/quota for sports persons. A specific order dated 25.07.2019 was also issued by the State Government. Therefore, the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while issuing a writ of mandamus directing the State to provide a particular percentage of reservation for sports persons, namely, in the present case, 3% reservation instead of 1% provided by the State Government, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court insofar as directing the State to provide for 3% reservation for sports persons and/or
provide for a sports quota of 3% in the Government Medical/Dental Colleges is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside."
11. Thus, in light of the aforesaid principle of law
laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of
Anshika Goyal (supra), it is quite vivid that
since the Ordinance, 2019 has already ceased to
operate on 13/11/2019, no writ or direction can
be given by this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to the State Government for
providing reservation to the candidates belonging
to EWS category.
12. The decision relied upon by the petitioner in
Dr. Jaishri LaxmanRao Patil (supra) would not be
applicable in the present case as the petitioner
therein assailed the constitutional validity of
the Maharashtra State Socially and Economically
Backward Class (SEBC)(Admission in Educational
Institutions in the State and for posts for
appointments in public service and posts)
Reservation Act, 2018 before the High Court by
way of PIL. The High Court upheld the validity of
the Act with certain directions. The SLP was
preferred by the petitioners before the Supreme
Court alleging that on account of the reservation
as has been provided for under the Act, 50%
ceiling over reservation as is prescribed in
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 5 has been
violated and therefore the said Act is
unconstitutional. In addition, the interpretation
of the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018
was also raised and since the said issue was
already pending before the larger Bench, the said
SLP was also referred to the larger Bench. It was
further directed that during the interregnum, the
appointments to the public services and posts
under the Government shall be made without
implementing the reservation as provided under
the Act.
13. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is
dismissed in limine leaving the parties to bear
their own cost(s).
Sd/ (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge
Harneet
5 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Writ Petition (S) No. 1107 of 2022
Petitioner Chitrakant Choubey
Versus
Respondents State of Chhattisgarh and Others
(English)
No writ/direction can be issued to the State Government under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for providing reservation to the candidates belonging to EWS category.
(Hindi)
भभरत कक ससववधभन कक अननचछकद 226 कक तहत आरररक रप सक कमजजर वरर (इ. डबलल. ऐस.) कक उमममदवभरर कज आरकण पदभन करनक हकतन रभजय सरकभर कज कजई ररट / वनदरश जभरम नहह ककयभ जभ सकतभ |
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!