[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Calcutta High Court
Godrej Consumer Products Limited vs Reckitt Benckister India Private ... on 27 February, 2026
Author: Rajasekhar Mantha
Bench: Rajasekhar Mantha
OD-1
ORDER SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
TEMPAPO-IPD/2/2026
WITH IP.COM/3/2026
IA NO:GA-COM/1/2026
GODREJ CONSUMER PRODUCTS LIMITED
-VS-
RECKITT BENCKISTER INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE RAJASEKHAR MANTHA
And
The Hon'ble JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI
Date: 27.02.2026.
APPEARANCE OF ADVOCATES FOR APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
Mr. M. Rohatgi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. R. Bachawat, Sr. Adv.
Mr. R. Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Roychowdhury, Adv.
Mr. S. Mitra, Adv.
Mr. A. Chaturvedi, Adv.
Mr. N. Nadkarni, Adv.
Ms. D. Singh, Adv.
Ms. V. Pandey, Adv.
Mr. S. Mukherjee, Adv.
Ms. A. Bohra, Adv.
Ms. S. Khannum, Adv.
APPEARANC OF ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENT:
Mr. S. Sarkar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S.N. Mookherjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. R. Banerji, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Ginodia, Adv.
Mr. J. Lal, Adv.
Ms. N. Roy, Adv.
Mr. Shwetank Ginodia, Adv.
Ms. M. Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. N. Choudhury, Adv.
Ms. S. Firdous, Adv.
1. The Court: Affidavit-of-service filed in Court is taken on record.
2. The instant appeal is directed against an ad interim order dated February 25,
2026, passed by a Single Bench of this Court.
3. By the impugned order, the appellant, defendant in the suit, has been restrained
from using its product. The product, common to both the appellant-defendant
and the respondent-plaintiff, is a toilet cleaning liquid.
4. The bone of contention between the parties is with regard to the shape of the
bottle which contains the cleaning liquid sold by either of them.
5. Mr. Sudipto Sarkar, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent,
submits that his client has obtained three several registrations of the trade mark
of the 'DEVICE' called "HARPIC BOTTLE AND CAP". The plaintiff is in the market
with its product HARPIC TOILET CLEANER for a substantial period of time.
6. It is an admitted position that the plaintiff-respondent enjoyed a registered design
under the Designs Act, 2000, the registration of which has since expired by efflux
of time in terms of the provisions of the Act.
7. The proprietorship of the spouted, duck head like head and shape of the bottle
has ended. It is now generic. The bottle of the plaintiff is blue in colour with a
spouted cap closed, dispenser. The name of the product is displayed in bold
English alphabets. The defendant entered into the market with its toilet cleaner
named 'spic' sometime in October 2025.
8. The colour of the appellant/defendant's bottle is black and its label is completely
different from the appellant's product. The design of the bottle is different. There
is only similarity in shape of the dispenser. The caps of the bottles of the plaintiff
and defendant are different. The dispenser is similar as its aim is to reach under
the rim of a toilet commode. The plaintiff-respondent was and is aware of the
launch and use of the defendant's product, as is evident from the pleadings made
in the plaint.
9. The respondent's suit was filed sometime in February, 2026 primarily assailing
disparaging advertisements by the appellants comparing and showing down the
product of the plaintiff. The allegedly disparaging advertisements were being
published since October, 2025. Pleading extreme urgency before the single bench,
an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 was filed and sought to be moved ex
parte. On intervention by the learned advocates of the appellants, service of the
applications comprising in four volumes was ordered and the matter was fixed for
hearing in an hour's time. The matter was heard and fixed for orders the next
day, when it was heard further and the impugned order was passed.
10. Paragraphs 1 to 60 of the plaint allege that the appellant has issued
advertisements in the market which disparage the product of the plaintiff-
respondent. Infringement of the trade mark is an ancillary prayer.
11. The respondent-plaintiff argued that it was entitled to move ever ex-parte for
injunction on the principle that once an infringement of a trade mark is alleged,
injunction should follow as a matter of course.
12. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, would
vehemently argue that the alleged disparaging advertisements were being
published since October, 2025, the plaintiff/ respondent mislead the single bench
pleading urgency to seek injunction at the ad-interim stage. There is substance in
this argument. Indeed the records indicate that the subject advertisements were
being published since October 2025, the single bench ought to have allowed the
defendants/appellant to use an affidavit to response to the application under
Order 39 Rule 1 & 2.
13. Paragraphs 1 to 68 of the plaint and its concise statement indicate that cause of
action placed in the plaint, was to challenge the disparaging advertisements by
the defendant of the plaintiff's products. The undertaking of the appellant before
the single bench to stop advertisement should have sufficed as an interim
protection to the plaintiff.
14. It is only in paragraphs 69 to 79 of the plaint that the plaintiff has, an
afterthought, alleged infringement of its Trademark and passing off by the
appellant /defendant. Across the bar, counsels for the respondents have admitted
that this was not a suit for passing off. The plaintiff therefore could not have
maintained a case for injunction, given the main pleadings in the plaint. The
undertakings of the defendants not to publish the allegedly disparaging
advertisement had addressed the principal grievance of the plaintiff at the ad
interim stage.
15. The next question is whether the plaintiff-respondent obtained any enforceable
trade mark in the light of sections 9 and 17 of the Act and even if the same is
lawfully granted, whether the product and the bottle of the defendant-appellant
have infringed any such mark of the plaintiff.
16. This court notes from the Trademark Registration Certificate annexed to the
application that the trade mark of the plaintiff is entitled to HARPIC BOTTLE AND
CAP and that too as a 'Device'.
17. On a plain look at the two bottles, i.e. the one belonging to the plaintiff-
respondent, namely HARPIC BOTTLE AND CAP and the one introduced in the
market by the appellant-defendant, clearly indicate that the defendant-appellant's
is distinctly and visibly different from the plaintiff-respondent.
18. The said mark must be seen as a whole, i.e. "the device HARPIC BOTTLE AND
CAP". The shape of the bottle alone could not have been the subject matter of
any trade mark infringement thereof unless the bottle of the product of the
defendant copies the colour, name, writing and display of the product of the
plaintiff-respondent.
19. Apart from being vague the grant of trademark to the plaintiffs after expiry of its
design under the Act of 2000 is wholly suspect. There is serious doubt whether
the appellant could have obtained the trademark in question to revive indirectly
an expired proprietary right of design. Even otherwise a trade mark that requires
interpretation cannot be enforced.
20. Mr. Sarkar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff,
submits that his client has initiated proceedings against such private parties and
has obtained injunction. As already stated above, it appears to this Court that the
design of the products of such private players is in fact similar in colour, shape
and design of the plaintiff's products. The various orders of injunction, referred to
in the impugned order cannot have any application to the facts of the instant
case. The decision dated April 13, 2023 in the case of Hindutan Unilever
Limited v. Reckitt Benckiser(India) in FAO(OS) (COMM) 157/ 2021 and CM
No. 42978/2021 was in respect of an action for disparagement alone.
21. Be that as it may, irrespective of the nature of the proceeding before a civil
court, the grant of injunction is governed by the principles of order 39 rules 1 and
2. There is serious doubt as to whether the plaintiff has made out any prima facie
case for interlocutory injunction.
22. The suit is one for disparagement. There are some belated pleadings with regard
to infringement of Trade mark and passing off in the plaint. The appellant has
undertaken before the Single Bench that it shall not publish the advertisements
any further. The appellant thus shall be bound by its undertaking and shall not
publish any of the advertisements that were specifically referred to in the plaint.
23. The parties may quantify the claims for such disparagement in the final hearing
of the suit. These are prima facie observations. The single bench may decide
finally the interlocutory applications after receiving affidavits from the parties.
24. Having regard to the discussions made above, this Court is of the view that grant
of ad interim order of injunction in the facts and circumstances of the case was
and is not warranted. The impugned order of injunction dated February 25, 2026
is set aside.
25. The appellant shall file affidavit-in-opposition to the interlocutory application
filed by the respondent within one week from date. Reply thereto, if any, may be
filed within a week thereafter. The single bench is requested not to grant any
adjournment to either of the parties on the returnable date already fixed.
26. The appeal and the connected application accordingly stand disposed of.
27. Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent seeks stay of the aforesaid order. The
same is concerned and refused.
(RAJASEKHAR MANTHA, J.)
(MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.)
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